Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
7. Of Trance.
Controverted Point—That to attain cessation of con-
sciousness is supramundane.
From the Commentary.—Inasmuch as what is called [trance or]
attaining cessation of feeling and perception is not a positive mental
state, but is the suspension of the mental aggregates, it is neither a
mundane nor a supramundane state. Some, however, like the
Hetuvadins, hold that since it is certainly not mundane, it must be
supramundane.
The argument is similar to that in XV. 5 [1], and 6 [2].
8. The Same (continued).
Controverted Point.—That to attain cessation of con-
sciousness is mundane.
[1] Th.—You must, then, be prepared to classify it as
one of the things admittedly mundane—the five aggregates,
or as belonging to one of the three spheres of life, that
of sense, or the Rupa or Arupa worlds—which you refuse
to do.
[2] Similar to 6 [2].
9. Of Trance (iii.).
Controverted Point.—That a person may die while in a
state of trance.
From the Commentary — The Rajagirikas and others hold that
since life is so uncertain, even one who has attained in Jhana to trance
may die, no less than anyone else. The argument shows that there
is1 a time for dying and for not dying.
[1] Th.—You must, then, admit that, while in that state,
he has all the mental symptoms2 betokening death—to wit,
in mental contact, feeling, perception, volition, conscious-
ness. But you agree that all moribund mental symptoms
are absent. Hence your proposition falls through.
[2] You will further agree with this: not only that for
one in a state of trance is all mental life in abeyance, but
also that death is accompanied by contactual, emotional,
volitional, and cognitive symptoms.2
[3] Moreover, can poison, weapons, or fire affect the body
of one in trance ? You deny.3 You assert, on the con-
trary, that those causes of death cannot affect him. Then,
can you maintain your proposition ?
[4] Or do you now maintain that poison, weapons, or
fire can affect his body?4 Then, is his attainment not
genuine? .. .
R.5—But in opposing my proposition you imply that
there must be some principle of certainty (or uniformity)
by which one is assured of not dying while in trance. If
you say that such an assurance does not exist, your
proposition cannot stand.
[5] Th.—But one who is enjoying visual consciousness
is not dying, even though there be no uniform principle of
certainty by which he is assured of being kept from death.
Hence I assert as much of one who is in trance.
1
Read, for samapannaya, samanaya.
2
This word is not in the Pali text.
3
Because of the abnormal power of his attainment.—Comy.
4
'He assents because of the body's natural liabilities. Hence there
is no abnormal power in the attainment.'—Comy.
5
In Commentary, PTS edition, read, for sakavadissa , para -
vadissa .
10. Of Trance as a Means of reaching the Unconscious
Sphere.
Controverted Point.—That trance conduces to rebirth in
the unconscious sphere.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Hetuvadins, make no
distinction between the two kinds of trance-attainment: the merely-
mundane, practised by worldly folks, and the supramundane, or
spiritual. The former does conduce to rebirth in the sphere of un-
conscious life, the latter does not.
[1] Th.—Can you say of anyone who has attained to
trance that [in his character] are the three moral conditions
—absence of greed, of hate, of dulness, also faith, energy,
mindfulness, concentration, and understanding ? Is not
the contrary [usually] the case ? . . .
[2] You admit of course* that one in trance is without
mental reaction, feeling, perception, volition, cognition?
But you cannot maintain that a Path1 can be practised in
the absence of these.
[3] Finally, your proposition implies that all who attain
to trance are tending to rebirth in the Unconscious Sphere
—which you must deny. . . .
[4] H.—But you admit, anyway, that in trance one is
unconscious, and in that sphere one is unconscious. Hence
I maintain that this tendency is a fact.
11. Of Karma and its Accumulation.
Controverted Point.—That karma is one thing, its accumu-
lation2 is another.
From the Commentary.—They who hold this view, for instance the
Andhakas and Sammitiyas, judge that the accumulating of karma
goes on automatically, independently of moral action, of mental action.
1
Magga, 'path,' is used, more generally, to denote a systematic
' means,' or method conducing to celestial rebirth. It is only the
Ariyan Path or Paths that are means leading away from rebirth.—
Bud.Psy. Eth., pp. 43 f.; 71 f.; 82 f ,
2
Upacaya may be rendered by 'conservation.'
[1] Th.—Are you then prepared to admit that each
mental phase—mental reaction, feeling, perception, voli-
tion, cognition, also faith, energy, mindfulness, concen-
tration, understanding, also the ten corruptions (kilesa's)
—is a different thing from its accumulation ? Of course
not. Then neither can you affirm your proposition.
[2] Again, do you imply that karmic accumulation is
coexistent with karma ? You deny ? But think! You
assent.1 Then [a fortiori] meritorious (or good) karma is
coexistent with good karmic accumulation? No? Nay,
you must admit it is. Then [it follows that] karma, [being
inseparably] conjoined with feeling, is both coexistent with
its accumulation, and also inseparably conjoined with corre-
sponding feeling.
[3] Similarly for demeritorious (or bad) karma.
[4] Again, you admit of course that karma is coexistent
with consciousness and has a mental object, but you do not
admit as much of its accumulation. That is to say, you
agree that karma, being coexistent with consciousness, is
broken of f [as mental process] when consciousness is
broken off . But, by your view of the different nature of
karmic accumulation, you hold that when consciousness
stops, karmic accumulation does not [necessarily] stop.
So that we may get a cessation of karma as conscious
process, and a continuation of karmic accumulation as
product!
[5] You admit, further, that karmic accumulation is
where karma is.2 Surely this implies that an act (kamma)
and its (accumulation or) conservation is one and the same
thing. . . . And that, the conservation of karmic energy
being where karma is, result is produced from that conserva-
tion ; and that you must conclude that there is no differ-
1 'Karma is " conjoined with consciousness " ; its accumulation, by
the thesis, is automatic, hence the vacillation.'—Comy.
2 Kammamhi—kamme sati, or patitthite. 'Where
there is karma, or where it is established, the "accumulating" begins,
but the latter lasts till results mature. Just as the seed retains all
the plant-energy till it sprouts.'—Comy.
ence in kind between karma, its conservation and its result.1
Yet this you deny.
Now you have admitted that karma has a mental object,2
and you also admit [of course] that result, which is pro-
duced from the conservation of karma, has a mental object.
But you deny that the conservation is of this nature, even
while you admit that where karma is, there, too, is its con-
servation, producing the result! . . .
[6] Finally, was it not said by the Exalted One: Here,
Puma, is one who plans activities in deed, tuord and thought,
either malevolent or benevolent. In consequence hereof he is
reborn in a world either of malevolence or of benevolence;
and when his mental reaction to good and bad shall set in,
his sensations are in accordance herewith, and his feel-
ings are a mixture of pleasure and pain, as is the case with
human beings, with certain of the devas, and ivith some of the
fallen angels.3 Now thus, Punna, is the rebirth of creatures
conspicuous and obscure:4—by that which he does is he reborn,
and being reborn mental reactions affect him. And so I
say, Punna, that beings are the heirs of their own actions
(karma) ?5
Hence it is not right to say that conservation of karma is
a thing apart from karma itself.
1
He asks concerning the oneness of these three.—Comy,
2
See above, § 4.
3
Vinipatika , asuras.
4
Bhutabhutassa. Cf. the term bhavabhavesu, Pss. of
the Brethren, 305, n. 4.
5
Majjhima-Nik., i. 390.
Showing posts with label Abhidhamma Pitaka. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Abhidhamma Pitaka. Show all posts
Thursday, June 23, 2011
Kathavatthu - Of Instants, Moments, Seconds of Time; the Intoxicants; Decay and Death
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
4. Of Instants, Moments,5 Seconds of Time.
Controverted Point.—That any stroke of time is pre-
determined.
From the Commentary.—The same argument is followed as in the
foregoing.
5
Khana , laya, muhutta : 10 'instants' = 1 'moment,' 10
'moments' = 1 'second.' There is no measured coincidence between
second and muhutta.
5. Of the Intoxicants (Asava's).
Controverted Point—That the four asava's are them-
selves non-asava.1
From the Commentary.—The Hetuvadins hold that, inasmuch as
over and above the four Intoxicants there is no other Intoxicant with
which they can be said to be ' co-intoxicants,' therefore they must
themselves be non-intoxicant.'
[1] Th.—Then you must be prepared to classify them
with one of the [approved] non-asava's—the Path, Fruit,
Nibbana, one of the four Paths or Fruits, one of the
Factors of Enlightenment—which you, of course, may
not do.
[2] H.—If I am wrong, I ask you to show me any other
asava, concomitant with which those four may be pro-
nounced co-asava. .. .
6. Of Decay and Death.
Controverted Point. — That the decay and death of
spiritual2 things is itself spiritual.3
From the Commentary.—Decay and death are not predetermined,
and therefore do not come under the categories 'mundane,' 'supra-
mundane.' The Mahasanghikas and others do not grasp this salient
feature.
[1] Th.—Then you must be prepared to classify it with
one of the [approved] spiritual things—Path, Fruit,
Nibbana, etc.4 . . , For instance, is the decay and death
of the Stream-Winner's Path the Path itself? If you
deny, your proposition falls through. If you assent, you
1
The four are sensuous desires [lust of] life renewed, erroneous
opinion, ignorance. See Compendium, 227; Bud. Psy. Eth., iii.,
ch. iv.
2
Or supramundane, or transcendental (lokuttara).
3
Cf. above, XI. 8, on the falsely including the notion 'imperma-
nence ' among things impermanent.
4
See XV. 5.
must also apply your proposition to all the other stages,
and say, finally, that the decay and death of the fruit of
arahantship is itself fruit of arahantship—which you may
not. Nor will you be prepared to admit decay and death
as identical with any one of the Factors of Enlighten-
ment.
[2] M.—Then, is the decay and death of supramundane
things a mundane thing ? You deny.1 Then it must be
supramundane.
1
The Buddha himself did not class it as of either category-Comy.
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
4. Of Instants, Moments,5 Seconds of Time.
Controverted Point.—That any stroke of time is pre-
determined.
From the Commentary.—The same argument is followed as in the
foregoing.
5
Khana , laya, muhutta : 10 'instants' = 1 'moment,' 10
'moments' = 1 'second.' There is no measured coincidence between
second and muhutta.
5. Of the Intoxicants (Asava's).
Controverted Point—That the four asava's are them-
selves non-asava.1
From the Commentary.—The Hetuvadins hold that, inasmuch as
over and above the four Intoxicants there is no other Intoxicant with
which they can be said to be ' co-intoxicants,' therefore they must
themselves be non-intoxicant.'
[1] Th.—Then you must be prepared to classify them
with one of the [approved] non-asava's—the Path, Fruit,
Nibbana, one of the four Paths or Fruits, one of the
Factors of Enlightenment—which you, of course, may
not do.
[2] H.—If I am wrong, I ask you to show me any other
asava, concomitant with which those four may be pro-
nounced co-asava. .. .
6. Of Decay and Death.
Controverted Point. — That the decay and death of
spiritual2 things is itself spiritual.3
From the Commentary.—Decay and death are not predetermined,
and therefore do not come under the categories 'mundane,' 'supra-
mundane.' The Mahasanghikas and others do not grasp this salient
feature.
[1] Th.—Then you must be prepared to classify it with
one of the [approved] spiritual things—Path, Fruit,
Nibbana, etc.4 . . , For instance, is the decay and death
of the Stream-Winner's Path the Path itself? If you
deny, your proposition falls through. If you assent, you
1
The four are sensuous desires [lust of] life renewed, erroneous
opinion, ignorance. See Compendium, 227; Bud. Psy. Eth., iii.,
ch. iv.
2
Or supramundane, or transcendental (lokuttara).
3
Cf. above, XI. 8, on the falsely including the notion 'imperma-
nence ' among things impermanent.
4
See XV. 5.
must also apply your proposition to all the other stages,
and say, finally, that the decay and death of the fruit of
arahantship is itself fruit of arahantship—which you may
not. Nor will you be prepared to admit decay and death
as identical with any one of the Factors of Enlighten-
ment.
[2] M.—Then, is the decay and death of supramundane
things a mundane thing ? You deny.1 Then it must be
supramundane.
1
The Buddha himself did not class it as of either category-Comy.
Kathavatthu - Of Correlation as specifically Fixed, Reciprocal Correlation, Duration
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
BOOK XV
1. Of Correlation as specifically fixed.
Controverted Point.—That one phenomenon can be re-
lated to another in one way only.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Mahasanghikas, hold that
if anything be correlated to another as its moral condition or motive
(hetu),1
it is not correlated to that other by way of [subject-]object,
or of contiguity, or of immediate succession.2 Or again, if anything
be correlated to another as its object, it is not correlated to that other
by way of contiguity, or immediate succession.
[1] Th.—Bat take the attitude of investigation,3 is not
that correlated both as moral condition and as dominance ?
You assent. Then your proposition falls through.
Again, is not predominant desire-to-do the dominant
factor in coexistent mental states? If so, we ought to
admit a dual correlation by way of [i.] dominance, [ii.] co-
existence. [2] The same holds wfren energy is the dominant
factor. Or if dominant energy be considered as 'controlling
power' or faculty (indriya) , we ought to admit a dual
correlation by way of dominance and controlling power.
Or if we consider dominant energy as a factor of the Path,4
we ought to admit a dual correlation by way of dominance
and path or means (magga). [3] The same holds when
apperception4 is the dominant factor. Or if dominant con-
sciousness be considered as nutriment (or cause, ahara) ,
1
See Compendium, p. 279 f .
2
Ibid., 191, § 7.
3
Vimangsa. Ibid., 177, n. 3. This in terms of hetu is
amoha=panna=intelligence, understanding, insight.
4
Citta in this connection is an abbreviation for javana-citta,
apperceptional consciousness.
we ought to admit a dual correlation by way of dominance
and nutriment. [4] The argument holds when we consider
conscious dominance as controlling power, or investigation
as a dominant factor, or, again, as part of the Path, or
means.
Once more, if, on adequately revering an Ariyan
phenomenon,1 reflection arises having that phenomenon
as its dominant object, we ought here to admit the dual
relation—dominance and object.
[5] Or again, if this or that previous moral consciousness
be related to this or that subsequent moral consciousness
as consecutive, and is also repeated, have we not to admit
here the dual correlation of contiguity and repetition ?2
[6] The same being valid for immoral states ? [7] The
same correlation being valid if, for moral, or immoral, we
substitute ' inoperative' or 'unmoral' states ?
[8] M:—Nevertheless, you admit the definitely distinct
modes of correlation, such as 'moral condition, or hetu, '
contiguity, immediate succession? Then surely my pro-
position is right.
2. Of 'Reciprocal3 Correlation.
Controverted Point—That whereas actions are conditioned
by ignorance, we may not stay that ignorance is conditioned
by actions.
1
Dhamma ; i.e., a Path, a Fruit, Nibbana, corruptions ex-
tirpated, or not yet extirpated. On this specific culture see Com-
pendium, pp. 58, 69.
2
Asevana , from asevati , to serve over and over again (a + si,
or si, to bind, hence to be a pendant, or dependent), is a difficult term to
translate. In the Compendium (p. 192, § 12) we used ' succession/ but
repetition, or even retention, is in some respects better. The Burmese
translators render by 'repetition so as to form a habit' ; hence,
habitual repetition.
3
Anna-m-anna, or one-another. The discourse shows that a
classification of relations in recent philosophy has been anticipated.
See Hon. Bertrand Russell's Our Knowledge of the External World,
etc., London, 1914, p. 47. See Appendix: Paccaya.
From the Commentary.—This view, held, for instance, by the
Mahasanghikas, is met by the opposite doctrine that there is a
reciprocal conditioning obtaining between ignorance and actions, and
so on.1
[1] Th.—But is not ignorance coexistent with action ?2
If so, here is a reciprocal correlation [namely, of coexist-
ence].
[2] Again, ' grasping is conditioned by craving.' Now, is
it wrong to say that craving is conditioned by grasping ?3
Yes, you say. But the argument above is valid here also.
[3] M.—'Birth, bhikkhus, is conditioned by decay and
death, the tendency to become is conditioned by birth'—is
the Suttanta thus ?
Th.—No.
M.—Neither is the reciprocal conditioning correlation
between ignorance and activities reciprocal, nor that be-
tween craving and grasping.
[4] Th.— 'Mind and body, bhikkhus, are conditioned by
rebirth-consciousness, and this by mind and body'—is the
Suttanta thus ?4
M.—Yes.
Th.—Then the conditioning relation may be reciprocal.
3 .Of Duration.5
Controverted Point.—That duration is predetermined.
From the Commentary.—Taking the word duration (addha ) in
the sense of period of time, they6 who hold this opinion base it on the
1
Namely, in the Paticca-samuppada formula; see VI. 2.
2
Sankharena. 'Here only non-meritorious activity is meant.
The correlation between this and ignorance may he analyzed into
"related by way of co-existence, reciprocity, presence, continuance,
association."'—Comy.
3
Here 'grasping' excludes kama-grasping (which=tanha).—
Comy. On the four 'graspings' see Bud. Psy. Eth., pp. 323 f .
4
Samyutta-Nik., iii. 114.
5
The opponent evidently uses addha . in this sense, suggestive of
M. Bergson's concept of time.
6
No adherents are named. Possibly the Andhakas. See above, XI. 8.
Sutta quoted below. The argument seeks to show that no interval
whatever is predetermined,, except as mere time-notion. But matter,
etc., when meaning the five aggregates (bodily and mental) is pre-
determined.
[1] Th.—Then must duration be one of the five aggre-
gates, which of course it is not. This holds good whether
you take past,1 [2] future, or present duration. [3] Now,
you say that any past aggregate, bodily or mental, consti-
tutes past duration; any future, any present aggregate,
future or present duration respectively. Then are there
five past durations, five future, five present durations ? . . .
[4] fifteen durations in all? Or, if they are regarded as
twelve past, future, present organs-and-objects-of-sense,
are there thirty-six durations in all ? . . .
[5] Or if we consider them as eighteen elements, are
there fifty-four durations? or as controlling powers,2 are
there sixty-six durations?
[6] Opp.—But was it not said by the Exalted One:
'There are these three subjects of discourse,3 bhikkhus—
which are the three ? One may talk about past time :
" Thus was it in times past." Or abo ut future time : " Thus
will it be in future times" Or about the present: "Thus is
it now at present "' ? 4
Hence surely duration is predetermined ?
1
Insert Amanta in PTS edition.
2
See above, p. 15 f .
3
Kathavatthuni .
4 Anguttara-Nik., i. 197. Cf. p. 95, § 60
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
BOOK XV
1. Of Correlation as specifically fixed.
Controverted Point.—That one phenomenon can be re-
lated to another in one way only.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Mahasanghikas, hold that
if anything be correlated to another as its moral condition or motive
(hetu),1
it is not correlated to that other by way of [subject-]object,
or of contiguity, or of immediate succession.2 Or again, if anything
be correlated to another as its object, it is not correlated to that other
by way of contiguity, or immediate succession.
[1] Th.—Bat take the attitude of investigation,3 is not
that correlated both as moral condition and as dominance ?
You assent. Then your proposition falls through.
Again, is not predominant desire-to-do the dominant
factor in coexistent mental states? If so, we ought to
admit a dual correlation by way of [i.] dominance, [ii.] co-
existence. [2] The same holds wfren energy is the dominant
factor. Or if dominant energy be considered as 'controlling
power' or faculty (indriya) , we ought to admit a dual
correlation by way of dominance and controlling power.
Or if we consider dominant energy as a factor of the Path,4
we ought to admit a dual correlation by way of dominance
and path or means (magga). [3] The same holds when
apperception4 is the dominant factor. Or if dominant con-
sciousness be considered as nutriment (or cause, ahara) ,
1
See Compendium, p. 279 f .
2
Ibid., 191, § 7.
3
Vimangsa. Ibid., 177, n. 3. This in terms of hetu is
amoha=panna=intelligence, understanding, insight.
4
Citta in this connection is an abbreviation for javana-citta,
apperceptional consciousness.
we ought to admit a dual correlation by way of dominance
and nutriment. [4] The argument holds when we consider
conscious dominance as controlling power, or investigation
as a dominant factor, or, again, as part of the Path, or
means.
Once more, if, on adequately revering an Ariyan
phenomenon,1 reflection arises having that phenomenon
as its dominant object, we ought here to admit the dual
relation—dominance and object.
[5] Or again, if this or that previous moral consciousness
be related to this or that subsequent moral consciousness
as consecutive, and is also repeated, have we not to admit
here the dual correlation of contiguity and repetition ?2
[6] The same being valid for immoral states ? [7] The
same correlation being valid if, for moral, or immoral, we
substitute ' inoperative' or 'unmoral' states ?
[8] M:—Nevertheless, you admit the definitely distinct
modes of correlation, such as 'moral condition, or hetu, '
contiguity, immediate succession? Then surely my pro-
position is right.
2. Of 'Reciprocal3 Correlation.
Controverted Point—That whereas actions are conditioned
by ignorance, we may not stay that ignorance is conditioned
by actions.
1
Dhamma ; i.e., a Path, a Fruit, Nibbana, corruptions ex-
tirpated, or not yet extirpated. On this specific culture see Com-
pendium, pp. 58, 69.
2
Asevana , from asevati , to serve over and over again (a + si,
or si, to bind, hence to be a pendant, or dependent), is a difficult term to
translate. In the Compendium (p. 192, § 12) we used ' succession/ but
repetition, or even retention, is in some respects better. The Burmese
translators render by 'repetition so as to form a habit' ; hence,
habitual repetition.
3
Anna-m-anna, or one-another. The discourse shows that a
classification of relations in recent philosophy has been anticipated.
See Hon. Bertrand Russell's Our Knowledge of the External World,
etc., London, 1914, p. 47. See Appendix: Paccaya.
From the Commentary.—This view, held, for instance, by the
Mahasanghikas, is met by the opposite doctrine that there is a
reciprocal conditioning obtaining between ignorance and actions, and
so on.1
[1] Th.—But is not ignorance coexistent with action ?2
If so, here is a reciprocal correlation [namely, of coexist-
ence].
[2] Again, ' grasping is conditioned by craving.' Now, is
it wrong to say that craving is conditioned by grasping ?3
Yes, you say. But the argument above is valid here also.
[3] M.—'Birth, bhikkhus, is conditioned by decay and
death, the tendency to become is conditioned by birth'—is
the Suttanta thus ?
Th.—No.
M.—Neither is the reciprocal conditioning correlation
between ignorance and activities reciprocal, nor that be-
tween craving and grasping.
[4] Th.— 'Mind and body, bhikkhus, are conditioned by
rebirth-consciousness, and this by mind and body'—is the
Suttanta thus ?4
M.—Yes.
Th.—Then the conditioning relation may be reciprocal.
3 .Of Duration.5
Controverted Point.—That duration is predetermined.
From the Commentary.—Taking the word duration (addha ) in
the sense of period of time, they6 who hold this opinion base it on the
1
Namely, in the Paticca-samuppada formula; see VI. 2.
2
Sankharena. 'Here only non-meritorious activity is meant.
The correlation between this and ignorance may he analyzed into
"related by way of co-existence, reciprocity, presence, continuance,
association."'—Comy.
3
Here 'grasping' excludes kama-grasping (which=tanha).—
Comy. On the four 'graspings' see Bud. Psy. Eth., pp. 323 f .
4
Samyutta-Nik., iii. 114.
5
The opponent evidently uses addha . in this sense, suggestive of
M. Bergson's concept of time.
6
No adherents are named. Possibly the Andhakas. See above, XI. 8.
Sutta quoted below. The argument seeks to show that no interval
whatever is predetermined,, except as mere time-notion. But matter,
etc., when meaning the five aggregates (bodily and mental) is pre-
determined.
[1] Th.—Then must duration be one of the five aggre-
gates, which of course it is not. This holds good whether
you take past,1 [2] future, or present duration. [3] Now,
you say that any past aggregate, bodily or mental, consti-
tutes past duration; any future, any present aggregate,
future or present duration respectively. Then are there
five past durations, five future, five present durations ? . . .
[4] fifteen durations in all? Or, if they are regarded as
twelve past, future, present organs-and-objects-of-sense,
are there thirty-six durations in all ? . . .
[5] Or if we consider them as eighteen elements, are
there fifty-four durations? or as controlling powers,2 are
there sixty-six durations?
[6] Opp.—But was it not said by the Exalted One:
'There are these three subjects of discourse,3 bhikkhus—
which are the three ? One may talk about past time :
" Thus was it in times past." Or abo ut future time : " Thus
will it be in future times" Or about the present: "Thus is
it now at present "' ? 4
Hence surely duration is predetermined ?
1
Insert Amanta in PTS edition.
2
See above, p. 15 f .
3
Kathavatthuni .
4 Anguttara-Nik., i. 197. Cf. p. 95, § 60
Kathavatthu - Of Desire as inherent in Heavenly Things, Of the Unmoral and the Unrevealed, Of the Unincluded
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
7. Of Desire as inherent in Heavenly Things.
Controverted Point.—That lust lor the things of the Rupa
heavens is inherent to and included therein.
From the Commentary.—Just as sensuous lusts are inherent in the
world of sense-experience, and are said to be included in it, the lust
for life in the Rupa heavens and the Arupa heavens was held, by the
Andhakas and the Sarnmitiyas, to be as stated.
[1] Th.—You imply that the desire which seeks attain-
ment in Jhana, the desire which seeks rebirth in the
heavens, and the delighting, under present conditions, in
celestial bliss,1 are all three concomitant, coexistent, asso-
ciated and conjoined with their respective kinds of con-
sciousness, are one in genesis and cessation, one in seat
and object with those kinds. If you deny your proposition
falls.
[2] Is a desire for sound inherent and included in the
sphere of sound, or is a desire for the other objects of sense
inherent and included in their respective spheres ? Why
not affirm here instead of denying ? If the desires are to
be denied here, neither can you affirm them in the case of
the heavens.2
[3-4] The same arguments apply to the desire for the
things of the Arupa heavens.
[5] A.S.—But if you admit that we may speak of
sensuous lusts as inherent and included in the world of
sense-experience, it is surely right to affirm analogous
desires in the case of the Rupa and Arupa heavens.3
1
According to the Commentary these three terms refer respectively
to moral (kusala) consciousness, resultant (vipaka) consciousness,
and inoperative (kriya) consciousness—-five modes in each of the
three—on the Rupa plane. Cf. Compendium, Part I., 2, §§ 8, 9.
2
For the point in this argument see XVI. 10, § 2.
3
The orthodox position is that such desires are inherent in and
confined to the world (earth, purgatory, lower heavens) of sense-
experience (Kamaloka).
8. Of the Unmoral and the Unrepealed,
Controverted Point.—That error is unmoral.
From the Commentary.—As to the term a-vy-a-kata , literally
'undeclared,' applied to the four categories : result-in-conscious-
ness1 (vipaka) , inoperative consciousness1 (kiriya) , matter and
Nibbana, it means 'cannot be declared to be either moral or unmoral,
because of the absence of moral [or karmic] result-in-consciousness'
(avipakatta) . Applied to speculative opinion on unproveable
matters, it means undeclared (akathitatta).2 Now some, like the
Andhakas and Uttarapathakas, making no such distinction, speak of
erroneous views as unmoral in their result [itself a very erroneous view].
[1] Th.—Then you must be prepared to class it as one
of the unmoral categories—result, inoperative conscious-
ness, matter, Nibbana, organ and object of sense3—which
you may not do. You must also be prepared to admit
that other mental factors, the conscious processes or
acts accompanying erroneous opinion, are unmoral. Else
you have this anomaly : that all these together constitute
a state of immoral consciousness, while the erroneous
opinion alone is unmoral.4
[2] Again, the unmoral has no moral fruit or result,
while erroneous opinion is of the opposite nature. Nay,
were not evil views ranked as paramount offences by the
Exalted One?5 [3] Did he not say : 'Wrong views,
Vaccha, are immoral, right views are moral'?6 And did he
not say also: ' For the holder of wrong views, Punna, I
declare one of tioo destinies, either purgatory or the animal
world'?7
1
See above, XII. 2,3.
2
A Christian would say 'unrevealed.'
3
See above, XI. 1, XIII. 9.
4
Ditthi-gata, or wrong views, is a factor in akusala-
cittang , bad consciousness (Bud. Psy. Eth., pp. 98-101). The idea
here seems to be: How can a part be amoral , while the whole is
immoral"?
5
We cannot trace this phrase verbatim. The Br. translator reads,
for paramani (paramount), pamanani, 'as their measure.'
6
Majjhima-Nik., i. 490.
7
Cf. ibid,, i. 388; Samyutta-Nik., iv. 307.
[4] A.U.—But did not the Exalted One say: 'This,
Vaccha, is unsolved (avyakata):—that the ivorld is eternal,
or that it is not eternal. This, too, is unsolved (avyakata)—
that the world is finite, or that it is infinite. And so, too, are
these : that the soul and the body are the same, or are different
things ; that a Tathagata comes to be after death, or not, or
both comes to be and does not come to be, or that neither
happens'?1
Surely then erroneous opinions are unmoral.
[5] Th.—But was it not said by the Exalted One:
' Of a person holding wrong views, bhikkhus, whatever karma
of deed, word and thought he completes and carries out in
accordance ivith those views, be it volition, aspiration, adjust-
ment of mind, or other activities, all those things conduce
to the undesirable, to the unpleasant, to the disagreeable, to
trouble, to ill '? 2
Hence it is surely wrong to say that ' erroneous opinions
are unmoral.'
9. Of the Unincluded.
Controverted Point.—That erroneous opinions [may enter
into] 'the Unincluded.'3
From the Commentary.—Inasmuch as when a man of the world
has attained to Jhana, he may be called passionless as to sense-
desires, but not free from erroneous opinions, some, like the Pubba-
seliyas, hold that erroneous views beset also that other consciousness
which is ' Unincluded.'
1
Samyutta-Nik., iv. 393, 401 (neither is quite verbatim as the text).
2
Anguttara-Nik., v. 212.
3
The opponent would break down the exclusive content of the
term a-pariyapanna—the Unincluded—which, according to the
Abhidhamma-Pitaka, is reserved for the consciousness and conscious
experiences of those qualifying in the Path, and for Nibbana
(Dhamma-sangani [Bud. Psy. Eth.], §§ 992, 1287). Such conscious-
ness would not be shared by a 'man of the world' or ' average person'
(puthujjana, literally, one of the many-folk, or hoi polloi).
It is 'not included' in the mental range of one whose interests
are confined to any sphere of life earth or in heaven.
[1] Th.—Then you must be prepared to class them
among the category of the ' Unincluded,' to wit, as Path,
Fruit, Nibbana, as one of the Four Paths, or Four Fruits,
-as one of the Factors of Enlightenment—which you may
not do.
[2] P.—But if I am wrong, why do you admit that a
worldly person [in Jhana] may be called passionless as to
sense-desires, but deny: that he has lost all erroneous
opinion ?
Surely then it is right to say that erroneous opinion
may enter into 'the Unincluded.'
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
7. Of Desire as inherent in Heavenly Things.
Controverted Point.—That lust lor the things of the Rupa
heavens is inherent to and included therein.
From the Commentary.—Just as sensuous lusts are inherent in the
world of sense-experience, and are said to be included in it, the lust
for life in the Rupa heavens and the Arupa heavens was held, by the
Andhakas and the Sarnmitiyas, to be as stated.
[1] Th.—You imply that the desire which seeks attain-
ment in Jhana, the desire which seeks rebirth in the
heavens, and the delighting, under present conditions, in
celestial bliss,1 are all three concomitant, coexistent, asso-
ciated and conjoined with their respective kinds of con-
sciousness, are one in genesis and cessation, one in seat
and object with those kinds. If you deny your proposition
falls.
[2] Is a desire for sound inherent and included in the
sphere of sound, or is a desire for the other objects of sense
inherent and included in their respective spheres ? Why
not affirm here instead of denying ? If the desires are to
be denied here, neither can you affirm them in the case of
the heavens.2
[3-4] The same arguments apply to the desire for the
things of the Arupa heavens.
[5] A.S.—But if you admit that we may speak of
sensuous lusts as inherent and included in the world of
sense-experience, it is surely right to affirm analogous
desires in the case of the Rupa and Arupa heavens.3
1
According to the Commentary these three terms refer respectively
to moral (kusala) consciousness, resultant (vipaka) consciousness,
and inoperative (kriya) consciousness—-five modes in each of the
three—on the Rupa plane. Cf. Compendium, Part I., 2, §§ 8, 9.
2
For the point in this argument see XVI. 10, § 2.
3
The orthodox position is that such desires are inherent in and
confined to the world (earth, purgatory, lower heavens) of sense-
experience (Kamaloka).
8. Of the Unmoral and the Unrepealed,
Controverted Point.—That error is unmoral.
From the Commentary.—As to the term a-vy-a-kata , literally
'undeclared,' applied to the four categories : result-in-conscious-
ness1 (vipaka) , inoperative consciousness1 (kiriya) , matter and
Nibbana, it means 'cannot be declared to be either moral or unmoral,
because of the absence of moral [or karmic] result-in-consciousness'
(avipakatta) . Applied to speculative opinion on unproveable
matters, it means undeclared (akathitatta).2 Now some, like the
Andhakas and Uttarapathakas, making no such distinction, speak of
erroneous views as unmoral in their result [itself a very erroneous view].
[1] Th.—Then you must be prepared to class it as one
of the unmoral categories—result, inoperative conscious-
ness, matter, Nibbana, organ and object of sense3—which
you may not do. You must also be prepared to admit
that other mental factors, the conscious processes or
acts accompanying erroneous opinion, are unmoral. Else
you have this anomaly : that all these together constitute
a state of immoral consciousness, while the erroneous
opinion alone is unmoral.4
[2] Again, the unmoral has no moral fruit or result,
while erroneous opinion is of the opposite nature. Nay,
were not evil views ranked as paramount offences by the
Exalted One?5 [3] Did he not say : 'Wrong views,
Vaccha, are immoral, right views are moral'?6 And did he
not say also: ' For the holder of wrong views, Punna, I
declare one of tioo destinies, either purgatory or the animal
world'?7
1
See above, XII. 2,3.
2
A Christian would say 'unrevealed.'
3
See above, XI. 1, XIII. 9.
4
Ditthi-gata, or wrong views, is a factor in akusala-
cittang , bad consciousness (Bud. Psy. Eth., pp. 98-101). The idea
here seems to be: How can a part be amoral , while the whole is
immoral"?
5
We cannot trace this phrase verbatim. The Br. translator reads,
for paramani (paramount), pamanani, 'as their measure.'
6
Majjhima-Nik., i. 490.
7
Cf. ibid,, i. 388; Samyutta-Nik., iv. 307.
[4] A.U.—But did not the Exalted One say: 'This,
Vaccha, is unsolved (avyakata):—that the ivorld is eternal,
or that it is not eternal. This, too, is unsolved (avyakata)—
that the world is finite, or that it is infinite. And so, too, are
these : that the soul and the body are the same, or are different
things ; that a Tathagata comes to be after death, or not, or
both comes to be and does not come to be, or that neither
happens'?1
Surely then erroneous opinions are unmoral.
[5] Th.—But was it not said by the Exalted One:
' Of a person holding wrong views, bhikkhus, whatever karma
of deed, word and thought he completes and carries out in
accordance ivith those views, be it volition, aspiration, adjust-
ment of mind, or other activities, all those things conduce
to the undesirable, to the unpleasant, to the disagreeable, to
trouble, to ill '? 2
Hence it is surely wrong to say that ' erroneous opinions
are unmoral.'
9. Of the Unincluded.
Controverted Point.—That erroneous opinions [may enter
into] 'the Unincluded.'3
From the Commentary.—Inasmuch as when a man of the world
has attained to Jhana, he may be called passionless as to sense-
desires, but not free from erroneous opinions, some, like the Pubba-
seliyas, hold that erroneous views beset also that other consciousness
which is ' Unincluded.'
1
Samyutta-Nik., iv. 393, 401 (neither is quite verbatim as the text).
2
Anguttara-Nik., v. 212.
3
The opponent would break down the exclusive content of the
term a-pariyapanna—the Unincluded—which, according to the
Abhidhamma-Pitaka, is reserved for the consciousness and conscious
experiences of those qualifying in the Path, and for Nibbana
(Dhamma-sangani [Bud. Psy. Eth.], §§ 992, 1287). Such conscious-
ness would not be shared by a 'man of the world' or ' average person'
(puthujjana, literally, one of the many-folk, or hoi polloi).
It is 'not included' in the mental range of one whose interests
are confined to any sphere of life earth or in heaven.
[1] Th.—Then you must be prepared to class them
among the category of the ' Unincluded,' to wit, as Path,
Fruit, Nibbana, as one of the Four Paths, or Four Fruits,
-as one of the Factors of Enlightenment—which you may
not do.
[2] P.—But if I am wrong, why do you admit that a
worldly person [in Jhana] may be called passionless as to
sense-desires, but deny: that he has lost all erroneous
opinion ?
Surely then it is right to say that erroneous opinion
may enter into 'the Unincluded.'
Kathavatthu - Of the Outward Life of the Ariyan, Latent Bias as something Apart, Unconscious Outbursts of Corruption
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
4. Of the Outward Life of an Ariyan.
Controverted Point—That the Ariyan ' forms ' [of speech
and action] are derived from the four primary qualities of
matter.3
From the Commentary.—The Uttarapathakas and others hold that
Ariyan speech and action are material qualities derived, as such, from
the four primary elements of matter, the Doctrine teaching that all
material qualities are the four primary qualities of matter, or are
derived from them.'4
3
Extended, cohesive, hot, and mobile elements, popularly called
earth, water, fire, air.
4
Majjhima-Nik., i. 53 ; cf . 185.
[1] Th.—You admit that the qualities1 of the Ariyan
are moral, and not unmoral. But the primary qualities of
matter are not moral; they are unmoral. . . .
[2] Again, there is in these primary qualities nothing
akin to the absence of intoxicant, fetter, tie, flood, bond,
hindrance, infection, grasping, corruption, characteristic of
the Ariyan's qualities. On the contrary, the former are
concomitant with these [ethically undesirable things].
[3] U.—But if I am wrong, was it not said by the
Exalted One: ' Whatever matter there is, bhikkhus, is the
four primary qualities and their derivatives' P Hence it is
surely right to say that the material qualities of the Ariyan
are derived from the primary qualities.
5. Of Latent Bias as Something Apart.3
Controverted Point.—That latent bias, in any of the
seven forms, is different in kind from a patent outbreak of
the vice.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Andhakas, hold this view,
inasmuch as an average worldly person, while his thoughts are
ethically good or neutral, may be said to have latent bias for the seven
vices, but not to be openly manifesting them.
[1] Th.—Do you equally maintain that the lusts of
sense are different in kind from the lusts of sense openly
manifested? You deny, but you cannot then maintain
your proposition. You cannot maintain that the lusts of
sense are the same as fchose lusts manifested, and yet deny
1
Evidently rupa is here taken in the limited sense of 'forms' of
speech and action—in fact, conduct. Cf. the Yamaka (i., p. xi), in
which book rupa is used in the sense of 'forms' of consciousness.
It should also be recollected that the Path-factors—supremely right
speech and action—are mental properties through which corresponding
conduct is effected. See above, X. 2.
2
Anguttara-Nik., v. 348.
3
This theory was discussed in IX. 4; XI. 1.
the identity in the case of the manifesting of them and the
latent bias.
[2-7] This argument holds good for the other six forms
—enmity, conceit, erroneous opinion, doubt, lust of life,
ignorance.
[8] A.—But if I am wrong, may not an average worldly
man, while thinking what is good or unmoral, be said to
have latent bias, but not to be openly manifesting any of
its forms ?
Th.—If you conclude from this that your proposition is
right, you must equally admit that, whereas such a person
may also be said to have lust, though he be not openly
manifesting it, lust is different in kind from open mani-
festation of it.
6. Of Unconscious Outbursts of Corruption.
Controverted Point—That outbursts of corruption take
place unconsciously.
From the Commentary.—The Andhakas, for instance, hold that lust
and other wrong states may arise even in one who is attending to
Impermanence, etc., and besides, it has been said: 'Sometimes,
Master Bharadvdja, when he is thinking: " I will attend to the
unbeautiful " he attends to it as beautiful.'1 Hence we are liable to
involuntary outbursts of corruption.
[1] Th.—You imply that such outbursts come under the
non-mental categories—matter, Nibbana, organ or object
of sense. . . . Are they not rather to be classed as lust-
ridden, hate-ridden, dulness-ridden mind, as immoral, cor-
rupted consciousness, the existence of which you of course
admit?
1
Samyutta-Nik., iv. 111. The PTS text of the Samyutta reads,
for subhato manasikarotiti , subhato agacchati. The
speaker is King Udena conversing with Pindola-Bharadvaja. Cf.
Vin. Texts, i. 302 f.; iii. 79 f.; 382 f .
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
4. Of the Outward Life of an Ariyan.
Controverted Point—That the Ariyan ' forms ' [of speech
and action] are derived from the four primary qualities of
matter.3
From the Commentary.—The Uttarapathakas and others hold that
Ariyan speech and action are material qualities derived, as such, from
the four primary elements of matter, the Doctrine teaching that all
material qualities are the four primary qualities of matter, or are
derived from them.'4
3
Extended, cohesive, hot, and mobile elements, popularly called
earth, water, fire, air.
4
Majjhima-Nik., i. 53 ; cf . 185.
[1] Th.—You admit that the qualities1 of the Ariyan
are moral, and not unmoral. But the primary qualities of
matter are not moral; they are unmoral. . . .
[2] Again, there is in these primary qualities nothing
akin to the absence of intoxicant, fetter, tie, flood, bond,
hindrance, infection, grasping, corruption, characteristic of
the Ariyan's qualities. On the contrary, the former are
concomitant with these [ethically undesirable things].
[3] U.—But if I am wrong, was it not said by the
Exalted One: ' Whatever matter there is, bhikkhus, is the
four primary qualities and their derivatives' P Hence it is
surely right to say that the material qualities of the Ariyan
are derived from the primary qualities.
5. Of Latent Bias as Something Apart.3
Controverted Point.—That latent bias, in any of the
seven forms, is different in kind from a patent outbreak of
the vice.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Andhakas, hold this view,
inasmuch as an average worldly person, while his thoughts are
ethically good or neutral, may be said to have latent bias for the seven
vices, but not to be openly manifesting them.
[1] Th.—Do you equally maintain that the lusts of
sense are different in kind from the lusts of sense openly
manifested? You deny, but you cannot then maintain
your proposition. You cannot maintain that the lusts of
sense are the same as fchose lusts manifested, and yet deny
1
Evidently rupa is here taken in the limited sense of 'forms' of
speech and action—in fact, conduct. Cf. the Yamaka (i., p. xi), in
which book rupa is used in the sense of 'forms' of consciousness.
It should also be recollected that the Path-factors—supremely right
speech and action—are mental properties through which corresponding
conduct is effected. See above, X. 2.
2
Anguttara-Nik., v. 348.
3
This theory was discussed in IX. 4; XI. 1.
the identity in the case of the manifesting of them and the
latent bias.
[2-7] This argument holds good for the other six forms
—enmity, conceit, erroneous opinion, doubt, lust of life,
ignorance.
[8] A.—But if I am wrong, may not an average worldly
man, while thinking what is good or unmoral, be said to
have latent bias, but not to be openly manifesting any of
its forms ?
Th.—If you conclude from this that your proposition is
right, you must equally admit that, whereas such a person
may also be said to have lust, though he be not openly
manifesting it, lust is different in kind from open mani-
festation of it.
6. Of Unconscious Outbursts of Corruption.
Controverted Point—That outbursts of corruption take
place unconsciously.
From the Commentary.—The Andhakas, for instance, hold that lust
and other wrong states may arise even in one who is attending to
Impermanence, etc., and besides, it has been said: 'Sometimes,
Master Bharadvdja, when he is thinking: " I will attend to the
unbeautiful " he attends to it as beautiful.'1 Hence we are liable to
involuntary outbursts of corruption.
[1] Th.—You imply that such outbursts come under the
non-mental categories—matter, Nibbana, organ or object
of sense. . . . Are they not rather to be classed as lust-
ridden, hate-ridden, dulness-ridden mind, as immoral, cor-
rupted consciousness, the existence of which you of course
admit?
1
Samyutta-Nik., iv. 111. The PTS text of the Samyutta reads,
for subhato manasikarotiti , subhato agacchati. The
speaker is King Udena conversing with Pindola-Bharadvaja. Cf.
Vin. Texts, i. 302 f.; iii. 79 f.; 382 f .
Kathavatthu - Of the Mental Consecutiveness of Good and Bad, The (pre-natal) Development of Sense-Organs, Immediate Contiguity in Sense
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
BOOK XIV
1. Of the Mutual Consecutiveness of Good and Bad.
Controverted Point—That a basis1 of bad thought is con-
secutive to a basis that is good, and conversely.
From the Commentary.—That which is good cannot directly and
immediately follow after what is bad, nor conversely. Such reciprocal
consecutiveness is anomalous. Some, however, like the Mahasanghi-
kas, hold that, inasmuch as one can both like and then dislike the
same thing, therefore there has been, in such a case, reciprocal con-
secutiveness. Good and bad thoughts cannot occur consecutively
during the stages of javana (apperception) in one and the same
process of cognition, inasmuch as each course of good or of bad
thought entails a distinct preliminary 'adverting' of consciousness.
[1] Th.—You are implying that the adverting,2 the
adjusting of the mind arising for ethically bad conscious-
ness is precisely the adverting and adjusting of the mind
arising for ethically good consciousness. You say 'No,'
while insisting on your proposition. Then you must mean
that the good consciousness can arise without our advert-
ing or adjusting the mind ? You maintain the opposite to
this ? Then, if the good consciousness in question arise
for a mind already adverted and adjusted, it must be
1
Literally, root, or conditioning state.
2
The seven terms characteristic of this work should here be supplied.
See, e.g., VII. 5, 2. The Commentary here for the first time explains
that 'adverting' (avattana=avajjana) is the turning of the
mind from the subconscious life-flux to full consciousness, and that
'adjusting' (or 'aiming,' panidhi ) is the further move on to a
definite mental object, and persistence thereon.
wrong to say that a basis of what is bad is consecutive to
what is good.
[2] Does what is bad arise for wrongly directed atten-
tion? You assent. Do you say as much o f the good
which, according to you, is consecutive thereto ? Is it not
truer to say that the good consciousness was preceded by
rightly directed attention ? You agree. Then that bad
thought cannot be immediately consecutive to this good
thought.
[3] Again, are you prepared to admit that the idea of
resignation follows immediately on that of sense-desires ?
That the idea of benevolence follows immediately on that
of malignity ? That the idea of . kindness follows imme-
diately on that of cruelty, the idea of love on that of
malevolence, pity on unkindness, sympathetic joy on
spleen, equanimity on resentment ? . . .
[4-6] The same argument is now applied to refute the
second half of the proposition, to wit, ' that a basis of what
is good is consecutive to a basis of what is bad'?
[7] M.—But if I am wrong, you will admit that one
can fall in and out of love with one and the same object ?
Surely then my proposition is right, that a bad thing is
consecutive to a good thing and conversely.1
2. Of the Development of Sense-Organs.
Controverted Point.—That the sense-mechanism starts
all at once to life in the womb.
From the Commentary.—Our doctrine teaches that at a [human]
rebirth the development of the embryo's sense-mechanism or mind is
not congenital, as in the case of angelic2 rebirth. In the human
embryo, at the moment of conception, the co-ordinating organ (mana
yatana) and the organ of touch alone among the sense-organs,
1
The parallel drawn is inconclusive, inasmuch as it refers to
passion and its opposite arising about the same object, not to the
consecution of the moral and the immoral.—Corny.
2
Opapatika .
are congenital. The remaining four organs (eye and ear mechanism,
smell and taste mechanism) take seventy-seven days to come to birth,
and this is partly through that karma which brought about conception,
partly through some other karma.1 But some, like the Pubbaseliyas
and the Aparaseliyas, believe that the sixfold sense-organism takes
birth at the moment of conception,, by the taking effect of one karma
only, as though a complete tree were already potentially contained in
the bud.
[1J Th.—Do you imply that the sense-mechanism
enters the womb with all its main and minor parts com-
plete, not deficient in any organ ? You deny . . . [Then
let us speak more in detail:] You admit that the organ
of sight starts by consciousness seeking rebirth ?2 Now,
you would not claim, for . that questing consciousness that
[at its taking effect] hands, feet, head, ears, nostrils,
mouth and teeth take their start? "Why claim an exception
in the case of the visual, or other sense-organs ?
[2] P. A.—Then you claim that four o f the sense-
organs—eye, ear, smell, taste — come later into being.
Are you implying that, to bring this about, one makes
karma in the mother's womb? You deny, but your
position implies it.
Th.—But you say, do you not, that in the embryo hair,
down, nails, teeth, bones, appear at a subsequent stage.
Do you imply a special embryonic karma done to bring
these to birth? You deny. Then why assail my posi-
tion ? [3] Or it may be you do not admit the subsequent
appearance of hair, etc.? But was it not said by the
Exalted One:
' At first the "kalala" takes birth, and thence
The "abbuda." Therefrom the " pes! " grows,
Developing as "ghana" in its turn.
Now in the "ghana " doth appear the hair,
The down, the nails. And whatsoever food
1
These are technically called janaka-karma and upattham-
baka-karma (reproductive and maintaining karmas). — Compen-
dium, p. 143 f . (A. 1, 2).
2
I.e., the potential resultant of some dying man's last conscious act.
And drink the mother of him takes, thereby
The man in mother's womb doth live aid grow '?1
Hence it is right to assign a later appearance to hair,
and so forth.
3. Of Immediate Contiguity in Sense.
Controverted Point—That one sensation follows another
asfan unbroken fused sequence.
From the Commentary.—In view of the swift alternations of seeing
and hearing at performances of dancing and singing, some, like the
Uttarapathakas, hold that the sense-cognitions arise in a mutually
unbroken succession.
[1] Th.—Do you imply that the mental adverting,
adjusting, etc.,2 conjured up by visual consciousness is the
same as that conjured up by auditory consciousness ?
Would you not affirm that this was wrong ? And i f wrong,
do you mean that the auditory consciousness brings about
no adverting or adjustment of mind ?3 Is not the opposite
true ? But if it be true, then your proposition falls.
[2] Again, you agree that ' visual consciousness ' occurs
to the person attending to a visible object. But you cannot
urge that auditory consciousness also occurs to such an
one attending to a visible object. .. . In other words, if
visual consciousness have only visible object as its object,
and nothing else, the unbrokenly succeeding auditory con-
sciousness must have the same kind of object only and
nothing else. .. .
Our doctrine says: 'Because of eye and visible objects
visual consciousness arisesCan you substitute the words
1
Samyutta-Nik., i. 206; Jataka, iv. 496; cf. Milinda, i. 63. The
Pali terms denote four stages in foetal growth.
2
I.e., can auditory consciousness possibly occur to one who has not
adverted or adjusted the mind ? The argument is similar to that in
XIV. 1. However swiftly one sense-operation follows another, it is
judged that 'adverting' is an essential preliminary in each.
3
See above, VIII. 9.
4
Samyutta-Nik., ii. 72 f.; cf. Majjhima Nik., i. 259.
'auditory consciousness' ? You deny this.1 But I repeat
the question, and ask, Is the Suttanta thus? Nay, you
say, the former quotation was alone right. But i f your
proposition be right, you are implying that the given
visual consciousness is none other than the given auditory
consciousness.
[3-4] The same argument holds whichever two of the
five kinds of sense we take.
[5] U. — But if I am wrong [consider any kind of
dramatic performance], when there is dancing, singing,
reciting, does not the spectator see objects, hear sounds,
smell odours, taste tastes, and touch tangibles ? Surely
then it is right to say that the five kinds of sense-cognition
arise in unbroken unitary sequence.2
1
As heterodox.
2 'The illustration is inconclusive, because it only alludes to a mixed
state of rapidly alternating grouped objects of mind, not to the succes-
sion in a unity.'—Comy. It is tantalizing that our historical materials
concerning a drama, which was apparently ultra-Wagnerian in pro-
viding stimuli for all the senses, are so slender.
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
BOOK XIV
1. Of the Mutual Consecutiveness of Good and Bad.
Controverted Point—That a basis1 of bad thought is con-
secutive to a basis that is good, and conversely.
From the Commentary.—That which is good cannot directly and
immediately follow after what is bad, nor conversely. Such reciprocal
consecutiveness is anomalous. Some, however, like the Mahasanghi-
kas, hold that, inasmuch as one can both like and then dislike the
same thing, therefore there has been, in such a case, reciprocal con-
secutiveness. Good and bad thoughts cannot occur consecutively
during the stages of javana (apperception) in one and the same
process of cognition, inasmuch as each course of good or of bad
thought entails a distinct preliminary 'adverting' of consciousness.
[1] Th.—You are implying that the adverting,2 the
adjusting of the mind arising for ethically bad conscious-
ness is precisely the adverting and adjusting of the mind
arising for ethically good consciousness. You say 'No,'
while insisting on your proposition. Then you must mean
that the good consciousness can arise without our advert-
ing or adjusting the mind ? You maintain the opposite to
this ? Then, if the good consciousness in question arise
for a mind already adverted and adjusted, it must be
1
Literally, root, or conditioning state.
2
The seven terms characteristic of this work should here be supplied.
See, e.g., VII. 5, 2. The Commentary here for the first time explains
that 'adverting' (avattana=avajjana) is the turning of the
mind from the subconscious life-flux to full consciousness, and that
'adjusting' (or 'aiming,' panidhi ) is the further move on to a
definite mental object, and persistence thereon.
wrong to say that a basis of what is bad is consecutive to
what is good.
[2] Does what is bad arise for wrongly directed atten-
tion? You assent. Do you say as much o f the good
which, according to you, is consecutive thereto ? Is it not
truer to say that the good consciousness was preceded by
rightly directed attention ? You agree. Then that bad
thought cannot be immediately consecutive to this good
thought.
[3] Again, are you prepared to admit that the idea of
resignation follows immediately on that of sense-desires ?
That the idea of benevolence follows immediately on that
of malignity ? That the idea of . kindness follows imme-
diately on that of cruelty, the idea of love on that of
malevolence, pity on unkindness, sympathetic joy on
spleen, equanimity on resentment ? . . .
[4-6] The same argument is now applied to refute the
second half of the proposition, to wit, ' that a basis of what
is good is consecutive to a basis of what is bad'?
[7] M.—But if I am wrong, you will admit that one
can fall in and out of love with one and the same object ?
Surely then my proposition is right, that a bad thing is
consecutive to a good thing and conversely.1
2. Of the Development of Sense-Organs.
Controverted Point.—That the sense-mechanism starts
all at once to life in the womb.
From the Commentary.—Our doctrine teaches that at a [human]
rebirth the development of the embryo's sense-mechanism or mind is
not congenital, as in the case of angelic2 rebirth. In the human
embryo, at the moment of conception, the co-ordinating organ (mana
yatana) and the organ of touch alone among the sense-organs,
1
The parallel drawn is inconclusive, inasmuch as it refers to
passion and its opposite arising about the same object, not to the
consecution of the moral and the immoral.—Corny.
2
Opapatika .
are congenital. The remaining four organs (eye and ear mechanism,
smell and taste mechanism) take seventy-seven days to come to birth,
and this is partly through that karma which brought about conception,
partly through some other karma.1 But some, like the Pubbaseliyas
and the Aparaseliyas, believe that the sixfold sense-organism takes
birth at the moment of conception,, by the taking effect of one karma
only, as though a complete tree were already potentially contained in
the bud.
[1J Th.—Do you imply that the sense-mechanism
enters the womb with all its main and minor parts com-
plete, not deficient in any organ ? You deny . . . [Then
let us speak more in detail:] You admit that the organ
of sight starts by consciousness seeking rebirth ?2 Now,
you would not claim, for . that questing consciousness that
[at its taking effect] hands, feet, head, ears, nostrils,
mouth and teeth take their start? "Why claim an exception
in the case of the visual, or other sense-organs ?
[2] P. A.—Then you claim that four o f the sense-
organs—eye, ear, smell, taste — come later into being.
Are you implying that, to bring this about, one makes
karma in the mother's womb? You deny, but your
position implies it.
Th.—But you say, do you not, that in the embryo hair,
down, nails, teeth, bones, appear at a subsequent stage.
Do you imply a special embryonic karma done to bring
these to birth? You deny. Then why assail my posi-
tion ? [3] Or it may be you do not admit the subsequent
appearance of hair, etc.? But was it not said by the
Exalted One:
' At first the "kalala" takes birth, and thence
The "abbuda." Therefrom the " pes! " grows,
Developing as "ghana" in its turn.
Now in the "ghana " doth appear the hair,
The down, the nails. And whatsoever food
1
These are technically called janaka-karma and upattham-
baka-karma (reproductive and maintaining karmas). — Compen-
dium, p. 143 f . (A. 1, 2).
2
I.e., the potential resultant of some dying man's last conscious act.
And drink the mother of him takes, thereby
The man in mother's womb doth live aid grow '?1
Hence it is right to assign a later appearance to hair,
and so forth.
3. Of Immediate Contiguity in Sense.
Controverted Point—That one sensation follows another
asfan unbroken fused sequence.
From the Commentary.—In view of the swift alternations of seeing
and hearing at performances of dancing and singing, some, like the
Uttarapathakas, hold that the sense-cognitions arise in a mutually
unbroken succession.
[1] Th.—Do you imply that the mental adverting,
adjusting, etc.,2 conjured up by visual consciousness is the
same as that conjured up by auditory consciousness ?
Would you not affirm that this was wrong ? And i f wrong,
do you mean that the auditory consciousness brings about
no adverting or adjustment of mind ?3 Is not the opposite
true ? But if it be true, then your proposition falls.
[2] Again, you agree that ' visual consciousness ' occurs
to the person attending to a visible object. But you cannot
urge that auditory consciousness also occurs to such an
one attending to a visible object. .. . In other words, if
visual consciousness have only visible object as its object,
and nothing else, the unbrokenly succeeding auditory con-
sciousness must have the same kind of object only and
nothing else. .. .
Our doctrine says: 'Because of eye and visible objects
visual consciousness arisesCan you substitute the words
1
Samyutta-Nik., i. 206; Jataka, iv. 496; cf. Milinda, i. 63. The
Pali terms denote four stages in foetal growth.
2
I.e., can auditory consciousness possibly occur to one who has not
adverted or adjusted the mind ? The argument is similar to that in
XIV. 1. However swiftly one sense-operation follows another, it is
judged that 'adverting' is an essential preliminary in each.
3
See above, VIII. 9.
4
Samyutta-Nik., ii. 72 f.; cf. Majjhima Nik., i. 259.
'auditory consciousness' ? You deny this.1 But I repeat
the question, and ask, Is the Suttanta thus? Nay, you
say, the former quotation was alone right. But i f your
proposition be right, you are implying that the given
visual consciousness is none other than the given auditory
consciousness.
[3-4] The same argument holds whichever two of the
five kinds of sense we take.
[5] U. — But if I am wrong [consider any kind of
dramatic performance], when there is dancing, singing,
reciting, does not the spectator see objects, hear sounds,
smell odours, taste tastes, and touch tangibles ? Surely
then it is right to say that the five kinds of sense-cognition
arise in unbroken unitary sequence.2
1
As heterodox.
2 'The illustration is inconclusive, because it only alludes to a mixed
state of rapidly alternating grouped objects of mind, not to the succes-
sion in a unity.'—Comy. It is tantalizing that our historical materials
concerning a drama, which was apparently ultra-Wagnerian in pro-
viding stimuli for all the senses, are so slender.
Kathavatthu - Of Lust for the Unpleasant, Natural Desire for Mental Objects as Unmoral, Desire for Ideas and the Cause of Ill
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
8. Of Lust for the Unpleasant.
Controverted Point.—That there is such a thing as lust-
ing for what is disagreeable.
From the Commentary. — In the Sutta-passage :—' Whatsoever
feeling he feels, pleasant, painful, or neutral, he delights in and
commends that feeling'—the reference is to erroneous enjoyment.1
But some, like the Uttarapathakas, emphasizing the ' delights in,'
hold that one can delight in painful feeling as enjoyment of passion-
lessness.
[1] Th.—Do you go so far as to maintain that of the
beings who delight in the painful, some wish for it, long
for it, seek, search, hunt for it, and persist in cleaving
to it? Is not rather the opposite your genuine belief-?
You assent. Then how do you maintain your proposi-
tion?
[2] Can anyone have at once a latent bias of lust for
painful feeling and a latent bias of aversion from pleasant
feeling?1 Will not these two forms of bias be [really]
directed inversely, the former craving pleasure, the latter
hating pain ?
[3] U.—But if I am wrong, was it not said by the
Exalted One: ' He, thus, expert in complacency and anti-
pathy, delights in and commends whatsoever feeling he feels,
pleasant, painful, or neutral, and persists in cleaving to
it'?2
Hence surely there is such a thing as lusting for the
unpleasant ?
9. Of the Unmorality of a Natural Desire for Objects
of the Mind.
Controverted Point.—That to crave for objects of the
mind is unmoral.
1
I.e. to being subjugated to feeling.
2
Majjhima-Nik., i, 266. ' Delight,' the Sutta goes on, ' is grasping
after the things of sense, which cause the feelings.'
From the Commentary.— Some, like the Pubbaseliyas, hold that
the sixth kind of objects of sense-experience,1 coming after any of the
five forms of sensations, is neither moral nor immoral.
[1] Th.—If that be so, this craving must belong to one
of the moral indeterminates—to wit, resultant or inopera-
tive indeterminates—matter, Nibbana, or the organs and
objects of the five senses. But you must deny this [as not
doctrinal].
Or what reason have you for dissociating this sixth
form of tanha [natural desire or craving] from the rest?
If you admit that a craving for objects of sight, sound,
and so on is immoral, you must admit as much concerning
the co-ordination of these.
[2] Did not the Exalted One call craving immoral ?
Does not this condemn your proposition ? Did he not call
appetite (or greed) immoral? and is not craving for objects
of the mind a kind of greed ?
[3] Tour contention is that a craving for objects of the
mind is an unmoral appetite, but you are not justified in
using lobha with this qualification, when in the other
five modes of sense it is called immoral.
[4] Again, was it not said by the Exalted One : ' This
natural desire is concerned with rebirth, is accompanied by
delight and hist, dallying here and there—to wit, desires of
sense, desire for rebirth, desire not to live again '?2 . . .
[5] P.—But if I am wrong, is not this [threefold]
craving a craving for certain ideas or mental objects?3
Hence surely such a craving is as such immoral.
1
The co-ordination of different successive sensations as a concrete
single percept and image—-e.g., of orange colour, smell, roundness, and
certain other touches into an orange—was conceived by Buddhists as
a sort of sixth sense.
2
Samyutta-Nik., iii. 26 ; Vin. Texts, i, 95, reading 'non-existence'
for 'prosperity.' (Vibhava may conceivably mean either ; but the
traditional reading is, as the Commentary to the Kathavatthu says,
the goal of the Annihilationists.)
3
'This is inconclusive, because the citation shows nothing as to
a non-ethical nature, but refers to the process of natural desire
concerning a mental object.'—Comy.
10. Of Desire for Ideas and the Cause of Ill.
Controverted Point.—That the natural desire for objects
of mind is not the Cause of Ill.
From the Commentary. — This, too, is an opinion of the Pubba-
seliyas and others. The argument follows the preceding.
[1] Th.—What reason have you for dissociating this
form of craving from the other five ? If you admit that
a craving for objects of sight, sound, and so on, is im-
moral, you must admit as much concerning the co-ordina-
tion of these as ideas (percepts or images).
[2-5] Continue to imitate the preceding argument, XIII. 9
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
8. Of Lust for the Unpleasant.
Controverted Point.—That there is such a thing as lust-
ing for what is disagreeable.
From the Commentary. — In the Sutta-passage :—' Whatsoever
feeling he feels, pleasant, painful, or neutral, he delights in and
commends that feeling'—the reference is to erroneous enjoyment.1
But some, like the Uttarapathakas, emphasizing the ' delights in,'
hold that one can delight in painful feeling as enjoyment of passion-
lessness.
[1] Th.—Do you go so far as to maintain that of the
beings who delight in the painful, some wish for it, long
for it, seek, search, hunt for it, and persist in cleaving
to it? Is not rather the opposite your genuine belief-?
You assent. Then how do you maintain your proposi-
tion?
[2] Can anyone have at once a latent bias of lust for
painful feeling and a latent bias of aversion from pleasant
feeling?1 Will not these two forms of bias be [really]
directed inversely, the former craving pleasure, the latter
hating pain ?
[3] U.—But if I am wrong, was it not said by the
Exalted One: ' He, thus, expert in complacency and anti-
pathy, delights in and commends whatsoever feeling he feels,
pleasant, painful, or neutral, and persists in cleaving to
it'?2
Hence surely there is such a thing as lusting for the
unpleasant ?
9. Of the Unmorality of a Natural Desire for Objects
of the Mind.
Controverted Point.—That to crave for objects of the
mind is unmoral.
1
I.e. to being subjugated to feeling.
2
Majjhima-Nik., i, 266. ' Delight,' the Sutta goes on, ' is grasping
after the things of sense, which cause the feelings.'
From the Commentary.— Some, like the Pubbaseliyas, hold that
the sixth kind of objects of sense-experience,1 coming after any of the
five forms of sensations, is neither moral nor immoral.
[1] Th.—If that be so, this craving must belong to one
of the moral indeterminates—to wit, resultant or inopera-
tive indeterminates—matter, Nibbana, or the organs and
objects of the five senses. But you must deny this [as not
doctrinal].
Or what reason have you for dissociating this sixth
form of tanha [natural desire or craving] from the rest?
If you admit that a craving for objects of sight, sound,
and so on is immoral, you must admit as much concerning
the co-ordination of these.
[2] Did not the Exalted One call craving immoral ?
Does not this condemn your proposition ? Did he not call
appetite (or greed) immoral? and is not craving for objects
of the mind a kind of greed ?
[3] Tour contention is that a craving for objects of the
mind is an unmoral appetite, but you are not justified in
using lobha with this qualification, when in the other
five modes of sense it is called immoral.
[4] Again, was it not said by the Exalted One : ' This
natural desire is concerned with rebirth, is accompanied by
delight and hist, dallying here and there—to wit, desires of
sense, desire for rebirth, desire not to live again '?2 . . .
[5] P.—But if I am wrong, is not this [threefold]
craving a craving for certain ideas or mental objects?3
Hence surely such a craving is as such immoral.
1
The co-ordination of different successive sensations as a concrete
single percept and image—-e.g., of orange colour, smell, roundness, and
certain other touches into an orange—was conceived by Buddhists as
a sort of sixth sense.
2
Samyutta-Nik., iii. 26 ; Vin. Texts, i, 95, reading 'non-existence'
for 'prosperity.' (Vibhava may conceivably mean either ; but the
traditional reading is, as the Commentary to the Kathavatthu says,
the goal of the Annihilationists.)
3
'This is inconclusive, because the citation shows nothing as to
a non-ethical nature, but refers to the process of natural desire
concerning a mental object.'—Comy.
10. Of Desire for Ideas and the Cause of Ill.
Controverted Point.—That the natural desire for objects
of mind is not the Cause of Ill.
From the Commentary. — This, too, is an opinion of the Pubba-
seliyas and others. The argument follows the preceding.
[1] Th.—What reason have you for dissociating this
form of craving from the other five ? If you admit that
a craving for objects of sight, sound, and so on, is im-
moral, you must admit as much concerning the co-ordina-
tion of these as ideas (percepts or images).
[2-5] Continue to imitate the preceding argument, XIII. 9
Kathavatthu - Of one whose Salvation is Morally Certain, One in the Toils, Of Captivity and Release, Of Jhana as Enjoyment
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
4. Of One whose Salvation is Morally Certain (niyata).
Controverted Point.—That one who is morally certain of
salvation has entered the Path of Assurance.1
From the Commentary. — Niyama (Assurance) is of two kinds,
according as it is in the wrong or the right direction. The former
is conduct that finds retribution without delay,2 the latter is the Ariyan
Path. And there is no other. All other mental phenomena happen-
ing in the three planes of being are not of the invariably fixed order,
and one who enjoys them is himself 'not assured.' Buddhas, by the
force of their foresight, used to prophesy: ' Such an one will in future
attain to Bodhi ' (Buddhahood). This person is a Bodhisat, who may
be called Assured (Niyata), by reason of the cumulative growth of
merit.3
Now the Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas, taking the term
' Assured' without distinction as to direction, assumed that a Bodhisat
was becoming fitted to penetrate the Truths in his last birth, and
therefore held that he was already ' Assured.'
1
Here the text (both PTS and Br.) has niyama, while the Com-
mentary has niyama. The former is technically more correct. See
V. 4, and Appendix : Assurance.
2
Anantariyakamma . See above, VIII. 9-11.
3
Read for punnassa datva , punn' ussadatta . The title
of Niyata is extended to a Bodhisat by courtesy, so to speak,
because his final salvation, through accumulating merit, amounts
almost to a certainty, is highly probable. Cf. IV. 8.
[1] Th.—Do you imply that the so-called 'Assured'
enters upon the True Path of Assurance when assured of
immediate retribution, and upon the False Path of Assur-
ance when assured of final salvation ? That having first
practised the Path, he afterwards enters upon the Assur-
ance ; that having first practised the Stream-Winner's
Path, he afterwards enters upon the Assurance of the,
Stream-Winner, and so on . . . That finally, entrance
upon Assurance comes after practise of the applications
in mindfulness and the rest of the Factors of Enlighten-
ment ?
[2] P.A.—But in contradicting us, you imply that the
Bodhisat was not fitted by that last birth to penetrate the
Truths.
1
Th.—Nay, I say not so.
P.A.—Then he was [already] assured of entering upon
the Path of Assurance.
5. Of One in the Toils.
Controverted Point.—That a Hindrance is cast of f by one
who is entangled in it.
From the Commentary.—The Uttarapathakas are among those who
hold that, just as there is no purifying work left for the purified, so
it must be one entangled, obstructed, cloaked by the Hindrances, who
abandons them.
[1] Th.—Equally then he who is infatuated abandons
lust; he who is malign, stupid, corrupt, abandons hate,
dulness, corruptions, respectively. Now, does he cast off
lust by lust, hate by hate, and so on ?
U.—[If this is not so, you are suggesting that the
Hindrances are cast out by the Path.] Now you allow
that lust, for instance, and the Path are both conscious
experiences. But do you not hereby imply a combination
of two rival mental procedures ? Lust is immoral, the
Path is moral—does not your position imply that good and
bad, moral and immoral, radiant and sinister mental states
confront each other in the mind ? And was it not said by
the Exalted One : 'These four things are very far apart: the
sky and the earth, the hither and the yonder shore of the
ocean, whence the sun rises and where he sinks. . . . Hence
far is norm of goodfrom that of evil' ? 1
Hence it is also wrong to say good and bad states con-
front each other in the mind at the same moment.
[2] Th.—But was it not said by the Exalted One:
' With consciousness thus concentrated, made pure, trans-
lucent, cleared, void of defilement, made supple, ivieldy, firm,
imperturbable, he applies and bends over the mind to insight
into the destruction of Intoxicants'?2
[3] U-.—But was it not also said by the Exalted One :
'He thus knowing, thus seeing, his heart is set free from the
Intoxicants — sense-desires, lust of becoming, error and
nescience ' ?3
Hence surely it is one who is entangled by the Hindrances
who casts them off .
6. Of Captivity and Release.
Controverted Point—That a Fetter is cast of f by one
who is in thrall to it.4
From the Commentary.—This follows the preceding argument. To
be ' in thrall to ' means fo be up against the Fetters, to have reached
the state of being possessed of them.
The discourse is similar to XIII. 5.
7. Of Jhana as Enjoyment,
Controverted Point.—That the expert enjoys Jhana, and
the desire for Jhana has Jhana as its object.5
1
Quoted in full on p. 201 f .
2
Dialogues, i. 92.
3
Ibid., 93. 'This is inconclusive, not being spoken concerning one
still in the toils.'— Comy. "With this discourse cf. III. 3.
4
Literally, is face to face with it.
5
Jhana-exercises, rightly valued, are solely a means, not an end, the,
end, for the Ariyan, being adhicitta , or the consciousness called,
From the Commentary.—This opinion, held, for instance, by the
Andhakas, is based upon the Word : 'He attaining to and abiding in
First Jhana finds enjoyment in it.'
[1] Th.—Do you mean that a given Jhana is the mental
object to that same Jhana ? If you deny,1 your proposi-
tion falls. If you assent, you must equally admit that he
touches a given mental contact with the same contact,
feels a given feeling with that feeling, and so on for per-
ception, volition, thought, applied and sustained intellec-
tion, zest, mindfulness, understanding. . . .
[2] You admit that desire for Jhana and Jhana itself
are forms of conscious experience ? But are you prepared
to admit further that they constitute two conscious pro-
cesses going on at once ? You deny; then your former
admission is invalid. And i f you admit further that desire
for Jhana is wrong while Jhana itself is good, you bring
the good and the bad up against each other in the same
consciousness—things as ' far apart as earth and sky,' etc.2
[3] A.—But, if I am wrong, was it not said by the
Exalted One : 'Take the case, bhikkhus, of a bhikkhu who,
aloof from sensuous ideas, aloof from evil ideas, entering into,
abides in First Jhana: he enjoys it, he yearns over it, and
by it he is delighted '?3
Hence surely the expert enjoys Jhana, and the desire for
Jhana has Jhana as a mental object.
especially in later books, supramundane. For the more worldly
aspirant the end was rebirth in the Rupa, or Arupa heavens.
1
For fear of not conforming to the Suttas.—Comy.
2
See VII. 5; XIII. 5.
3
Anguttara-Nik., ii. 126. Here such an expert is aspiring to the
Brahma-heavens (Rupa-loka) only, and is contrasted with the ' disciple
of the Exalted One.' ' The passage is inconclusive, inasmuch as it
refers to pleasure in and desire for Jhana after, and not during the
exercise of it.'—Comy.
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
4. Of One whose Salvation is Morally Certain (niyata).
Controverted Point.—That one who is morally certain of
salvation has entered the Path of Assurance.1
From the Commentary. — Niyama (Assurance) is of two kinds,
according as it is in the wrong or the right direction. The former
is conduct that finds retribution without delay,2 the latter is the Ariyan
Path. And there is no other. All other mental phenomena happen-
ing in the three planes of being are not of the invariably fixed order,
and one who enjoys them is himself 'not assured.' Buddhas, by the
force of their foresight, used to prophesy: ' Such an one will in future
attain to Bodhi ' (Buddhahood). This person is a Bodhisat, who may
be called Assured (Niyata), by reason of the cumulative growth of
merit.3
Now the Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas, taking the term
' Assured' without distinction as to direction, assumed that a Bodhisat
was becoming fitted to penetrate the Truths in his last birth, and
therefore held that he was already ' Assured.'
1
Here the text (both PTS and Br.) has niyama, while the Com-
mentary has niyama. The former is technically more correct. See
V. 4, and Appendix : Assurance.
2
Anantariyakamma . See above, VIII. 9-11.
3
Read for punnassa datva , punn' ussadatta . The title
of Niyata is extended to a Bodhisat by courtesy, so to speak,
because his final salvation, through accumulating merit, amounts
almost to a certainty, is highly probable. Cf. IV. 8.
[1] Th.—Do you imply that the so-called 'Assured'
enters upon the True Path of Assurance when assured of
immediate retribution, and upon the False Path of Assur-
ance when assured of final salvation ? That having first
practised the Path, he afterwards enters upon the Assur-
ance ; that having first practised the Stream-Winner's
Path, he afterwards enters upon the Assurance of the,
Stream-Winner, and so on . . . That finally, entrance
upon Assurance comes after practise of the applications
in mindfulness and the rest of the Factors of Enlighten-
ment ?
[2] P.A.—But in contradicting us, you imply that the
Bodhisat was not fitted by that last birth to penetrate the
Truths.
1
Th.—Nay, I say not so.
P.A.—Then he was [already] assured of entering upon
the Path of Assurance.
5. Of One in the Toils.
Controverted Point.—That a Hindrance is cast of f by one
who is entangled in it.
From the Commentary.—The Uttarapathakas are among those who
hold that, just as there is no purifying work left for the purified, so
it must be one entangled, obstructed, cloaked by the Hindrances, who
abandons them.
[1] Th.—Equally then he who is infatuated abandons
lust; he who is malign, stupid, corrupt, abandons hate,
dulness, corruptions, respectively. Now, does he cast off
lust by lust, hate by hate, and so on ?
U.—[If this is not so, you are suggesting that the
Hindrances are cast out by the Path.] Now you allow
that lust, for instance, and the Path are both conscious
experiences. But do you not hereby imply a combination
of two rival mental procedures ? Lust is immoral, the
Path is moral—does not your position imply that good and
bad, moral and immoral, radiant and sinister mental states
confront each other in the mind ? And was it not said by
the Exalted One : 'These four things are very far apart: the
sky and the earth, the hither and the yonder shore of the
ocean, whence the sun rises and where he sinks. . . . Hence
far is norm of goodfrom that of evil' ? 1
Hence it is also wrong to say good and bad states con-
front each other in the mind at the same moment.
[2] Th.—But was it not said by the Exalted One:
' With consciousness thus concentrated, made pure, trans-
lucent, cleared, void of defilement, made supple, ivieldy, firm,
imperturbable, he applies and bends over the mind to insight
into the destruction of Intoxicants'?2
[3] U-.—But was it not also said by the Exalted One :
'He thus knowing, thus seeing, his heart is set free from the
Intoxicants — sense-desires, lust of becoming, error and
nescience ' ?3
Hence surely it is one who is entangled by the Hindrances
who casts them off .
6. Of Captivity and Release.
Controverted Point—That a Fetter is cast of f by one
who is in thrall to it.4
From the Commentary.—This follows the preceding argument. To
be ' in thrall to ' means fo be up against the Fetters, to have reached
the state of being possessed of them.
The discourse is similar to XIII. 5.
7. Of Jhana as Enjoyment,
Controverted Point.—That the expert enjoys Jhana, and
the desire for Jhana has Jhana as its object.5
1
Quoted in full on p. 201 f .
2
Dialogues, i. 92.
3
Ibid., 93. 'This is inconclusive, not being spoken concerning one
still in the toils.'— Comy. "With this discourse cf. III. 3.
4
Literally, is face to face with it.
5
Jhana-exercises, rightly valued, are solely a means, not an end, the,
end, for the Ariyan, being adhicitta , or the consciousness called,
From the Commentary.—This opinion, held, for instance, by the
Andhakas, is based upon the Word : 'He attaining to and abiding in
First Jhana finds enjoyment in it.'
[1] Th.—Do you mean that a given Jhana is the mental
object to that same Jhana ? If you deny,1 your proposi-
tion falls. If you assent, you must equally admit that he
touches a given mental contact with the same contact,
feels a given feeling with that feeling, and so on for per-
ception, volition, thought, applied and sustained intellec-
tion, zest, mindfulness, understanding. . . .
[2] You admit that desire for Jhana and Jhana itself
are forms of conscious experience ? But are you prepared
to admit further that they constitute two conscious pro-
cesses going on at once ? You deny; then your former
admission is invalid. And i f you admit further that desire
for Jhana is wrong while Jhana itself is good, you bring
the good and the bad up against each other in the same
consciousness—things as ' far apart as earth and sky,' etc.2
[3] A.—But, if I am wrong, was it not said by the
Exalted One : 'Take the case, bhikkhus, of a bhikkhu who,
aloof from sensuous ideas, aloof from evil ideas, entering into,
abides in First Jhana: he enjoys it, he yearns over it, and
by it he is delighted '?3
Hence surely the expert enjoys Jhana, and the desire for
Jhana has Jhana as a mental object.
especially in later books, supramundane. For the more worldly
aspirant the end was rebirth in the Rupa, or Arupa heavens.
1
For fear of not conforming to the Suttas.—Comy.
2
See VII. 5; XIII. 5.
3
Anguttara-Nik., ii. 126. Here such an expert is aspiring to the
Brahma-heavens (Rupa-loka) only, and is contrasted with the ' disciple
of the Exalted One.' ' The passage is inconclusive, inasmuch as it
refers to pleasure in and desire for Jhana after, and not during the
exercise of it.'—Comy.
Wednesday, June 22, 2011
Kathavatthu - Of Age-long Penalty, A Doomed Man's Morality, Abettors of Cardinal Crimes
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
BOOK XIII
1. Of Age-Long Penalty.
Controverted Point.—That one doomed to age-long retri-
bution must endure it for a whole kappa .
From the Commentary.—This concerns those who, like the Raja-
girikas, hold the notion that the phrase, 'one who breaks up the
concord of the Crder is tormented in purgatory for a kappa,'1
means that a schismatic is so 'tormented for an entire kappa.'2
[1] Th.—But this implies that the cycle may start
when a Buddha is born into the world, or when the Order
is dissolved, or when the condemned person is committing
the act incurring the penalty, or when he is dying. . . .
[2] It also implies that if he live for a past kappa , he
may live for a future one—nay, for two, three, or four. . . .
And if during his kapp a there be a cosmic conflagra-
tion,3 whither will he go ?
R.—To another plane of the universe.4
Th.—Do the dead go thither ? Do they go to the sky ?
R.—The dead go.
Th.—Can the act involving the penalty take effect in
a subsequent life ? You must deny.5. . . . Hence he must
go to the sky. This implies that he has the gift of iddhi3—
1
Itivuttaka, § 18.
2
On the loose significance of the time-term kappa , see above,
XI. 5. The orthodox view was that the purgatorial retribution lasted
for the remainder of the cycle or cosmic era.
3
Literally, 'should the kapp a burn.' . . .
4
Loka-dhatu.
5
See above, p. 260.
else he could not. Now can one doomed to age-long
retribution practise the four steps to Iddhi—will, effort,
thought, investigation ? . . .
[3] R.—But if I am wrong, was it not said by the
Exalted One:
'Doomed to the Waste, to purgatorial woe
For age-long penalties, provoking schism,
Of discord fain, fixed in unrighteousness,
From the sure haven doth he fall away,
Breaking the concord of the Brotherhood,
Age-long in pur gat ry he waxeth ripe '?1
Hence my proposition is true.
2. Of a Doomed Man's Morality.
Controverted Point.—That a person doomed for a kappa
may not acquire moral consciousness.
From the Commentary. — So, for instance, the Uttarapathakas,
making no distinction between that lower goodness of the world of
sense-desire, which such a person may alone acquire, and the sub-
limer," or the highest goodness, by which he would be able to avert
his doom.
[1] Th.—Yet you admit that he may make gifts [to the
Order]—how then can your proposition hold ? And not
only gifts—namely, of raiment, alms, food, lodging, medica-
ments against illness, various kinds of food, drink—but also
that he may render homage at a shrine of older faiths,2
decorate it with a wreath, with incense, with ointment,
salute it by marching round.3 .. .
1
Itivuttaka, § 13. The Commentary adds that these stanzas
were uttered by the Buddha with reference to the normal life-cycle
(ayukappa ) in purgatory. This is one-eightieth part of a great
kappa.' As thus included it is also called an antarakappa.
2
Cetiya , a pre-Buddhist term for anything worthy of being
revered as a memorial. Buddhism has applied it to the four classes
of recognized memorials—paribhoga- , dhatu- , Dhamma- ,
And udissa-cetiya's. The last includes images.
3
In Br. abhidakkhinang, or consummate offering.
T.S. V.
[2] U.—You contradict my proposition. Now you admit
that he may acquire good consciousness arising out of that
[purgatorial discipline]. Yet this implies that he may also
acquire good consciousness belonging to the Rupa- and
Arupa-spheres,1 and belonging even to the supramundane
mind. .. .
3. Of Abettors of Cardinal Crimes.
Controverted Point.—That a person who, as abettor, is
involved in ' immediate retribution' may enter on the
True Path of Assurance.
From the Commentary.—Such a person, who at death inherits the
immediate effect of karma, may have abetted any of the cardinal
crimes (matricide, etc.) in one of two ways—by a permanent or stand-
ing injunction to commit the crime, or by an occasional injunction.
An abettor of the former class is already assured of his doom along
the Wrong Path, because of the will to accomplish such a course
having arisen. He is incapable of entering the True Path. But the
other class of abettor is not incapable. So do we conclude in our
doctrine. But some, like the Uttarapathakas, judge of the latter class
as we do of the former only.
[1] U.—Do you mean that such a culpable abettor can
enter on both the False and the True Path of Assurance ?
If you deny, neither can you affirm your proposition.
Again, if he become worried and uneasy after his con-
nection with the deed, how can he ever enter on the True
Path of Assurance ?2
[2] Th.—You say he is incapable o f entering on that
Path. But are you assuming that one or other of the five
cardinal crimes has actually been committed [through his
abetment] ? Your proposition implies this.3
1
In Jhana-ecstasy.
2
Stress is laid by the opponent on the evil character of worry
(kukkucca-pattimattang gahetva).—Comy. It is one of the'
Five Hindrances, taken together with uddhacca (distraction, or
flurry). See Dialogues, i., p. 82, § 68.
3 'Actual commission of any one of the five is to be proved in-
capable of entering on the True Path of Assurance.'—Comy. This,,
we judge, refers to the principal offender. If there be no actual
commission, the abettor is a fortiori not liable to severe retribution.
Again, you affirm that an abettor of such crimes, when
he has withdrawn his instigation, and has dispelled his
worry and remorse, is still incapable of entering upon the
True Path of Assurance. Hereby you imply that some one
of the grave misdeeds just named has been actually com-
mitted [at his instigation]. But can you maintain your
position in the face of his reforming before the commis-
sion of the act ?
[3] U.—But has he not previously instigated someone
to commit it? How then can you judge him capable of
entering on the True Path of Assurance ?
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
BOOK XIII
1. Of Age-Long Penalty.
Controverted Point.—That one doomed to age-long retri-
bution must endure it for a whole kappa .
From the Commentary.—This concerns those who, like the Raja-
girikas, hold the notion that the phrase, 'one who breaks up the
concord of the Crder is tormented in purgatory for a kappa,'1
means that a schismatic is so 'tormented for an entire kappa.'2
[1] Th.—But this implies that the cycle may start
when a Buddha is born into the world, or when the Order
is dissolved, or when the condemned person is committing
the act incurring the penalty, or when he is dying. . . .
[2] It also implies that if he live for a past kappa , he
may live for a future one—nay, for two, three, or four. . . .
And if during his kapp a there be a cosmic conflagra-
tion,3 whither will he go ?
R.—To another plane of the universe.4
Th.—Do the dead go thither ? Do they go to the sky ?
R.—The dead go.
Th.—Can the act involving the penalty take effect in
a subsequent life ? You must deny.5. . . . Hence he must
go to the sky. This implies that he has the gift of iddhi3—
1
Itivuttaka, § 18.
2
On the loose significance of the time-term kappa , see above,
XI. 5. The orthodox view was that the purgatorial retribution lasted
for the remainder of the cycle or cosmic era.
3
Literally, 'should the kapp a burn.' . . .
4
Loka-dhatu.
5
See above, p. 260.
else he could not. Now can one doomed to age-long
retribution practise the four steps to Iddhi—will, effort,
thought, investigation ? . . .
[3] R.—But if I am wrong, was it not said by the
Exalted One:
'Doomed to the Waste, to purgatorial woe
For age-long penalties, provoking schism,
Of discord fain, fixed in unrighteousness,
From the sure haven doth he fall away,
Breaking the concord of the Brotherhood,
Age-long in pur gat ry he waxeth ripe '?1
Hence my proposition is true.
2. Of a Doomed Man's Morality.
Controverted Point.—That a person doomed for a kappa
may not acquire moral consciousness.
From the Commentary. — So, for instance, the Uttarapathakas,
making no distinction between that lower goodness of the world of
sense-desire, which such a person may alone acquire, and the sub-
limer," or the highest goodness, by which he would be able to avert
his doom.
[1] Th.—Yet you admit that he may make gifts [to the
Order]—how then can your proposition hold ? And not
only gifts—namely, of raiment, alms, food, lodging, medica-
ments against illness, various kinds of food, drink—but also
that he may render homage at a shrine of older faiths,2
decorate it with a wreath, with incense, with ointment,
salute it by marching round.3 .. .
1
Itivuttaka, § 13. The Commentary adds that these stanzas
were uttered by the Buddha with reference to the normal life-cycle
(ayukappa ) in purgatory. This is one-eightieth part of a great
kappa.' As thus included it is also called an antarakappa.
2
Cetiya , a pre-Buddhist term for anything worthy of being
revered as a memorial. Buddhism has applied it to the four classes
of recognized memorials—paribhoga- , dhatu- , Dhamma- ,
And udissa-cetiya's. The last includes images.
3
In Br. abhidakkhinang, or consummate offering.
T.S. V.
[2] U.—You contradict my proposition. Now you admit
that he may acquire good consciousness arising out of that
[purgatorial discipline]. Yet this implies that he may also
acquire good consciousness belonging to the Rupa- and
Arupa-spheres,1 and belonging even to the supramundane
mind. .. .
3. Of Abettors of Cardinal Crimes.
Controverted Point.—That a person who, as abettor, is
involved in ' immediate retribution' may enter on the
True Path of Assurance.
From the Commentary.—Such a person, who at death inherits the
immediate effect of karma, may have abetted any of the cardinal
crimes (matricide, etc.) in one of two ways—by a permanent or stand-
ing injunction to commit the crime, or by an occasional injunction.
An abettor of the former class is already assured of his doom along
the Wrong Path, because of the will to accomplish such a course
having arisen. He is incapable of entering the True Path. But the
other class of abettor is not incapable. So do we conclude in our
doctrine. But some, like the Uttarapathakas, judge of the latter class
as we do of the former only.
[1] U.—Do you mean that such a culpable abettor can
enter on both the False and the True Path of Assurance ?
If you deny, neither can you affirm your proposition.
Again, if he become worried and uneasy after his con-
nection with the deed, how can he ever enter on the True
Path of Assurance ?2
[2] Th.—You say he is incapable o f entering on that
Path. But are you assuming that one or other of the five
cardinal crimes has actually been committed [through his
abetment] ? Your proposition implies this.3
1
In Jhana-ecstasy.
2
Stress is laid by the opponent on the evil character of worry
(kukkucca-pattimattang gahetva).—Comy. It is one of the'
Five Hindrances, taken together with uddhacca (distraction, or
flurry). See Dialogues, i., p. 82, § 68.
3 'Actual commission of any one of the five is to be proved in-
capable of entering on the True Path of Assurance.'—Comy. This,,
we judge, refers to the principal offender. If there be no actual
commission, the abettor is a fortiori not liable to severe retribution.
Again, you affirm that an abettor of such crimes, when
he has withdrawn his instigation, and has dispelled his
worry and remorse, is still incapable of entering upon the
True Path of Assurance. Hereby you imply that some one
of the grave misdeeds just named has been actually com-
mitted [at his instigation]. But can you maintain your
position in the face of his reforming before the commis-
sion of the act ?
[3] U.—But has he not previously instigated someone
to commit it? How then can you judge him capable of
entering on the True Path of Assurance ?
Kathavatthu - Of Murder, Of Evil Tendency, Of him who has reached the Seventh Rebirth
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
7. Of Murder.
Controverted Point—That a person who has attained to
sound views3 may yet designedly commit murder.
From the Commentary. — Some, like the Pubbaseliyas, hold that,
since a person who has attained to sound views has not entirely put
3
Ditthisampanno puggalo , a technical term of religious
life, wherein the word ditthi no longer means erroneous opinion,
but the opposite. Such an one is still a learner (sekha) , but has
put away all but the last fetters and residual lust, hate, and nescience,
and is incapable, so the Buddha taught, of any of the misdeeds or of
the irreverence mentioned above.—Samyutta-Nik., ii. 43 f.; vi. s.v.
Ditthi ; Anguttara-Nik., iii. 438 f.
away enmity, and since he who takes life has enmity in his heart,
therefore one who thinks rightly may yet commit wilful murder.
[1] Th.—Then you imply that he may designedly com-
mit [any murder, even the worst, to wit] matricide, parri-
cide, Arahanticide, or with enmity at heart may wound a
Tathagata, or create schism in the Order. . . .
[2] You imply, moreover, that [since he may commit
such a deed] he can have no reverence for Master, Doctrine,
Order, or Training, [3] while you know, on the other hand,
that such a person feels just the opposite.
[4] You imply, moreover, that such a person may defile1
Buddha shrines, desecrate them, spit on them, behave as
an infidel in presence of them ?2
[5] But was it not said by the Exalted One: ' Just as
the ocean, bhikkhus, remains of the same native, and passes
not beyond the shore, just so is the body of precepts which I
have established for those who are hearers of my word, and
which they their lives long do not pass beyond' ?3
Hence it is not right to say that a person who has
attained to sound views may designedly deprive a living
creature of life.
8. Of Evil Tendency.4
Controverted Point.—That for a person holding sound
views evil tendencies are eliminated.
From the Commentary.—This view is due to the lack of making
proper distinction, by such as the Uttarapathakas, between an evil
1
See Vin. Texts, iii. 277, n, 3.
Apabyamato, Br. asabyakato , Br. translation: abyasa -
kato. The Burmese scholar, U. Pandi, suggests we should read
apabyakato , by which he understands 'blasphemously.' The
Commentary on Samyutta-Nik., i. 226, only remarks: apabyamato
karitya abyamato katva .
3 Vin. Texts, iii. 303.
4
Duggati denotes evil destiny, and connotes the sense-desires
of beings involved therein. The orthodox position is, that one who
holds sound views may still possess sense-desires which may involve
such a destiny.
destiny and the natural desires concerning objects of sense felt by
those who are involved in such a destiny.
[1-4] Th,—But you concede that such a person [though
safe as to his destiny] may still get infatuated with any
purgatorial objects of sense,1 may commit fornication with
females that are not human, whether demons, animals, or
fairies ; may keep worldly possessions, such as goats and
sheep, poultry and swine, elephants, cattle, horses and
mules, partridges, quails, peacocks and pheasants.2 If
you assent to all this, your proposition cannot stand.
Moreover, you cannot possibly admit all this in the case
of an Arahant. Contrariwise, you repudiate it for him,
while you admit (as you must) that it may prove true for
one who has [merely] sound views.
[5] U.—Then if I am wrong, you imply that the person
holding sound views may yet be reborn in purgatory, in
the animal kingdom, in the realm of the Petas ? If you
deny, you must also retract your contradiction.3
9. Of Him ivho has reached the Seventh Rebirth.4
Controverted Point—That for a person in the seventh
rebirth evil tendencies are eliminated.
The text gives only the opponents rejoinder, similar to § 5
in the foregoing.
1
In PTS edition [1] the reply to the second question should also
be Amanta.
2 See above, IV. 1. [5].
3
The Commentary finds the rejoinder inconclusive, because 'the
question refers to the tanha which may entail purgatorial retribu-
tion, but not to the tanha for purgatorial objects of desire.
4
Sattamabhavika, or Sattamaka , terms which we have
not met elsewhere. See XII. 5.
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
7. Of Murder.
Controverted Point—That a person who has attained to
sound views3 may yet designedly commit murder.
From the Commentary. — Some, like the Pubbaseliyas, hold that,
since a person who has attained to sound views has not entirely put
3
Ditthisampanno puggalo , a technical term of religious
life, wherein the word ditthi no longer means erroneous opinion,
but the opposite. Such an one is still a learner (sekha) , but has
put away all but the last fetters and residual lust, hate, and nescience,
and is incapable, so the Buddha taught, of any of the misdeeds or of
the irreverence mentioned above.—Samyutta-Nik., ii. 43 f.; vi. s.v.
Ditthi ; Anguttara-Nik., iii. 438 f.
away enmity, and since he who takes life has enmity in his heart,
therefore one who thinks rightly may yet commit wilful murder.
[1] Th.—Then you imply that he may designedly com-
mit [any murder, even the worst, to wit] matricide, parri-
cide, Arahanticide, or with enmity at heart may wound a
Tathagata, or create schism in the Order. . . .
[2] You imply, moreover, that [since he may commit
such a deed] he can have no reverence for Master, Doctrine,
Order, or Training, [3] while you know, on the other hand,
that such a person feels just the opposite.
[4] You imply, moreover, that such a person may defile1
Buddha shrines, desecrate them, spit on them, behave as
an infidel in presence of them ?2
[5] But was it not said by the Exalted One: ' Just as
the ocean, bhikkhus, remains of the same native, and passes
not beyond the shore, just so is the body of precepts which I
have established for those who are hearers of my word, and
which they their lives long do not pass beyond' ?3
Hence it is not right to say that a person who has
attained to sound views may designedly deprive a living
creature of life.
8. Of Evil Tendency.4
Controverted Point.—That for a person holding sound
views evil tendencies are eliminated.
From the Commentary.—This view is due to the lack of making
proper distinction, by such as the Uttarapathakas, between an evil
1
See Vin. Texts, iii. 277, n, 3.
Apabyamato, Br. asabyakato , Br. translation: abyasa -
kato. The Burmese scholar, U. Pandi, suggests we should read
apabyakato , by which he understands 'blasphemously.' The
Commentary on Samyutta-Nik., i. 226, only remarks: apabyamato
karitya abyamato katva .
3 Vin. Texts, iii. 303.
4
Duggati denotes evil destiny, and connotes the sense-desires
of beings involved therein. The orthodox position is, that one who
holds sound views may still possess sense-desires which may involve
such a destiny.
destiny and the natural desires concerning objects of sense felt by
those who are involved in such a destiny.
[1-4] Th,—But you concede that such a person [though
safe as to his destiny] may still get infatuated with any
purgatorial objects of sense,1 may commit fornication with
females that are not human, whether demons, animals, or
fairies ; may keep worldly possessions, such as goats and
sheep, poultry and swine, elephants, cattle, horses and
mules, partridges, quails, peacocks and pheasants.2 If
you assent to all this, your proposition cannot stand.
Moreover, you cannot possibly admit all this in the case
of an Arahant. Contrariwise, you repudiate it for him,
while you admit (as you must) that it may prove true for
one who has [merely] sound views.
[5] U.—Then if I am wrong, you imply that the person
holding sound views may yet be reborn in purgatory, in
the animal kingdom, in the realm of the Petas ? If you
deny, you must also retract your contradiction.3
9. Of Him ivho has reached the Seventh Rebirth.4
Controverted Point—That for a person in the seventh
rebirth evil tendencies are eliminated.
The text gives only the opponents rejoinder, similar to § 5
in the foregoing.
1
In PTS edition [1] the reply to the second question should also
be Amanta.
2 See above, IV. 1. [5].
3
The Commentary finds the rejoinder inconclusive, because 'the
question refers to the tanha which may entail purgatorial retribu-
tion, but not to the tanha for purgatorial objects of desire.
4
Sattamabhavika, or Sattamaka , terms which we have
not met elsewhere. See XII. 5.
Kathavatthu - Of the Sense-Organs, Of the Seven Rebirths' Limit, Sequel
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
4. Of the Sense-Organs.
Controverted Point.—That the sense-organs are results
of karma.
From the Commentary.—Here again it is a Mahasanghika belief
that, because the sense-organs have arisen through the doing of past
actions, therefore they are results (understood as subjective or mental).
Of them the sixth, or co-ordinating, sense may at times be such a
result, but not the others.
[1-4] The argument follows that of the previous dialogue
verbatim, the ' sixth sense' (man'ayatana) being omitted.
5. Of the Seven-Rebirths'-Limit.1
Controverted Point,—That he who is said to be liable to
seven more rebirths at most is assured of final salvation2
only at the end of the seven-rebirths' interval.3
From the Commentary.—This is a belief held, for instance, by the
Uttarapathakas. The Theravadin's object is to show that there is
no such immutably fixed order. There is only (1) the ' true order' of the
Ariyan Path, and (2) the 'false order,'4 to which belong the five heinous
crimes entailing inevitable retribution in the very next existence.
[1] Th.—Is such an one capable of murdering mother,
father, or Arahant, of shedding with malign heart a Tatha-
gata's blood, of creating schism ? You deny. . . .
[2] And is he incapable of penetrating Truth during the
interval ? You deny. Then he cannot possibly become
guilty of those heinous crimes, which admit o f no inter-
vening rebirth without retribution. You now assent, ad-
mitting that he is incapable of that penetration. Then
you imply that he may commit those crimes, which of
such a man you deny.
[3] Is there a fixed order of things5 (among the Paths)
by which the seven-rebirths'-limit man is bound to go
through all the seven ? You deny. Then your proposition
cannot hold. Do you in other words hold that there are
applications o f mindfulness, supreme efforts, steps to
potency, controlling powers, forces, factors of enlighten-
ment, by [culture in] which the seven-births'-limit person
is destined to go through all seven ?
1
That is, seven at the outside, possibly fewer. See I. 4.
2
I.e., in the Ariyan fourfold Path and its climax. On niyato
see V. 4; cf. VI. 1.
3
According to the Burmese translation of the text, the question
turns on whether such a person is subjectively assured of his own
state, or whether he must go through his last seven lives before he
becomes so assured? The Commentary paraphrases -paramata
by -paramataya, and the Br. translator takes this as either instru-
mental or locative. The sense is the same.
4
Cf. I. 3.
5
On niyama and niyama, see Appendix : Assurance.
[4] Is not the opposite the ease ? And how then can
you maintain your proposition ?
[5] You maintain that such a person is not so destined
except by the fixed order of the First, or Stream-winner's
Path. But are all who enter on that Path destined to go
through all the seven rebirths ?
[6] U.—You say I am wrong; nevertheless you must
admit that the person in question is a seven-births'-limit
person ? Surely then my proposition stands ? . . .
6. Sequel to the Foregoing.
[1] U.—Again, if you maintain it is wrong to say that the
kolankola,1
or one ranking in the First Path next above
him of the seven rebirths' limit, is assured of salvation by
his rank,2
I ask, Does not his rank itself [guarantee that he
shall attain] ?
[2] And does not the next higher rank in the First Path,
that of eka-bijin , or 'one-seeder,' also guarantee final
salvation?
1
Explained by Buddhaghosa, commenting on Anguttara-Nik.,
i. 233, as meaning 'a goer from family (kula) to family,' 'kula
here standing for bhava ' (rebirth). See above, p. 77, n. 3.
2
Burmese translators give alternative renderings—in or by his rank
—for kolankolata .
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
4. Of the Sense-Organs.
Controverted Point.—That the sense-organs are results
of karma.
From the Commentary.—Here again it is a Mahasanghika belief
that, because the sense-organs have arisen through the doing of past
actions, therefore they are results (understood as subjective or mental).
Of them the sixth, or co-ordinating, sense may at times be such a
result, but not the others.
[1-4] The argument follows that of the previous dialogue
verbatim, the ' sixth sense' (man'ayatana) being omitted.
5. Of the Seven-Rebirths'-Limit.1
Controverted Point,—That he who is said to be liable to
seven more rebirths at most is assured of final salvation2
only at the end of the seven-rebirths' interval.3
From the Commentary.—This is a belief held, for instance, by the
Uttarapathakas. The Theravadin's object is to show that there is
no such immutably fixed order. There is only (1) the ' true order' of the
Ariyan Path, and (2) the 'false order,'4 to which belong the five heinous
crimes entailing inevitable retribution in the very next existence.
[1] Th.—Is such an one capable of murdering mother,
father, or Arahant, of shedding with malign heart a Tatha-
gata's blood, of creating schism ? You deny. . . .
[2] And is he incapable of penetrating Truth during the
interval ? You deny. Then he cannot possibly become
guilty of those heinous crimes, which admit o f no inter-
vening rebirth without retribution. You now assent, ad-
mitting that he is incapable of that penetration. Then
you imply that he may commit those crimes, which of
such a man you deny.
[3] Is there a fixed order of things5 (among the Paths)
by which the seven-rebirths'-limit man is bound to go
through all the seven ? You deny. Then your proposition
cannot hold. Do you in other words hold that there are
applications o f mindfulness, supreme efforts, steps to
potency, controlling powers, forces, factors of enlighten-
ment, by [culture in] which the seven-births'-limit person
is destined to go through all seven ?
1
That is, seven at the outside, possibly fewer. See I. 4.
2
I.e., in the Ariyan fourfold Path and its climax. On niyato
see V. 4; cf. VI. 1.
3
According to the Burmese translation of the text, the question
turns on whether such a person is subjectively assured of his own
state, or whether he must go through his last seven lives before he
becomes so assured? The Commentary paraphrases -paramata
by -paramataya, and the Br. translator takes this as either instru-
mental or locative. The sense is the same.
4
Cf. I. 3.
5
On niyama and niyama, see Appendix : Assurance.
[4] Is not the opposite the ease ? And how then can
you maintain your proposition ?
[5] You maintain that such a person is not so destined
except by the fixed order of the First, or Stream-winner's
Path. But are all who enter on that Path destined to go
through all the seven rebirths ?
[6] U.—You say I am wrong; nevertheless you must
admit that the person in question is a seven-births'-limit
person ? Surely then my proposition stands ? . . .
6. Sequel to the Foregoing.
[1] U.—Again, if you maintain it is wrong to say that the
kolankola,1
or one ranking in the First Path next above
him of the seven rebirths' limit, is assured of salvation by
his rank,2
I ask, Does not his rank itself [guarantee that he
shall attain] ?
[2] And does not the next higher rank in the First Path,
that of eka-bijin , or 'one-seeder,' also guarantee final
salvation?
1
Explained by Buddhaghosa, commenting on Anguttara-Nik.,
i. 233, as meaning 'a goer from family (kula) to family,' 'kula
here standing for bhava ' (rebirth). See above, p. 77, n. 3.
2
Burmese translators give alternative renderings—in or by his rank
—for kolankolata .
Kathavatthu - Of Self-Restraint, Of Action, Of Sound as Result of Karma
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
BOOK XII
1. Of Self Restraint.1
Controverted Point.— That self-restraint is [positive]
action (karma).
From the Commentary.—This is a view held, for instance, by the
Mahasanghikas, and based on the Sutta: ' When he sees an object,
hears a sound, etc., he grasps, etc., at the general characters thereof,'2
etc. They hold that both self-restraint and want of self-restraint amount
to overt action, or karma. In our doctrine it is volition that con-
stitutes karma. And it is argued that just as volition, proceeding by way
of deed, word, and thought, gets the name of action of body, speech, and
mind, so, if self-restraint be action, that self-restraint, proceeding by
way of sense-control, would get the name of visual karmas, auditory
karmas, etc. This, as not warranted by the Suttanta, the opponent
rejects till the fifth sense is mentioned. Here he stumbles at the
ambiguity of kaya : 'sentient skin-surface' and 'intimating body.'
The Sutta quoted is concerned with the presence and absence of
self-restraint, not of karma, hence it is inconclusive.
[1] Th.—If this be so, you imply that ocular self-
restraint is moral action of the eye; so for the other
senses — you cannot admit this. . . . But as to self-
restraint, involved in sense-control of body and in control
of mind, you at first deny it3
to be moral action, and then
1 Cf . above, III. 10.
2
Anguttara-Nik., ii. 16; also Dialogues, i. 80, and elsewhere. The
'general characters' (nimit t a), according to the Commentators, are
usually taken, in this connection, as referring to sex-features and sex-
attraction. Self-restraint is the carrying out of the volition (cetana),
which alone ranks as morally effective action—i.e., karma.
3
He rejects for k ay a as organ of touch; accepts for it as the
vehicle of intimation. As to 'mind,' he rejects it as organ of sense,
accepts it as an avenue of karma.
assent to the proposition that it is moral action. Why
then do you not concede this for the remaining four senses ?
That which you admit as true for mind, the co-ordinator
of sense, you must admit as true no less for the five senses.
[2] Want of self - restraint you admit of course is
[immoral] action (karma): is it eye-karma when self-
restraint is not practised by the controlling power of
sight ? . . . (proceed as in § 1).
[3] M.—But i f I am wrong, was it not said by the
Exalted One: ' Here, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu, when he sees an
object with the eye, grasps at the general characters thereof,'
. . . [again] ' does not grasp at the external appearance, . . .
when he hears a sound, . . . cognizes a thing with the mind,
, . . does not grasp, etc'?1
Surely both self-restraint and want of it are herein
shown to be morally effective action ?
2. Of Action.
Controverted Point.—That all action (karma) entails
moral result (vipaka).
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Mahasanghikas again, hold
this view, basing their opinion on the Sutta quoted below. Now
whereas the Master, without any qualification, spoke of volition as
moral action (karma), the argument here shows that only good or
bad volition as entailing moral result was meant, and that volition
which is morally indeterminate is without moral result. The Sutta
quoted is inconclusive, since it refers to the experience of results in
actual life or lives, given the necessary conditions.
[1] Th.—Do you imply that all volition entails result
[volition being moral action]? If you deny, then your
proposition is not universally valid. If you do imply that
volition entails result, then you are committed to this—
that volition which is indeterminate as to moral result
entails moral result; that volition which is inoperative and
1
See preceding note.2
therefore indeterminate as to moral result entails such
result, whether such volition be exercised in any one of the
three spheres of life, or in that which is not included in
them.1 .. . All of this you must deny. .. . [2] For do
you not hold that resultant or inoperative volition, which
is indeterminate as to moral result, cannot be said to entail
result ? Where then is your universal proposition ?
[3] M.—But i f I am wrong, was it not said by the
Exalted One : ' I declare, bhikkhus, that there can be no
annulment of voluntary deeds done and' accumulated, without
experience of the results thereof, be it in this life or in the
after-life'?2
Wherefore all action surely entails result.
3. Of Sound as Result [of Karma].
Controverted Point.—That sound is a result of karma.
From the Commentary.—Here again some, like the Mahasanghikas,
from carelessly interpreting such passages as, ' He by the doing, the
accumulating, the augmenting, the abundance of that karma, is
gifted with the voice of a Brahma god^ have adopted this view. The
argument shows that ' result of karma ' is a term applying to mental
states only, which have been transmitted by karma, but does not apply
to material things. The retinue, for instance, attending a Superman is
not a vipaka, or specific result of karma.3
[1] Th.—[Now what can rightly be predicated of a
'result of karma' ?] Such a result is a matter of feeling,
pleasant, painful, or neutral; it is conjoined with feeling
1
Dhammasangani, § 583.
2
Anguttara-Nik., v.292 ff.
3
But the pleasure derived from well-being of this kind is vipaka.
Vipaka is essentially a subjective phenomenon, subjective experience,
emotional and intellectual. Sound, as object, is something 'other,' or
external. The importance of speech-sounds for thought doubtless
provoked the exceptional position claimed by the heterodox for sound.
Sadd a means both sound and word; hence, without a qualifying
context, sadd a means as much vocal sound as sound in general.
of these three kinds; it is conjoined with mental contact,
feeling, perception, volition, thought; it goes with a mental
object; with it go adverting, ideating, co-ordinated applica-
tion, attention, volition, anticipation, aiming. Is sound
anything of this kind?1 Is it not rather the opposite?
[2] Now mental contact is result of karma, and of
mental contact it is right to predicate any of the fore-
going characteristics, and wrong not to. But the opposite
holds with regard to sound.
[3] M.—But if I am wrong, was it not said by the
Exalted One : 'He through having tvrought, having accumu-
lated, having piled up, having increased such karma, becomes
reborn with the voice of a Brahma god, like that of the
karavika bird '?2 Hence surely sound3 is a specific result
of karma.
1 In the PTS edition the reply should here be, Na h'evang
vattabbe .
2
Digha Nikaya, iii. 178.
3
Though,the sense-organs are well produced through karma, they
are not designated as vipaka's.—Comy.
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
BOOK XII
1. Of Self Restraint.1
Controverted Point.— That self-restraint is [positive]
action (karma).
From the Commentary.—This is a view held, for instance, by the
Mahasanghikas, and based on the Sutta: ' When he sees an object,
hears a sound, etc., he grasps, etc., at the general characters thereof,'2
etc. They hold that both self-restraint and want of self-restraint amount
to overt action, or karma. In our doctrine it is volition that con-
stitutes karma. And it is argued that just as volition, proceeding by way
of deed, word, and thought, gets the name of action of body, speech, and
mind, so, if self-restraint be action, that self-restraint, proceeding by
way of sense-control, would get the name of visual karmas, auditory
karmas, etc. This, as not warranted by the Suttanta, the opponent
rejects till the fifth sense is mentioned. Here he stumbles at the
ambiguity of kaya : 'sentient skin-surface' and 'intimating body.'
The Sutta quoted is concerned with the presence and absence of
self-restraint, not of karma, hence it is inconclusive.
[1] Th.—If this be so, you imply that ocular self-
restraint is moral action of the eye; so for the other
senses — you cannot admit this. . . . But as to self-
restraint, involved in sense-control of body and in control
of mind, you at first deny it3
to be moral action, and then
1 Cf . above, III. 10.
2
Anguttara-Nik., ii. 16; also Dialogues, i. 80, and elsewhere. The
'general characters' (nimit t a), according to the Commentators, are
usually taken, in this connection, as referring to sex-features and sex-
attraction. Self-restraint is the carrying out of the volition (cetana),
which alone ranks as morally effective action—i.e., karma.
3
He rejects for k ay a as organ of touch; accepts for it as the
vehicle of intimation. As to 'mind,' he rejects it as organ of sense,
accepts it as an avenue of karma.
assent to the proposition that it is moral action. Why
then do you not concede this for the remaining four senses ?
That which you admit as true for mind, the co-ordinator
of sense, you must admit as true no less for the five senses.
[2] Want of self - restraint you admit of course is
[immoral] action (karma): is it eye-karma when self-
restraint is not practised by the controlling power of
sight ? . . . (proceed as in § 1).
[3] M.—But i f I am wrong, was it not said by the
Exalted One: ' Here, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu, when he sees an
object with the eye, grasps at the general characters thereof,'
. . . [again] ' does not grasp at the external appearance, . . .
when he hears a sound, . . . cognizes a thing with the mind,
, . . does not grasp, etc'?1
Surely both self-restraint and want of it are herein
shown to be morally effective action ?
2. Of Action.
Controverted Point.—That all action (karma) entails
moral result (vipaka).
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Mahasanghikas again, hold
this view, basing their opinion on the Sutta quoted below. Now
whereas the Master, without any qualification, spoke of volition as
moral action (karma), the argument here shows that only good or
bad volition as entailing moral result was meant, and that volition
which is morally indeterminate is without moral result. The Sutta
quoted is inconclusive, since it refers to the experience of results in
actual life or lives, given the necessary conditions.
[1] Th.—Do you imply that all volition entails result
[volition being moral action]? If you deny, then your
proposition is not universally valid. If you do imply that
volition entails result, then you are committed to this—
that volition which is indeterminate as to moral result
entails moral result; that volition which is inoperative and
1
See preceding note.2
therefore indeterminate as to moral result entails such
result, whether such volition be exercised in any one of the
three spheres of life, or in that which is not included in
them.1 .. . All of this you must deny. .. . [2] For do
you not hold that resultant or inoperative volition, which
is indeterminate as to moral result, cannot be said to entail
result ? Where then is your universal proposition ?
[3] M.—But i f I am wrong, was it not said by the
Exalted One : ' I declare, bhikkhus, that there can be no
annulment of voluntary deeds done and' accumulated, without
experience of the results thereof, be it in this life or in the
after-life'?2
Wherefore all action surely entails result.
3. Of Sound as Result [of Karma].
Controverted Point.—That sound is a result of karma.
From the Commentary.—Here again some, like the Mahasanghikas,
from carelessly interpreting such passages as, ' He by the doing, the
accumulating, the augmenting, the abundance of that karma, is
gifted with the voice of a Brahma god^ have adopted this view. The
argument shows that ' result of karma ' is a term applying to mental
states only, which have been transmitted by karma, but does not apply
to material things. The retinue, for instance, attending a Superman is
not a vipaka, or specific result of karma.3
[1] Th.—[Now what can rightly be predicated of a
'result of karma' ?] Such a result is a matter of feeling,
pleasant, painful, or neutral; it is conjoined with feeling
1
Dhammasangani, § 583.
2
Anguttara-Nik., v.292 ff.
3
But the pleasure derived from well-being of this kind is vipaka.
Vipaka is essentially a subjective phenomenon, subjective experience,
emotional and intellectual. Sound, as object, is something 'other,' or
external. The importance of speech-sounds for thought doubtless
provoked the exceptional position claimed by the heterodox for sound.
Sadd a means both sound and word; hence, without a qualifying
context, sadd a means as much vocal sound as sound in general.
of these three kinds; it is conjoined with mental contact,
feeling, perception, volition, thought; it goes with a mental
object; with it go adverting, ideating, co-ordinated applica-
tion, attention, volition, anticipation, aiming. Is sound
anything of this kind?1 Is it not rather the opposite?
[2] Now mental contact is result of karma, and of
mental contact it is right to predicate any of the fore-
going characteristics, and wrong not to. But the opposite
holds with regard to sound.
[3] M.—But if I am wrong, was it not said by the
Exalted One : 'He through having tvrought, having accumu-
lated, having piled up, having increased such karma, becomes
reborn with the voice of a Brahma god, like that of the
karavika bird '?2 Hence surely sound3 is a specific result
of karma.
1 In the PTS edition the reply should here be, Na h'evang
vattabbe .
2
Digha Nikaya, iii. 178.
3
Though,the sense-organs are well produced through karma, they
are not designated as vipaka's.—Comy.
Tuesday, June 21, 2011
Kathavatthu - Of Concentration, Of the Causality of Things, Of Impermanence
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
6. Of Concentration.
Controverted Point.—That the continuity of conscious-
ness2 is concentration o f mind (samadhi).3
From the Commentary,—Some, like the Sabbatthivadins and
Uttarapathakas, hold that, because of the Word—'to spend seven
days and nights motionless, speechless, in the experience of absolute
bliss'—the flow of consciousness itself may constitute concentration.
They do not take the latter term as meaning collectedness of thought,
even when the coefficient of individualizing intentness (ekaggata )
has arisen in a momentary unit of consciousness.
[1] Th.—Your statement must include of course past
and future states of consciousness in the series. You
forgot that, and you must agree that the pust having
ceased and the future being unborn, it is not right to say
that they form a [present] concentrated state of mind.4
2
Citta-santati. See Compendium, 6,153, n. 1; 157, n. 4; 252 f .
3
Samadhi means the placing, establishing of consciousness ex-
clusively and voluntarily on any single object. Ekaggata is the
essential factor in consciousness, the cultivation of which may bring
about the state called Samadhi .
4
There is no use in speaking of a ' state' without a 'function' of
mind. And only the present state can be functioning (paccup-
pannam eva cittang kiccakarang hoti).—Comy.
[2] S. U.—Then is concentration confined to a momen-
tary conscious unit ?
Th.—Yes.
S. U.—But if you could affirm that concentration is
involved in each momentary unit of consciousness, you
should say no less that one had won the ecstasy1 of Jhana
on the actual occasion of any sense-cognition, or at the
very moment of thinking immoral thoughts, accompanied
by lust, hate, dulness, or any of the ten corruptions.2 . . .
[3] Th.—If your proposition is true, it must also be
true [a fortiori] that a series of bad conscious units is
concentration, whether it is accompanied by lust, hate, or
any of the ten corruptions. This you deny. . . .
[4] S. U.—But if we are wrong, did not the Exalted
One say: 'I, friend Jainas,3 am able, without moving the
body or using the voice, to spend seven nights and days in the
experience of absolute bliss '?4
Surely then the flow of consciousness constitutes con-
centration of mind.
7. Of the Causality of Things.5
Controverted Point.—That a cause of things is predeter-
mined.6
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Andhakas, hold that,
because of the Word— 'There is a cause, and that is elemental '7—
1
Here appana-samadhi is meant (Compendium, p. 56).
2
See above, pp. 65, 66, nn. 4; Compendium, p. 173.
3
Nigantha Jains.
4
Majjhima-Nik., i. 94.
5
Dhammatthitata —i.e., the state of being a cause by which
resulting things are established. See above, VI. 2, and Appendix.
6
Parinipphanna . On nipphanna (here intensified by the
prefix) see Compendium, pp. 156 (c), 157, n. 6.
7
Samyutta-Nik., ii. 25 ; Anguttara-Nik., i. 286. In these passages
it is stated that, whether Tathagatas arise to point it out or not,
always the natural order holds good that (1) causation in the physical
and psychical world goes on; (2) all things are impermanent, pregnant
with ill, soulless.
each term in the chain of Causal Origination is, as a cause, elemental,
and is therefore predetermined. The Theravadin shows that, if it were
predetermined by another cause, this cause would in turn be pre-
determined by yet another, and so on ad infinitum.
[1] Th.—Is then the cause of causes predetermined [by
something else] ? You deny. For if you assent,1 you
commit yourself to this: that, because of the continued
eventuating due to endless causation, there can never be an
end made to 111 , nor any cutting of f the round of rebirth,
nor any Nibbana free from the residual stuff of rebirth.
[2] Again, is the cause of any one of the five aggregates
(body, mind) predetermined ? If you assent, you commit
yourself to the admission that the cause itself is predeter-
mined by something else. And if you deny—and I insist,
and take no denial—you, assenting, commit yourself to
this—that there is, for this endless causation,2 no making
an end of Ill , no cutting of f of the round of rebirth, no
Nibbana without stuff of rebirth. . . .
8. Of Impermanence.
Controverted Point.—That impermanence is predeter-
mined.
From the CommentarySome, like the Andhakas, hold that im-
permanence itself is no less predetermined than impermanent things,
such as the body, etc. By this they are involved either in a plural
order of impermanence, or in an interminable series of temporal
features, each predetermined in its own way, with no prospect of
coming to the end of predetermination.3
[1-3] Th.—Then is impermanence predetermined by im-
permanence already predetermined. And if you admit this,
1
He judges that the correlation may hold by way of contiguity and
reciprocity (two of the twenty-four Paccayas or conditioning relation),
—Comy.
2
Literally, predetermination of one by the other.
3
The idea is that things possess impermanence as a characteristic
feature. If this characteristic were predetermined, it should possess
another feature of impermanence equally predetermined.
you imply that there is no making an end of ill, no cutting
off the round of rebirth, no Nibbana without residual stuff
of rebirth. This holds good for both decay and death, the
two manifestations of impermanence.
[4-5] [Take now these manifestations of impermanence
in the five aggregates, body-mind:] body is undoubtedly
predetermined and characterized by impermanence in the
form of decay, dissolution, disappearance. But you cannot
equally affirm all this of impermanence, decay, or death
itself. So far the mental aggregates....
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
6. Of Concentration.
Controverted Point.—That the continuity of conscious-
ness2 is concentration o f mind (samadhi).3
From the Commentary,—Some, like the Sabbatthivadins and
Uttarapathakas, hold that, because of the Word—'to spend seven
days and nights motionless, speechless, in the experience of absolute
bliss'—the flow of consciousness itself may constitute concentration.
They do not take the latter term as meaning collectedness of thought,
even when the coefficient of individualizing intentness (ekaggata )
has arisen in a momentary unit of consciousness.
[1] Th.—Your statement must include of course past
and future states of consciousness in the series. You
forgot that, and you must agree that the pust having
ceased and the future being unborn, it is not right to say
that they form a [present] concentrated state of mind.4
2
Citta-santati. See Compendium, 6,153, n. 1; 157, n. 4; 252 f .
3
Samadhi means the placing, establishing of consciousness ex-
clusively and voluntarily on any single object. Ekaggata is the
essential factor in consciousness, the cultivation of which may bring
about the state called Samadhi .
4
There is no use in speaking of a ' state' without a 'function' of
mind. And only the present state can be functioning (paccup-
pannam eva cittang kiccakarang hoti).—Comy.
[2] S. U.—Then is concentration confined to a momen-
tary conscious unit ?
Th.—Yes.
S. U.—But if you could affirm that concentration is
involved in each momentary unit of consciousness, you
should say no less that one had won the ecstasy1 of Jhana
on the actual occasion of any sense-cognition, or at the
very moment of thinking immoral thoughts, accompanied
by lust, hate, dulness, or any of the ten corruptions.2 . . .
[3] Th.—If your proposition is true, it must also be
true [a fortiori] that a series of bad conscious units is
concentration, whether it is accompanied by lust, hate, or
any of the ten corruptions. This you deny. . . .
[4] S. U.—But if we are wrong, did not the Exalted
One say: 'I, friend Jainas,3 am able, without moving the
body or using the voice, to spend seven nights and days in the
experience of absolute bliss '?4
Surely then the flow of consciousness constitutes con-
centration of mind.
7. Of the Causality of Things.5
Controverted Point.—That a cause of things is predeter-
mined.6
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Andhakas, hold that,
because of the Word— 'There is a cause, and that is elemental '7—
1
Here appana-samadhi is meant (Compendium, p. 56).
2
See above, pp. 65, 66, nn. 4; Compendium, p. 173.
3
Nigantha Jains.
4
Majjhima-Nik., i. 94.
5
Dhammatthitata —i.e., the state of being a cause by which
resulting things are established. See above, VI. 2, and Appendix.
6
Parinipphanna . On nipphanna (here intensified by the
prefix) see Compendium, pp. 156 (c), 157, n. 6.
7
Samyutta-Nik., ii. 25 ; Anguttara-Nik., i. 286. In these passages
it is stated that, whether Tathagatas arise to point it out or not,
always the natural order holds good that (1) causation in the physical
and psychical world goes on; (2) all things are impermanent, pregnant
with ill, soulless.
each term in the chain of Causal Origination is, as a cause, elemental,
and is therefore predetermined. The Theravadin shows that, if it were
predetermined by another cause, this cause would in turn be pre-
determined by yet another, and so on ad infinitum.
[1] Th.—Is then the cause of causes predetermined [by
something else] ? You deny. For if you assent,1 you
commit yourself to this: that, because of the continued
eventuating due to endless causation, there can never be an
end made to 111 , nor any cutting of f the round of rebirth,
nor any Nibbana free from the residual stuff of rebirth.
[2] Again, is the cause of any one of the five aggregates
(body, mind) predetermined ? If you assent, you commit
yourself to the admission that the cause itself is predeter-
mined by something else. And if you deny—and I insist,
and take no denial—you, assenting, commit yourself to
this—that there is, for this endless causation,2 no making
an end of Ill , no cutting of f of the round of rebirth, no
Nibbana without stuff of rebirth. . . .
8. Of Impermanence.
Controverted Point.—That impermanence is predeter-
mined.
From the CommentarySome, like the Andhakas, hold that im-
permanence itself is no less predetermined than impermanent things,
such as the body, etc. By this they are involved either in a plural
order of impermanence, or in an interminable series of temporal
features, each predetermined in its own way, with no prospect of
coming to the end of predetermination.3
[1-3] Th.—Then is impermanence predetermined by im-
permanence already predetermined. And if you admit this,
1
He judges that the correlation may hold by way of contiguity and
reciprocity (two of the twenty-four Paccayas or conditioning relation),
—Comy.
2
Literally, predetermination of one by the other.
3
The idea is that things possess impermanence as a characteristic
feature. If this characteristic were predetermined, it should possess
another feature of impermanence equally predetermined.
you imply that there is no making an end of ill, no cutting
off the round of rebirth, no Nibbana without residual stuff
of rebirth. This holds good for both decay and death, the
two manifestations of impermanence.
[4-5] [Take now these manifestations of impermanence
in the five aggregates, body-mind:] body is undoubtedly
predetermined and characterized by impermanence in the
form of decay, dissolution, disappearance. But you cannot
equally affirm all this of impermanence, decay, or death
itself. So far the mental aggregates....
Kathavatthu - Of the Utterance: 'This is Pain and Sorrow!', Of the Force of the Magic Gift (iddhi)
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
4. Of the Utterance, 'This is Pain and Sorrow!'
Controverted Point.—That from utterance of the word,
'This is Ill! ' insight into the nature of Ill is set working.
From the Commentary.™Some, like, the Andhakas, hold that this
befalls the devotee at the moment when he enters on the Path.1 The
opponent's reply admits both utterance and insight. In the last
-question, to which the opponent replies in the negative, he is asked
whether, by the procedure he upholds, he is not committed to allow
an insight issuing from each syllable: I - dang du-kkhang ?
[1] Th.—But you deny that a similar result ensues on
the utterance of the other three Truths: This is the Cause,
this the Cessation, this the Path leading to the Cessation of
111 . Why is this ? [2] Why deny for these what you
affirm for the first Truth ?
[3] Or why deny, as you do, that insight into the im-
permanenee of each of the five aggregates (body-mind)
follows from statement of the fact ? [4] Or, once more,
1
When he is fleeing from 11 1 rather than envisaging positive
happiness. See above, IX. 1; cf . II. 5, 6.
T.S. v.
that insight into the soullessness of each aggregate follows
from a statement of the fact ? [5-6] On what grounds can
you defend the sequence in one case only out of the three
sets of five propositions ?
[7] Now do you mean to tell me that insight issues from
every syllable of this formula :—This—is—pain—and—
sor—row?1
A.—Nay, that cannot truly be said.2 . . .
5. Of the Force of the Magic Gift (Iddhi).
Controverted Point.—That one who has the gift of magic
potency might live on for a kappa [on earth].
From the Commentary.—The interval, kappa, here means a 'great'
cycle (mahakappa3), not its fourth part, the 'incalculable cycle'
(asankheyyakappa4) , nor the mere 'life-term' (ayukappa) .
Now some, like the Mahasanghikas, hold this view, because they have
not thoroughly grasped the real advantage lying in the development
of the steps to magic potency. The opponent, knowing that his vital
principle or functioning is but the result of karma, has to deny that
his vital functions are determined by iddhi. All that magic potency
can effect is to avert things that would bring about an untimely death.
[1] Th.—But is his life-span, is his destiny, is his
acquisition of individuality a thing of magic potency [that
he should be able to prolong one interval of it] ? For this,
is what you are herein affirming.
And do you reckon the kappa as past or as future?
[And why restrict yourself to one kappa ?] Why not say
'might live on for two, three, four kappas '?
[2] Again, do you mean that, given life, he could live-
on for the remainder of his life, or that he could live on
1
Dukkha includes both. In PTS text read du ti for ruci.
2
Ibid., read, for Amanta , Na h'evang vattabbe—pe—.
3
See Compendium, 142, n. 1 (in which page, for [n.] 3 read 1, and
2nd fn. as 2). Cf. Anguttara-Nik., ii. 126,142. On iddhi see
Bud. Psychology, 127, 161.
4
Cf. Childers' Pali Dictionary, sub voce kappa .
for the remainder of his life if there were no [organic] life
left?
M.—He could live on for the remainder of his life,
given life.
Th —Then he could certainly not live on for a kappa}
M.— [Well then] i f there were no [organic] life left.
Th.—What! he could live on though dead, though
deceased ? . . .
[3] [Again, what could he effect by the magic gift in the
duration of consciousness ?] Could he by it succeed in
preventing any phase of consciousness that had arisen
from ceasing, contact, for instance, or feeling, or perception,
or volition, and so on ?
[4] Or could he by it make any one of the five aggre-
gates (body-mind) permanent ?
[5] Or could he by it prevent (a) beings liable to re-birth2
from being born ? Or (b) beings liable to grow old, from
old age ?3 Or (c) beings liable to disease, from disease,4 or
(d) liable to die, from death ? . . .
[6] M.—But was it not said by the Exalted One:
' Ananda, whosoever has cultivated, developed, established,
built up, and persistently practised the four Steps to Iddhi,
so as to be able to use them as a vehicle and as a basis, he,
should he desire it, coidd remain in the same birth for a kappa,
or for that portion of the kappa which had yet to run '?5
Does not this support my proposition ?
1
The normal duration of human life being at the most 100 years
(Samyutta-Nik., ii. 94 f.).—Comy.
2
Literally, having the quality or nature of birth.
3
In the Netti (p. 23) it is said that by iddh i old age may be
deferred, and youthfulness prolonged till death.
4
From this it may be inferred that Buddhists did not attach much
importance to the therapeutic value of magic potency, or iddhi .
5
Dialogues, ii. 110 f . The four Steps are will, effort , thought, in-
vestigation, each united to earnest thought and the struggle against
evil. ' Iddhi ' means accomplishment. Cf . Milinda, i. 198 f . (trans-
lation), where the question is again argued without reference to the
Kathdvatthu. Whether kappa here meant ayukappa only or not, the
Mahasanghika takes it to mean mahakappa.
[7] Th.—But was it not also said by the Exalted One :
' O bhikkhus ! against four things there is none that can be
surety, be he recluse or brahmin, be he deva, or Mara, or
Brahma, or anyone whatever in the world. Against which
four ? Against the old age of those subject to decay. Against
the infirmities of those liable to infirmities. Against the dying
of those whose nature it is to die. Against the coming to pass
of the consequences of the evil deeds done in the past—deeds
that were corrupt, tending to re-becoming, vain, of evil effect,
making for birth, decay, and death' ?1
Is the Suttanta thus ?
Hence it is not right to say that one who has the gift
of magic potency might live on for an aeon.
1 Anguttara-Nik., ii. 172.
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
4. Of the Utterance, 'This is Pain and Sorrow!'
Controverted Point.—That from utterance of the word,
'This is Ill! ' insight into the nature of Ill is set working.
From the Commentary.™Some, like, the Andhakas, hold that this
befalls the devotee at the moment when he enters on the Path.1 The
opponent's reply admits both utterance and insight. In the last
-question, to which the opponent replies in the negative, he is asked
whether, by the procedure he upholds, he is not committed to allow
an insight issuing from each syllable: I - dang du-kkhang ?
[1] Th.—But you deny that a similar result ensues on
the utterance of the other three Truths: This is the Cause,
this the Cessation, this the Path leading to the Cessation of
111 . Why is this ? [2] Why deny for these what you
affirm for the first Truth ?
[3] Or why deny, as you do, that insight into the im-
permanenee of each of the five aggregates (body-mind)
follows from statement of the fact ? [4] Or, once more,
1
When he is fleeing from 11 1 rather than envisaging positive
happiness. See above, IX. 1; cf . II. 5, 6.
T.S. v.
that insight into the soullessness of each aggregate follows
from a statement of the fact ? [5-6] On what grounds can
you defend the sequence in one case only out of the three
sets of five propositions ?
[7] Now do you mean to tell me that insight issues from
every syllable of this formula :—This—is—pain—and—
sor—row?1
A.—Nay, that cannot truly be said.2 . . .
5. Of the Force of the Magic Gift (Iddhi).
Controverted Point.—That one who has the gift of magic
potency might live on for a kappa [on earth].
From the Commentary.—The interval, kappa, here means a 'great'
cycle (mahakappa3), not its fourth part, the 'incalculable cycle'
(asankheyyakappa4) , nor the mere 'life-term' (ayukappa) .
Now some, like the Mahasanghikas, hold this view, because they have
not thoroughly grasped the real advantage lying in the development
of the steps to magic potency. The opponent, knowing that his vital
principle or functioning is but the result of karma, has to deny that
his vital functions are determined by iddhi. All that magic potency
can effect is to avert things that would bring about an untimely death.
[1] Th.—But is his life-span, is his destiny, is his
acquisition of individuality a thing of magic potency [that
he should be able to prolong one interval of it] ? For this,
is what you are herein affirming.
And do you reckon the kappa as past or as future?
[And why restrict yourself to one kappa ?] Why not say
'might live on for two, three, four kappas '?
[2] Again, do you mean that, given life, he could live-
on for the remainder of his life, or that he could live on
1
Dukkha includes both. In PTS text read du ti for ruci.
2
Ibid., read, for Amanta , Na h'evang vattabbe—pe—.
3
See Compendium, 142, n. 1 (in which page, for [n.] 3 read 1, and
2nd fn. as 2). Cf. Anguttara-Nik., ii. 126,142. On iddhi see
Bud. Psychology, 127, 161.
4
Cf. Childers' Pali Dictionary, sub voce kappa .
for the remainder of his life if there were no [organic] life
left?
M.—He could live on for the remainder of his life,
given life.
Th —Then he could certainly not live on for a kappa}
M.— [Well then] i f there were no [organic] life left.
Th.—What! he could live on though dead, though
deceased ? . . .
[3] [Again, what could he effect by the magic gift in the
duration of consciousness ?] Could he by it succeed in
preventing any phase of consciousness that had arisen
from ceasing, contact, for instance, or feeling, or perception,
or volition, and so on ?
[4] Or could he by it make any one of the five aggre-
gates (body-mind) permanent ?
[5] Or could he by it prevent (a) beings liable to re-birth2
from being born ? Or (b) beings liable to grow old, from
old age ?3 Or (c) beings liable to disease, from disease,4 or
(d) liable to die, from death ? . . .
[6] M.—But was it not said by the Exalted One:
' Ananda, whosoever has cultivated, developed, established,
built up, and persistently practised the four Steps to Iddhi,
so as to be able to use them as a vehicle and as a basis, he,
should he desire it, coidd remain in the same birth for a kappa,
or for that portion of the kappa which had yet to run '?5
Does not this support my proposition ?
1
The normal duration of human life being at the most 100 years
(Samyutta-Nik., ii. 94 f.).—Comy.
2
Literally, having the quality or nature of birth.
3
In the Netti (p. 23) it is said that by iddh i old age may be
deferred, and youthfulness prolonged till death.
4
From this it may be inferred that Buddhists did not attach much
importance to the therapeutic value of magic potency, or iddhi .
5
Dialogues, ii. 110 f . The four Steps are will, effort , thought, in-
vestigation, each united to earnest thought and the struggle against
evil. ' Iddhi ' means accomplishment. Cf . Milinda, i. 198 f . (trans-
lation), where the question is again argued without reference to the
Kathdvatthu. Whether kappa here meant ayukappa only or not, the
Mahasanghika takes it to mean mahakappa.
[7] Th.—But was it not also said by the Exalted One :
' O bhikkhus ! against four things there is none that can be
surety, be he recluse or brahmin, be he deva, or Mara, or
Brahma, or anyone whatever in the world. Against which
four ? Against the old age of those subject to decay. Against
the infirmities of those liable to infirmities. Against the dying
of those whose nature it is to die. Against the coming to pass
of the consequences of the evil deeds done in the past—deeds
that were corrupt, tending to re-becoming, vain, of evil effect,
making for birth, decay, and death' ?1
Is the Suttanta thus ?
Hence it is not right to say that one who has the gift
of magic potency might live on for an aeon.
1 Anguttara-Nik., ii. 172.
Kathavatthu - Of Three Facts about Latent Bias, Of Insight and Ordinary Consciousness
Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
BOOK XI
1. Of Three Facts about Latent Bias.
Controverted Points.—(i.) That latent bias1 is unmoral
(indeterminate).
From the Commentary. — That latent bias in its seven forms is
(i.) unmoral, (ii.) without moral or immoral motive, (iii.) indepen-
dent of mind, is an opinion held, for instance, by the Mahasanghikas
and the Sammitiyas. They allege that it is not right to say that the
average man, while moral, or unmoral consciousness is going on, has
latent bias, since the motive or condition of such consciousness cannot
cause latent bias [to manifest itself], nor is such consciousness con-
joined with any form of bias.
[1] Th.—But are you prepared to identify latent bias
with any of the morally indeterminate ultimates—with
resultant or with inoperative indeterminates, with matter
or body, with Nibbana, or with the organs and objects of
sense ? Of course you deny this. . . .
[2-8] Again, take each form of bias—unless you can
prove that each form is something different in kind or
degree from the corresponding kind of 'fetter,' or 'outburst,'
or 'flood,' or 'yoke,' or 'hindrance,' which are indisputably
immoral states, you cannot call the corresponding form of
bias unmoral, whether it be sensual desires, or enmity,
or conceit, or mere opinion, or doubt, or lust of life, or
nescience.2
[9] M. S.—Well, but would you say that an average
man, while thinking moral or tmmoral thoughts, had latent
bias ?
Th.—Yes.
1 On this term see III. 2 f. ; IX. 4.
2 The 'seven forms.'
M. S.—Do you tell me then that good and bad ideas
can come together side by side in consciousness ?
Th—Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
M. S.—Then latent bias must be unmoral.
Th.—Then you must go further and admit that lust is
unmoral, because you will agree that the average man,
when thinking good or unmoral thoughts, has not got rid
the while of the root-condition of lust or greed. . . .
(ii.) That latent bias is without moral motive (or root-
condition).1
[10] Th.—Since you cannot identify latent bias with
any ultimate [cf. § 1], these being admittedly independent
of the root-conditions or hetu's, it only remains for you to
show that each form of latent bias is something different
in kind or degree from the corresponding kind of 'fetter,' or
'outburst,' or 'flood,' or 'yoke,' or 'hindrance,' which are
indisputably motived by the root-conditions of lust, or
enmity, or dulness. .. .
[11] M. S.—You urge that latent biases are not uncon-
ditioned by these root-conditions, and you still maintain
that an average person, while thinking moral or unmoral
thoughts, is possessed the while by forms of latent bias.
But you deny that these forms are conditioned by any of
the root-conditions accompanying those thoughts. Surely
then latent-bias is unconditioned.
2
Th.—You admit that such an average person is still
possessed of lust, even while thinking moral or unmoral
thoughts. But you deny that that lust is conditioned by
the 'hetu' accompanying those thoughts. According to
you, therefore, lust is unconditioned—which is absurd.
1
On hetu, see Compendium, 279 f.; cf. .Duka-patthana, (PTS), '
xii., xiii.
2
The argument is complicated by ra g a being classed as both
(i.) 'root-condition,' or het n (as such it is sometimes called
lobha) , and (ii.) the first in the list of seven forms of latent bias :
kama-raga .
(iii.) That latent bias is independent of consciousness.
[12-19] Argued verbatim as in IX. 4, § § 1-8, substituting
' independent of' or ' conjoined with ' ' consciousness ' for
' without' or 'with ' ' mental object' respectively.
[20] M. S.—You affirm that an average person is still
possessed of latent bias, even while thinking moral or
unmoral thoughts. But you deny that the latent bias is
conjoined with such thoughts. Surely then latent bias is
independent of mind.
Th.—If, as you admit, such a person is still possessed of
lust while thinking moral or immoral thoughts, your
denial that lust is conjoined with those thoughts does not
necessarily lead to the false conclusion that lust is inde-
pendent of mind.
2. Of Insight.
Controverted Point.—That it is wrong to say 'he has
insight' of one who, though he has banished nescience,
has thoughts not conjoined with insight.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Mahasanghikas, hold that
one who, having banished spiritual ignorance by Path-insight, is
experiencing ordinary cognitions by way of sense, cannot at the time
be said to ' have insight,' since Path-consciousness is then not active.
The criticism reveals their ineptitude in the notion of what an [Ariyan]
person is, and also the propriety of ascribing insight to one who,
having acquired insight [has it always potentially, if not actually].1
[1] Th.—Then you must also admit it is not right to
say that, when lust has departed, a man has ' done with
lust.' Similarly for hate, and for dulness, and for worldly
corruptions generally. [2] If, on the contrary, you main-
tain that it is right to affirm these latter propositions, then
it is no less right to say, of one for whom nescience is
departed, but for whom cognition not conjoined with insight
is active, that he has insight.
1
Cf . this borrowing of a modern turn (anticipated by Aristotle) in
X. 12, p. 248.
[3] M.—But if it be right to say thus of that person, is
it in virtue of past insight? Can he be said 'to have in-
sight ' by an insight that has ceased, that is past, that has
subsided ? You deny this . . .
3. Of Insight and Ordinary Consciousness.
Controverted Point.—That insight (nana) is not con-
joined with consciousness.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Pubbaseliyas, hold that,
inasmuch as an Arahant, who is said to have insight on account of
that which he has won by the Path, may experience sense-cognitions
which "are not conjoined with that insight, therefore insight is inde-
pendent of ordinary consciousness. The criticism shows that, if
insight be detached from consciousness, it must be identifiable with
one of the categories of things that are other than consciousness.
[1] Th.—But are you prepared to identify insight,
with all that is admittedly detached from consciousness:
—with matter, Nibbana, or the organs and objects of sense ?
Scarcely! .. .
Or are you prepared to declare 'insight' as having
nothing in common with understanding?1 For you will
admit that understanding, as controlling power or force, as
supremely right view, as intuitive search for truth,2 is not
detached from, but is bound up with, consciousness?
[2] Insight, again, as* we agree, includes, involves the
activity of the aggregate of the coefficients of conscious-
ness, [3] as also does understanding. Both of these are
conjoined with consciousness. How then can insight be
detached from it ? [4] Hence, if you maintain that insight
and understanding, both involving conscious coefficients,
are respectively detached from and conjoined with con-
1
Panna . It is possible to translate both terms by the same
English term, none fitting exactly. Both are aspects of ' knowledge.'
Cf . Ledi Sadaw, JPTS, 1914, 142 ;' Mrs. Rh. D.: Buddhism, 1914,
pp. 94, 130, 201; also on the Patisambhiddamagga, JRAS,1906, 239 f.
2
Cf. Dhamma-sangani, § 292.
sciousness, you are committed to this: that the aggregate
of coefficients is in part conjoined with, in part detached
from, consciousness—which you of course deny. . . .
[5] P.—You contend then that an Arahant who is
enjoying cognitions by way o f sight, etc., may be said to
'have insight'?
Th.—Yes.
P.—But is his insight conjoined with that consciousness
(sight, etc.) ?
Th.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
P.—Then my proposition holds.
Th.—But such an argument holds equally for 'under-
standing,' if you substitute that for 'insight.' And you
have admitted the connection between understanding and
consciousness.
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
BOOK XI
1. Of Three Facts about Latent Bias.
Controverted Points.—(i.) That latent bias1 is unmoral
(indeterminate).
From the Commentary. — That latent bias in its seven forms is
(i.) unmoral, (ii.) without moral or immoral motive, (iii.) indepen-
dent of mind, is an opinion held, for instance, by the Mahasanghikas
and the Sammitiyas. They allege that it is not right to say that the
average man, while moral, or unmoral consciousness is going on, has
latent bias, since the motive or condition of such consciousness cannot
cause latent bias [to manifest itself], nor is such consciousness con-
joined with any form of bias.
[1] Th.—But are you prepared to identify latent bias
with any of the morally indeterminate ultimates—with
resultant or with inoperative indeterminates, with matter
or body, with Nibbana, or with the organs and objects of
sense ? Of course you deny this. . . .
[2-8] Again, take each form of bias—unless you can
prove that each form is something different in kind or
degree from the corresponding kind of 'fetter,' or 'outburst,'
or 'flood,' or 'yoke,' or 'hindrance,' which are indisputably
immoral states, you cannot call the corresponding form of
bias unmoral, whether it be sensual desires, or enmity,
or conceit, or mere opinion, or doubt, or lust of life, or
nescience.2
[9] M. S.—Well, but would you say that an average
man, while thinking moral or tmmoral thoughts, had latent
bias ?
Th.—Yes.
1 On this term see III. 2 f. ; IX. 4.
2 The 'seven forms.'
M. S.—Do you tell me then that good and bad ideas
can come together side by side in consciousness ?
Th—Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
M. S.—Then latent bias must be unmoral.
Th.—Then you must go further and admit that lust is
unmoral, because you will agree that the average man,
when thinking good or unmoral thoughts, has not got rid
the while of the root-condition of lust or greed. . . .
(ii.) That latent bias is without moral motive (or root-
condition).1
[10] Th.—Since you cannot identify latent bias with
any ultimate [cf. § 1], these being admittedly independent
of the root-conditions or hetu's, it only remains for you to
show that each form of latent bias is something different
in kind or degree from the corresponding kind of 'fetter,' or
'outburst,' or 'flood,' or 'yoke,' or 'hindrance,' which are
indisputably motived by the root-conditions of lust, or
enmity, or dulness. .. .
[11] M. S.—You urge that latent biases are not uncon-
ditioned by these root-conditions, and you still maintain
that an average person, while thinking moral or unmoral
thoughts, is possessed the while by forms of latent bias.
But you deny that these forms are conditioned by any of
the root-conditions accompanying those thoughts. Surely
then latent-bias is unconditioned.
2
Th.—You admit that such an average person is still
possessed of lust, even while thinking moral or unmoral
thoughts. But you deny that that lust is conditioned by
the 'hetu' accompanying those thoughts. According to
you, therefore, lust is unconditioned—which is absurd.
1
On hetu, see Compendium, 279 f.; cf. .Duka-patthana, (PTS), '
xii., xiii.
2
The argument is complicated by ra g a being classed as both
(i.) 'root-condition,' or het n (as such it is sometimes called
lobha) , and (ii.) the first in the list of seven forms of latent bias :
kama-raga .
(iii.) That latent bias is independent of consciousness.
[12-19] Argued verbatim as in IX. 4, § § 1-8, substituting
' independent of' or ' conjoined with ' ' consciousness ' for
' without' or 'with ' ' mental object' respectively.
[20] M. S.—You affirm that an average person is still
possessed of latent bias, even while thinking moral or
unmoral thoughts. But you deny that the latent bias is
conjoined with such thoughts. Surely then latent bias is
independent of mind.
Th.—If, as you admit, such a person is still possessed of
lust while thinking moral or immoral thoughts, your
denial that lust is conjoined with those thoughts does not
necessarily lead to the false conclusion that lust is inde-
pendent of mind.
2. Of Insight.
Controverted Point.—That it is wrong to say 'he has
insight' of one who, though he has banished nescience,
has thoughts not conjoined with insight.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Mahasanghikas, hold that
one who, having banished spiritual ignorance by Path-insight, is
experiencing ordinary cognitions by way of sense, cannot at the time
be said to ' have insight,' since Path-consciousness is then not active.
The criticism reveals their ineptitude in the notion of what an [Ariyan]
person is, and also the propriety of ascribing insight to one who,
having acquired insight [has it always potentially, if not actually].1
[1] Th.—Then you must also admit it is not right to
say that, when lust has departed, a man has ' done with
lust.' Similarly for hate, and for dulness, and for worldly
corruptions generally. [2] If, on the contrary, you main-
tain that it is right to affirm these latter propositions, then
it is no less right to say, of one for whom nescience is
departed, but for whom cognition not conjoined with insight
is active, that he has insight.
1
Cf . this borrowing of a modern turn (anticipated by Aristotle) in
X. 12, p. 248.
[3] M.—But if it be right to say thus of that person, is
it in virtue of past insight? Can he be said 'to have in-
sight ' by an insight that has ceased, that is past, that has
subsided ? You deny this . . .
3. Of Insight and Ordinary Consciousness.
Controverted Point.—That insight (nana) is not con-
joined with consciousness.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Pubbaseliyas, hold that,
inasmuch as an Arahant, who is said to have insight on account of
that which he has won by the Path, may experience sense-cognitions
which "are not conjoined with that insight, therefore insight is inde-
pendent of ordinary consciousness. The criticism shows that, if
insight be detached from consciousness, it must be identifiable with
one of the categories of things that are other than consciousness.
[1] Th.—But are you prepared to identify insight,
with all that is admittedly detached from consciousness:
—with matter, Nibbana, or the organs and objects of sense ?
Scarcely! .. .
Or are you prepared to declare 'insight' as having
nothing in common with understanding?1 For you will
admit that understanding, as controlling power or force, as
supremely right view, as intuitive search for truth,2 is not
detached from, but is bound up with, consciousness?
[2] Insight, again, as* we agree, includes, involves the
activity of the aggregate of the coefficients of conscious-
ness, [3] as also does understanding. Both of these are
conjoined with consciousness. How then can insight be
detached from it ? [4] Hence, if you maintain that insight
and understanding, both involving conscious coefficients,
are respectively detached from and conjoined with con-
1
Panna . It is possible to translate both terms by the same
English term, none fitting exactly. Both are aspects of ' knowledge.'
Cf . Ledi Sadaw, JPTS, 1914, 142 ;' Mrs. Rh. D.: Buddhism, 1914,
pp. 94, 130, 201; also on the Patisambhiddamagga, JRAS,1906, 239 f.
2
Cf. Dhamma-sangani, § 292.
sciousness, you are committed to this: that the aggregate
of coefficients is in part conjoined with, in part detached
from, consciousness—which you of course deny. . . .
[5] P.—You contend then that an Arahant who is
enjoying cognitions by way o f sight, etc., may be said to
'have insight'?
Th.—Yes.
P.—But is his insight conjoined with that consciousness
(sight, etc.) ?
Th.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
P.—Then my proposition holds.
Th.—But such an argument holds equally for 'under-
standing,' if you substitute that for 'insight.' And you
have admitted the connection between understanding and
consciousness.
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