Khuddaka Nikaya - Nettippakarana ( The Guide ) - Specification Section Part 3-15
ACCORDING TO
KACCANA THERA
TRANSLATED FROM THE PALI BY
BHIKKHU NANAMOLI
Pali Text Society
Mode 15
[The Ninefold Thread in the Mode of Conveying Requisites]
448. Herein, what is the Mode of Conveying Requisites ? [It is
this:]
'Ideas that generate each an idea
In due relation are conditions;
And by its picking out the cause
This Mode Conveys the Requisite' (§15).
449. Any idea that generates
1
an idea is a requisite of that idea.
450. What is the Requisite's characteristic ? The Requisite has
the characteristic of a generator.
449/1 I.e., an idea that is another idea's condition sine qua nony as, say,
ignorance is for determination.
451. Two kinds of ideas generate, namely a cause and a condition.
452. Herein, what is a cause's characteristic ? What is a con-
dition's characteristic ? A cause has the characteristic of not being
shared in common, while a condition has the characteristic of being
shared in common.
1
453. How might that be ? In the same way that for the occurrence
of a [seed's] sprout the seed is not shared in common [with the
sprout] while earth [79] and water are common to both [seed and
sprout]; for while the earth and the water are each a condition for
the sprout, still individual essence is its cause;
1
or in the same way
that milk left in a pot is
2
curd, and yet there is no simultaneous con-
452/1 This distinction and these two definitions are perhaps peculiar to this
work.
453/1 For 'sabhdva—individual essence' see Ppn. ch. viii, n. 68, where the
term is discussed and various commentarial derivations given. The only
Pitaka ref. seems to be that at Ps. ii, 178 (either 'born form is void of individual
essence' or 'born form is void by individual essence' according to how the
instr. (sabhdvena) is taken in that passage, which has given PsA much trouble).
See also Miln. 90, 164, 212, 360; also Pe 104. Very frequent in the Com-
mentaries. The use of the word here as a synonym for 'cause' (hetu) is
different from the commentarial use as a synonym for 'nature' (pakati) or
any idea (dhamma) that is not merely a name or a negation. NettiA: ' "It s
individual essence is its cause": the same (existing) essence (samdna-bhdva),
the seed, is the cause. But is it not a fact that the seed is not like (sadisa)
the sprout, etc.?—There is no (saying) that it is not ; for there is no arising
of that kind (of sprout) from any other kind, (of seed)' (p. 115). The Netties
argument here contains a hidden (and apparently unintentional?) ambiguity,
namely, that between the seed-as-thing (individual) and the seed-as-nature
(principle). Vis categorically denies the non-Buddhist doctrine of 'inherence'
or 'immanence' (samavaya), by which the cause is held to inhere in the result
(Vis. 513), and Vis A rejects the theory of sabhdva as an adequate and sufficient
cause (Ppn., ch. xvi , note 23); cf. also the wrong theory attributed to Makkhali
Gosala at D. i, 53 with use of bhdva (some read sabhdva). The word svabhdva
had great currency in Indian Sanskrit philosophy, both Mahayana-Buddhist
and non-Buddhist, and it took on many shades, sometimes approaching
Aristotle's use of 'essence' as distinct from 'attributes' . To repeat, the word
never seems to have been used at all by the Buddha. »
453/2 This is an instance where it would be incorrect to translate bhavati
by 'becomes'. NettiA senses an ontological difficulty when i t says ' "I s
curd (dadhi bhavati)" is said according to the Identity Guide-Line (Ekatta-naya
—see Vis. 585) or according to the Metaphor of Non-Breach (abhedopacdra
—see Ppn ch. viii, n. 65), but not in any other way; for milk is not (na hoti)
curd, which is why "and yet there is no simultaneous occur-
rence of milk and curd" is said' (p. 115). To translate by 'becomes'
leaves nothing for the commentary to explain and conceals the difficulty
of deciding the 'first moment ' when it is curd.
currence of milk and curd, so too there is no simultaneous con-
currence of the cause and the condition.
454. Now this roundabout [of rebirths] has occurrence with cause
and with condition; for this is said: (Wiih ignorance as condition,
determinations; with determinations as condition, consciousness; . . .
and so with all the formula of Dependent Arising (cf. S. ii, 1).
Consequently ignorance is the cause and unreasoned attention the
condition (cf. Pe 104 and §462).
455. Previous ignorance is the cause of subsequent ignorance.
Herein, the previous ignorance is underlying tendency to ignorance,
while the subsequent ignorance is [open] obsession by ignorance.
The previous underlying tendency to ignorance is the cause, in
causality-by-immediate-proximity, of the subsequent obsession by
ignorance, like the seed and the sprout in the growing -,
1
but wherever
any fruit [of that seed] occurs, this [seed] is [then only] the cause-
in-remote-relation of that [fruit]; for cause is of two kinds, namely
cause-in-immediate-proximity [as that of the seed for the sprout]
and cause-in-remote-relation [as that of the seed for the fruit].
2
So the cause of ignorance is also of two kinds, namely cause-in-
immediate-proximity and cause-in-remote-relation.
456. Or in the same way that vessel, wick and oil are, as it were, the
light's condition, but not its cause-as-individual-essence—for one
cannot, without a flame, light the vessel, wick and oil, which are the
light's condition—; the individual-essence-as-cause being like the
light. So the individual-essence is the cause, while the other-
essence is the condition;
1
the in-itself is the cause while the external-
to-it is the condition; the generator is the cause while the accessory2
455/1 'Paribrilhand—growing': not in PED.
455/2 Cf. Vis. 532 (anantarapaccaya and samanantarapaccaya) and 536
(anantarupanissayapaccaya) for discussion. I t is not clear whether the Netti
has the Patthdna in view or not. Samatiantara-hetu and parampara-hetu
seem to be confined to this work and the Pe (cf. Pe 77 and 104-5).
456/1 This use of sabhdva ('individual essence') and parabhdva ('other
essence') is taken straight from the Pe (p. 104). I t makes this argument a
purely ontological one. Bhdva is caus. subst. fm. \/bhu, i.e., a 'making be' ,
a 'keeping in being', an 'essence', a '-ness' or '-hood', in the sense of recognizable
distinctive quality.
456/2 This definition of hetu ('cause') as on a lower level of generality to
paccaya ('condition') seems peculiar to this work. In the Suttas no difference
is discernible. In the Abhidhamma hetu tends to be restricted to the six hetu,
namely greed, etc., while paccaya can be either antecedent (e.g., kamrna), or
postnascent (i.e., cetasikadhammd against any contemporary rupa-dhammd
that arose earlier but ceases with or later owing to the longer presence (thiti)),
is the condition; the not-shared-in-common is the cause while the
shared-in-common is the condition.
457. The meaning of continuity, the meaning of non-interruption,
the meaning of fruit, the meaning of being-made-to-occur, the
meaning of renewal of being, the meaning of relinking, the meaning
of obsession, the meaning of impediment, the meaning of underlying-
tendency, the meaning of non-eradication, the meaning of ignorance,
the meaning of non-penetration, the meaning of being undiagnosed,
are consciousness's meaning of seed (cf. A. i, 224).
458. Where there is non-interruption there is continuity, where
there is continuity there is [80] occurrence, where there is occurrence
there is fruit, where there is fruit there is relinking,
1
where there is
relinking there is renewal of being, where there is renewal of being
there is impediment, where there is impediment there is obsession,
where there is obsession there is non-eradication, where there is non-
eradication there is underlying tendency, where there is underlying
tendency there is non-penetration, where there is non-penetration
there is ignorance, where there is ignorance there is undiagnosed
consciousness affected by taints, where there is undiagnosed
consciousness affected by taints there is the meaning of seed (see
§304).
459. The virtue category is the condition for the concentration
category, the concentration category is the condition for the under-
standing category, the understanding category is the condition for
the deliverance category, the deliverance category is the condition
for the knowing-and-seeing-of-deliverance category.
or conascent (i.e., cetasikd dhammd that arise and cease together, or that
arise with rv/pa-dhammd but cease earlier). Also hetupaccaya is one of the
24 kinds of paccaya listed in the Patthdna (see Vis. ch. xvii). Buddhist
doctrine does not allow a first cause (§644; Vis. ch. xvii, §§35ff./p. 525).
458/1 'Patisandhi—relinking' (or 'rebirth-linking'): PED's article is in-
adequate, and also misleading with its unfortunate choice of 'metempsychosis'
(besides overlooking the only Sutta ref. M. hi, 230, which has a different,
non-technical, meaning). Some technical Abhidhamma and Commentary
refs. are: Ptn. 320, etc., Ps. ii, 72, etc., Vis. 460. Commentarial meaning:
while cuti-citta is used for the last cognizance of a dying person, patisandhi-
citta is used for the first cognizance upon rebirth, which follows immediately
upon—'links up with'—the death-cognizance. There is thus unbroken
continuity without any 'thing'—consciousness or anything else—having any
permanency. Only the 'momentum' of kamma is communicated or 'passed
on' by the dying cognizance to the relinking cognizance in virtue of ignorance
and craving.
460. Knowledge of watering-places is the condition for knowledge of
what it is to have drunk [enough], knowledge of what it is to have
drunk [enough] is the condition for knowledge of the [right] amount,
knowledge of the [right] amount is the condition for knowledge of
self (§167).
461. Or in the same way that (eye consciousness arises depending
upon eye and forms ) (M. i, 111; iii, 285): Herein, the eye is a con-
dition through the conditionality of predominance, while forms are a
condition through conditionality of object, light
1
is a condition
through co-supporting, and attention, as the individual-essence, is
the cause (cf. §454).
462. While consciousness's condition is determinations, its individual
essence is its cause.
1
While name-and-form's condition is conscious-
ness, its individual essence is its cause. While the sixfold base's
condition is name-and-form, its individual essence is its cause.
While contact's condition is the sixfold base, its individual essence
is its cause. While feeling's condition is contact, its individual
essence is its cause. While craving's condition is feeling, its
individual essence is its cause. While assuming's condition is
craving, its individual essence is its cause. While being's condition
is assuming, its individual essence is its cause. While birth's
condition is being, its individual essence is its cause. While ageing-
and-death's condition is birth, its individual essence is its cause.
While sorrow's condition is ageing-and-death, its individual essence
is its cause. While lamentation's condition is sorrow, its individual
essence is its cause. While pain's condition is lamentation, its
individual essence is its cause. While grief's condition is pain, its
individual essence is its cause. While despair's condition is grief,
its individual essence is its cause.
461/1 The addition of 'light' (dloka) as one of the conditions for the arising
of eye-consciousness is later than the Tipitaka, in which i t is not mentioned
in that capacity. Cf. Vis. 488-9 (quoting the 'Former Teachers'). This
must be the earliest mention in any extant Pah work, though cf. the passage
in Nd2 (234)
l
cakkhundpuriso dloketi rupagatdni'. Cf. D. iii, 223—'dlokasanna*.
462/1 From what has gone before (§§452 and 456) this must mean prior
consciousness in continuity, and so with the rest. NettiA says 'Determinative-
acts of merit (demerit and imperturbability) are the condition for relinking-
consciousness (at rebirth). Herein, that which is the individual-essence is the
cause. And here by "determinations" is intended any arising of cognizance,
profitable or unprofitable, that belongs to worlds' (p. 116). The Pitaka refs.
for Dependent Arising are as follows: D. Sutta 15; M. Suttas 9 and 38; S.
Niddna Samyutta; A, i, 177; Vbh. Paccaydkdravibhanga; Ps. i, 50-2.
463. In this way all kinds of general-support are a requisite (cf.
§168).
464. That is why the venerable Maha-Kaccana said:
'Ideas that generate each an idea
In due relation are conditions;
And by its picking out the cause
This Mode Conveys the Requisite' (§19).
The Mode of Conveying Requisites is ended.
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