Visuddhimagga - Notes V

THE PATH
OF PURIFICATION
(VISUDDHIMAGGA)
BY
BHADANTACARIYA BUDDHAGHOSA
Translated from the Pali
by
BHIKKHU NANAMOLI
FIFTH EDITION
BUDDHIST PUBLICATION SOCIETY
Kandy Sri Lanka


CHAPTER XIII
1. 'With the consciousness belonging to the particular concentration that con-
stitutes the preliminary work. The meaning is: by means of consciousness con-
centrated with the momentary concentration that occurs in the form of the pre-
liminary work for knowledge of the divine ear element. The occasion of access
for the divine ear element is called preliminary-work consciousness, but that as
stated refers to multiple advertings' (Pm. 401).
2. 'The sound sign is the sound itself since it is the cause for the arising of the
knowledge. Or the gross-subtle aspect acquired in the way stated is the sound
sign* (Pm. 402).
3. 'This is momentary-concentration consciousness, which owing to the fact
that the preliminary work contingent upon the sound has been performed, occurs
in one who has attained the basic jhana and emerged for the purpose of arousing
the divine ear element' (Pm. 402).
4. ' "Becomes merged9
' is amalgamated with the divine ear element. He is
called an obtainer of divine-ear knowledge as soon as the absorption conscious-
ness has arisen. The meaning is that there is now no further need of development
for the purpose' (Pm. 403).


5. The "matter of the heart" is not the heart-basis, but rather it is the heart as
the piece of flesh described as resembling a lotus bud in shape outside and like a
kosdtaki fruit inside (Ch. VIII, §111). For the blood mentioned here is to be
found with that as its support. But the heart-basis occurs with this blood as its
support' (Pm. 403)
6. 'Of one who has not done any interpreting (abhinivesa) reckoned as study
for direct-knowledge* (Pm. 407). A rather special use of the word abhinivesa,
perhaps more freely renderable here as 'practice'.
7. For the term chinna-vatumaka ('one who has broken the cycle of rebirths')
as an epithet of former Buddhas, see M.iii,l 18.
8. Sarhvannita—'given in detail'; Pm. glosses by vitthdritan ti attho. Not in
this meaning in P.T.S Diet. See prologue verses to the four Nikayas.
9. A commentarial account of the behaviour of lions will be found in the
Manorathapuranl, commentary to A. Catukkanipata 33. Pm. says: Slhokkamana-
vasena sihdtipatanavasena hdnagatiyd gacchati (p. 408).
10. Ugghatetvd: see Ch. X, §6; the word is obviously used here in the same
sense.
11. "The "ordinary sun" is the sun's divine palace that arose before the emer-
gence of the aeon. But like the other sense-sphere deities at the time of the
emergence of the aeon the sun deity too produces jhana and reappears in the
Brahma-world. But the actual sun's disk becomes brighter and more fiery. Oth-
ers say that it disappears and another appears in its place' (Pm. 412).
12. The five are the Ganges, Yamuna (Jumma), Sarabhu, Sarassati, and Mahl
(Pm. 412).
13. Hamsapatana is another name for Mandakini (Pm.). For seven Great Lakes
seeA.iv,101.
14. 'At the place where the Yama Deities are established. The places where the
CatumahArajika and Tavatinisa heavens become established do not reappear at
first because they are connected with the earth' (Pm. 412).
15. Khdrudaka—'caustic waters': the name given to the waters on which the
world-spheres rest (see MA.iv,178).
16. Kutdgdra: see Ch. XII, n.14; here this seems the most likely of the various
meanings of the word.
17. ' "He cannot see them with the divine eye'
1
—with the knowledge of the
divine eye—because of the extreme brevity and extreme subtlety of the material
moment in anyone. Moreover, it is present materiality that is the object of the
divine eye, and that is by prenascence condition. And there is no occurrence of
exalted consciousness without adverting and preliminary work. Nor is material-
ity that is only arising able to serve as object condition, nor that which is dissolv-
ing. Therefore it is rightly said that he cannot see with the divine eye materiality
at the moments of death and reappearance. If the knowledge of the divine eye
has only materiality as its object, then why is it said that he "sees beings"? It is
said in this way since it is mainly concerned with instances of materiality in a


being's continuity, or because that materiality is a reason for apprehending beings.
Some say that this is said according to conventional usage' (Pm. 417).
18. In rendering yathdbhatam here in this very idiomatic passage MA.ii,32 has
been consulted.
19. For the word aya see Ch. XVI, § 17.
20. See Abhidhamma Matika ('schedule'), Dhs. p.If. This consists of 22 sets of
triple classifications (tika) and 100 sets of double ones (duka). The first triad is
'profitable, unprofitable, and [morally] indeterminate', and the first dyad is 'root-
cause, not-root-cause\ The Matika is used in the Dhammasangani (for which it
serves as the basic structure), in the Vibhahga (in some of the 'Abhidhamma
Sections' and in the 'Questionnaires') and in the Patthana. All dhammas are
either classifiable according to these triads and dyads, under one of the headings,
if the triad or dyad is all-embracing, or are called 'not-so-classifiable' (na-vat~
tabba), if the triad or dyad is not. The four triads mentioned here are: no. 13
'dhammas with a limited object, with an exalted object, with a measureless
object'; no. 16 'dhammas with a path as object, with a path as root-cause, with a
path as predominance'; no. 19 'dhammas with a past object, with a future object,
with a present object'; and no. 21 'dhammas with an internal object, with an
external object, with an internal-external object'.
21. The 'word in the accusative case' is in the first instance 'body', governed
by the verb 'converts' (kdyarh parindmeti); see Pm.
22. Pm. comments: 'Although with the words 'These perfumes", etc., he appre-
hends present perfumes, etc., nevertheless the object of his resolving conscious-
ness is actually their future materiality that is to be associated with the distinc-
tion of not drying up. This is because the resolve concerns the future ... "Cream
of curd": when resolving, his object is the future appearance of curd*.
Vatanlyasendsana was apparently a monastery in the Vindhya Hills
(Vinjatavi): see Mv.l9:6; DhsA. 419. The Elders Assagutta and Rohana in-
structed Kajangala who was sent to convert Menander (Lamotte, Histoire de la
Bouddhisme Indien, p. 440).
23. Cf. also Vbh. 62 and 91.
24. Pm. adds: 'Some however explain the meaning in this way: It is as long as,
when one has stepped on the dry bank with a wet foot, the water line on the foot
does not disappear'.
25. The residents of the Abhayagiri Monastery in Anuradhapura (Pm.).
CHAPTER XIV
1. Cf. Ps.i, 42, etc.; Abhidhamma definitions very commonly make use of the
Pali forms of verbal nouns, here instanced by pannd (understanding = state of
understanding) and pajdnana (understanding = act of understanding), both from
the verb pajdndti (he understands). English does not always, as in this case,
distinguish between the two. Similarly, for example, from the verb socati (he
sorrows) we find soka (sorrow, state of sorrowing) and socana (sorrowing, act of


sorrowing), and here the English differentiates. Cf. parallel treatment of pannd at
MA.ii,343f.
2. 'In arisings of consciousness with two root-causes [i.e. with non-greed and
non-hate but without non-delusion], or without root-cause, understanding does
not occur' (Pm. 432). 'Just as pleasure is not invariably inseparable from happi-
ness, so perception and consciousness are not invariably inseparable from under-
standing. But just as happiness is invariably inseparable from pleasure, so under-
standing is invariably inseparable from perception and consciousness' (Pm. 432).
3. 'A phenomenon's own essence (sako bhdvo) or existing essence (samdno
VA bhdva) is its individual essence (sabhdva)' (Pm. 433). Cf. Ch. VIII, note 68,
where Pm. gives the definition from saha-bhdva (with essence).
4. Patisambhidd is usually rendered by 'analysis' (see e.g. Points of Contro-
versy—Kathdvatthu translation—pp. 377ff.). But the Tipitaka explanations of
the four patisambhidd suggest no emphasis on analysis rather than synthesis. Pm.
gives the following definition of the term: 'Knowledge that is classified (pabheda-
gata = put into a division) under meaning (aitha) as capable of effecting the
explanation and definition of specific characteristics of the meaning class (mean-
ing division) is called attha-patisambhidd; and so with the other three' (Pm.
436). 'Discrimination' has been chosen for patisambhidd because, while it has
the sense of 'division', it does not imply an opposite process as 'analysis' does.
Also it may be questioned whether the four are well described as 'entirely logi-
cal': 'entirely epistemological' might perhaps be both less rigid and nearer; for
they seem to cover four interlocking fields, namely: meanings of statements and
effects of causes (etc.), statements of meanings and causes of effects (etc.),
language as restricted to etymological rules of verbal expression, and clarity (or
perspicuous inspiration) in marshalling the other three.
5. 'I.e. the four paths with the first jhana and those with the second, third, and
fourth, out of the five' (Pm. 434).
6. The word abhinivisati with its noun abhinivesa means literally 'to dwell on',
and so to adhere, or 'insist'. In the Tipitaka it always appears in a bad sense and
always appears in contexts with wrong view and clinging (see e.g. M.iii, 30-31,
Nd. 1, 436, and also Ps. quoted above at Ch.I,§140). However, in the Commen-
taries the word appears also in a good sense as at Ch. XIV, §130, Ch. XXI, §73
and 83f., and at MA.i,250 (cf. saddham nivisati, M.ii,173). In this good sense it
is synonymous with right interpretation of experience. All the bare experience of
perception is interpreted by the mind either in the sense of permanence, pleasure,
self, which is wrong because it is not confirmed by experience, or in the sense of
impermanence, etc., which is right because it is confirmed by experience (see
Ch. XIV, §130). There is no not interpreting experience, and it is a function of
the mind that the interpretation adopted is 'dwelt upon', i.e. insisted upon. And
so it is this insistence or interpretation in accordance with reality as confirmed by
experience that is the abhinivesa of the Commentaries in the good sense. For
these reasons the words interpretation, misinterpretation and insistence have been
chosen here as renderings.
7. Ariyati—'to honour, to serve'. Not in P.T.S. Diet. Cf. ger. araniya


(MA.i,21,173), also not in P.T.S. Diet., explained by Majjhima Tika as 'to be
honoured' (payirupasitabbd).
8. This quotation has been filled out from the Vibhanga text for clarity.
9. Byabhicdra (vyabhicdra): not in P.T.S. Diet.; normal grammarian's term for
an 'exception'.
10. The idea behind the term 'individual-essence language' (sabhdvanirutti),
that is to say, that there is a real name for each thing that is part of that thing's
individual essence, is dealt with at DhsA. 391-92. Magadhan as 'the root speech
of all beings' and the 'individual-essence language' is dealt with in greater detail
at VbhA. 387.
'Phasso' and 'vedand' as respectively masc. and fern. nom. sing, have the
correct terminations. 'Phassd* and 'vedano* are wrong.
11. The expression gatapaccdgatikabhdva refers to the practice of 'carrying the
meditation subject to and from the alms round', which is described at MA.i,257
in detail. The same expression is also used of a certain kind of refuse-rag (see
Ch. II, §17).
12. 'The "Chapter of Similes" is the Chapter of Twin Verses in the Dham-
mapada (Dh.1-20), they say. Others say that it is the Book of Pairs in the First
Fifty (M. Suttas 31-40)' (Pm. 436).
13. 'Tangible data are omitted from this list because, not being derived matter,
they are included in the primaries' (Pm. 442). They are described as consisting
of three of the four primaries, excluding the water (cohesion) element. 'What is
the materiality of the great primaries? It is the tangible-data base and the water-
element' (Dhs. 663). For the whole list see Dhs. 596, in which (N.B.) the heart-
basis does not appear. See also note 32 and Ch. XV, n.15.
14. 'Here the first-mentioned characteristic of the eye is described according to
the kamma that produces a selfhood, and is common to all of it, and this without
touching on differentiation is the cause. The second is according to the special-
ized kamma generated thus, 'Let my eye be thus'. This is what they say. But it
can be taken that the first-mentioned characteristic is stated as sensitivity's inter-
est in lighting up its own objective fields, the five senses' state of sensitivity
being taken as a generality; and that the second is stated as the seeing that is due
to the particular division of its own cause, the sensitivities' cause as the state of
kamma being taken as a generality or as a unity. The same method applies to tjie
ear and so on.
/ 'Here it may be asked, "Is the arising of the faculties of the eye, etc., due to
kamma that is one or to kamma that is different?". Now the Ancients say, "In
both ways". Herein, firstly, in the case of the arising of an eye, etc., due to
kamma that is different there is nothing to be explained since the cause is divided
up. But when their arising is due to kamma that is one, how does there come to
be differentiation among them? It is due to dividedness in the cause too. For it is
craving, in the form of longing for this or that kind of becoming that, itself
having specific forms owing to hankering after the sense-bases included in some
kind of becoming or other, contrives, acting as decisive-support, the specific
divisions in the kamma that generates such a kind of becoming. As soon as the


kamma has acquired the differentiation induced by that [hankering] it generates
through effort consisting in appropriate ability a multiple fruit with differentiated
individual essences, as though it had itself taken on a multiple form. And the
ability here need not be understood as anything other than the able state; for it is
simply the effort of producing fruit that is differentiated by the differentiation
due to the differentiation in its cause. And the fact of this differentiating effort on
the part of kamma that is one being the cause of the multiple faculties will be
dealt with below as to logic and texts (note 21). Besides, it is told how one kind
of consciousness only is the cause of the generation of the sixteen kinds of
resultant consciousness and so on; and in the world it is also found that a single
paddy seed is the cause of the generation of the ripe, the unripe, the husked, and
the unhusked fruit. But what is the use of logical thinking? For the eye, etc., are
the fruit of kamma; and kamma-result is exclusively the province of a Buddha's
knowledge' (Pm. 444).
15. Avinjana—'picking up': see dvijjhati in P.T.S. Diet.
16. * "Some" are certain Mahasahghikas; for among these Vasudhamma says
this: "In the eye fire is in excess; in the ear, air; in the nose, earth; in the tongue,
water; in the body all are equal" ' (Pm. 444).
17. ' "As qualities of fire, and so on": [aided] by visible data as the illuminating
[quality] of heat, which is called lighting up; by sound [as a quality] of air, by
odour [as a quality] of earth, by flavour [as a quality] of the water called spittle—
so according to the first theory [that of "some"]; and it can be suitably adjusted
to accord with the second [that of "others"] because they need to be assisted by
such and such qualities of primaries: what is meant is that they have to be helped
in apprehending visible data and so on. This theory holds that the quality is the
ability of the eye, etc., to light up [respectively] visible data, etc., only when
associated with the reasons that are their accessories consisting of light, etc., and
aperture's state of decisive support for ear-consciousness. Aperture is taken in
due order, as are fire, etc., since it is absence of primaries. Or alternatively, when
others intend that aperture is a quality of primaries, as visible data, etc., are, then
the qualities of primaries are construable in their order thus: [aided] by visible
data and light [as a quality] of fire, by sound [as a quality] of aperture called
space, by odour [as a quality] of air, by flavour [as a quality] of water, by
tangible data [as a quality] of earth' (Pm. 445).
18. The four primaries are held to be inseparable and not to exist separate from
each other; cf. quotation from the 'Ancients' in §45. Pm. says: 'Excess is in
capability, not in quantity, otherwise their inseparability would be illogical' (Pm.
451).
19. ' "From finding visibility, etc., [respectively] in a state of excess": from
finding them associated with these differences, namely, the bright visible datum
in fire, sound audible through its individual essence in air, the odour beginning
with surabhi perfume in earth, and the sweet taste in water; thus "visible data,
etc., are the [respective] qualities of these". This is according to the first theory,
and he has stated the conclusion (uttara) that follows, beginning with "we might
assume" in terms of that. The second is confuted in the same way. Or alterna-


tively, "Then they may say", etc., can be taken as said emphasizing, in order to
confute it, the theory of Kanada, which asserts that the eye, etc., are respectively
made by fire, space, earth, water, and air, that have visible data, etc., as their
respective qualities' (Pm. 445).
20. In the P.T.S. text and Sinhalese Hewavitarne text the word ekakaldpe, 'that
form a single group*, occurs in this sentence but is not in the Harvard text.
21. 'If there is no differentiation according to primaries, what then is the reason
for the differentiation of the eye, and so on? Though the kamma that is produced
by the longing for a selfhood (individual personality) with five sense-bases is
one only, still it should be taken as called "not common to them all" and "differ-
ence of kamma" because it is the cause of the differentiation of the eye, and so
on. For it is not a condition for the ear through the same particular difference
through which it is a condition for the eye, since, if it were, it would then follow
that there was no distinction between the faculties. Because of the words, "At the
moment of rebirth-linking, exalted volition is a condition, as kamma condition,
for the kinds of materiality due to kamma performed" (Ptn.) it must be recog-
nized that a single volition is kamma condition for all the kinds of materiality
due to kamma performed that come into existence at the moment of rebirth-
linking. For if the volition were different, then, when there came to be the arising
of the faculties, it would follow that the materiality due to kamma performed was
generated by limited and exalted kamma. And rebirth-linking that is one is not
generated by a plurality of kinds of kamma. Thus it is established that the arising
of the plurality of the faculties is due to a single kamma' (Pm. 446).
22. See also §134 and notes 60, 61. The amplification in this paragraph is from
Pm., which continues: There is another method: the eye and the ear have non-
contiguous objective fields because arising of consciousness is caused while
their objective fields are separated by an interval and apart (adhika). Some say
that the ear has a contiguous objective field. If it did, then sound born of con-
sciousness would not be the object of ear-consciousness, for there is no arising
externally of what is consciousness-originated. And in the texts sound as object
is spoken of as being the object of ear-consciousness without making any dis-
tinction. Besides, there would be no defining the direction and position of the
sound because it would then have to be apprehended in the place occupied by the
possessor of the objective field, as happens in the case of an odour. Conse-
quently it remains in the same place where it arose, if it comes into focus in the
f ear avenue (so the Burmese ed.). Are not the sounds of washermen [beating their
washing on stones] heard later by those who stand at a distance? No; because
there is a difference in the way of apprehending a sound according to the ways in
which it becomes evident to one nearby and to one at a distance. For just as,
because of difference in the way of apprehending the sound of words according
to the ways in which it becomes evident to one at a distance and to one nearby,
there comes to be [respectively] not apprehending, and apprehending, of the
differences in the syllables, so also, when the sound of washermen (a) becomes
[an occurrence] that is evident throughout from beginning to end to one who is
neraby, and (b) becomes an occurrence that is evident in compressed form in the


end or in the middle to one who is at a distance, it is because there is a difference
in the apprehending and definition, which occur later in the cognitive series of
ear-consciousness, that there comes to be the assumption (abhimdna) "Heard
faintly is heard later". But that sound comes into the ear's focus at the moment of
its own existence and in dependence on the place where it arises (see Ch. XIII,
§112; DhsA. 313). If there is absolutely no successive becoming of sound, how
does an echo arise? The sound, though it remains at a distance, is a condition for
the arising of an echo and for the vibration of vessels, etc., elsewhere as a
magnet (ayo-kanta) is for the movement of iron' (Pm. 446-47).
23. Upddinna (also upddinnaka) is pp. of upddiyati (he clings), from which the
noun updddna (clinging ) also comes. Upddinna-(ka-) rupa (clung-to matter) =
kammaja-rupa (kamma-born matter); see Dhs. §653. It is vaguely renderable by
'organic or sentient or living matter'; technically, it is matter of the four prima-
ries that is 'clung to' (upddinna) or 'derived' (updddya) by kamma. Generally
taken as a purely Abhidhamma term (Dhs., p.l), it nevertheless occurs in the
Suttas at M.i,185 in the same sense.
24. P.T.S. text reads ahhamannam sahkaro natthi. Harvard text omits sahkaro
natthi. The word sahkara in the sense of 'confounding' or error is not in P.T.S.
Diet.; see Vis. concluding verses. P.T.S. ed., p. 711.
'Though these things, that is to say, the "mark ... of the female", etc., arise
each due to its own condition consisting in kamma, etc., they mostly only do so
as modes in a continuity accompanied by the femininity faculty. And so "if is
manifested as the reason for the mark", etc., is said making the femininity
faculty their cause.
'As regards the "mark of the female", etc., too, its "facultiness" is stated as
predominance, in other words, as a state of cause, because the conditions for the
modal matter (dkdra-rupa) consisting of the mark of the female, etc., in a conti-
nuity accompanied by faculties do not arise otherwise, and because these kinds
of materiality are a condition for apprehending the female. But because the
femininity faculty does not generate even the material instances in its own group
or maintain or consolidate them, and because it does not so act for the material
instances of other groups, it is therefore not called in the text faculty, presence,
and non-disappearance conditions, as the life faculty is for the material instances
of its group, and as nutriment is for the material instances in succeeding groups.
And it is because the mark, etc., are dependent on other conditions that wherever
they have predominance its shape is encountered, even in dead and sculptured
matter that resembles it. And so too with the masculinity faculty.
'And since these two do not occur together in a single continuity, because
of the words "Does the masculinity faculty arise in one in whom the femininity
faculty arises?—No" (Yamaka), etc., therefore even in a hermaphrodite there is
only one of them at a given moment (see also DhsA. 323)' (Pm. 448).
25. 'Since the life faculty is itself entirely kamma-born it is established, by tak-
ing them as conascent, that the things to be protected by it are kamma-born too;
this is why there is no inclusion of the term "kamma-born". It maintains as if it
were its own that kamma-born matter by being the cause of its occurrence even


though only lasting for a moment; that is why it has the characteristic of main-
taining conascent kinds of matter. For kamma alone is not competent to be the
cause of kamma-born things' presence, as nutriment, etc., are of the nutriment-
born. Why? Because it is no longer existent at that moment.
* "Because it does accomplish each of those functions": it does so because it
is a condition for distinguishing what is living. For it is the life faculty that dis-
tinguishes matter that is bound up with faculties from dead matter, and kamma-
born matter and what is bound up with that from matter that is temperature
originated, and so on.
'And the life faculty must be regarded as the reason not only for presence
during a moment but also for non-interruption of connexion; otherwise death as
the termination of a life span would be illogical' (Pm. 448).
26. * "The heart-basis ... the support for the mind-element and for the mind-
consciousness-element": how is that to be known? (i) From scriptures and (ii)
from logical reasoning.
'The scripture is this: "The materiality dependent on which the mind-ele-
ment and mind-consciousness-element occur is a condition, as a support condi-
tion, for the mind-element and the mind-consciousness-element and what is as-
sociated therewith" (Ptn.1,4). If that is so, why is it not mentioned in the Rupakanda
of the Dhammasangani (Dhs. §583ff.)? Its not being mentioned there is for
another reason. What is that? Non-inconsistency of the teaching. For while eye-
consciousness, etc., have the eye, etc., as their respective supports absolutely,
mind-consciousness does not in the same way have the heart-basis as its support
absolutely. And the teaching in the physical-basis dyad (vatthu-duka) is given by
way of the material support thus, "There is matter that is the physical basis of
eye-consciousness, there is matter that is not the physical basis of eye-conscious-
ness" (Dhs. §585) and so on; and if the dyads were stated by way of what had the
heart-basis absolutely as its support thus, "There is matter that is the physical
basis of mind-consciousness" and so on, then the object dyads (drammana-duka)
do not fall into line: for one cannot say: "There is matter that is the object of
mind-consciousness, there is matter that is not the object of mind-conscious-
ness". So the physical-basis dyads and object dyads being thus made inconsis-
tent, the teaching would lack unity, and the Master's wish was to give the teach-
ing here in a form that has unity. That is why the heart-basis is not mentioned,
not because it is unapprehendable.
'(ii) But the logical reasoning should be understood in this way. In the five-
constituent becoming, [that is, in the sense sphere and fine-material sphere,]
these two elements have as their support produced (nipphanna) derived matter.
Herein, since the visible-data base, etc., and nutritive essence, are found to occur
apart from what is bound up with faculties, to make them the support would be
illogical. And since these two elements are found in a continuity that is devoid of
the femininity and masculinity faculties [i.e. in the Brahma-world], to make them
the support would be illogical too. And in the case of the life faculty that would
have to have another function, so to make it the support would be illogical too.
So it is the heart-basis that remains to be recognized as their support. For it is
possible to say that these two elements have as their support produced derived


matter, since existence is bound up with matter in the five-constituent becoming.
Whatever has its existence bound up with matter is found to have as its support
produced derived matter, as the eye-consciousness-element does. And the dis-
tinction "in the five-constituent becoming" is made on account of the mind-
consciousness-element; in the four-constituent becoming, [that is, the immaterial
sphere,] there is no mind-element. Does there not follow contradiction of the
middle term (hetu) because of establishing faculties as their support? No; be-
cause that is disproved by what is seen. For these two elements are not, as in the
case of eye-consciousness, controlled by the slackness and keenness, etc., of
their physical basis; and accordingly it is not said in the texts that they have the
faculties as their condition. Hence their having faculties as their support, in other
words, their being controlled by them, is disproved.
'Granted that these two elements have as their support the derived matter
consisting of the heart-basis, how is it to be known that it is kamma-originated,
has an invariable function, and is to be found located in the heart? It may be said
to be kamma-originated because, like the eye, it is the materiality of a physical
basis; and because of that it has an invariable function; because it is the material-
ity of a physical basis and because it is a support for consciousness, is the
meaning. It is known that its location is there because of the heart's exhaustion
(khijjana) in one who thinks of anything, bringing it to mind intently and direct-
ing his whole mind to it' (Pm. 449-50).
The word hadaya (heart), used in a purely mental and not physical sense,
occurs in the definitions of the mind-element and mind-consciousness-element in
the Vibhahga (Vbh. 88-89). The brain (matthaluhga), which seems to have been
first added as the 32nd part of the body in the Patisambhida (Ps.i,7), was ig-
nored, and the Visuddhimagga is hard put to it to find a use for it. The Pitakas
(e.g. Ptn.1,4 quoted above) connect the mind with the matter of the body without
specifying.
27. 'It is the mode and the alteration of what? Of consciousness-originated
primary elements that have the air-element in excess of capability. What is that
capability? It is the state of being consciousness-born and the state of being
derived matter. Or alternatively, it can be taken as the mode alteration of the air
element. If that is so, then intimation is illogical as derived matter, for there is no
derived matter with a single primary as its support, since "matter derived from
the four great primaries" (M.i,53) is said. That is not wrong. Alteration of one of
the four is that of all four, as with wealth shared among four. And excess of air
element in a material group (kaldpa) does not contradict the words "of the air
element"; and excess is in capability, not in quantity, otherwise their inseparabil-
ity would be illogical. According to some it is that of the air element only. In
their opinion the state of derived matter is inapplicable (durupapdda) to intima-
tion, since the alteration of one is not that of all. But this [air element] is
apprehended by mind-door impulsion that is next to the non-intimating [appre-
hension] that is next to the apprehension of the appearance of motion in the
movement of the hands, and so on. There is a certain kind of alteration that is
separate from the appearance of motion. And the apprehension of the former is
next to the apprehension of the latter. How is that to be known? By the apprehen-


sion of intention. For no apprehension of intention such as "He is getting this
done, it seems" is met with in the case of trees* movements, etc., which are
devoid of intention. But it is met with in the case of hand movements and so on.
Therefore there is a certain kind of alteration that is separate from the appearance
of motion, and it is known as the "intimator of the intention". Also it is known
by inference that the apprehension of the alteration is next to the apprehension of
the appearance thus: The intimator intimates the meaning to be intimated only
when it is apprehended as a cause, not merely as present. For they say accord-
ingly:
Sounds that have entered no objective field
Do not awaken any kind of meaning;
And also beings merely recognized
As such communicate no meanings either.
* If just the apprehension of the alteration is the reason for the apprehension
of the intention, why is there no apprehension of intention in unapprehended
communication (sanketa)! It is not only just the apprehension of the alteration
that is the reason for the apprehension of the intention; but rather it should be
taken that the apprehension of the previously-established connexion is the deci-
sive support for this. The stiffening, upholding, and movement are due to the air-
element associated with the alteration belonging to the intimation, is what is
said. What, is it all the air-element that does all those things? It is not like that.
For it is the air element given rise to by the seventh impulsion that, by acquiring
as its reinforcing conditions the air elements given rise to by the preceding im-
pulsions, moves consciousness-originated matter by acting as cause for its suc-
cessive arisings in adjacent locations (desantaruppatti—cf. Ch. VIII, n. 54), not
the others. The others, however, help it by doing the stiffening and upholding,
the successive arising in adjacent locations being itself the movement. So the in-
strumentality should be taken as attributed when there is the sign [of movement];
otherwise there would not be uninterestedness and momentariness of dhammas.
And here the cart to be drawn by seven yokes is given as simile in the Commen-
tary. But when consciousness-born matter moves, the kinds of matter born of
temperature, kamma, and nutriment move too because they are bound up with it,
like a piece of dry cow-dung thrown into a river's current.
* Since it has been said that the apprehension of intimation is next to the
apprehension of the appearance of motion, how then, is the air element itself as
the maker of the movement accompanied by the alteration consisting in the
intimation? It is not like that. It is the air elements given rise to by the first
impulsion, etc., and which are unable to cause movement in that way and per-
form only the stiffening and upholding, that should be taken as only accompa-
nied by the alteration belonging to intimation. For it is the alteration coexistent
with the intention that is the intimation, because of giving rise to alteration in
whatever direction it wishes to cause the occurrence of moving forward and so
on. Taking it in this way, it is perfectly logical to say that the origination of
intimation belongs to mind-door adverting. Since the intention possessed of the
aforesaid alteration is intimated through the apprehension of that alteration, it is
said that "Its function is to display intention1
'. The air element being the cause of


the motion of the body intimation, is figuratively said, as a state of alteration, to
be ''manifested as the cause of bodily motion". "Its proximate cause is the con-
sciousness-originated air-element" is said since the air element's excessive func-
tion is the cause of intimating intention by movement of the body' (Pm. 450-52).
Cf. DhsA. 83f.
28. Vaclbheda—'speech utterance' is not in P.T.S. Diet., which does not give
this use of bheda. Pm. (p. 452) explains: 'The function (—"knocking together")
of the vocal apparatus (—"clung-to matter")'.
29. 'The question, "It is the mode and the alteration of what?", should be
handled in the same way as for bodily intimation, with this difference: for "next
to the apprehension of the appearance of movement" substitute "next to the
hearing of an audible sound". And here, because of the absence of stiffening,
etc., the argument beginning "For it is the air element given rise to by the
seventh impulsion" does not apply; for the sound arises together with the knock-
ing together, and the knocking together only applies in the case of the first im-
pulsion, and so on. The knocking together is the arising of groups of primaries
(bhuta-kaldpa) in proximity to each other due to conditions. The movement is
the progression of the successive arising in adjacent locations. This is the differ-
ence. The earth element's knocking together is parallel to the air element's
moving as regards function' (Pm. 452).
30. In actual fact the heart-basis is not in the Pitakas as such.
31. ' "Some" are the inmates of the Abhayagiri Monastery at Anuradhapura'
(Pm. 455). A long discussion on this follows in Pm., not given here.
32. ' "Sensed (jnuta)" means apprehendable by sensing (MWTVA), by reaching;
hence he said "because they are the objective fields of faculties that take contigu-
ous [objective fields}" (cf. §46). But what is it that is called a tangible datum? It
is the three elements, earth, heat, and air. But why is the water element not
included here? Is not cold apprehended by touching; and that is the water ele-
ment? Certainly it is apprehended but it is not the water element. What is it then?
It is just the fire element. For there is the sensation (buddhi) of cold when heat is
sluggish. There is no quality that is called cold; there is only the assumption
(abhimdna) of coldness due to the sluggishness of the state of heat. How is that
to be known? Because of the unreliability of the sensation of cold, like "beyond
and not beyond". For in hot weather, while those who stand in the sun and go
into the shade have the sensation of cold, yet those who go to the same place
from an underground cave have the sensation of heat. And if coldness were the
water element it would be found in a single group (kaldpa) along with heat; but
it is not so found. That is why it may be known that coldness is not the water
element. And that is conclusive (uttara) for those who agree to the inseparable
existence of the primary elements; and it is conclusive too even for those who do
not agree because it is disproved by associate existence through seeing the func-
tions of the four primaries in a single group. It is conclusive too for those who
say that coldness is the characteristic of the air element; for if coldness were the
air element, coldness would be found in a single group along with heat, and it is
not so found. That is why it may be known that coldness is not the air element


either. But those who hold the opinion that fluidity (dravata) is the water ele-
ment and that that is apprehended by touching should be told: "That fluidity is
touched is merely the venerable ones' assumption as is the case with shape". For
this is said by the Ancients:
"Three elements coexisting with fluidity
Together form what constitutes a tangible;
That 'I succeed in touching this fluidity'
Is a common misconception in the world.
And as a man who touches elements,
And apprehends a shape then with his mind,
Fancies 'I really have been touching shape',
So too fluidity is recognized" ' (Pm. 459).
33. * "The sound base only": here some say, "The consciousness-born is always
intimative (savinnattika)". The Ancients say, "There is sound due to the interven-
tion iyipphdra) of applied thought that does not intimate". While depending on
the word of the Great Commentary that puts it thus, "Intimatable (cognizable)
through the ear by means of the sound due to applied thought's intervention",
still there is also need of the arising of consciousness-originated sound without
intimation (cognition) for because of the words "For the intimation (cognition) is
not due to intimating speech" (?), it arises together with sound not intimatable
(cognizable) through the ear. That being so, there would have to be a conscious-
ness-born sound-ennead. And that theory is rejected by Sahghakaras who imag-
ine that it is self-contradictory to say that there is sound not intimatable (cogni-
zable) through the ear. Others, however, do not reject the Great Commentary's
statement and they comment on its intention. How? [They say that] the non-
intimation (non-cognition) through the ear of the sound activated due to applied
thought's intervention is stated in the Suttas with this intention, "He tells by
hearing with the divine ear the subtle sound that is conascent with the intimation,
originated by applied thought, and consisting in movement of the tongue and
palate, and so on" (cf, A.i,171), and that in the Patthana (Ptn.1,7) the state of
object condition for ear-consciousness is stated with reference to gross sound'
(Pm. 460.)
34. • "Has the characteristic of being felt" means that it has as its characteristic
what is felt, what is experienced as the "taste (stimulus)" of the object. ^Charac-
teristic of perceiving" means that it has as its characteristic the perceiving of an
object clashed as blue, etc., and the knowing, the apprehending, of it by arousing
the perception of it as blue, yellow, long, short, and so on. Forming (abhi-
sahkharana) is accumulating, or it is contriving by becoming interested. And it
is because volition is basic in both of these ways that the formations aggregate is
said thus to have the characteristic of forming. For in expounding the formations
aggregate in the Suttanta-Bhajaniya of the Vibhanga, volition was expounded by
the Blessed One thus, "Eye-contact-born volition" (Vbh. 8) and so on. "Has the
characteristic of cognizing" means that it has as its characteristic that kind of
knowing called apprehension of an object in a mode in which the objective field
is apprehended differently from the mode of perceiving' (Pm. 462).