Visuddhimagga - Notes VII

THE PATH
OF PURIFICATION
(VISUDDHIMAGGA)
BY
BHADANTACARIYA BUDDHAGHOSA
Translated from the Pali
by
BHIKKHU NANAMOLI
FIFTH EDITION
BUDDHIST PUBLICATION SOCIETY
Kandy Sri Lanka


CHAPTER XVI
1. 'In the noble path moment's initial stage' (Pm. 519).
2. The words sittha (prepared = sajjita, uppddita, Pm. 520) and juttha (fos-
tered = sevita, Pm. 520) are not in P.T.S. Diet.
The Pali is: indalihgattho indriyattho, indadesitattho indriyattho, inda-
ditthattho indriyattho, indasitthattho indriyattho, indajutthattho indriyattho', cf.
Panini v, 2,93: Indriyam indralihgam indradrishtam indrasrishtam indrajushtam
indradattam iti va.
3. Anuvattdpana—'causing occurrence parallel to': not in P.T.S. Diet; not in
T.C.P. Diet.
4. Aya—'reason': not in P.T.S. Diet in this sense.
5. Cdraka—'prison': not in P.T.S. Diet, in this sense; see Ch. XIV §221.
6. ' "Signless": being secluded from the sign of the five aggregates, it is taken
as having no graspable entity (aviggahaY (Pm. 525).
7. 'Sickness is not included here (as at D.ii,305 for example) because no
particular person is meant, and there are persons in whom sickness does not arise
at all, like the venerable Bakkula (M. Sutta 124); otherwise it may be taken as
already included by suffering itself; for in the ultimate sense sickness is bodily
pain conditioned by disturbance of elements' (Pm. 527).
8. 'The question "But why is it suffering!" means this: granted firstly that birth
in hell is painful, since hell is unalloyed pain, and that it is painful in the other
unhappy destinies since it is originated by bad kamma; but how is it so in the
happy destinies since it is there originated by kamma that leads to bliss? The
answer, "Because it is the basis for many kinds of suffering", etc., shows that this
birth is not called suffering because of having suffering as its individual es-
sence—for there is no rebirth-linking associated with painful feeling—but rather
because it is the foundation for suffering' (Pm. 528).
Something must be said here about the words dukkha and sukha, the former
being perhaps the* hardest after dhamma to render into English. Dukkha is consis-
tently rendered by either the vaguer general term 'suffering' or by the more
specific '[bodily] pain'. Different, but overlapping, ideas are expressed. The
latter needs no explanation; but 'suffering' must be stretched to include the
general insecurity of the whole of experience, of the impermanent world. For
this, 'uneasiness' would certainly be preferable ('ill' is sometimes used), but
multiplication of renderings is to be avoided as much as possible; local accuracy
is only too often gained at the cost of general disorientation in a work of this
sort, with these very general words capable of sharp focussing. Again, sukha has
been rendered as either 'bliss' or 'pleasure', though the latter does not at all
necessarily imply any hedonism construed with sensual pleasure (kdma). Again,
'ease' (in the sense of relief) is in many ways preferable for the first sense but
has not been used for the reason already given.


9. * Since also what does not have suffering as its individual essence is yet
called suffering indirectly, consequently "intrinsic suffering" (dukkha-dukkha) is
said particularizing what does have suffering as its individual essence, just as in
the case of particularizing "concrete matter" (rupa-rupa) (see Ch. XIV, §77)
(Pm. 528). For these three kinds see S.iv,259.
10. See M. Sutta 13 and 129, though it is not clear where the figure 'thirty-two'
is taken from.
11. Pavana—'stench': not in P.T.S. Diet, in this sense. The Sammohavinodani
(Burm. ed.) reproducing this passage inserts the word asuci (impurity), lacking in
P.T.S. and Harvard eds. of Vis. Kunapa is only given the meaning of 'corpse or
carcase' in P.T.S. Diet.; but Pm. says 'various ordures (kunapa) such as bile,
phlegm, pus, blood, excrement, gorge and so on' (Pm. 529). 'Whether the mother
is 20, 30 or 40 years old, it is "as exceptionally loathsome" as an excrement
bucket that has not been washed for a like number of years' (Pm. 529).
12. The P.T.S. and Harvard texts read uddhapddam (or uddham pddarh) pa-
patanti, but Burmese ed. of Sammohavinodani reads chinnapapdtam papatanti.
The former reading is favoured by Pm.
13. Burmese ed. of Sammohavinodani adds telddlnam; not in P.T.S. and Har-
vard texts.
14. Anutthunana—'brooding': not in P.T.S. Diet. = anto nijjhdyana (Pm. 532).
15. 'Just as a lion directs his strength against the man who shot the arrow at
him, not against the arrow, so the Buddhas deal with the cause, not with the fruit.
But just as dogs, when struck with a clod, snarl and bite the clod and do not
attack the striker, so the sectarians who want to make suffering cease devote
themselves to mutilating the body, not to causing cessation of defilements'' (Pm.
533).
16. ' "On coming to that (tarn dgamma)": on reaching that nibbana by making
it the object' (Pm. 533). Agamma (ger. of dgacchati—to come) is commonly used
as an adverb in the sense of 'owing to' (e.g. at M.i,119). Here, however, it is
taken literally by the Commentaries and forms an essential part of the ontologi-
cal proof of the positive existence of nibbana. The Sammohavinodani (commen-
tary on the Ayatana-Vibhanga Abhidhamma-bhajaniya) refutes the suggestion of
a disputant (vitandavadin) who asserts that nibbana is 'mere destruction'
(khayamatta). The arguments used are merely supplementary to those in §69
here, and so are not quoted. The conclusion of the argument is worth noting,
however, because of the emphasis on the words 'tam dgamma'. It is this: 'It is on
coming to nibbana that greed, etc., are destroyed. It is the same nibbana that is
called "destruction of greed, destruction of hate, destruction of delusion". These
are just three terms for nibbana.—When this was said, he asked: You say "On
coming to" (dgamma); from where have you got this "on coming to"?—It is got
from the Suttas.—Quote the sutta.—"Thus ignorance and craving, on coming to
that, are destroyed in that, are abolished in that, nor does anything anywhere ...
(evam avijja ca tanha ca tam agamma tamhi khinam tamhi bhaggam na ca kinci
kadaci ...)". When this was said, the other was silent'. The quotation has not
been traced.


17. Nippapanca (non-diversification) is one of the synonyms for nibbana. The
word papanca is commonly used in the Commentaries in the sense (a) of an im-
pediment or obstacle (DhA.i,18), and (b) as a delay, or diffuseness (Vis. Ch.
XVII, §73). The sense in which the word is used in the Suttas is that of diversify-
ing and is best exemplified at M.i.lll: 'Friends, due to eye and to a visible
object eye-consciousness arises. The coincidence of the three is contact. With
contact as condition there is feeling. What a man feels that he perceives. What he
perceives he thinks about. What he thinks about he diversifies (papanceti). Ow-
ing to his having diversified, the evaluation of diversifying perceptions besets a
man with respect to past, future, and present visible objects', and so on. This
kind of papanca is explained by the Commentaries as 'due to craving, pride and
views' (MA.i,25; ii,10; ii,75, etc.), and it may be taken as the diversifying action,
the choosing and rejecting, the approval and disapproval (M.i,65), exercised by
craving, etc., on the bare material supplied by perception and thought. Conse-
quently, though it is bound up with craving, etc., a false emphasis is given in
rendering papanca in these contexts by 'obsession* as is done in P.T.S. Diet.
Nippapanca as a term for nibbana emphasises the absence of that.
18. This discussion falls under three headings: Qs. 1 to 4 refute the assertion
that nibbana is mythical and non-existent; Qs. 5 to 7 refute the assertion that
nibbana is 'mere destruction' (further argued in the Sammohavinodani—VbhA.
5If.); the remaining questions deal with the proof that only nibbana (and not the
atom, etc.,) is permanent because uncreated.
The Paramatthamanjusa covers the subject at great length and reinforces the
arguments given here with much syllogistic reasoning. However, only the fol-
lowing paragraph will be quoted here, which is reproduced in the commentaries
to Ud. 80 and Iti. 37. (The last sentence marked * * appears only in the Udana
Commentary. Readings vary considerably:)
'Now in the ultimate sense the existingness of the nibbana-element has been
demonstrated by the Fully Enlightened One, compassionate for the whole world,
by many sutta passages such as "Dhammas without condition", "unformed dham-
mas" (see Dhs., p.2), "Bhikkhus, there is that base (sphere) where neither earth
..." (Ud. 80), "This state is very hard to see, that is to say, the stilling of all
formations, the relinquishing of all substance of becoming" (D.ii,36; M.i,167),
"Bhikkhus, I shall teach you the unformed and the way leading to the unformed"
(S.iv,362), and so on, and in this sutta, "Bhikkhus, there is an unborn ..." (Iti.
87; Ud. 80). So even if the wise trust completely in the Dispensation and have no
doubts, though they may not yet have had direct perception of it, nevertheless
there are persons who come to understand through another's guidance (reading
paraneyya-buddhino)\ and the intention here is that this logical reasoning under
the heading of deduction (niddharana) should be for the purpose of removing
their doubts.
'Just as it is owing to full-understanding (reading yatha parinneyyataya)
that from the sense desires and from materiality, etc. (reading rupddinam), that
have something beyond them, there is made known an escape [from them] that is
their opposite and whose individual essence is devoid of them, so there must
exist an escape that is the opposite of, and whose individual essence is devoid of,


all formed dhammas, all of which have the aforesaid individual essence (reading
evarh tam-sabhdvdnam), and it is this escape that is the unformed element.
'Besides, insight knowledge, which has formed dhammas as its object, and
also conformity knowledge, abandon the defilements with the abandoning con-
sisting in substitution of opposites, being unable to abandon them with the aban-
doning consisting in cutting off. Likewise, the kind of knowledge that has con-
ventional truth (sammuti-sacca) [that is, concepts] as its object, in the first jhAna,
etc., abandons the defilements only with the abandoning consisting in suppres-
sion, not by cutting them off. So, because the kind of knowledge that has formed
dhammas as its object and that which has conventional truth as its object are both
incapable of abandoning defilements by cutting them off, there must [conse-
quently] exist an object for the noble-path knowledge that effects their abandon-
ment by cutting them off, [which object must be] of a kind opposite to both. And
it is this that is the unformed element.
'Likewise, the words "Bhikkhus, there is an unborn, an unbecome, an un-
made, an unformed" and so on, which demonstrate the existingness of nibbana in
the ultimate sense, are not misleading because they are spoken by the Blessed
One, like the words "All formations are impermanent, all formations are painful,
all dhammas (states) are not self
1
 (Dh. 277-79; A.i,286, etc.).
'Likewise, in certain instances as regards scope, the word "nibbana" has the
correct ultimate meaning for its scope [precisely] because of the existence of its
use as a mere metaphor—like the word "lion" (see Ch. XV, note 12, for the word
lion). *Or alternatively, the unformed element exists in the ultimate sense also,
because its individual essence is the opposite of, is free from, that of the other
kind [of element such as] the earth element and feeling*' (Pm. 534-40). The Pali
of the last two paragraphs is taken to read thus:
'Tathd "atthi bhikkhave ajdtarh abhutam akatam asahkhatan" ti idarh
nibbdna-padassa paramatthato atthibhdva-jotakarh vacanam avipantattham
bhagavatd kathitatta; yam hi bhagavata bhasitam tam avipantattham yatha tam
"sabbe sankhara anicca sabbe sankhara dukkha sabbe dhamma anatta" ti.
'Tatha nibbana-saddo katthaci (pi) visaye yathabhuta-paramatthavisayo
upacaravuttimatta-sabhavato (pi) seyyatha pi siha-saddo. *Atha va atth'eva
paramatthato asankhata-dhatu itaram tabbiparitavimuttasabhdvatta seyyatha pi
pathavi-dhatu vedana va ti'.*
The discusssion is summarised and additional arguments are added in the
Abhidhammavatara. The later Abhidhammatthasahgaha appears to have shelved
the problem. It may be noted that in the whole of this discussion (particularly in
the answer to Q.4) no mention is made of the abandoning of the inherent tenden-
cies (anusaya) in the attainment of nibbana (see, e.g., M. Sutta 64; S.ii,66). For
derivations of the word 'nibbana' see Ch. VIII, §247 and note 72.
19. 'Right speech has as its individual essence the embracing of associated
states through affectionateness because it is the opposite of false speech and the
other kinds, which, being rough owing to their respective functions of deceiving,
etc., do not embrace' (Pm. 541).
20. 'Bodily work (kayika-kriya) originates (sets up) whatever has to be done.


And that originating (setting up) is itself a combining, so the abstinence called
right action is said to have originating as its individual essence. Or it is the
picking up of associated states which is the causing of them to be originated, on
the part of bodily work, like the picking up of a burden* (Pm. 541).
21. 'The purification of a living being or of associated states is "cleansing" '
(Pm. 541).
22. Viniddhunana—'shaking off: not in P.T.S. Diet, (but see under dhundti);
cf. Ch. II, §11.
'The observing (sallakkhana) of an object according to its individual es-
sence is "establishing" (upatthdna)
1
 (Pm. 541).
23. 'Those who hold that there is an Overlord (Omnipotent Being) as reason
say, "An Overlord (issara) makes the world occur, prepares it, halts, it, disposes
of it". Those who hold that there is a Basic Principle as reason say, "The world is
manifested from out of a Basic Principle (padhdna), and it is reabsorbed in that
again". Those who hold the theory of Time say:
"Time it is that creates beings,
Disposes of this generation;
Time watches over those who sleep;
To outstrip Time is hard indeed".
Those who hold the theory of Nature (sabhdva—individual essence) say, "The
world appears and disappears (sambhoti vibhoti ca) just because of its nature
(individual essence), like the sharp nature (essence) of thorns, like the roundness
of apples (kabittha-phala), like the variedness of wild beasts, birds, snakes, and
so on". The word "etc." refers to those who preach fatalism and say, "The
occurrence of the world is due to atoms. All is due to causes effected in the past.
The world is determined, like drilled gems threaded on an unbroken string. There
is no doing by a man"; and to those who preach chance:
"It is by chance that they occur,
By chance as well that they do not;
Pleasure and pain are due to chance,
This generation [lives] by chance";
and to those who preach liberation by chance.
' "Taking final release to be in the immaterial world" like that of Ramuddaka,
Alara (see M. Sutta 26), etc., or "in a World Apex (World Shrine—lokathupika)"
like that of the Niganthas (Jains). And by the word "etc." are included also the
preachers of "Nibbana here and now" as the self s establishment in its own self
when it has become dissociated from the qualities (guna) owing to the non-
occurrence of the Basic Principle (padhdnay Skr. pradhdna—see the Samkhya
system), and being in the same world as, in the presence of, or in union with,
Brahma* (Pm. 543).
24. 'The "thirty-six modes of behaviour of craving" are the three, craving for
sense desires, for becoming, and for non-becoming, in the cases of each one of
the twelve internal-external bases; or they are those given in the Khuddakavat-
thu-Vibhanga (Vbh. 391 and 396), leaving out the three periods of time, for with


those they come to one hundred and eight' (Pm. 544). ' "Thoughts of renuncia-
tion, etc.": in the mundane moment they are the three separately, that is, non-
greed, lovingkindness, and compassion; they are given as one at the path mo-
ment, owing to the cutting off of greed, ill will and cruelty' (Pm. 544).
* "Consciousness concentration (citta-samddhi)" is the road to power con-
sisting of [purity of] consciousness, they say' (Pm. 544).
25. It may be noted in passing that the word anattd (not-self) is never applied
directly to nibbana in the Suttas (and Abhidhamma), or in Bh. Buddhaghosa's
commentaries. (Cf. Ch. XXI, note 4, where Pm. is quoted explaining the scope
of applicability of the 'three characteristics'.) The argument introduced here that,
since and (self) is a non-existent myth, therefore nibbana (the unformed dhamma,
the truth of cessation) is void of self (atta-sunna) is taken up in the Sad-
dhammappakasini (Hewavitarne Sinhalese ed., p. 464):
'All dhammas whether grouped together
In three ways, two ways, or one way,
Are void: thus here in this dispensation
Do those who know voidness make their comment.
'How so? Firstly, all mundane dhammas are void of lastingness, beauty,
pleasure, and self, because they are destitute of lastingness, beauty, pleasure, and
self. Path and fruition dhammas are void of lastingness, pleasure, and self, be-
cause they are destitute of lastingness, pleasure, and self. Nibbana dhammas (pi.)
are void of self because of the non-existence (abhdva) of self. [Secondly,] formed
dhammas, both mundane and supramundane, are all void of a [permanent] living
being (satta) because of the non-existence of [such] a living being of any sort
whatever. The unformed dhamma (sing.) is void of formations because of the
non-existence (abhdva: or absence) of those formations too. [Thirdly,] all dham-
mas formed and unformed are void of self because of the non-existence of any
person (puggala) called "self" (atta)\
26. 'It is clung-to (upddiyati) by the kinds of clinging (updddna), thus it is
"result-of-past-clinging" (upddi): this is the pentad of aggregates [as objects] of
clinging. Taking nibbana, which is the escape from that, as its stilling, its quiet-
ing, since there is remainder of it up till the last consciousness [of the Arahant],
after which there is no remainder of it, the nibbana element is thus convention-
ally spoken of in two ways as "with result of past clinging left" (sa-upddi-sesa)
and "without result of past clinging left" (an-upadi-sesa)' (Pm. 547).
CHAPTER XVII
1. ' "Subject to destruction" (khaya-dhamma) means that its individual es-
sence is the state of being destroyed (khayana-sabhava)' (Pni. 549). The other
expressions are explained in the same way.
2. Paticco as a declinable adjective is not in P.T.S. Diet. Patiyamdna ('when
it is arrived at'): 'When it is gone to by direct confrontation (patimukham
upeyamdno) by means of knowledge's going; when it is penetrated to
(abhisamiyamana), is the meaning' (Pm. 555). The word paticca (due to,


depending on) and the word paccaya (condition) are both gerunds of pati + eti
or ayati (to go back to).
3. The doctrine of eternalism is that beginning "The world and self are eter-
nal" (D.i,14). That of no-cause is that beginning "There is no cause, there is no
condition, for the defilement of beings" (D.i,53). That of fictitious-cause holds
that the world's occurrence is due to Primordial Essence (prakriti), atoms (anu)y
time (kdla), and so on. That of a power-wielder asserts the existence of an
Overlord (issara), or of a World-soul (purusha), or of Pajapati (the Lord of the
Race). Also the doctrines of Nature (sabhdva, Skr. svabhdva = individual
essence), Fate (niyati), and Chance (yadiccha), should be regarded as included
here under the doctrine of no-cause. Some, however, say that the doctrine of fic-
titious-cause is that beginning with "The eye is the cause of the eye", and that the
doctrine of the power-wielder is that beginning "Things occur owing to their
own individual essence" (see Ch. XVI, note 23)' (Pm. 557).
4. 'Such terms as "woman", "man", etc., are local forms of speech (janapada-
nirutti) because even wise men, instead of saying, "Fetch the five aggregates", or
"Let the mentality-materiality come", use the current forms "woman" and "man".
This is how, in those who have not fully understood what a physical basis is,
there comes to be the insistence (misinterpretation), "This is really a woman, this
is really a man". But since this is a mere concept, which depends on states made
to occur in such and such wise, one who sees and knows the dependent origina-
tion does not insist on (misinterpret) it as the ultimate meaning. "Current speech"
is speech current in the world. "Not overriding" is not going beyond. For when
"a being" is said, instead of making an analysis like this, "What is the [lasting]
being here? Is it materiality? Or feeling?" and so on, one who does not override
current usage should express a worldly meaning in ordinary language as those in
the world do, employing the usage current in the world' (Pm. 557-58). The ex-
planation differs somewhat from the Majjhima Sutta (no. 139).
5. The term 'analyser' (vibhajjavddiri) appears at A.v,190, and at M.ii,197, in
this sense, used to describe the Buddha and his followers, who do not rashly give
unqualified answers to questions that need analysing before being answered.
6. The "law" (dhamma) is the text of the dependent origination. The "mean-
ing" (attha) is the meaning of that. Or they are the cause, and the fruit of the
cause here, is what is meant. Or "law" (dhamma) is regularity (dhammata). Now
some, misinterpreting the meaning of the sutta passage, "Whether Perfect Ones
arise or do not arise, there yet remains that element ..." (S.ii,25), wrongly de-
scribe the regularity of the dependent origination as a "permanent dependent
origination", instead of which it should be described as having the individual
essence of a cause (kdrana), defined according to its own fruit, in the way stated.
And some misinterpret the meaning of the dependent origination thus, "Without
cessation, without arising" (anuppadam anirodham) instead of taking the un-
equivocal meaning in the way stated' (Pm. 561). The last-mentioned quota-
tion, 'Without cessation, without arising' (anuppadam anirodham), seems
almost certainly to refer to a well-known stanza in Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamika
Karika:


'Anirodham anutpadam anucchedani asasratam
Anekartham ananartham anagamam anirgamam
Yah pratltyasamutpadam prapancopasamam sivam
Desayamasa sambuddhas tarn vande vadatam varam'.
7. * Formations "accumulate", work, for the purpose of rebirth. So that is their
function. To accumulate is to heap up. Consciousness's function is "to go be-
fore" since it precedes mentality-materiality at rebirth-linking. Mentality's func-
tion is "to associate" since it joins with consciousness in a state of mutuality.
"Inseparability of its components" is owing to their having no separate existence
[mentality here being feeling, perception, and formations]. Materiality is dispers-
ible since it has in itself nothing [beyond the water element] to hold it [abso-
lutely] together, so "its function is to be dispersed"', that is why, when rice
grains, etc., are pounded, they get scattered and reduced to powder. It is called
"indeterminate" to distinguish it from mentality, which is profitable, etc., at
different times' (Pm. 571).
8. ' "No theory" is unknowing about suffering, etc., "wrong theory" is per-
verted perception of what is foul, etc., as beautiful, etc., or else "no theory" is
unassociated with [false] view, and "wrong theory" is associated with it' (Pm.
751). This use of the word patipatti as 'theory', rare in Pali but found in San-
skrit, is not in P.T.S. Diet. An alternative rendering for these two terms might be
'agnosticism' and 'superstition' (see also Ch. XIV, §163 and §177).
9. * "With the nature of result, and so on": the words "and so on" here include
"neither-trainer-nor-non-trainer" (Dhs., p.2), "conducive to fetters" (Dhs., p.3),
and so on. [§54] "Mundane resultant and so on": the words "and so on" here
include "indeterminate" (Dhs., p.2), "formed" (Dhs., p.2), and so on. "With root-
cause and without root-cause, and so on": the words "and so on" here include
"prompted", "unprompted", and so on' (Pm.).
10. 'This refers to the teacher Revata' (Pm. 582).
11. ' "Which are contingent upon other such states": because it is said without
distinction of all visible-data bases ... and of all mental-data bases, there is con-
sequently no dhamma (state) among the formed, unformed, and conceptual dham-
mas, classed as sixfold under visible data, etc., that does not become an object
condition' (Pm. 584).
12. 'Proximity and contiguity conditions are not stated in accordance with the
distinction between making occur and giving opportunity, as the absence and
disappearance conditions are: rather they are stated as the causes of the regular
order of consciousness [in the cognitive series]' (Pm. 585).
13. 'This refers to the Elder Revata too' (Pm. 586).
14. 'The state of proximity condition is the ability to cause arising proximately
(without interval) because there is no interval between the cessation of the pre-
ceding and the arising of the subsequent. The state of contiguity condition is the
ability to cause arising by being quite proximate (without interval) through ap-
proaching, as it were, identity with itself owing to absence of any distinction that
"This is below, above, or around that", which is because of lack of any such co-


presence as in the case of the [components of the] material groups, and because
of lack of any co-positionality of the condition and the conditionally arisen. And
[in general], because of the uninterestedness of [all] states (dhamma), when a
given [state] has ceased, or is present, in a given mode, and [other] states (dhamma)
come to be possessed of that particular mode, it is that [state's] mode that must
be regarded as what is called "ability to cause arising" ' (Pm. 586).
15. 'Reviewing change-of-lineage' (the consciousness that precedes the path
consciousness) applies to stream-enterers. 'Reviewing cleansing' (the 'cleansing'
that consists in attaining a higher path than the first) applies to once-returners
and non-returners (see Pm. 589).
16. 'The presence (atthi) condition is not applicable to nibbana. For a presence
condition is that which is unhelpful by its absence of existingness (atthi-
bhdvdbhdva) and becomes helpful by obtaining existingness. And nibbana does
not, after being unhelpful by its own absence of existingness to those states that
have nibbana as their object, become helpful to them by obtaining existingness.
Or alternatively, the presence condition, which by its non-existingness is the
opposite of helpfulness to those states that are associated with arising, etc., is
helpful to them by its existingness. So nibbana is not a presence condition' (Pm.
597).
It may be noted that atthi has more than one use, among which the follow-
ing two may be mentioned: (1) atthi (is) = upalabbhaniya (is (a) 'apprehend-
able', and (b) not a self-contradictory impossibility)— 'atthi, bhikkhave, ajdtarh—
There is an unborn' (Ud. 80), and the discussion on the existence of nibbana
(Ch. XVI, §67ff.). (2) Atthi (is) = uppanna (arisen)—see 'Yam, bhikkhave, rupam
jdtarh pdtubhutam atthi ti tassa sankhd—Of the materiality that is born, mani-
fested, it is said that "It is" ' (S.ii,71-72). The atthi-paccaya (presence condi-
tion), being implicitly equated with the latter, cannot be applied to nibbana
because nibbana is not subject to arising (A.i,152).
17. 'The assertion of a single cause (kdrana) is undesirable because it follows
that there would be production of everything all the time, and because it follows
that there would be a single homogeneous state' (Pm. 599); cf. Ch. XIX, §3.
18. Parihara-vacana—'explanation': not in P.T.S. Diet, in this sense.
19. Avi—'a goat or sheep': not in P.T.S. Diet. The Vis. text reads 'go-
lomavilomavisana-dadhitilapitthddini ca dubbasarabhutanakadinam'. Pm. ex-
plains thus: 'Golomavilomadi ti adisu golomavilomani dubbaya avi ti ratta
elaka veditabba visanam sarassa dadhitilapitthagulani bhutinakassa sevalam
tanduleyyakassa kharavalava assatarassa ti evam adi adisaddena sangahito\
which renders thus: 'As to "Ox hair and rams hair, etc.
1
', and the rest: ox hair
and ram's hair [are conditions for the unlike] dubba (dabba) grass—a ram (avi)
should be understood as a red sheep (elakd); horn is for reeds (sara)\ curds, ses-
amum flour and molasses are for bhutinaka grass; moss is for the tanduleyyaka
plant; a she donkey is for a mule; and so on in this way as included by the word
"etc" ' (Pm. 601). Except for the last-mentioned, it seems problematical why
these things, if rightly interpreted, should be conditions for the things mentioned.
20. For five-constituent becoming, etc., see §§253-54. 'Unprofitable resultant


eye-consciousness, etc. sometimes arise even in Brahmas when undesirable vis-
ible data, etc., come into focus* (Pm. 604); cf. §180.
21. This refers to the old Sinhalese commentary no longer extant.
22. Burmese ed. of SammohavinodanI adds 'suddhdya va javanavithiyd' here,
as in §140 below in all texts.
23. * "With the appearance of fire and flames, etc., in the hells*1
 is said owing to
likeness to that; appearance of hell and fire does not itself come into focus for
him then* (Pm. 607).
24. The Sammohavinodani adds more details here: 'When hell appears it does
so like a metal cauldron; when the human world appears, the mother's womb
appears like a woollen slipper (kambala-ydna—for ydna as footwear or sandals
see MA.iii,222); when the heavenly world appears, wishing trees, divine palaces
and couches, etc., appear*.
Pm. remarks here: 'By the words "the appearance of the mother's womb"y
etc., only visual appearance is given as the sign of destiny. Herein, in the first
place it would be logical that sound has not been given in the Commentaries as a
sign of destiny because it is included in the happy destinies as not-clung-to, but
the reason for odour, etc., not having been given, will be inquired into* (Pm.
609). This question is in fact dealt with at length at Pm. 611, but the arguments
are not reproduced here. See note 26 below.
25. Sa-bhdva (with sex) and a-bhdva (without sex) are not to be confused with
sabhava (individual essence) and abhdva (absence, non-existence).
26. Pm. (p. 611) has a long discussion here of the difficulty of speaking of the
Brahma-world (where there are only the senses of seeing and hearing) in terms
of the decads, which contain the components of odour and flavour (§156). It
ends by defending the Visuddhimagga standpoint.
27. The Burmese ed. of the SammohavinodanI has 'rebirth-linking with a past,
not so-classifiable, and present object next to* and so on.
28. See the classification of kamma at Ch. XIX, §74ff. 'Repeated' (samdsevita)
kamma is not mentioned there as such. Of 'near' kamma Pm. says, 'It is that
performed next to death, or which is conspicuous in the memory then, whenever
it was performed' (Pm. 617).
29. ' "Sign of the kamma" is the event (vatthu) by means of which a man
accumulates kamma through making it the object at the time of accumulation.
Even if the kamma was performed as much as a hundred thousand aeons ago,
nevertheless at the time of its ripening it appears as kamma or sign of kamma.
The "sign of the destiny" is one of the visual scenes in the place where rebirth is
due to take place. It consists in the visual appearance of flames of fire, etc., to
one ready to be reborn in hell, and so on as already stated* (Pm. 617).
30. 'Owing to craving being unabandoned, and because the previously-arisen
continuity is similarly deflected, consciousness occurs inclining, leaning and
tending towards the place of rebirth-linking. The "conascent formations" are the
volitions conascent with the impulsion consciousness next to death. Or they are
all those that begin with contact. They fling consciousness on to that place of


rebirth-linking, which is the object of the kamma and so on. The meaning is that
they occur as the cause for the establishment of consciousness on the object by
rebirth-linking as though flinging it there' (Pm. 617).
31. 'As a continuous process consisting of death, rebirth-linking, and the adja-
cent consciousnesses' (Pm. 617).
32. Patisiddhattd—* because ... excluded': patisiddha is not in P.T.S. Diet.
Abhisahkhdra here might mean 'planting work', not * formative processes'.
33. Pm. points out that this is generally but not always so, since deities see such
portents of their death as the fading of their flowers, etc., which are undesirable
visible data (see note 43).
34. A Sinhalese text adds the following paragraph: * Also the bodily formation,
when giving rebirth-linking, gives the whole of its results in the sense-sphere
becoming alone in the four generations, in the five destinies, in the first two
stations of consciousness, and in two abodes of beings. Therefore it is a condi-
tion in the way already stated for the twenty-three kinds of consciousness in one
kind of becoming, four generations, five destinies, two stations of consciousness,
and two abodes of beings, both in rebirth-linking and in the course of an exis-
tence. The same method applies to the verbal formation. But the mental forma-
tion does not fail to ripen anywhere except in one abode of beings. Therefore it is
a condition in the way already stated for the thirty-two kinds of resultant con-
sciousness, as appropriate, in the three kinds of becoming, four generations, five
destinies, seven stations of consciousness, and eight abodes of beings, both in
rebirth-linking and in the course of an existence. There is no consciousness with
formations as condition in the non-percipient abode of beings. Furthermore, in
the case of non-percipient beings, the formation of merit is a condition, as kamma
condition acting from a different time, for the kinds of materiality due to kamma
performed'.
35. Resolve compound agahitagahanena as gahitassa a-gahanena, not as
a-gahitassa gahanena\ i.e. it is 'by not taking what is taken', not 'by taking
what has not been taken'; cf. Ch. IV, §75.
36. 'This means, due to the heat element in the materiality that arose together
with the rebirth-linking consciousness. It is because the heart-basis is arisen only
at that very moment, that there is weakness of the physical basis' (Pm. 622).
37. Vdhanika—'having a float': not in P.T.S. Diet. The context suggests a cata-
maran, universal in Indian waters.
38. The expression 'ekadesasarupekasesa' is grammatically explained at Pm.
623; see allied expressions, 'katekasesa' (§204) and 'ekasese kate' (§223). Cf.
Panini i, 2, 64
39. Rasayana—'elixir': not in P.T.S. Diet; cf. DA. 568 and UdA. (commentary
to Ud. VIII, 5)
40. * 'Though feeling is condition" is said in order to prevent a generalization
from the preceding words "With feeling as condition" to the effect that craving
arises in the presence of every condition accompanied by feeling.—But is it not
impossible to prevent over-generalization in the absence of any such statements


as "Feeling accompanied by inherent tendency is a condition for craving"?—No;
for we are dealing with an exposition of the round of rebirths. Since there is no
round of rebirths without inherent tendencies, so far as the meaning is concerned
it may be taken for granted that the condition is accompanied by inherent ten-
dency. Or alternatively, it may be recognized that this condition is accompanied
by inherent tendency because it follows upon the words "With ignorance as
condition". And with the words "With feeling as condition, craving" the ruling
needed is this: "There is craving only with feeling as condition", and not "With
feeling as condition there is only craving" ' (Pm.). For inherent tendencies see
Ch. XXII §45, §60; M. Sutta 64. The Arahant has none.
41. Upakuttha—'great pox7
 or 'great leprosy': not in P.T.S. Diet.; see kuttha.
42. P.T.S. ed. has 'sassatan tV\ Harvard ed., 'sa' ssa ditthi ti; VbhA. (Burm.
ed.),'/IA sassataditthiti\
43. Their flowers wither, their clothes get dirty, sweat comes from their arm-
pits, their bodies become unsightly, and they get restless (see MA.iv,170).
44. As regards these four paragraphs from the Patisambhida (see §§292, 294,
296, and 297), all four end with the word 'paccaya"' (nom. pi. and abl. s. of
paccaya = condition). In the first and third paragraphs (§§292 and 296) this is
obviously nom. pi. and agrees with Hme pahca dhammd' (these five things). But
in the second and fourth paragraphs the context suggests vipdkd (results) instead
of conditions. However, there is no doubt that the accepted reading is paccaya
here too; for the passage is also quoted in Ch. XIX, §13, in the Sammohavi-
nodani (Paccayakara-Vibhanga commentary = present context), and at MA.i,
53. The ParamatthamanjusA and Mula-tlka do not mention this point. The
Saddhammappakasini (Patisambhida commentary) comments on the first para:
4
Purimakammabhavasmin ti atltajatiya kammabhave kariyamane pavatta; idha
patisandhiyd paccaya ti paccuppanna patisandhiya paccayabhuta', and on the
second para: 'Idh'upapattibhavasmim pure katassa kammassa paccaya ti paccup-
panne vipakabhave atitajatiyam katassa kammassa paccayena pavatt! ti attho'.
The Tika to the Majjhima-nikaya Commentary (MA.i,53) says of the second
paragraph: 'Ime paccaya ti ime vinnanadayo panca kotthasika dhammA, puri-
mabhave katassa kammassa, kammavattassa, paccayA, paccayabhavato, tarn
paticca, idha, etarahi, upapattibhavasmirh upapattibhavabhavena va hontl ti at-
tho'. From these comments it is plain enough that 'paccaya' in the second and
fourth paragraphs is taken as abi. sing. (e.g. avijjd-paccayd sahkhdra). There is a
parallel ablative construction with genitive at Ps.ii,72, 1.8: 'GatisampattiyA
nanasampayutte atthannarh hetunarh paccaya uppatti hoti\ Perhaps the literal
rendering of the second and fourth paragraphs' final sentence might be: 'Thus
there are these five things here in the [present] rebirth-process becoming with
their condition [consisting] of kamma done in the past', and so on. The point is
unimportant.
45. 'Sorrow, etc., have already been established as ignorance; but death con-
sciousness itself is devoid of ignorance and formations and is not a condition for
the next becoming; that is why "because it assures sorrow, etc" is sa"id' (Pm.
640).


 46. Avatthd— 'occasion*: not in P.T.S. Diet.
47. Avydpdra—'uninterest': here the equivalent of andbhoga, see Ch. IV, §171
and Ch. IX, §108. The perhaps unorthodox form * uninterest
1
 has been used to
avoid the 'unselfish' sense sometimes implied by 'disinterestedness'. Vydpdra is
clearly intended throughout this work as 'motivated action* in contrast with
'blind action of natural forces'. The word 'interest' has therefore been chosen to
bring out this effect.
48. The dependent origination, or structure of conditions, appears as a flexible
formula with the intention of describing the ordinary human situation of a man in
his world (or indeed any conscious event where ignorance and craving have not
entirely ceased). That situation is always complex, since it is implicit that con-
sciousness with no object, or being (bhava—becoming, or however rendered)
without consciousness (of it), is impossible except as an artificial abstraction.
The dependent origination, being designed to portray the essentials of that situ-
ation in the limited dimensions of words and using only elements recognizable in
experience, is not a logical proposition (Descartes' cogito is not a logical propo-
sition). Nor is it a temporal cause-and-effect chain: each member has to be exam-
ined as to its nature in order to determine what its relations to the others are (e.g.
whether successive in time or conascent, positive or negative, etc., etc.). A purely
cause-and-effect chain would not represent the pattern of a situation that is
always complex, always subjective-objective, static-dynamic, positive-negative,
and so on. Again, there is no evidence of any historical development in the
various forms given within the limit of the Sutta Pitaka (leaving aside the
Patisambhidamaggaj^and historical treatment within that particular limit is likely
to mislead, if it is hypothesis with no foundation.
Parallels with European thought have been avoided in this translation. But
perhaps an exception can be made here, with due caution, in the case of Des-
cartes. The revolution in European thought started by his formula cogito ergo
sum ('I think, therefore I am') is not yet ended. Now it will perhaps not escape
notice that the two elements, 'I think' and 'I am', in what is not a logical
proposition parallel to some extent the two members of the dependent origina-
tion, consciousness and being (becoming). In other words, consciousness acti-
vated by craving and clinging as the dynamic factory, guided and blinkered by
ignorance ('I think' or 'consciousness with the conceit "I am" '), conditions
being ('therefore I am') in a complex relationship with other factors relating
subject and object (not accounted for by Descartes). The parallel should not be
pushed too far. In fact it is only introduced because in Europe the dependent
origination seems to be very largely misunderstood with many strange interpreta-
tions placed upon it, and because the cogito does seem to offer some sort of
reasonable approach.
In this work, for convenience because of the special importance attached
here to the aspect of the death-rebirth link, the dependent origination is consid-
ered from only one standpoint, namely, as applicable to a period embracing a
minimum of three lives. But this is not the only application. With suitable modi-
fications it is also used in the Vibhanga to describe the structure of the complex
in each one of the 89 single type-consciousnesses laid down in the Dhamma-


sangani; and Bhadantacariya Buddhaghosa says: 'This structure of conditions is
present not only in (a continuity period consisting of) multiple consciousness but
also in each single consciousness as weir (VbhA. 199-200). Also the Patisam-
bhidamagga gives five expositions, four describing dependent origination in one
life, the fifth being made to present a special inductive generalization to extend
what is observable in this life (the fact that consciousness is always preceded by
consciousness, cf. this Ch. §83f.—i.e. that it always has a past and is inconceiv-
able without one) back beyond birth, and (since craving and ignorance ensure its
expected continuance) on after death. There are, besides, various other, differing
applications indicated by the variant forms given in the Suttas themselves.