THE PATH
OF PURIFICATION
(VISUDDHIMAGGA)
BY
BHADANTACARIYA BUDDHAGHOSA
Translated from the Pali
by
BHIKKHU NANAMOLI
FIFTH EDITION
BUDDHIST PUBLICATION SOCIETY
Kandy Sri Lanka
35. Profitable in the sense of health, blamelessness, and pleasant result (see Pm.
463). Unprofitable in the opposite sense. Indeterminate because not describable
as either profitable or unprofitable (see Pm. 464). This is the first of the twenty-
two triads in the Abhidhamma Matika (Dhs., p. 1)
Pali has five principal words, ndma, vinndna, mano, citta, and ceto, against
the normal English consciousness and mind. While their etymology can be looked
up in the dictionary, one or two points need noting here. Ndma (rendered by
'mentality' when not used to refer to a name) is almost confined in the sense
considered to the expression ndma-rupa ('mentality-materiality') as the fourth
member of the dependent origination, where it comprises the three mental aggre-
gates of feeling, perception and formations, but not that of consciousness (vinndna).
Vinndna (rendered by 'consciousness') is, loosely, more or less a synonym for
mano and citta; technically, it is bare cognition considered apart from feeling,
perception or formations. Mano (rendered by 'mind'), when used technically, is
confined to the sixth internal base for contact (Ch. XV). Citta (rendered by
'mind' and 'consciousness' or '[manner of] consciousness'), when used techni-
cally, refers to a momentary type-situation considered as vinndna in relation to
the tone of its concomitant feeling, perception and formations. Possibly, a better
rendering would have been 'cognizance' throughout. It carries a flavour of its
etymological relative, cetand ('volition'). Ceto (another etymological relative,
rendered by 'heart'—i.e. 'seat of the emotions'—, 'will' or 'mind'), when used
loosely is very near to citta; but technically it is restricted to one or two such
expressions as ceto-vimutti ('mind-deliverance' or 'heart-deliverance*).
36. ' "Sense sphere" (kdmdvacara): here there are the two kinds of sense desire
(kdma), sense desire as basis (vatthu-kdma) and sense desire as defilement (kilesa-
kdma). Of these, sense desire as [objective] basis particularized as the five cords
of sense desire (panca-kdma-guna = dimensions of sensual desires), is desired
(kdmiyati). Sense desire as defilement, which is craving, desires (kdmeti). The
sense sphere (kdmdvacara) is where these two operate (avacaranti) together. But
what is that? It is the elevenfold sense-desire becoming, i.e. hell, asura demons,
ghosts, animals, human beings, and six sensual-sphere heavens. So too with the,
fine-material sphere and the immaterial sphere, taking 'fine-material' as craving
for the fine-material too, and 'immaterial' as craving for the immaterial too. It
crosses over (uttarati) from the world (loka), thus it is supramundane (lokut-
taraY (Pm. 464).
37. The meaning of the expression tathabhava-paccupatthana appears more
clearly where it is used again at §108. In this definition (sadhana) the function
(kicca-rasa) in fact describes the verb action (kicca) while the manifestation
(paccupatthana) describes the relevant nounal state (bhava). So 'tathabhava'
means that what has just been taken as a function (e.g. 'receiving') is to be taken
also as a state ('reception').
38. 'To the six kinds of objects all classed as limited, etc., past, etc., internal,
etc' (Pm. 474).
39. Registration consciousness does not, it is stated, occur with an object of
exalted consciousness—see VbhA. 154.
40. ' "The source it has come from, and so on" means the source it has come
from and its condition. Here, in the opinion of certain teachers the result of the
unprompted profitable is unprompted and the result of the prompted is prompted,
like the movement of the face's reflexion in a looking-glass when the face
moves; thus it is due to the source it has come from. But in the opinion of other
teachers the unprompted arises due to powerful kamma as condition and the
prompted does so due to weak kamma; thus it is due to its condition1
(Pm. 474).
41. 'With respect to such unsublime objects as the forms of skeletons or ghosts'
(Pm. 476). See e.g. Vin.iii,104.
42. See also MA.iv,124f. 'Here "kamma" is stored-up profitable kamma of the
sense sphere that has got an opportunity to ripen; hence he said "that has ap-
peared". "Sign of kamma" is the gift to be given that was a condition for the
volition at the moment of accumulating the kamma. "Sign of destiny" is the
visible-data base located in the destiny in which he is about to be reborn1
(Pm.
477), See Ch. XVII, §136ff.
43. * "The sign of kamma" here is only the kamma's own object consisting of
an earth kasina, etc.* (Pm. 478).
44. * "With that same object": if kamma is the life-continuum's object, then it is
that kamma; if the sign of the kamma, or the sign of the destiny, then it is one of
those' (Pm. 478).
45. * "Occurring endlessly": this is, in fact, thus called "bhavahga" (life-contin-
uum, lit. "limb" (or "practice"—see Ch. II, §11) of becoming) because of its
occurring as the state of an anga ("limb" or "practice") of the rebirth-process be-
coming (uppatti-bhavaY (Pm. 478).
The word bhavahga appears in this sense only in the Patthana (See Tika-
Patthana, P.T.S. ed., pp. 159, 169, 324).
For the commentarial description of dream consciousness and kamma ef-
fected during dreams, see VbhA. (commentary to Nana-Vibhanga, Ekaka) and
A A. (commentary to A. Pancaka-nipata, no. 196), which largely but not entirely
overlap. Pm. says here: 'The seeing of dreams is done with consciousness con-
sisting only of the functional' (Pm. 478).
46. ' "A disturbance in the life-continuum" is a wavering of the life-continuum
consciousness; the meaning is that there is the arrival at a state that is a reason
for dissimilarity in its occurrence twice in that way. For it is called disturbance
(calana) because it is like a disturbance (movement) since there seems to be a
cause for an Occasion (avattha) in the mind's continuity different from the previ-
ous occasion. Granted, firstly, that there is impact on the sensitivity owing to
confrontation with an object, since the necessity for that is established by the ex-
istence of the objective field and the possessor of the objective field, but how
does there come to be disturbance (movement) of the life-continuum that has a
different support? Because it is connected with it. And here the example is this:
when grains of sugar are put on the surface of a drum and one of the grains of
sugar is tapped, a fly sitting on another grain of sugar moves' (Pm. 478).
47. ' "Next to adverting" means next to five-door adverting. For those who do
not admit the cognitive series beginning with receiving, just as they do not admit
the heart basis, the Pali has been handed down in various places in the way
beginning "For the eye-consciousness element as receiving (sampaticchandya
cakkhuviMdnadhdtuya)" (see Ch. IV, n.13); for the Pali cannot be contradicted'
(Pm. 479). The quotation as it stands is not traced to the Pitakas.
48. See Ch. IV, note 13.
49. * "I/.. . vivid (lit. large)": this is said because it is the occurrence of con-
sciousness at the end of the impulsions that is being discussed. For an object is
here intended as "vivid" when its life is fourteen conscious moments; and that
should be understood as coming into focus when it has arisen and is two or three
moments past' (Pm. 479).
50. 'This includes also the preliminary-work and the cleansing (see Ch. XXII,
note 7), not change-of-lineage only' (Pm. 479). See also Ch. IV, §74 and Ch.
XXI, §129.
51. * "That obtains a condition": any impulsion that has obtained a condition
for arising next to change-of-lineage, as that of the fine-material sphere, and so
on' (Pm. 479).
52. * "A very vivid one" is one with a life of sixteen conscious moments. For
registration consciousness arises with respect to that, not with respect to any
other. "Clear" means very evident, and that is only in the sense sphere; for regis-
tration arises with respect to that' (Pm. 479).
53. * "Previous kamma": this is said in order to show the differences in kinds
of registration; for kamma that generates rebirth-linking is not the only kind to
generate registration; other kinds of kamma do so too. But the latter generates
registration unlike that generatable by the kamma that generates rebirth-linking.
"Impulsion consciousness": this is said in order to show what defines the regis-
tration; for it is said, "Registration is definable by impulsion" (?). The word
"etc." includes rebirth-linking, however; for that is not a condition for registra-
tion that is more outstanding than itself. "Any condition": any condition from
among the desirable objects, etc., that has combined (samaveta) to produce the
arising of registration' (Pm. 479).
54. 'This should be regarded as a secondary characteristic (upalakkhana) of
profitable feeling, that is to say, the fact that whatever profitable feeling there is,
is all associated with profitable consciousness. That, however, is not for the
purpose of establishing its profitableness. For the profitableness of profitable
feeling is not due to its association with profitable consciousness, but rather to
wise attention and so on. That is why he said "as to kind". So too in the case of
the unprofitable and so on' (Pm. 481).
55. Sambhoga—'exploiting': not in this sense in P.T.S. Diet, (see also Ch.
XVII, §51).
56. 'Pleasure and pain respectively gratify and afflict by acting in one way on
the body and in another way on the mind, but not so equanimity, which is why
the latter is described as of one class.
'Just as, when a man places a piece of cottonwool on an anvil and strikes it
with an iron hammer, and his hammer goes right through the cotton and hits the
anvil, the violence of the blow is great, so too because the violence of the im-
pact's blow is great, body-consciousness is accompanied by pleasure when the
object is a desirable or desirable-neutral one, and by pain when the object is an
undesirable or undesirable-neutral one. [It is the impact of primary matter (tan-
gible object) on the primaries of the body.]
'Herein, though profitable-resultant and unprofitable-resultant conscious-
ness discriminated according to the desirable and undesirable might logically be
associated with pleasure and pain, nevertheless the eight kinds of consciousness
that have the eye, etc., as their support ((34)-(37) and (50)-(53)) are invariably
associated only with equanimity, because of the gentleness of the impact's blow
in the case of two instances of derived matter, like that of two pieces of cotton
wool' (Pm. 482). For simile see DhsA. 263.
57. * "The characteristic of agglomerating" means the characteristic of adding
together (sampindana); then they are said to have the function of accumulating,
for the dhammas in the formations aggregate are so described because volition is
their basis' (Pm. 484).
58. Vipphdra—'intervening' here is explained by Pm. (p. 484) as vydpdra (in-
terest or work); not in this sense in P.T.S. Diet. See Ch. VI, n.6.
59. Yevdpanaka (ye-vd-pana-lca) is commentarial shorthand derived from the
DhammasanganI phrase 'ye-vd-pana tasmim samaye ahne pi atthi paticca-samup-
pannd arupino dhamma'—'Or whatever other immaterial conditionally-arisen
states (phenomena) there are too on that occasion' (Dhs. 1). Cf. also M.i,85.
60. ' "Ay the act of touching too": by this he shows that this is its individual
essence even though it is immaterial. And the characteristic of touching is obvi-
ous in its occurrence in such instances as, say, the watering of the mouth in one
who sees another tasting vinegar or a ripe mango, the bodily shuddering in a
sympathetic person who sees another being hurt, the trembling of the knees in a
timid man standing on the ground when he sees a man precariously balanced on
a high tree branch, the loss of power of the legs in one who sees something
terrifying such as apisdea (goblin)' (Pm. 484-85).
6L For 'non-adherent' see §46.
4
"On any one side" means on any one side of itself, like a pair of planks
and so on. "Non-adherent" means not sticking (asamsilissamdna). It is only the
impact without adherence that contact shares with visible data and sound, not the
objective field. Just as, though eye and ear are non-adherent respectively to
visible data snd sounds still they have the word "touched" used of them, so too it
can be said of contact's touching and impinging on the object. Contact's imping-
ing is the actual concurrence (meeting) of consciousness and object' (Pm. 485).
62. Adhitthana—'habitat' (or site or location or foundation): this meaning not
given in P.T.S. Diet.
63. The four factors of stream-entry (see S.v,347) are: waiting on good men,
hearing the Good Dhamma, wise attention, and practice in accordance with the
Dhamma. Again they are: absolute confidence in the Buddha, the Dhamma, and
the Sangha, and possession of noble virtue (S.v,343).
64. 'Apildpana ("not wobbling'*) is the steadying of an object, the remembering
and not forgetting it, keeping it as immovable as a stone instead of letting it go
bobbing about like a pumpkin in water' (Pm. 487).
65. 'And here by tranquillization, etc., of consciousness only consciousness is
tranquillized and becomes light, malleable, wieldy, proficient and upright. But
with tranquillization, etc., of the [mental] body also the material body is tranquil-
lized, and so on. This is why the twofoldness of states is given by the Blessed
One here, but not in all places' (Pm. 489).
66. * "The act of resolving" should be understood as the act of being convinced
(sannitthdna) about an object, not as trusting (pasddanay (Pm. 489). See §140.
67. * Because the path consciousnesses have nibbana as their object and because
compassion, gladness, etc., have living beings as their object, there is no com-
passion, etc., in the path' (Pm. 491).
68. * Because the paralysis (samhanana) of consciousness comes about through
stiffness, but that of matter through torpor like that of the three aggregates
beginning with feeling, therefore torpor is manifested as nodding and sleep' (Pm.
493).
69. Kukata is not in P.T.S. Diet. It is impossible to render into English this
'portmanteau' etymology, e.g. kucchita-kata—kukata, kukutatd ... kukkucca,
which depends mostly on a fortuitous parallelism of meaning and verbal forms in
the Pali. While useless to strict modern etymologists, it has a definite semantic
and mnemonic use.
70. * "Mere steadiness in occurrence" is mere presence for a moment. That it is
only "mere steadiness in occurrence" owing to the mere condition for the steadi-
ness of the mind (ceto) is because of lack of real steadiness due to absence of
decidedness (nicchaya), and it is incapable of being a condition for such steadi-
ness in continuity (see §188) as the steadiness of consciousness stated thus: "like
the steadiness of a flame sheltered from a draught" (Ch. XIV, §139)' (Pm. 495).
71. *Here when the time is delimited by death and rebirth-linking the term
"extent" is applicable. It is made known through the Suttas in the way beginning
"Was I in the past?" (M.i,8); for the past state is likewise mentioned as "extent"
in the Bhaddekaratta Sutta too in the way beginning "He does not follow what is
past (the past extent)" (M.iii,188). But when it is delimited in the ultimate sense
as in the Addhaniruttipatha Sutta thus, "Bhikkhus, there are three extents, the
past extent, the future extent, and the present extent" (Iti. 53), then it is appropri-
ate as delimited by moment. Herein, the existingness of the present is stated thus,
"Bhikkhus, of matter that is born ... manifested, it is said that 'It exists'"
(S.iii,72), and pastness and futureness are respectively called before and after
that' (Pm. 496).
72. 'Cold temperature is like with cold, and hot with hot. But that temperature
which falls on the body, whether hot or cold, and occurs as a continuity in one
mode, being neither less nor more, is called "single temperature". The word
"single" is used because of the plurality of "like" temperature. So too with
nutriment. "In one cognitive series, in one impulsion" refers respectively to five
door and mind-door consciousness. The explanations of continuity and period are
given in the Commentaries for the purpose of helping the practice of insight'
(Pm. 496).
73. In these two paragraphs 'past' and 'future
1
refer not to time, as in the other
paragraphs, but to the materiality.
74. * "Cause" (hetu) is what gives birth (janaka); "condition" (paccaya) is what
consolidates (upatthambhaka). Their respective functions are arousing and con-
solidating. Just as the seed's function is to arouse the sprout and that of the earth,
etc., is to consolidate it, and just as kamma's function is to arouse result as
matter that is due to kamma performed, and that of nutriment is to consolidate it,
so the function of those [conditions] that give birth to each material group and
each thought-arising and serve as kamma and proximity-conditions, etc., for
them, and the function of those that consolidate them and serve as conascence,
prenascence, and postnascence condition^ for them may be construed accord-
ingly as appropriate.
'Because there is similarity and dissimilarity in temperature, etc., in the way
stated, the pastness, etc., of material instances originated by it are stated accord-
ing to continuity. But there is no such similarity and dissimilarity in the kamma
that gives birth to a single becoming, so instead of stating according to continu-
ity the pastness, etc., of material instances originated by that, it is stated accord-
ing to what consolidates. However, when there comes to be reversal of sex, then
the male sex disappears owing to powerful unprofitable kamma, and the female
sex appears owing to weak profitable kamma; and the female sex disappears
owing to weak unprofitable kamma, while the male sex appears owing to power-
ful profitable kamma (see DhsA. 321). So there is in fact dissimilarity in what is
originated by kamma and consequent dissimilarity in what is past, etc., in accor-
dance with the continuity of these as well. But it is not included because it does
not happen always' (Pm. 497).
75. Niyakajjhatta—'internally in the sense of one's own': four kinds of ajjhatta
(internal, lit. 'belonging to oneself) are mentioned in the commentaries and sub-
commentaries (see DhsA. 46): gocarajjhatta—internally as range or resort
(MA.iv,161; ii,90, 292), ajjhattajjhata—internally as such (Pm. 152), niyak-
ajjhatta—internally in the sense of one's own (Ch. IV, §141, IX, §114, this ref.;
MA.iv,161), visayajjhatta—internally as objective field (MA.iv, 160).
76. Profitable result is superior because it produces a desirable object (see Pm.
498). This question is treated at length at VbhA. 9f.
77. 'The feeling that accompanies the faith, etc., occurring in one who sees an
image of the Buddha or who hears the Dhamma, even for a whole day, is
"present" ' (Pm. 499).
78. 'Consciousness dominates because of the words "Dhammas have mind as
their forerunner" (Dh.l), "Dhammas (states) that have parallel turn-over with
consciousness" (Dhs.§1522), and "The king, lord of the six doors" (?)' (Pm.503).
79. Burmese ed. of the Sammohavinodani (Khandha Vibhanga Commentary) in
the identical passage, reads vedanddayo anasava pi sasava pi atthi. The P.T.S.
and Harvard eds. read vedanddayo anasava pi atthi.
80. Avarodha—'inclusion*: not in P.T.S. Diet. The term etaparama— 'the widest
limit* is not mentioned in P.T.S. Diet. See M.i,80, 339; S.v,119; MA.iii,281. Cf.
also etdvaparama, M.i, 246.
81. 'When all formed dhammas are grouped together according to similarity,
they naturally fall into five aggregates. Herein, it is the items that are the same
owing to the sameness consisting respectively in "molesting", etc., that are to be
understood as "similar". Among them, those that are strong in the volition whose
nature is accumulating with the function of forming the formed, are called the
formations aggregate. And the others, that is, contact, etc., which are devoid of
the distinguishing characteristics of "being molested", etc., may also be so re-
garded under the generality of forming the formed. But the similarities consisting
in touching are not describable separately by the word "aggregate", and so that is
why no aggregates of contact, etc., have been stated by the Perfect One who
knows the similarities of dhammas. "Bhikkhus, whatever ascetics or brahmans
there are who are asserters of eternity and declare the self and the world to be
eternal, all do so depending and relying on these same five aggregates or on one
or other of them" (cf. S.iii,46), and so on' (Pm. 503).
82. The aggregates of virtue, concentration, understanding, liberation, and knowl-
edge and vision of liberation (S.i,99), etc.
83. 'The matter of the body is like the prison because it is the site of the punish-
ment. Perception is like the offence because owing to perception of beauty, etc.,
it is a cause of the punishment, which is feeling. The formations aggregate is like
the punisher because it is a cause of feeling. Consciousness is like the offender
because it is afflicted by feeling. Again, matter is like the dish because it bears
the food. Perception is like the curry sauce because, owing to perception of
beauty, etc., it hides the food, which is feeling. The formations aggregate is like
the server because it is a cause of feeling; and service is included since one who
is taking a meal is usually served. Consciousness is like the eater because it is
helped by feeling' (Pm. 504). For cdraka (prison^see Ch. XVI, §18.
84. P.T.S. and Harvard eds. both read visesato ca suldram pi ajjhattikarh ruparh.
But Burmese ed. of SammohavinodanI in identical passage reads visesato ca
subhdrammanam pi oldrikam pi ajjhattika-rupam.
CHAPTER XV
1. The following words in §3 are not in P.T.S. Diet.: cakkhati (it relishes),
rupayati (it makes visible—only referred to under rupa), sappati (it is emitted;
pass, of sapati, to swear (Ud. 45)), uddhariyati (it is uttered, lit. 'is carried up
to'), gandhayati (it is smelt), sucayati (it betrays), rasati (it tastes). Burmese ed.
of VbhA. reads manayati (not in P.T.S. Diet.) for mundti in parallel passage.
Pm. (p. 508) explains cakkhati (relishes) semantically by 'tasting a flavour
as in "relishing" honey or sauce' and cites M.i,503. Linguistically it connects the
word with dcikkhati (to show).
'When a visible form (rupa) undergoes, like the visible aspect of a chame-
leon, an alteration in appearance (colour) at times when [the mind is] dyed with
greed or corrupted with hate, etc., it makes visible what state [is prevalent] in the
heart (i.e. the mind) and makes that evident as though it were an actual visible
object; the meaning is that it demonstrates it by giving it, as it were, a graspable
entity (saviggaha). Or the word rupa means demonstration, and that is the same
as evidencing. Or the word rupa can be regarded as evidencing of elements too,
since it has many meanings. Rupayati (it makes visible) is a derivative (nib-
bacana) of the word rupa that expresses appearance (colour), while ruppati (it is
molested) is a derivative that expresses the materiality aggregate. [As to sound]
only the sound of words (vacana-sadda) would be covered by the meaning "is
uttered (uddhariyati)", and here sound is not only the sound of words, but rather
all that can be cognized by the ear is what "is emitted (sappati)"; the meaning is
that by means of its own conditions it is emitted (sappiyati), is made cognizable
by the ear' (Pm. 508) (cf. also sappati, to crawl).
* "It evokes life (jivitam avhayati)" owing to appetite for tastes in food
(dhdra), which is the cause of life (jivita), since the act of swallowing is rooted
in approval of tastes. This is the linguistic characteristic of the word jivhd (tongue)'
(Pm. 509).
2. The following words in §4 are not in P.T.S. Diet.: dyatana (actuating: verbal
n. fm. dyatati, to actuate); tanana (range: verbal n. fm. tanoti, to provide a range
for, to extend—q.v. P.T.S. Diet.—; mentioned under dyatana, base); nayana (lead-
ing on: verbal n. fm. neti, to lead on; lit. meaning not in P.T.S. Diet.); dyatati (to
actuate—'cakkhuvinhdnddinam uppddanam dyatanam, Pm.). See also dydpenti
at Ps.ii,21.
3. Akara means either a mine or a store (P.T.S. Diet, apparently believes in
mining for pearls—see ratandkard).
4. * Because of the absence of anything whatever not included in the twelve
bases, there is no arguing that they are more than twelve' (Pm. 510).
5. ' "In other words, the life-continuum mind19
: that which occurs twice in
disturbance (see Ch. XIV, n.46). Only when there has been the occurrence of the
life-continuum in a state of disturbance (iff a state of dissimilar occurrence) is
there the arising of adverting, not otherwise. Taking it thus as the reason for
adverting, what is called "life-continuum mind" is a door of arising. "Not com-
mon to air means not common to eye-consciousness and the rest' (Pm. 510).
See M.i,293.
6. * "Condition" is kamma, etc., "destiny" is from hell upwards; "order [of
beings]" refers to^such species as elephants, horses, etc., or to the castes of the
khattiyas (warrior nobles), and so on; "person" refers to any given living being's
continuity' (Pm. 511).
7. There are eighty-one mundane sorts of consciousness; and since there is no
path or fruition without jhana, when the four paths and four fruitions are multi-
plied by the five jhanas, there are forty kinds of supramundane consciousness: 81
+ 40=121.
8. ' "Physical basis" is that consisting of the eye, etc.; according to that. "Prog-
ress" is painful progress, and the other three. "And so on" refers to jhana, pre-
dominance, plane, object, and so on' (Pm. 512).
9. 'Blue is similar to blue; it is dissimilar to any other colour. "Condition" is
kamma, and so on' (Pm. 512).
10. The verb dahati, the basis of all these derivatives, means literally 'to put'.
'There are five meanings stated, since the word dhdtu (element, sort, "putting")
has its form established (siddha) here by (a) the transitive (kattu), (b) the intran-
sitive (kamma), (c) the abstract noun (bhdva), (d) the instrumental case (kdrana),
and (e) the causative voice (adhikarana). Supramundane elements do not sort out
(yidahanti) the suffering of the round of rebirths; on the contrary, they destroy
(vidharhsenti) it. That is why "mundane" is specified1
(Pm. 513).
11. ' "Are elements since they cause [a state's] own individual essence to be
borne": here, while the establishment of the word's form should be understood
as "dadhdtl ti dhdtu (it puts, sorts, thus it is an element)", still taking the word
dhd to share the meanings [of both dadhdti and dhdreti (see Ch. XI, §104)], there
is also the meaning of the active voice different from the first, because the
meanings of vidhdna (sorting out) and dhdrana (causing to bear) are uncon-
nected. The causing of the bearing of mere individual essences without any
permanent living being, is a basic meaning of the word dhdtu (element), and so it
is stated separately' (Pm. 513).
12. ' "Are elements like those elements": here, just as the word "lion" (siha),
which is properly applicable to the bearer of a mane, [is used] of a man, so too
the word "element", which is properly applicable to the constituents of marble, is
used of the eye and so on' (Pm. 513).
13. ' "Successive definition of cause and fruit" is just the state of cause and
fruit' (Pm. 514).
14. 'It is the mere cessation of the mind-consciousness element and mental-data
element because it is the ceasedness of thought-arisings in the fourth immaterial
state' (Pm. 514).
15. In Ch. XIV, §§35-70, the material instances listed total 28, that is, 4 primary
elements, 9 sense faculties (excluding the tangible-data faculty, which is the 3
elements except water), and 15 kinds of subtle materiality beginning with the
femininity faculty (cf. treatment at Dhs. §596). Other lists, however, sometimes
give a total of 26 kinds, that is, 10 sense faculties (including the tangible-data
faculty, which is the 3 primary elements) and 16 kinds of subtle materiality, that
is, the above-mentioned 15 plus the water element, which is listed then after the
space element (cf. treatment at Dhs. §653 and list at MA.ii,261). See Table I.
16. 'Here the word "etc." stands for the mind-consciousness element's states
where suitable as root-cause, predominance, kamma, kamma-result, nutriment,
faculty, jhana, and path conditions' (Pm. 516).
17. 'I.e. subtle materiality and nibbana' (Pm. 516).
18. ' "Life-continuum mind" is the life-continuum consciousness occurring twice
in disturbance' (Pm. 516).
19. 'Formed elements are secluded in both instances (i.e. when past and future)
because their individual essences are unapprehendable then' (Pm. 516).
20. Adhararani (adho-arani)—* lower fire-stick' and uttararani (uttara-arani)—
'upper fire-stick' are not in P.T.S. Diet, as such.
Showing posts with label Visuddhimagga. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Visuddhimagga. Show all posts
Friday, July 15, 2011
Visuddhimagga - Notes V
THE PATH
OF PURIFICATION
(VISUDDHIMAGGA)
BY
BHADANTACARIYA BUDDHAGHOSA
Translated from the Pali
by
BHIKKHU NANAMOLI
FIFTH EDITION
BUDDHIST PUBLICATION SOCIETY
Kandy Sri Lanka
CHAPTER XIII
1. 'With the consciousness belonging to the particular concentration that con-
stitutes the preliminary work. The meaning is: by means of consciousness con-
centrated with the momentary concentration that occurs in the form of the pre-
liminary work for knowledge of the divine ear element. The occasion of access
for the divine ear element is called preliminary-work consciousness, but that as
stated refers to multiple advertings' (Pm. 401).
2. 'The sound sign is the sound itself since it is the cause for the arising of the
knowledge. Or the gross-subtle aspect acquired in the way stated is the sound
sign* (Pm. 402).
3. 'This is momentary-concentration consciousness, which owing to the fact
that the preliminary work contingent upon the sound has been performed, occurs
in one who has attained the basic jhana and emerged for the purpose of arousing
the divine ear element' (Pm. 402).
4. ' "Becomes merged9
' is amalgamated with the divine ear element. He is
called an obtainer of divine-ear knowledge as soon as the absorption conscious-
ness has arisen. The meaning is that there is now no further need of development
for the purpose' (Pm. 403).
5. The "matter of the heart" is not the heart-basis, but rather it is the heart as
the piece of flesh described as resembling a lotus bud in shape outside and like a
kosdtaki fruit inside (Ch. VIII, §111). For the blood mentioned here is to be
found with that as its support. But the heart-basis occurs with this blood as its
support' (Pm. 403)
6. 'Of one who has not done any interpreting (abhinivesa) reckoned as study
for direct-knowledge* (Pm. 407). A rather special use of the word abhinivesa,
perhaps more freely renderable here as 'practice'.
7. For the term chinna-vatumaka ('one who has broken the cycle of rebirths')
as an epithet of former Buddhas, see M.iii,l 18.
8. Sarhvannita—'given in detail'; Pm. glosses by vitthdritan ti attho. Not in
this meaning in P.T.S Diet. See prologue verses to the four Nikayas.
9. A commentarial account of the behaviour of lions will be found in the
Manorathapuranl, commentary to A. Catukkanipata 33. Pm. says: Slhokkamana-
vasena sihdtipatanavasena hdnagatiyd gacchati (p. 408).
10. Ugghatetvd: see Ch. X, §6; the word is obviously used here in the same
sense.
11. "The "ordinary sun" is the sun's divine palace that arose before the emer-
gence of the aeon. But like the other sense-sphere deities at the time of the
emergence of the aeon the sun deity too produces jhana and reappears in the
Brahma-world. But the actual sun's disk becomes brighter and more fiery. Oth-
ers say that it disappears and another appears in its place' (Pm. 412).
12. The five are the Ganges, Yamuna (Jumma), Sarabhu, Sarassati, and Mahl
(Pm. 412).
13. Hamsapatana is another name for Mandakini (Pm.). For seven Great Lakes
seeA.iv,101.
14. 'At the place where the Yama Deities are established. The places where the
CatumahArajika and Tavatinisa heavens become established do not reappear at
first because they are connected with the earth' (Pm. 412).
15. Khdrudaka—'caustic waters': the name given to the waters on which the
world-spheres rest (see MA.iv,178).
16. Kutdgdra: see Ch. XII, n.14; here this seems the most likely of the various
meanings of the word.
17. ' "He cannot see them with the divine eye'
1
—with the knowledge of the
divine eye—because of the extreme brevity and extreme subtlety of the material
moment in anyone. Moreover, it is present materiality that is the object of the
divine eye, and that is by prenascence condition. And there is no occurrence of
exalted consciousness without adverting and preliminary work. Nor is material-
ity that is only arising able to serve as object condition, nor that which is dissolv-
ing. Therefore it is rightly said that he cannot see with the divine eye materiality
at the moments of death and reappearance. If the knowledge of the divine eye
has only materiality as its object, then why is it said that he "sees beings"? It is
said in this way since it is mainly concerned with instances of materiality in a
being's continuity, or because that materiality is a reason for apprehending beings.
Some say that this is said according to conventional usage' (Pm. 417).
18. In rendering yathdbhatam here in this very idiomatic passage MA.ii,32 has
been consulted.
19. For the word aya see Ch. XVI, § 17.
20. See Abhidhamma Matika ('schedule'), Dhs. p.If. This consists of 22 sets of
triple classifications (tika) and 100 sets of double ones (duka). The first triad is
'profitable, unprofitable, and [morally] indeterminate', and the first dyad is 'root-
cause, not-root-cause\ The Matika is used in the Dhammasangani (for which it
serves as the basic structure), in the Vibhahga (in some of the 'Abhidhamma
Sections' and in the 'Questionnaires') and in the Patthana. All dhammas are
either classifiable according to these triads and dyads, under one of the headings,
if the triad or dyad is all-embracing, or are called 'not-so-classifiable' (na-vat~
tabba), if the triad or dyad is not. The four triads mentioned here are: no. 13
'dhammas with a limited object, with an exalted object, with a measureless
object'; no. 16 'dhammas with a path as object, with a path as root-cause, with a
path as predominance'; no. 19 'dhammas with a past object, with a future object,
with a present object'; and no. 21 'dhammas with an internal object, with an
external object, with an internal-external object'.
21. The 'word in the accusative case' is in the first instance 'body', governed
by the verb 'converts' (kdyarh parindmeti); see Pm.
22. Pm. comments: 'Although with the words 'These perfumes", etc., he appre-
hends present perfumes, etc., nevertheless the object of his resolving conscious-
ness is actually their future materiality that is to be associated with the distinc-
tion of not drying up. This is because the resolve concerns the future ... "Cream
of curd": when resolving, his object is the future appearance of curd*.
Vatanlyasendsana was apparently a monastery in the Vindhya Hills
(Vinjatavi): see Mv.l9:6; DhsA. 419. The Elders Assagutta and Rohana in-
structed Kajangala who was sent to convert Menander (Lamotte, Histoire de la
Bouddhisme Indien, p. 440).
23. Cf. also Vbh. 62 and 91.
24. Pm. adds: 'Some however explain the meaning in this way: It is as long as,
when one has stepped on the dry bank with a wet foot, the water line on the foot
does not disappear'.
25. The residents of the Abhayagiri Monastery in Anuradhapura (Pm.).
CHAPTER XIV
1. Cf. Ps.i, 42, etc.; Abhidhamma definitions very commonly make use of the
Pali forms of verbal nouns, here instanced by pannd (understanding = state of
understanding) and pajdnana (understanding = act of understanding), both from
the verb pajdndti (he understands). English does not always, as in this case,
distinguish between the two. Similarly, for example, from the verb socati (he
sorrows) we find soka (sorrow, state of sorrowing) and socana (sorrowing, act of
sorrowing), and here the English differentiates. Cf. parallel treatment of pannd at
MA.ii,343f.
2. 'In arisings of consciousness with two root-causes [i.e. with non-greed and
non-hate but without non-delusion], or without root-cause, understanding does
not occur' (Pm. 432). 'Just as pleasure is not invariably inseparable from happi-
ness, so perception and consciousness are not invariably inseparable from under-
standing. But just as happiness is invariably inseparable from pleasure, so under-
standing is invariably inseparable from perception and consciousness' (Pm. 432).
3. 'A phenomenon's own essence (sako bhdvo) or existing essence (samdno
VA bhdva) is its individual essence (sabhdva)' (Pm. 433). Cf. Ch. VIII, note 68,
where Pm. gives the definition from saha-bhdva (with essence).
4. Patisambhidd is usually rendered by 'analysis' (see e.g. Points of Contro-
versy—Kathdvatthu translation—pp. 377ff.). But the Tipitaka explanations of
the four patisambhidd suggest no emphasis on analysis rather than synthesis. Pm.
gives the following definition of the term: 'Knowledge that is classified (pabheda-
gata = put into a division) under meaning (aitha) as capable of effecting the
explanation and definition of specific characteristics of the meaning class (mean-
ing division) is called attha-patisambhidd; and so with the other three' (Pm.
436). 'Discrimination' has been chosen for patisambhidd because, while it has
the sense of 'division', it does not imply an opposite process as 'analysis' does.
Also it may be questioned whether the four are well described as 'entirely logi-
cal': 'entirely epistemological' might perhaps be both less rigid and nearer; for
they seem to cover four interlocking fields, namely: meanings of statements and
effects of causes (etc.), statements of meanings and causes of effects (etc.),
language as restricted to etymological rules of verbal expression, and clarity (or
perspicuous inspiration) in marshalling the other three.
5. 'I.e. the four paths with the first jhana and those with the second, third, and
fourth, out of the five' (Pm. 434).
6. The word abhinivisati with its noun abhinivesa means literally 'to dwell on',
and so to adhere, or 'insist'. In the Tipitaka it always appears in a bad sense and
always appears in contexts with wrong view and clinging (see e.g. M.iii, 30-31,
Nd. 1, 436, and also Ps. quoted above at Ch.I,§140). However, in the Commen-
taries the word appears also in a good sense as at Ch. XIV, §130, Ch. XXI, §73
and 83f., and at MA.i,250 (cf. saddham nivisati, M.ii,173). In this good sense it
is synonymous with right interpretation of experience. All the bare experience of
perception is interpreted by the mind either in the sense of permanence, pleasure,
self, which is wrong because it is not confirmed by experience, or in the sense of
impermanence, etc., which is right because it is confirmed by experience (see
Ch. XIV, §130). There is no not interpreting experience, and it is a function of
the mind that the interpretation adopted is 'dwelt upon', i.e. insisted upon. And
so it is this insistence or interpretation in accordance with reality as confirmed by
experience that is the abhinivesa of the Commentaries in the good sense. For
these reasons the words interpretation, misinterpretation and insistence have been
chosen here as renderings.
7. Ariyati—'to honour, to serve'. Not in P.T.S. Diet. Cf. ger. araniya
(MA.i,21,173), also not in P.T.S. Diet., explained by Majjhima Tika as 'to be
honoured' (payirupasitabbd).
8. This quotation has been filled out from the Vibhanga text for clarity.
9. Byabhicdra (vyabhicdra): not in P.T.S. Diet.; normal grammarian's term for
an 'exception'.
10. The idea behind the term 'individual-essence language' (sabhdvanirutti),
that is to say, that there is a real name for each thing that is part of that thing's
individual essence, is dealt with at DhsA. 391-92. Magadhan as 'the root speech
of all beings' and the 'individual-essence language' is dealt with in greater detail
at VbhA. 387.
'Phasso' and 'vedand' as respectively masc. and fern. nom. sing, have the
correct terminations. 'Phassd* and 'vedano* are wrong.
11. The expression gatapaccdgatikabhdva refers to the practice of 'carrying the
meditation subject to and from the alms round', which is described at MA.i,257
in detail. The same expression is also used of a certain kind of refuse-rag (see
Ch. II, §17).
12. 'The "Chapter of Similes" is the Chapter of Twin Verses in the Dham-
mapada (Dh.1-20), they say. Others say that it is the Book of Pairs in the First
Fifty (M. Suttas 31-40)' (Pm. 436).
13. 'Tangible data are omitted from this list because, not being derived matter,
they are included in the primaries' (Pm. 442). They are described as consisting
of three of the four primaries, excluding the water (cohesion) element. 'What is
the materiality of the great primaries? It is the tangible-data base and the water-
element' (Dhs. 663). For the whole list see Dhs. 596, in which (N.B.) the heart-
basis does not appear. See also note 32 and Ch. XV, n.15.
14. 'Here the first-mentioned characteristic of the eye is described according to
the kamma that produces a selfhood, and is common to all of it, and this without
touching on differentiation is the cause. The second is according to the special-
ized kamma generated thus, 'Let my eye be thus'. This is what they say. But it
can be taken that the first-mentioned characteristic is stated as sensitivity's inter-
est in lighting up its own objective fields, the five senses' state of sensitivity
being taken as a generality; and that the second is stated as the seeing that is due
to the particular division of its own cause, the sensitivities' cause as the state of
kamma being taken as a generality or as a unity. The same method applies to tjie
ear and so on.
/ 'Here it may be asked, "Is the arising of the faculties of the eye, etc., due to
kamma that is one or to kamma that is different?". Now the Ancients say, "In
both ways". Herein, firstly, in the case of the arising of an eye, etc., due to
kamma that is different there is nothing to be explained since the cause is divided
up. But when their arising is due to kamma that is one, how does there come to
be differentiation among them? It is due to dividedness in the cause too. For it is
craving, in the form of longing for this or that kind of becoming that, itself
having specific forms owing to hankering after the sense-bases included in some
kind of becoming or other, contrives, acting as decisive-support, the specific
divisions in the kamma that generates such a kind of becoming. As soon as the
kamma has acquired the differentiation induced by that [hankering] it generates
through effort consisting in appropriate ability a multiple fruit with differentiated
individual essences, as though it had itself taken on a multiple form. And the
ability here need not be understood as anything other than the able state; for it is
simply the effort of producing fruit that is differentiated by the differentiation
due to the differentiation in its cause. And the fact of this differentiating effort on
the part of kamma that is one being the cause of the multiple faculties will be
dealt with below as to logic and texts (note 21). Besides, it is told how one kind
of consciousness only is the cause of the generation of the sixteen kinds of
resultant consciousness and so on; and in the world it is also found that a single
paddy seed is the cause of the generation of the ripe, the unripe, the husked, and
the unhusked fruit. But what is the use of logical thinking? For the eye, etc., are
the fruit of kamma; and kamma-result is exclusively the province of a Buddha's
knowledge' (Pm. 444).
15. Avinjana—'picking up': see dvijjhati in P.T.S. Diet.
16. * "Some" are certain Mahasahghikas; for among these Vasudhamma says
this: "In the eye fire is in excess; in the ear, air; in the nose, earth; in the tongue,
water; in the body all are equal" ' (Pm. 444).
17. ' "As qualities of fire, and so on": [aided] by visible data as the illuminating
[quality] of heat, which is called lighting up; by sound [as a quality] of air, by
odour [as a quality] of earth, by flavour [as a quality] of the water called spittle—
so according to the first theory [that of "some"]; and it can be suitably adjusted
to accord with the second [that of "others"] because they need to be assisted by
such and such qualities of primaries: what is meant is that they have to be helped
in apprehending visible data and so on. This theory holds that the quality is the
ability of the eye, etc., to light up [respectively] visible data, etc., only when
associated with the reasons that are their accessories consisting of light, etc., and
aperture's state of decisive support for ear-consciousness. Aperture is taken in
due order, as are fire, etc., since it is absence of primaries. Or alternatively, when
others intend that aperture is a quality of primaries, as visible data, etc., are, then
the qualities of primaries are construable in their order thus: [aided] by visible
data and light [as a quality] of fire, by sound [as a quality] of aperture called
space, by odour [as a quality] of air, by flavour [as a quality] of water, by
tangible data [as a quality] of earth' (Pm. 445).
18. The four primaries are held to be inseparable and not to exist separate from
each other; cf. quotation from the 'Ancients' in §45. Pm. says: 'Excess is in
capability, not in quantity, otherwise their inseparability would be illogical' (Pm.
451).
19. ' "From finding visibility, etc., [respectively] in a state of excess": from
finding them associated with these differences, namely, the bright visible datum
in fire, sound audible through its individual essence in air, the odour beginning
with surabhi perfume in earth, and the sweet taste in water; thus "visible data,
etc., are the [respective] qualities of these". This is according to the first theory,
and he has stated the conclusion (uttara) that follows, beginning with "we might
assume" in terms of that. The second is confuted in the same way. Or alterna-
tively, "Then they may say", etc., can be taken as said emphasizing, in order to
confute it, the theory of Kanada, which asserts that the eye, etc., are respectively
made by fire, space, earth, water, and air, that have visible data, etc., as their
respective qualities' (Pm. 445).
20. In the P.T.S. text and Sinhalese Hewavitarne text the word ekakaldpe, 'that
form a single group*, occurs in this sentence but is not in the Harvard text.
21. 'If there is no differentiation according to primaries, what then is the reason
for the differentiation of the eye, and so on? Though the kamma that is produced
by the longing for a selfhood (individual personality) with five sense-bases is
one only, still it should be taken as called "not common to them all" and "differ-
ence of kamma" because it is the cause of the differentiation of the eye, and so
on. For it is not a condition for the ear through the same particular difference
through which it is a condition for the eye, since, if it were, it would then follow
that there was no distinction between the faculties. Because of the words, "At the
moment of rebirth-linking, exalted volition is a condition, as kamma condition,
for the kinds of materiality due to kamma performed" (Ptn.) it must be recog-
nized that a single volition is kamma condition for all the kinds of materiality
due to kamma performed that come into existence at the moment of rebirth-
linking. For if the volition were different, then, when there came to be the arising
of the faculties, it would follow that the materiality due to kamma performed was
generated by limited and exalted kamma. And rebirth-linking that is one is not
generated by a plurality of kinds of kamma. Thus it is established that the arising
of the plurality of the faculties is due to a single kamma' (Pm. 446).
22. See also §134 and notes 60, 61. The amplification in this paragraph is from
Pm., which continues: There is another method: the eye and the ear have non-
contiguous objective fields because arising of consciousness is caused while
their objective fields are separated by an interval and apart (adhika). Some say
that the ear has a contiguous objective field. If it did, then sound born of con-
sciousness would not be the object of ear-consciousness, for there is no arising
externally of what is consciousness-originated. And in the texts sound as object
is spoken of as being the object of ear-consciousness without making any dis-
tinction. Besides, there would be no defining the direction and position of the
sound because it would then have to be apprehended in the place occupied by the
possessor of the objective field, as happens in the case of an odour. Conse-
quently it remains in the same place where it arose, if it comes into focus in the
f ear avenue (so the Burmese ed.). Are not the sounds of washermen [beating their
washing on stones] heard later by those who stand at a distance? No; because
there is a difference in the way of apprehending a sound according to the ways in
which it becomes evident to one nearby and to one at a distance. For just as,
because of difference in the way of apprehending the sound of words according
to the ways in which it becomes evident to one at a distance and to one nearby,
there comes to be [respectively] not apprehending, and apprehending, of the
differences in the syllables, so also, when the sound of washermen (a) becomes
[an occurrence] that is evident throughout from beginning to end to one who is
neraby, and (b) becomes an occurrence that is evident in compressed form in the
end or in the middle to one who is at a distance, it is because there is a difference
in the apprehending and definition, which occur later in the cognitive series of
ear-consciousness, that there comes to be the assumption (abhimdna) "Heard
faintly is heard later". But that sound comes into the ear's focus at the moment of
its own existence and in dependence on the place where it arises (see Ch. XIII,
§112; DhsA. 313). If there is absolutely no successive becoming of sound, how
does an echo arise? The sound, though it remains at a distance, is a condition for
the arising of an echo and for the vibration of vessels, etc., elsewhere as a
magnet (ayo-kanta) is for the movement of iron' (Pm. 446-47).
23. Upddinna (also upddinnaka) is pp. of upddiyati (he clings), from which the
noun updddna (clinging ) also comes. Upddinna-(ka-) rupa (clung-to matter) =
kammaja-rupa (kamma-born matter); see Dhs. §653. It is vaguely renderable by
'organic or sentient or living matter'; technically, it is matter of the four prima-
ries that is 'clung to' (upddinna) or 'derived' (updddya) by kamma. Generally
taken as a purely Abhidhamma term (Dhs., p.l), it nevertheless occurs in the
Suttas at M.i,185 in the same sense.
24. P.T.S. text reads ahhamannam sahkaro natthi. Harvard text omits sahkaro
natthi. The word sahkara in the sense of 'confounding' or error is not in P.T.S.
Diet.; see Vis. concluding verses. P.T.S. ed., p. 711.
'Though these things, that is to say, the "mark ... of the female", etc., arise
each due to its own condition consisting in kamma, etc., they mostly only do so
as modes in a continuity accompanied by the femininity faculty. And so "if is
manifested as the reason for the mark", etc., is said making the femininity
faculty their cause.
'As regards the "mark of the female", etc., too, its "facultiness" is stated as
predominance, in other words, as a state of cause, because the conditions for the
modal matter (dkdra-rupa) consisting of the mark of the female, etc., in a conti-
nuity accompanied by faculties do not arise otherwise, and because these kinds
of materiality are a condition for apprehending the female. But because the
femininity faculty does not generate even the material instances in its own group
or maintain or consolidate them, and because it does not so act for the material
instances of other groups, it is therefore not called in the text faculty, presence,
and non-disappearance conditions, as the life faculty is for the material instances
of its group, and as nutriment is for the material instances in succeeding groups.
And it is because the mark, etc., are dependent on other conditions that wherever
they have predominance its shape is encountered, even in dead and sculptured
matter that resembles it. And so too with the masculinity faculty.
'And since these two do not occur together in a single continuity, because
of the words "Does the masculinity faculty arise in one in whom the femininity
faculty arises?—No" (Yamaka), etc., therefore even in a hermaphrodite there is
only one of them at a given moment (see also DhsA. 323)' (Pm. 448).
25. 'Since the life faculty is itself entirely kamma-born it is established, by tak-
ing them as conascent, that the things to be protected by it are kamma-born too;
this is why there is no inclusion of the term "kamma-born". It maintains as if it
were its own that kamma-born matter by being the cause of its occurrence even
though only lasting for a moment; that is why it has the characteristic of main-
taining conascent kinds of matter. For kamma alone is not competent to be the
cause of kamma-born things' presence, as nutriment, etc., are of the nutriment-
born. Why? Because it is no longer existent at that moment.
* "Because it does accomplish each of those functions": it does so because it
is a condition for distinguishing what is living. For it is the life faculty that dis-
tinguishes matter that is bound up with faculties from dead matter, and kamma-
born matter and what is bound up with that from matter that is temperature
originated, and so on.
'And the life faculty must be regarded as the reason not only for presence
during a moment but also for non-interruption of connexion; otherwise death as
the termination of a life span would be illogical' (Pm. 448).
26. * "The heart-basis ... the support for the mind-element and for the mind-
consciousness-element": how is that to be known? (i) From scriptures and (ii)
from logical reasoning.
'The scripture is this: "The materiality dependent on which the mind-ele-
ment and mind-consciousness-element occur is a condition, as a support condi-
tion, for the mind-element and the mind-consciousness-element and what is as-
sociated therewith" (Ptn.1,4). If that is so, why is it not mentioned in the Rupakanda
of the Dhammasangani (Dhs. §583ff.)? Its not being mentioned there is for
another reason. What is that? Non-inconsistency of the teaching. For while eye-
consciousness, etc., have the eye, etc., as their respective supports absolutely,
mind-consciousness does not in the same way have the heart-basis as its support
absolutely. And the teaching in the physical-basis dyad (vatthu-duka) is given by
way of the material support thus, "There is matter that is the physical basis of
eye-consciousness, there is matter that is not the physical basis of eye-conscious-
ness" (Dhs. §585) and so on; and if the dyads were stated by way of what had the
heart-basis absolutely as its support thus, "There is matter that is the physical
basis of mind-consciousness" and so on, then the object dyads (drammana-duka)
do not fall into line: for one cannot say: "There is matter that is the object of
mind-consciousness, there is matter that is not the object of mind-conscious-
ness". So the physical-basis dyads and object dyads being thus made inconsis-
tent, the teaching would lack unity, and the Master's wish was to give the teach-
ing here in a form that has unity. That is why the heart-basis is not mentioned,
not because it is unapprehendable.
'(ii) But the logical reasoning should be understood in this way. In the five-
constituent becoming, [that is, in the sense sphere and fine-material sphere,]
these two elements have as their support produced (nipphanna) derived matter.
Herein, since the visible-data base, etc., and nutritive essence, are found to occur
apart from what is bound up with faculties, to make them the support would be
illogical. And since these two elements are found in a continuity that is devoid of
the femininity and masculinity faculties [i.e. in the Brahma-world], to make them
the support would be illogical too. And in the case of the life faculty that would
have to have another function, so to make it the support would be illogical too.
So it is the heart-basis that remains to be recognized as their support. For it is
possible to say that these two elements have as their support produced derived
matter, since existence is bound up with matter in the five-constituent becoming.
Whatever has its existence bound up with matter is found to have as its support
produced derived matter, as the eye-consciousness-element does. And the dis-
tinction "in the five-constituent becoming" is made on account of the mind-
consciousness-element; in the four-constituent becoming, [that is, the immaterial
sphere,] there is no mind-element. Does there not follow contradiction of the
middle term (hetu) because of establishing faculties as their support? No; be-
cause that is disproved by what is seen. For these two elements are not, as in the
case of eye-consciousness, controlled by the slackness and keenness, etc., of
their physical basis; and accordingly it is not said in the texts that they have the
faculties as their condition. Hence their having faculties as their support, in other
words, their being controlled by them, is disproved.
'Granted that these two elements have as their support the derived matter
consisting of the heart-basis, how is it to be known that it is kamma-originated,
has an invariable function, and is to be found located in the heart? It may be said
to be kamma-originated because, like the eye, it is the materiality of a physical
basis; and because of that it has an invariable function; because it is the material-
ity of a physical basis and because it is a support for consciousness, is the
meaning. It is known that its location is there because of the heart's exhaustion
(khijjana) in one who thinks of anything, bringing it to mind intently and direct-
ing his whole mind to it' (Pm. 449-50).
The word hadaya (heart), used in a purely mental and not physical sense,
occurs in the definitions of the mind-element and mind-consciousness-element in
the Vibhahga (Vbh. 88-89). The brain (matthaluhga), which seems to have been
first added as the 32nd part of the body in the Patisambhida (Ps.i,7), was ig-
nored, and the Visuddhimagga is hard put to it to find a use for it. The Pitakas
(e.g. Ptn.1,4 quoted above) connect the mind with the matter of the body without
specifying.
27. 'It is the mode and the alteration of what? Of consciousness-originated
primary elements that have the air-element in excess of capability. What is that
capability? It is the state of being consciousness-born and the state of being
derived matter. Or alternatively, it can be taken as the mode alteration of the air
element. If that is so, then intimation is illogical as derived matter, for there is no
derived matter with a single primary as its support, since "matter derived from
the four great primaries" (M.i,53) is said. That is not wrong. Alteration of one of
the four is that of all four, as with wealth shared among four. And excess of air
element in a material group (kaldpa) does not contradict the words "of the air
element"; and excess is in capability, not in quantity, otherwise their inseparabil-
ity would be illogical. According to some it is that of the air element only. In
their opinion the state of derived matter is inapplicable (durupapdda) to intima-
tion, since the alteration of one is not that of all. But this [air element] is
apprehended by mind-door impulsion that is next to the non-intimating [appre-
hension] that is next to the apprehension of the appearance of motion in the
movement of the hands, and so on. There is a certain kind of alteration that is
separate from the appearance of motion. And the apprehension of the former is
next to the apprehension of the latter. How is that to be known? By the apprehen-
sion of intention. For no apprehension of intention such as "He is getting this
done, it seems" is met with in the case of trees* movements, etc., which are
devoid of intention. But it is met with in the case of hand movements and so on.
Therefore there is a certain kind of alteration that is separate from the appearance
of motion, and it is known as the "intimator of the intention". Also it is known
by inference that the apprehension of the alteration is next to the apprehension of
the appearance thus: The intimator intimates the meaning to be intimated only
when it is apprehended as a cause, not merely as present. For they say accord-
ingly:
Sounds that have entered no objective field
Do not awaken any kind of meaning;
And also beings merely recognized
As such communicate no meanings either.
* If just the apprehension of the alteration is the reason for the apprehension
of the intention, why is there no apprehension of intention in unapprehended
communication (sanketa)! It is not only just the apprehension of the alteration
that is the reason for the apprehension of the intention; but rather it should be
taken that the apprehension of the previously-established connexion is the deci-
sive support for this. The stiffening, upholding, and movement are due to the air-
element associated with the alteration belonging to the intimation, is what is
said. What, is it all the air-element that does all those things? It is not like that.
For it is the air element given rise to by the seventh impulsion that, by acquiring
as its reinforcing conditions the air elements given rise to by the preceding im-
pulsions, moves consciousness-originated matter by acting as cause for its suc-
cessive arisings in adjacent locations (desantaruppatti—cf. Ch. VIII, n. 54), not
the others. The others, however, help it by doing the stiffening and upholding,
the successive arising in adjacent locations being itself the movement. So the in-
strumentality should be taken as attributed when there is the sign [of movement];
otherwise there would not be uninterestedness and momentariness of dhammas.
And here the cart to be drawn by seven yokes is given as simile in the Commen-
tary. But when consciousness-born matter moves, the kinds of matter born of
temperature, kamma, and nutriment move too because they are bound up with it,
like a piece of dry cow-dung thrown into a river's current.
* Since it has been said that the apprehension of intimation is next to the
apprehension of the appearance of motion, how then, is the air element itself as
the maker of the movement accompanied by the alteration consisting in the
intimation? It is not like that. It is the air elements given rise to by the first
impulsion, etc., and which are unable to cause movement in that way and per-
form only the stiffening and upholding, that should be taken as only accompa-
nied by the alteration belonging to intimation. For it is the alteration coexistent
with the intention that is the intimation, because of giving rise to alteration in
whatever direction it wishes to cause the occurrence of moving forward and so
on. Taking it in this way, it is perfectly logical to say that the origination of
intimation belongs to mind-door adverting. Since the intention possessed of the
aforesaid alteration is intimated through the apprehension of that alteration, it is
said that "Its function is to display intention1
'. The air element being the cause of
the motion of the body intimation, is figuratively said, as a state of alteration, to
be ''manifested as the cause of bodily motion". "Its proximate cause is the con-
sciousness-originated air-element" is said since the air element's excessive func-
tion is the cause of intimating intention by movement of the body' (Pm. 450-52).
Cf. DhsA. 83f.
28. Vaclbheda—'speech utterance' is not in P.T.S. Diet., which does not give
this use of bheda. Pm. (p. 452) explains: 'The function (—"knocking together")
of the vocal apparatus (—"clung-to matter")'.
29. 'The question, "It is the mode and the alteration of what?", should be
handled in the same way as for bodily intimation, with this difference: for "next
to the apprehension of the appearance of movement" substitute "next to the
hearing of an audible sound". And here, because of the absence of stiffening,
etc., the argument beginning "For it is the air element given rise to by the
seventh impulsion" does not apply; for the sound arises together with the knock-
ing together, and the knocking together only applies in the case of the first im-
pulsion, and so on. The knocking together is the arising of groups of primaries
(bhuta-kaldpa) in proximity to each other due to conditions. The movement is
the progression of the successive arising in adjacent locations. This is the differ-
ence. The earth element's knocking together is parallel to the air element's
moving as regards function' (Pm. 452).
30. In actual fact the heart-basis is not in the Pitakas as such.
31. ' "Some" are the inmates of the Abhayagiri Monastery at Anuradhapura'
(Pm. 455). A long discussion on this follows in Pm., not given here.
32. ' "Sensed (jnuta)" means apprehendable by sensing (MWTVA), by reaching;
hence he said "because they are the objective fields of faculties that take contigu-
ous [objective fields}" (cf. §46). But what is it that is called a tangible datum? It
is the three elements, earth, heat, and air. But why is the water element not
included here? Is not cold apprehended by touching; and that is the water ele-
ment? Certainly it is apprehended but it is not the water element. What is it then?
It is just the fire element. For there is the sensation (buddhi) of cold when heat is
sluggish. There is no quality that is called cold; there is only the assumption
(abhimdna) of coldness due to the sluggishness of the state of heat. How is that
to be known? Because of the unreliability of the sensation of cold, like "beyond
and not beyond". For in hot weather, while those who stand in the sun and go
into the shade have the sensation of cold, yet those who go to the same place
from an underground cave have the sensation of heat. And if coldness were the
water element it would be found in a single group (kaldpa) along with heat; but
it is not so found. That is why it may be known that coldness is not the water
element. And that is conclusive (uttara) for those who agree to the inseparable
existence of the primary elements; and it is conclusive too even for those who do
not agree because it is disproved by associate existence through seeing the func-
tions of the four primaries in a single group. It is conclusive too for those who
say that coldness is the characteristic of the air element; for if coldness were the
air element, coldness would be found in a single group along with heat, and it is
not so found. That is why it may be known that coldness is not the air element
either. But those who hold the opinion that fluidity (dravata) is the water ele-
ment and that that is apprehended by touching should be told: "That fluidity is
touched is merely the venerable ones' assumption as is the case with shape". For
this is said by the Ancients:
"Three elements coexisting with fluidity
Together form what constitutes a tangible;
That 'I succeed in touching this fluidity'
Is a common misconception in the world.
And as a man who touches elements,
And apprehends a shape then with his mind,
Fancies 'I really have been touching shape',
So too fluidity is recognized" ' (Pm. 459).
33. * "The sound base only": here some say, "The consciousness-born is always
intimative (savinnattika)". The Ancients say, "There is sound due to the interven-
tion iyipphdra) of applied thought that does not intimate". While depending on
the word of the Great Commentary that puts it thus, "Intimatable (cognizable)
through the ear by means of the sound due to applied thought's intervention",
still there is also need of the arising of consciousness-originated sound without
intimation (cognition) for because of the words "For the intimation (cognition) is
not due to intimating speech" (?), it arises together with sound not intimatable
(cognizable) through the ear. That being so, there would have to be a conscious-
ness-born sound-ennead. And that theory is rejected by Sahghakaras who imag-
ine that it is self-contradictory to say that there is sound not intimatable (cogni-
zable) through the ear. Others, however, do not reject the Great Commentary's
statement and they comment on its intention. How? [They say that] the non-
intimation (non-cognition) through the ear of the sound activated due to applied
thought's intervention is stated in the Suttas with this intention, "He tells by
hearing with the divine ear the subtle sound that is conascent with the intimation,
originated by applied thought, and consisting in movement of the tongue and
palate, and so on" (cf, A.i,171), and that in the Patthana (Ptn.1,7) the state of
object condition for ear-consciousness is stated with reference to gross sound'
(Pm. 460.)
34. • "Has the characteristic of being felt" means that it has as its characteristic
what is felt, what is experienced as the "taste (stimulus)" of the object. ^Charac-
teristic of perceiving" means that it has as its characteristic the perceiving of an
object clashed as blue, etc., and the knowing, the apprehending, of it by arousing
the perception of it as blue, yellow, long, short, and so on. Forming (abhi-
sahkharana) is accumulating, or it is contriving by becoming interested. And it
is because volition is basic in both of these ways that the formations aggregate is
said thus to have the characteristic of forming. For in expounding the formations
aggregate in the Suttanta-Bhajaniya of the Vibhanga, volition was expounded by
the Blessed One thus, "Eye-contact-born volition" (Vbh. 8) and so on. "Has the
characteristic of cognizing" means that it has as its characteristic that kind of
knowing called apprehension of an object in a mode in which the objective field
is apprehended differently from the mode of perceiving' (Pm. 462).
OF PURIFICATION
(VISUDDHIMAGGA)
BY
BHADANTACARIYA BUDDHAGHOSA
Translated from the Pali
by
BHIKKHU NANAMOLI
FIFTH EDITION
BUDDHIST PUBLICATION SOCIETY
Kandy Sri Lanka
CHAPTER XIII
1. 'With the consciousness belonging to the particular concentration that con-
stitutes the preliminary work. The meaning is: by means of consciousness con-
centrated with the momentary concentration that occurs in the form of the pre-
liminary work for knowledge of the divine ear element. The occasion of access
for the divine ear element is called preliminary-work consciousness, but that as
stated refers to multiple advertings' (Pm. 401).
2. 'The sound sign is the sound itself since it is the cause for the arising of the
knowledge. Or the gross-subtle aspect acquired in the way stated is the sound
sign* (Pm. 402).
3. 'This is momentary-concentration consciousness, which owing to the fact
that the preliminary work contingent upon the sound has been performed, occurs
in one who has attained the basic jhana and emerged for the purpose of arousing
the divine ear element' (Pm. 402).
4. ' "Becomes merged9
' is amalgamated with the divine ear element. He is
called an obtainer of divine-ear knowledge as soon as the absorption conscious-
ness has arisen. The meaning is that there is now no further need of development
for the purpose' (Pm. 403).
5. The "matter of the heart" is not the heart-basis, but rather it is the heart as
the piece of flesh described as resembling a lotus bud in shape outside and like a
kosdtaki fruit inside (Ch. VIII, §111). For the blood mentioned here is to be
found with that as its support. But the heart-basis occurs with this blood as its
support' (Pm. 403)
6. 'Of one who has not done any interpreting (abhinivesa) reckoned as study
for direct-knowledge* (Pm. 407). A rather special use of the word abhinivesa,
perhaps more freely renderable here as 'practice'.
7. For the term chinna-vatumaka ('one who has broken the cycle of rebirths')
as an epithet of former Buddhas, see M.iii,l 18.
8. Sarhvannita—'given in detail'; Pm. glosses by vitthdritan ti attho. Not in
this meaning in P.T.S Diet. See prologue verses to the four Nikayas.
9. A commentarial account of the behaviour of lions will be found in the
Manorathapuranl, commentary to A. Catukkanipata 33. Pm. says: Slhokkamana-
vasena sihdtipatanavasena hdnagatiyd gacchati (p. 408).
10. Ugghatetvd: see Ch. X, §6; the word is obviously used here in the same
sense.
11. "The "ordinary sun" is the sun's divine palace that arose before the emer-
gence of the aeon. But like the other sense-sphere deities at the time of the
emergence of the aeon the sun deity too produces jhana and reappears in the
Brahma-world. But the actual sun's disk becomes brighter and more fiery. Oth-
ers say that it disappears and another appears in its place' (Pm. 412).
12. The five are the Ganges, Yamuna (Jumma), Sarabhu, Sarassati, and Mahl
(Pm. 412).
13. Hamsapatana is another name for Mandakini (Pm.). For seven Great Lakes
seeA.iv,101.
14. 'At the place where the Yama Deities are established. The places where the
CatumahArajika and Tavatinisa heavens become established do not reappear at
first because they are connected with the earth' (Pm. 412).
15. Khdrudaka—'caustic waters': the name given to the waters on which the
world-spheres rest (see MA.iv,178).
16. Kutdgdra: see Ch. XII, n.14; here this seems the most likely of the various
meanings of the word.
17. ' "He cannot see them with the divine eye'
1
—with the knowledge of the
divine eye—because of the extreme brevity and extreme subtlety of the material
moment in anyone. Moreover, it is present materiality that is the object of the
divine eye, and that is by prenascence condition. And there is no occurrence of
exalted consciousness without adverting and preliminary work. Nor is material-
ity that is only arising able to serve as object condition, nor that which is dissolv-
ing. Therefore it is rightly said that he cannot see with the divine eye materiality
at the moments of death and reappearance. If the knowledge of the divine eye
has only materiality as its object, then why is it said that he "sees beings"? It is
said in this way since it is mainly concerned with instances of materiality in a
being's continuity, or because that materiality is a reason for apprehending beings.
Some say that this is said according to conventional usage' (Pm. 417).
18. In rendering yathdbhatam here in this very idiomatic passage MA.ii,32 has
been consulted.
19. For the word aya see Ch. XVI, § 17.
20. See Abhidhamma Matika ('schedule'), Dhs. p.If. This consists of 22 sets of
triple classifications (tika) and 100 sets of double ones (duka). The first triad is
'profitable, unprofitable, and [morally] indeterminate', and the first dyad is 'root-
cause, not-root-cause\ The Matika is used in the Dhammasangani (for which it
serves as the basic structure), in the Vibhahga (in some of the 'Abhidhamma
Sections' and in the 'Questionnaires') and in the Patthana. All dhammas are
either classifiable according to these triads and dyads, under one of the headings,
if the triad or dyad is all-embracing, or are called 'not-so-classifiable' (na-vat~
tabba), if the triad or dyad is not. The four triads mentioned here are: no. 13
'dhammas with a limited object, with an exalted object, with a measureless
object'; no. 16 'dhammas with a path as object, with a path as root-cause, with a
path as predominance'; no. 19 'dhammas with a past object, with a future object,
with a present object'; and no. 21 'dhammas with an internal object, with an
external object, with an internal-external object'.
21. The 'word in the accusative case' is in the first instance 'body', governed
by the verb 'converts' (kdyarh parindmeti); see Pm.
22. Pm. comments: 'Although with the words 'These perfumes", etc., he appre-
hends present perfumes, etc., nevertheless the object of his resolving conscious-
ness is actually their future materiality that is to be associated with the distinc-
tion of not drying up. This is because the resolve concerns the future ... "Cream
of curd": when resolving, his object is the future appearance of curd*.
Vatanlyasendsana was apparently a monastery in the Vindhya Hills
(Vinjatavi): see Mv.l9:6; DhsA. 419. The Elders Assagutta and Rohana in-
structed Kajangala who was sent to convert Menander (Lamotte, Histoire de la
Bouddhisme Indien, p. 440).
23. Cf. also Vbh. 62 and 91.
24. Pm. adds: 'Some however explain the meaning in this way: It is as long as,
when one has stepped on the dry bank with a wet foot, the water line on the foot
does not disappear'.
25. The residents of the Abhayagiri Monastery in Anuradhapura (Pm.).
CHAPTER XIV
1. Cf. Ps.i, 42, etc.; Abhidhamma definitions very commonly make use of the
Pali forms of verbal nouns, here instanced by pannd (understanding = state of
understanding) and pajdnana (understanding = act of understanding), both from
the verb pajdndti (he understands). English does not always, as in this case,
distinguish between the two. Similarly, for example, from the verb socati (he
sorrows) we find soka (sorrow, state of sorrowing) and socana (sorrowing, act of
sorrowing), and here the English differentiates. Cf. parallel treatment of pannd at
MA.ii,343f.
2. 'In arisings of consciousness with two root-causes [i.e. with non-greed and
non-hate but without non-delusion], or without root-cause, understanding does
not occur' (Pm. 432). 'Just as pleasure is not invariably inseparable from happi-
ness, so perception and consciousness are not invariably inseparable from under-
standing. But just as happiness is invariably inseparable from pleasure, so under-
standing is invariably inseparable from perception and consciousness' (Pm. 432).
3. 'A phenomenon's own essence (sako bhdvo) or existing essence (samdno
VA bhdva) is its individual essence (sabhdva)' (Pm. 433). Cf. Ch. VIII, note 68,
where Pm. gives the definition from saha-bhdva (with essence).
4. Patisambhidd is usually rendered by 'analysis' (see e.g. Points of Contro-
versy—Kathdvatthu translation—pp. 377ff.). But the Tipitaka explanations of
the four patisambhidd suggest no emphasis on analysis rather than synthesis. Pm.
gives the following definition of the term: 'Knowledge that is classified (pabheda-
gata = put into a division) under meaning (aitha) as capable of effecting the
explanation and definition of specific characteristics of the meaning class (mean-
ing division) is called attha-patisambhidd; and so with the other three' (Pm.
436). 'Discrimination' has been chosen for patisambhidd because, while it has
the sense of 'division', it does not imply an opposite process as 'analysis' does.
Also it may be questioned whether the four are well described as 'entirely logi-
cal': 'entirely epistemological' might perhaps be both less rigid and nearer; for
they seem to cover four interlocking fields, namely: meanings of statements and
effects of causes (etc.), statements of meanings and causes of effects (etc.),
language as restricted to etymological rules of verbal expression, and clarity (or
perspicuous inspiration) in marshalling the other three.
5. 'I.e. the four paths with the first jhana and those with the second, third, and
fourth, out of the five' (Pm. 434).
6. The word abhinivisati with its noun abhinivesa means literally 'to dwell on',
and so to adhere, or 'insist'. In the Tipitaka it always appears in a bad sense and
always appears in contexts with wrong view and clinging (see e.g. M.iii, 30-31,
Nd. 1, 436, and also Ps. quoted above at Ch.I,§140). However, in the Commen-
taries the word appears also in a good sense as at Ch. XIV, §130, Ch. XXI, §73
and 83f., and at MA.i,250 (cf. saddham nivisati, M.ii,173). In this good sense it
is synonymous with right interpretation of experience. All the bare experience of
perception is interpreted by the mind either in the sense of permanence, pleasure,
self, which is wrong because it is not confirmed by experience, or in the sense of
impermanence, etc., which is right because it is confirmed by experience (see
Ch. XIV, §130). There is no not interpreting experience, and it is a function of
the mind that the interpretation adopted is 'dwelt upon', i.e. insisted upon. And
so it is this insistence or interpretation in accordance with reality as confirmed by
experience that is the abhinivesa of the Commentaries in the good sense. For
these reasons the words interpretation, misinterpretation and insistence have been
chosen here as renderings.
7. Ariyati—'to honour, to serve'. Not in P.T.S. Diet. Cf. ger. araniya
(MA.i,21,173), also not in P.T.S. Diet., explained by Majjhima Tika as 'to be
honoured' (payirupasitabbd).
8. This quotation has been filled out from the Vibhanga text for clarity.
9. Byabhicdra (vyabhicdra): not in P.T.S. Diet.; normal grammarian's term for
an 'exception'.
10. The idea behind the term 'individual-essence language' (sabhdvanirutti),
that is to say, that there is a real name for each thing that is part of that thing's
individual essence, is dealt with at DhsA. 391-92. Magadhan as 'the root speech
of all beings' and the 'individual-essence language' is dealt with in greater detail
at VbhA. 387.
'Phasso' and 'vedand' as respectively masc. and fern. nom. sing, have the
correct terminations. 'Phassd* and 'vedano* are wrong.
11. The expression gatapaccdgatikabhdva refers to the practice of 'carrying the
meditation subject to and from the alms round', which is described at MA.i,257
in detail. The same expression is also used of a certain kind of refuse-rag (see
Ch. II, §17).
12. 'The "Chapter of Similes" is the Chapter of Twin Verses in the Dham-
mapada (Dh.1-20), they say. Others say that it is the Book of Pairs in the First
Fifty (M. Suttas 31-40)' (Pm. 436).
13. 'Tangible data are omitted from this list because, not being derived matter,
they are included in the primaries' (Pm. 442). They are described as consisting
of three of the four primaries, excluding the water (cohesion) element. 'What is
the materiality of the great primaries? It is the tangible-data base and the water-
element' (Dhs. 663). For the whole list see Dhs. 596, in which (N.B.) the heart-
basis does not appear. See also note 32 and Ch. XV, n.15.
14. 'Here the first-mentioned characteristic of the eye is described according to
the kamma that produces a selfhood, and is common to all of it, and this without
touching on differentiation is the cause. The second is according to the special-
ized kamma generated thus, 'Let my eye be thus'. This is what they say. But it
can be taken that the first-mentioned characteristic is stated as sensitivity's inter-
est in lighting up its own objective fields, the five senses' state of sensitivity
being taken as a generality; and that the second is stated as the seeing that is due
to the particular division of its own cause, the sensitivities' cause as the state of
kamma being taken as a generality or as a unity. The same method applies to tjie
ear and so on.
/ 'Here it may be asked, "Is the arising of the faculties of the eye, etc., due to
kamma that is one or to kamma that is different?". Now the Ancients say, "In
both ways". Herein, firstly, in the case of the arising of an eye, etc., due to
kamma that is different there is nothing to be explained since the cause is divided
up. But when their arising is due to kamma that is one, how does there come to
be differentiation among them? It is due to dividedness in the cause too. For it is
craving, in the form of longing for this or that kind of becoming that, itself
having specific forms owing to hankering after the sense-bases included in some
kind of becoming or other, contrives, acting as decisive-support, the specific
divisions in the kamma that generates such a kind of becoming. As soon as the
kamma has acquired the differentiation induced by that [hankering] it generates
through effort consisting in appropriate ability a multiple fruit with differentiated
individual essences, as though it had itself taken on a multiple form. And the
ability here need not be understood as anything other than the able state; for it is
simply the effort of producing fruit that is differentiated by the differentiation
due to the differentiation in its cause. And the fact of this differentiating effort on
the part of kamma that is one being the cause of the multiple faculties will be
dealt with below as to logic and texts (note 21). Besides, it is told how one kind
of consciousness only is the cause of the generation of the sixteen kinds of
resultant consciousness and so on; and in the world it is also found that a single
paddy seed is the cause of the generation of the ripe, the unripe, the husked, and
the unhusked fruit. But what is the use of logical thinking? For the eye, etc., are
the fruit of kamma; and kamma-result is exclusively the province of a Buddha's
knowledge' (Pm. 444).
15. Avinjana—'picking up': see dvijjhati in P.T.S. Diet.
16. * "Some" are certain Mahasahghikas; for among these Vasudhamma says
this: "In the eye fire is in excess; in the ear, air; in the nose, earth; in the tongue,
water; in the body all are equal" ' (Pm. 444).
17. ' "As qualities of fire, and so on": [aided] by visible data as the illuminating
[quality] of heat, which is called lighting up; by sound [as a quality] of air, by
odour [as a quality] of earth, by flavour [as a quality] of the water called spittle—
so according to the first theory [that of "some"]; and it can be suitably adjusted
to accord with the second [that of "others"] because they need to be assisted by
such and such qualities of primaries: what is meant is that they have to be helped
in apprehending visible data and so on. This theory holds that the quality is the
ability of the eye, etc., to light up [respectively] visible data, etc., only when
associated with the reasons that are their accessories consisting of light, etc., and
aperture's state of decisive support for ear-consciousness. Aperture is taken in
due order, as are fire, etc., since it is absence of primaries. Or alternatively, when
others intend that aperture is a quality of primaries, as visible data, etc., are, then
the qualities of primaries are construable in their order thus: [aided] by visible
data and light [as a quality] of fire, by sound [as a quality] of aperture called
space, by odour [as a quality] of air, by flavour [as a quality] of water, by
tangible data [as a quality] of earth' (Pm. 445).
18. The four primaries are held to be inseparable and not to exist separate from
each other; cf. quotation from the 'Ancients' in §45. Pm. says: 'Excess is in
capability, not in quantity, otherwise their inseparability would be illogical' (Pm.
451).
19. ' "From finding visibility, etc., [respectively] in a state of excess": from
finding them associated with these differences, namely, the bright visible datum
in fire, sound audible through its individual essence in air, the odour beginning
with surabhi perfume in earth, and the sweet taste in water; thus "visible data,
etc., are the [respective] qualities of these". This is according to the first theory,
and he has stated the conclusion (uttara) that follows, beginning with "we might
assume" in terms of that. The second is confuted in the same way. Or alterna-
tively, "Then they may say", etc., can be taken as said emphasizing, in order to
confute it, the theory of Kanada, which asserts that the eye, etc., are respectively
made by fire, space, earth, water, and air, that have visible data, etc., as their
respective qualities' (Pm. 445).
20. In the P.T.S. text and Sinhalese Hewavitarne text the word ekakaldpe, 'that
form a single group*, occurs in this sentence but is not in the Harvard text.
21. 'If there is no differentiation according to primaries, what then is the reason
for the differentiation of the eye, and so on? Though the kamma that is produced
by the longing for a selfhood (individual personality) with five sense-bases is
one only, still it should be taken as called "not common to them all" and "differ-
ence of kamma" because it is the cause of the differentiation of the eye, and so
on. For it is not a condition for the ear through the same particular difference
through which it is a condition for the eye, since, if it were, it would then follow
that there was no distinction between the faculties. Because of the words, "At the
moment of rebirth-linking, exalted volition is a condition, as kamma condition,
for the kinds of materiality due to kamma performed" (Ptn.) it must be recog-
nized that a single volition is kamma condition for all the kinds of materiality
due to kamma performed that come into existence at the moment of rebirth-
linking. For if the volition were different, then, when there came to be the arising
of the faculties, it would follow that the materiality due to kamma performed was
generated by limited and exalted kamma. And rebirth-linking that is one is not
generated by a plurality of kinds of kamma. Thus it is established that the arising
of the plurality of the faculties is due to a single kamma' (Pm. 446).
22. See also §134 and notes 60, 61. The amplification in this paragraph is from
Pm., which continues: There is another method: the eye and the ear have non-
contiguous objective fields because arising of consciousness is caused while
their objective fields are separated by an interval and apart (adhika). Some say
that the ear has a contiguous objective field. If it did, then sound born of con-
sciousness would not be the object of ear-consciousness, for there is no arising
externally of what is consciousness-originated. And in the texts sound as object
is spoken of as being the object of ear-consciousness without making any dis-
tinction. Besides, there would be no defining the direction and position of the
sound because it would then have to be apprehended in the place occupied by the
possessor of the objective field, as happens in the case of an odour. Conse-
quently it remains in the same place where it arose, if it comes into focus in the
f ear avenue (so the Burmese ed.). Are not the sounds of washermen [beating their
washing on stones] heard later by those who stand at a distance? No; because
there is a difference in the way of apprehending a sound according to the ways in
which it becomes evident to one nearby and to one at a distance. For just as,
because of difference in the way of apprehending the sound of words according
to the ways in which it becomes evident to one at a distance and to one nearby,
there comes to be [respectively] not apprehending, and apprehending, of the
differences in the syllables, so also, when the sound of washermen (a) becomes
[an occurrence] that is evident throughout from beginning to end to one who is
neraby, and (b) becomes an occurrence that is evident in compressed form in the
end or in the middle to one who is at a distance, it is because there is a difference
in the apprehending and definition, which occur later in the cognitive series of
ear-consciousness, that there comes to be the assumption (abhimdna) "Heard
faintly is heard later". But that sound comes into the ear's focus at the moment of
its own existence and in dependence on the place where it arises (see Ch. XIII,
§112; DhsA. 313). If there is absolutely no successive becoming of sound, how
does an echo arise? The sound, though it remains at a distance, is a condition for
the arising of an echo and for the vibration of vessels, etc., elsewhere as a
magnet (ayo-kanta) is for the movement of iron' (Pm. 446-47).
23. Upddinna (also upddinnaka) is pp. of upddiyati (he clings), from which the
noun updddna (clinging ) also comes. Upddinna-(ka-) rupa (clung-to matter) =
kammaja-rupa (kamma-born matter); see Dhs. §653. It is vaguely renderable by
'organic or sentient or living matter'; technically, it is matter of the four prima-
ries that is 'clung to' (upddinna) or 'derived' (updddya) by kamma. Generally
taken as a purely Abhidhamma term (Dhs., p.l), it nevertheless occurs in the
Suttas at M.i,185 in the same sense.
24. P.T.S. text reads ahhamannam sahkaro natthi. Harvard text omits sahkaro
natthi. The word sahkara in the sense of 'confounding' or error is not in P.T.S.
Diet.; see Vis. concluding verses. P.T.S. ed., p. 711.
'Though these things, that is to say, the "mark ... of the female", etc., arise
each due to its own condition consisting in kamma, etc., they mostly only do so
as modes in a continuity accompanied by the femininity faculty. And so "if is
manifested as the reason for the mark", etc., is said making the femininity
faculty their cause.
'As regards the "mark of the female", etc., too, its "facultiness" is stated as
predominance, in other words, as a state of cause, because the conditions for the
modal matter (dkdra-rupa) consisting of the mark of the female, etc., in a conti-
nuity accompanied by faculties do not arise otherwise, and because these kinds
of materiality are a condition for apprehending the female. But because the
femininity faculty does not generate even the material instances in its own group
or maintain or consolidate them, and because it does not so act for the material
instances of other groups, it is therefore not called in the text faculty, presence,
and non-disappearance conditions, as the life faculty is for the material instances
of its group, and as nutriment is for the material instances in succeeding groups.
And it is because the mark, etc., are dependent on other conditions that wherever
they have predominance its shape is encountered, even in dead and sculptured
matter that resembles it. And so too with the masculinity faculty.
'And since these two do not occur together in a single continuity, because
of the words "Does the masculinity faculty arise in one in whom the femininity
faculty arises?—No" (Yamaka), etc., therefore even in a hermaphrodite there is
only one of them at a given moment (see also DhsA. 323)' (Pm. 448).
25. 'Since the life faculty is itself entirely kamma-born it is established, by tak-
ing them as conascent, that the things to be protected by it are kamma-born too;
this is why there is no inclusion of the term "kamma-born". It maintains as if it
were its own that kamma-born matter by being the cause of its occurrence even
though only lasting for a moment; that is why it has the characteristic of main-
taining conascent kinds of matter. For kamma alone is not competent to be the
cause of kamma-born things' presence, as nutriment, etc., are of the nutriment-
born. Why? Because it is no longer existent at that moment.
* "Because it does accomplish each of those functions": it does so because it
is a condition for distinguishing what is living. For it is the life faculty that dis-
tinguishes matter that is bound up with faculties from dead matter, and kamma-
born matter and what is bound up with that from matter that is temperature
originated, and so on.
'And the life faculty must be regarded as the reason not only for presence
during a moment but also for non-interruption of connexion; otherwise death as
the termination of a life span would be illogical' (Pm. 448).
26. * "The heart-basis ... the support for the mind-element and for the mind-
consciousness-element": how is that to be known? (i) From scriptures and (ii)
from logical reasoning.
'The scripture is this: "The materiality dependent on which the mind-ele-
ment and mind-consciousness-element occur is a condition, as a support condi-
tion, for the mind-element and the mind-consciousness-element and what is as-
sociated therewith" (Ptn.1,4). If that is so, why is it not mentioned in the Rupakanda
of the Dhammasangani (Dhs. §583ff.)? Its not being mentioned there is for
another reason. What is that? Non-inconsistency of the teaching. For while eye-
consciousness, etc., have the eye, etc., as their respective supports absolutely,
mind-consciousness does not in the same way have the heart-basis as its support
absolutely. And the teaching in the physical-basis dyad (vatthu-duka) is given by
way of the material support thus, "There is matter that is the physical basis of
eye-consciousness, there is matter that is not the physical basis of eye-conscious-
ness" (Dhs. §585) and so on; and if the dyads were stated by way of what had the
heart-basis absolutely as its support thus, "There is matter that is the physical
basis of mind-consciousness" and so on, then the object dyads (drammana-duka)
do not fall into line: for one cannot say: "There is matter that is the object of
mind-consciousness, there is matter that is not the object of mind-conscious-
ness". So the physical-basis dyads and object dyads being thus made inconsis-
tent, the teaching would lack unity, and the Master's wish was to give the teach-
ing here in a form that has unity. That is why the heart-basis is not mentioned,
not because it is unapprehendable.
'(ii) But the logical reasoning should be understood in this way. In the five-
constituent becoming, [that is, in the sense sphere and fine-material sphere,]
these two elements have as their support produced (nipphanna) derived matter.
Herein, since the visible-data base, etc., and nutritive essence, are found to occur
apart from what is bound up with faculties, to make them the support would be
illogical. And since these two elements are found in a continuity that is devoid of
the femininity and masculinity faculties [i.e. in the Brahma-world], to make them
the support would be illogical too. And in the case of the life faculty that would
have to have another function, so to make it the support would be illogical too.
So it is the heart-basis that remains to be recognized as their support. For it is
possible to say that these two elements have as their support produced derived
matter, since existence is bound up with matter in the five-constituent becoming.
Whatever has its existence bound up with matter is found to have as its support
produced derived matter, as the eye-consciousness-element does. And the dis-
tinction "in the five-constituent becoming" is made on account of the mind-
consciousness-element; in the four-constituent becoming, [that is, the immaterial
sphere,] there is no mind-element. Does there not follow contradiction of the
middle term (hetu) because of establishing faculties as their support? No; be-
cause that is disproved by what is seen. For these two elements are not, as in the
case of eye-consciousness, controlled by the slackness and keenness, etc., of
their physical basis; and accordingly it is not said in the texts that they have the
faculties as their condition. Hence their having faculties as their support, in other
words, their being controlled by them, is disproved.
'Granted that these two elements have as their support the derived matter
consisting of the heart-basis, how is it to be known that it is kamma-originated,
has an invariable function, and is to be found located in the heart? It may be said
to be kamma-originated because, like the eye, it is the materiality of a physical
basis; and because of that it has an invariable function; because it is the material-
ity of a physical basis and because it is a support for consciousness, is the
meaning. It is known that its location is there because of the heart's exhaustion
(khijjana) in one who thinks of anything, bringing it to mind intently and direct-
ing his whole mind to it' (Pm. 449-50).
The word hadaya (heart), used in a purely mental and not physical sense,
occurs in the definitions of the mind-element and mind-consciousness-element in
the Vibhahga (Vbh. 88-89). The brain (matthaluhga), which seems to have been
first added as the 32nd part of the body in the Patisambhida (Ps.i,7), was ig-
nored, and the Visuddhimagga is hard put to it to find a use for it. The Pitakas
(e.g. Ptn.1,4 quoted above) connect the mind with the matter of the body without
specifying.
27. 'It is the mode and the alteration of what? Of consciousness-originated
primary elements that have the air-element in excess of capability. What is that
capability? It is the state of being consciousness-born and the state of being
derived matter. Or alternatively, it can be taken as the mode alteration of the air
element. If that is so, then intimation is illogical as derived matter, for there is no
derived matter with a single primary as its support, since "matter derived from
the four great primaries" (M.i,53) is said. That is not wrong. Alteration of one of
the four is that of all four, as with wealth shared among four. And excess of air
element in a material group (kaldpa) does not contradict the words "of the air
element"; and excess is in capability, not in quantity, otherwise their inseparabil-
ity would be illogical. According to some it is that of the air element only. In
their opinion the state of derived matter is inapplicable (durupapdda) to intima-
tion, since the alteration of one is not that of all. But this [air element] is
apprehended by mind-door impulsion that is next to the non-intimating [appre-
hension] that is next to the apprehension of the appearance of motion in the
movement of the hands, and so on. There is a certain kind of alteration that is
separate from the appearance of motion. And the apprehension of the former is
next to the apprehension of the latter. How is that to be known? By the apprehen-
sion of intention. For no apprehension of intention such as "He is getting this
done, it seems" is met with in the case of trees* movements, etc., which are
devoid of intention. But it is met with in the case of hand movements and so on.
Therefore there is a certain kind of alteration that is separate from the appearance
of motion, and it is known as the "intimator of the intention". Also it is known
by inference that the apprehension of the alteration is next to the apprehension of
the appearance thus: The intimator intimates the meaning to be intimated only
when it is apprehended as a cause, not merely as present. For they say accord-
ingly:
Sounds that have entered no objective field
Do not awaken any kind of meaning;
And also beings merely recognized
As such communicate no meanings either.
* If just the apprehension of the alteration is the reason for the apprehension
of the intention, why is there no apprehension of intention in unapprehended
communication (sanketa)! It is not only just the apprehension of the alteration
that is the reason for the apprehension of the intention; but rather it should be
taken that the apprehension of the previously-established connexion is the deci-
sive support for this. The stiffening, upholding, and movement are due to the air-
element associated with the alteration belonging to the intimation, is what is
said. What, is it all the air-element that does all those things? It is not like that.
For it is the air element given rise to by the seventh impulsion that, by acquiring
as its reinforcing conditions the air elements given rise to by the preceding im-
pulsions, moves consciousness-originated matter by acting as cause for its suc-
cessive arisings in adjacent locations (desantaruppatti—cf. Ch. VIII, n. 54), not
the others. The others, however, help it by doing the stiffening and upholding,
the successive arising in adjacent locations being itself the movement. So the in-
strumentality should be taken as attributed when there is the sign [of movement];
otherwise there would not be uninterestedness and momentariness of dhammas.
And here the cart to be drawn by seven yokes is given as simile in the Commen-
tary. But when consciousness-born matter moves, the kinds of matter born of
temperature, kamma, and nutriment move too because they are bound up with it,
like a piece of dry cow-dung thrown into a river's current.
* Since it has been said that the apprehension of intimation is next to the
apprehension of the appearance of motion, how then, is the air element itself as
the maker of the movement accompanied by the alteration consisting in the
intimation? It is not like that. It is the air elements given rise to by the first
impulsion, etc., and which are unable to cause movement in that way and per-
form only the stiffening and upholding, that should be taken as only accompa-
nied by the alteration belonging to intimation. For it is the alteration coexistent
with the intention that is the intimation, because of giving rise to alteration in
whatever direction it wishes to cause the occurrence of moving forward and so
on. Taking it in this way, it is perfectly logical to say that the origination of
intimation belongs to mind-door adverting. Since the intention possessed of the
aforesaid alteration is intimated through the apprehension of that alteration, it is
said that "Its function is to display intention1
'. The air element being the cause of
the motion of the body intimation, is figuratively said, as a state of alteration, to
be ''manifested as the cause of bodily motion". "Its proximate cause is the con-
sciousness-originated air-element" is said since the air element's excessive func-
tion is the cause of intimating intention by movement of the body' (Pm. 450-52).
Cf. DhsA. 83f.
28. Vaclbheda—'speech utterance' is not in P.T.S. Diet., which does not give
this use of bheda. Pm. (p. 452) explains: 'The function (—"knocking together")
of the vocal apparatus (—"clung-to matter")'.
29. 'The question, "It is the mode and the alteration of what?", should be
handled in the same way as for bodily intimation, with this difference: for "next
to the apprehension of the appearance of movement" substitute "next to the
hearing of an audible sound". And here, because of the absence of stiffening,
etc., the argument beginning "For it is the air element given rise to by the
seventh impulsion" does not apply; for the sound arises together with the knock-
ing together, and the knocking together only applies in the case of the first im-
pulsion, and so on. The knocking together is the arising of groups of primaries
(bhuta-kaldpa) in proximity to each other due to conditions. The movement is
the progression of the successive arising in adjacent locations. This is the differ-
ence. The earth element's knocking together is parallel to the air element's
moving as regards function' (Pm. 452).
30. In actual fact the heart-basis is not in the Pitakas as such.
31. ' "Some" are the inmates of the Abhayagiri Monastery at Anuradhapura'
(Pm. 455). A long discussion on this follows in Pm., not given here.
32. ' "Sensed (jnuta)" means apprehendable by sensing (MWTVA), by reaching;
hence he said "because they are the objective fields of faculties that take contigu-
ous [objective fields}" (cf. §46). But what is it that is called a tangible datum? It
is the three elements, earth, heat, and air. But why is the water element not
included here? Is not cold apprehended by touching; and that is the water ele-
ment? Certainly it is apprehended but it is not the water element. What is it then?
It is just the fire element. For there is the sensation (buddhi) of cold when heat is
sluggish. There is no quality that is called cold; there is only the assumption
(abhimdna) of coldness due to the sluggishness of the state of heat. How is that
to be known? Because of the unreliability of the sensation of cold, like "beyond
and not beyond". For in hot weather, while those who stand in the sun and go
into the shade have the sensation of cold, yet those who go to the same place
from an underground cave have the sensation of heat. And if coldness were the
water element it would be found in a single group (kaldpa) along with heat; but
it is not so found. That is why it may be known that coldness is not the water
element. And that is conclusive (uttara) for those who agree to the inseparable
existence of the primary elements; and it is conclusive too even for those who do
not agree because it is disproved by associate existence through seeing the func-
tions of the four primaries in a single group. It is conclusive too for those who
say that coldness is the characteristic of the air element; for if coldness were the
air element, coldness would be found in a single group along with heat, and it is
not so found. That is why it may be known that coldness is not the air element
either. But those who hold the opinion that fluidity (dravata) is the water ele-
ment and that that is apprehended by touching should be told: "That fluidity is
touched is merely the venerable ones' assumption as is the case with shape". For
this is said by the Ancients:
"Three elements coexisting with fluidity
Together form what constitutes a tangible;
That 'I succeed in touching this fluidity'
Is a common misconception in the world.
And as a man who touches elements,
And apprehends a shape then with his mind,
Fancies 'I really have been touching shape',
So too fluidity is recognized" ' (Pm. 459).
33. * "The sound base only": here some say, "The consciousness-born is always
intimative (savinnattika)". The Ancients say, "There is sound due to the interven-
tion iyipphdra) of applied thought that does not intimate". While depending on
the word of the Great Commentary that puts it thus, "Intimatable (cognizable)
through the ear by means of the sound due to applied thought's intervention",
still there is also need of the arising of consciousness-originated sound without
intimation (cognition) for because of the words "For the intimation (cognition) is
not due to intimating speech" (?), it arises together with sound not intimatable
(cognizable) through the ear. That being so, there would have to be a conscious-
ness-born sound-ennead. And that theory is rejected by Sahghakaras who imag-
ine that it is self-contradictory to say that there is sound not intimatable (cogni-
zable) through the ear. Others, however, do not reject the Great Commentary's
statement and they comment on its intention. How? [They say that] the non-
intimation (non-cognition) through the ear of the sound activated due to applied
thought's intervention is stated in the Suttas with this intention, "He tells by
hearing with the divine ear the subtle sound that is conascent with the intimation,
originated by applied thought, and consisting in movement of the tongue and
palate, and so on" (cf, A.i,171), and that in the Patthana (Ptn.1,7) the state of
object condition for ear-consciousness is stated with reference to gross sound'
(Pm. 460.)
34. • "Has the characteristic of being felt" means that it has as its characteristic
what is felt, what is experienced as the "taste (stimulus)" of the object. ^Charac-
teristic of perceiving" means that it has as its characteristic the perceiving of an
object clashed as blue, etc., and the knowing, the apprehending, of it by arousing
the perception of it as blue, yellow, long, short, and so on. Forming (abhi-
sahkharana) is accumulating, or it is contriving by becoming interested. And it
is because volition is basic in both of these ways that the formations aggregate is
said thus to have the characteristic of forming. For in expounding the formations
aggregate in the Suttanta-Bhajaniya of the Vibhanga, volition was expounded by
the Blessed One thus, "Eye-contact-born volition" (Vbh. 8) and so on. "Has the
characteristic of cognizing" means that it has as its characteristic that kind of
knowing called apprehension of an object in a mode in which the objective field
is apprehended differently from the mode of perceiving' (Pm. 462).
Visuddhimagga - Notes IV
THE PATH
OF PURIFICATION
(VISUDDHIMAGGA)
BY
BHADANTACARIYA BUDDHAGHOSA
Translated from the Pali
by
BHIKKHU NANAMOLI
FIFTH EDITION
BUDDHIST PUBLICATION SOCIETY
Kandy Sri Lanka
CHAPTER IX
1. * "Fighting against the wall": having undertaken the precepts of virtue and
sat down on a seat in his room with the door locked, he was developing lov-
ingkindness. Blinded by lust arisen under cover of the lovingkindness, he wanted
to go to his wife, and without noticing the door he beat on the wall in his desire
to get out even by breaking the wall down1
(Pm. 286).
2. Reading dana-piyavacanadini with Sinhalese ed. (see four sangahavatthuni—
A. ii,32).
3. The Anguttara text has 'Let him ... reappear in a state of loss' and so on.
4. 'The eight great hells beginning with that of Sanjlva (see Ja.v, 266, 270). At
each of the four doors of the Great Unmitigated (Avici) Hell there are the four
beginning with the Ember (Kukula) Hell (M.iii,185), which make up the sixteen
prominent hells' (Pm. 291).
5. Sanku-patha—'set on piles': Pm. (p. 294) says: 'Sahku laggdpetvd te
dlambhitva gamanamaggo sahkupatho\ This disagrees with P.T.S. Diet, for this
ref.
6. Sana—'the bright principle': Skr. sattva\ one of the three principles in the
Sanikhya system, the other two being rajas (Pali: rajo) or turbulence and tamas
(Pali: tamo) or darkness. Not in P.T.S. Diet.
7. 'Here when the aggregates are not fully understood, there is naming
(abhidhdna) of them and of the consciousness of them as self (atta), that is to
say, the physical body or alternatively the five aggregates. "Derived from": ap-
prehending, gripping, making a support. "Since it is actually a mere concept":
because of presence (sabbhavato) as a mere concept in what is called a being,
though in the highest sense the "being" is non-existent' (Pm. 298). See also Ch.
VIII, n. 11
8. Harvard text reads
k
byapadarahita\ which would be renderable as 'free
from ill will'. Pm. (p. 299) supports a reading byabadha, which seems better.
9. For dutthulla see Ch. IV, note 36. Here the meaning is more likely to be
'bad' or 'lewd' than 'inert'.
10. Mudita—'gladness' as one of the divine abidings is always in the sense of
gladness at others' success. Sometimes rendered 'altruistic joy' and 'sympathetic
gladness'.
11. Kinati—'it combats': Skr. krndti—to injure or kill. P.T.S. Diet, gives this
ref. under ordinary meaning 'to buy', which is wrong.
12. So Pm. 309.
13. All texts read kassa (whose), which is confirmed in the quotation translated
in note 20. It is tempting, in view of the context, to read kammassa (kamma's),
but there is no authority for it. The statement would then be an assertion instead
of a question.
14. 'Greed is the near enemy of lovingkindness since it is able to corrupt owing
to its similarity, like an enemy masquerading as a friend' (Pm. 309).
15. Patihannati—'to be resentful': not in P.T.S. Diet.; the verb has been needed
to correspond to 'resentment' (patigha), as the verb 'to be inflamed with greed'
(rajjati) corresponds with 'greed' (raga).
16. Sambhavetva—'judging': not in this sense in P.T.S. Diet. Pm. (p. 313)
explains by parikappetva (conjecturing).
17. For which kinds of body contemplation give which kinds of concentration
see Ch. VIII, §43 and MA.i,247.
18. ' "Mere unification of the mind": the kind of concentrating (samddhdna)
that is undeveloped and just obtained by one in pursuit of development. That is
called "basic concentration", however, since it is the basic reason for the kinds
of more distinguished concentration to be mentioned later in this connexion. This
"mere unification of the mind" is intended as momentary concentration as in the
passage beginning "I internally settled, steadied, unified and concentrated my
mind" (M.i,116). For the first unification of the mind is recognized as momen-
tary concentration here as it is in the first of the two successive descriptions:
"Tireless energy was aroused in me ... my mind was concentrated and unified"
followed by "Quite secluded from sense desires ..." (M.i,21)* (Pm. 314).
19. ' "Thus developed": just as a fire started with wood and banked up with
cowdung, dust, etc., although it arrives at the state of a "cowdung fire", etc. (cf.
M.i,259), is nevertheless called after the original fire that was started with the
wood, so too it is the basic concentration that is spoken of here, taking it as
banked up with lovingkindness, and so on. "In other objects" means in such
objects as the earth kasina' (Pm. 315).
20. 'The beautiful' (subha) is the third of the eight liberations {yimokkha—see
M.ii,12; MA.iii,255).
21. Reading in both cases 'avijjamdna-gahana-dakkam cittam', not '-dukkham*.
' "Because it has no more concern (abhoga)": because it has no further act of
being concerned (abhujana) by hoping (asimsana) for their pleasure, etc., thus
"May they be happy". The development of lovingkindness, etc., occurring as it
does in the form of hope for beings' pleasure, etc., makes them its object by
directing [the mind] to apprehension of [what is existent in] the ultimate sense
[i.e. pleasure, etc.]. But development of equanimity, instead of occurring like
that, makes beings its object by simply looking on. — But does not the divine
abiding of equanimity itself too make beings its object by directing the mind to
apprehension of [what is existent in] the ultimate sense, because of the words
"Beings are owners of their deeds. Whose [if not theirs] is the choice by which
they will become happy ..."? (§96) — Certainly that is so. But that is in the
prior stage of development of equanimity. When it has reached its culmination, it
makes beings its object by simply looking on. So its occurrence is specially
occupied with what is non-existent in the ultimate sense [i.e. beings, which are a
concept]. And so skill in apprehending the non-existent should be understood as
avoidance of bewilderment due to misrepresentation in apprehension of beings,
which avoidance of bewilderment has reached absorption' (Pm.).
22. For the 'ten powers' and 'four kinds of fearlessness' see M. Sutta 12. For
the 'six kinds of knowledge not shared by disciples' see Ps.i,121f. For the 'eight-
een states of the Enlightened One' see Cp. Commentary.
CHAPTER X
1. 'A dog, it seems, was attacked in the forest by a boar and fled. When it was
dusk he saw in the distance a cauldron for boiling rice, and perceiving it as a
boar, he fled in fear and terror. Again, a man who was afraid of pisdca goblins
saw a decapitated palm stump at night in a place that was unfamiliar to him, and
perceiving it as a pisdca goblin, he fell down in his fear, horror and confusion'
(Pm. 320).
2. P.T.S. Diet., this ref. reads ydnaputosd for ydnapatoli, taking it as one
compound (see under ydna and mutoli), but this does not fit the context happily.
Pm. (p. 321) has: * "Ydnappatolikumbhimuknddinan" ti ogunthana-sivikadi-ydnam
mukharh = ydna-mukharh\ patoliyd kuddakadvdrassa mukharh = patoli-mukham;
kumbhi-mukhan ti paccekarh mukha-saddo sambandhitabbo\ Tliis necessitates
taking ydna separately.
3. These two quotations refer respectively to the first of the eight liberations
and the first of the eight bases of mastery. (See MA.iii,255ff.)
4. This explanation depends on a play on the word sahhd as the (subjective)
perception and as the (objective) sign, signal or label perceived.
5. See Ch. XIV, §129, description of perception aggregate, which is classified
in the same way as the consciousness aggregate. Those referred to here are the
fifteen fine-material kinds, corresponding to nos. (9M13), (57M61) and (81M85)
in Table II.
6. See Ch. XIV, §96f. nos. (34M38) and (50M54) in Table II.
7. *A [formed] dhamma with an individual essence is delimited by rise and fall
because it is produced after having not been, and because after having been it
vanishes. But space is called boundless since it has neither rise nor fall because it
is a dhamma without individual essence' (Pm. 323).
8. 'He should not give attention to it only as "Boundless, boundless"; instead
of developing it thus, he should give attention to it as "Boundless consciousness,
boundless consciousness" or as "Consciousness, consciousness" * (Pm. 324).
9. There is a play on the words natthi kind ('there is nothing') and akiheana
('non-owning'). At M.i,298 there occurs the expression 'Rdgo kho dvuso kiheano
(greed, friend, is an owning)', which is used in connexion with this attainment.
The commentary (MA.ii,354) says 'Rdgo uppajjitvd puggalam kincati, maddati,
palibujjhati, tasmd kiheano ti vutto (greed having arisen owns, presses, impedes,
a person, that is why it is called an owning)'. (Cf. MA.i,27; also Ch. XXI, §53
and note 19.) Pm. (p. 327) here says 'Kihcanan ti kihci pi
9
. The word kincati is
not in P.T.S. Diet.
10. Mahacca (see D.i,49 and DA.i,148); the form is not given in P.T.S. Diet.;
probably a form of mahatiya.
11. Sukhodaka—'tepid water': see Monier Williams Skr. Diet.; this meaning of
sukha not given in P.T.S. Diet.
CHAPTER XI
1. 'The word "perception" (sanna) is used for the dhamma with the character-
istic of perceiving (sanjanana), as in the case of "perception of visible objects",
"perception of sound", etc.; and it is used for insight, as in the case of "percep-
tion of impermanence", "perception of suffering", etc.; and it is used for serenity,
as in the passage, "Perception of the bloated and perception of visible objects,
have these one meaning or different meanings, Sopaka?" (?), and so on. Here,
however, it should be understood as the preliminary work for serenity; for it is
the apprehending of the repulsive aspect in nutriment, or the access jhana pro-
duced by means of that, that is intended here by "perception of repulsiveness in
nutriment" ' (Pm. 334-35).
2. A more detailed exposition of nutriment is given at MA.i, 107ff.' "/f nour-
ishes" (dfiaratiY: the meaning is that is leads up, fetches, produces, its own fruit
through its state as a condition for the fruit's arising or presence, which state is
called "nutriment condition". It is made into a mouthful (kabalarh kariyati), thus
it is physical (kabalinkdra). In this way it gets its designation from the concrete
object; but as to characteristic, it should be understood to have the characteristic
of nutritive essence (oja). It is physical and it is nutriment in the sense stated,
thus it is physical nutriment. So with the rest. It touches (phusati), thus it is
contact (phassa); for although this is an immaterial state, it occurs also as the
aspect of touching on an object (drammana—lit. 'what is to be leaned on'),
which is why it is said to have the characteristic of touching. It wills (cetayati),
thus it is volition (cetana); the meaning is that it arranges (collects) itself to-
gether with associated states upon the object. Mental volition is volition occu-
pied with the mind. It cognizes (vijdnati) by conjecturing about rebirth (see Ch.
XVII, §303), thus it is consciousness (vinndna = cognition)* (Pm. 335).
3. For the 'octad with nutritive essence as eighth' (ojatthamaka), see Ch.
XVIII, §5ff. and XX, §27ff.
4. Pm. (p. 355) explains attachment here as craving which is 'perilous because
it brings harm' (see e.g. D.ii,58-59), or in other words, 'greed for the five aggre-
gates (lust after five-aggregate experience)'. It cites the following: 'Bhikkhus,
when there is physical nutriment, there is greed (lust), there is delighting, there is
craving; consciousness being planted therein grows. Wherever consciousness
being planted grows, there is the combination of mind-and-matter. Wherever
there is the combination of mind-and-matter, there is ramification of formations.
Wherever there is ramification of formations, there is production of further be-
coming in the future. Wherever there is production of further becoming in the
future, there is future birth, ageing and death. Wherever there is future birth,
ageing and death, bhikkhus, the end is sorrow, I say, with woe and despair'
(S.ii,101; cf. S.ii,66). Approaching is explained as 'meeting, coinciding, with
unabandoned perversions [of perception] due to an object [being perceived as
permanent, etc., when it is not]'. That is 'perilous since it is not free from the
three kinds of suffering'. The quotation given is: 'Bhikkhus, due to contact of the
kind to be felt as pleasant, pleasant feeling arises. With that feeling as condition
there is craving, ... thus there is the arising of this whole mass of suffering' (cf.
S.iv,215). Reappearance is 'rebirth in some kind of becoming or other. Being
flung into a new becoming is perilous because there is no immunity from the
risks rooted in reappearance*. The following is quoted: 'Not knowing, bhikkhus,
a man forms the formation of merit, and his [rebirth] consciousness accords with
the merit [he performed]; he forms the formation of demerit; ... he forms the
formation of the imperturbable ...' (S.ii,82). Rebirth-linking is the actual linking
with the next becoming, which 'is perilous since it is not immune from the
suffering due to the signs of [the impending] rebirth-linking'. The quotation
given is: 'Bhikkhus, when there is consciousness as nutriment there is greed
(lust), there is delighting ...' (S.ii,102—complete as above).
5. ' "Twenty or thirty times": here some say that the definition of the number
of times is according to what is present-by-continuity (see Ch. XIV, §188). But
others say that it is by way of "warming up the seat" (see MA.i,255); for devel-
opment that has not reached suppression of hindrances does not remove the bod-
ily discomfort in the act of sitting, because of the lack of pervading happiness.
So there is inconstancy of posture too. Then "twenty or thirty" is taken as the
number already observed by the time of setting out on the alms round. Or
alternatively, from "going" up to "smearing" is one turn; then it is after giving
attention to the meditation subject by twenty or thirty turns in this way' (Pm.
339).
6. Paccattharana—'carpet': the word normally means a coverlet, but here, ac-
cording to Pm. (p. 339), it is 'a spread (attharana) consisting of a rug (cilimika)
to be spread on the ground for protecting the skin'.
7. For pamukha—'doorstep', perhaps an open upper floor gallery here, see Ch.
XIII, §6.
8. 7aTw£A—'bat' = khuddaka-vagguli (Pm. 339): not in P.T.S. Diet.; see Ch.
XIII, §97.
9. Pdrdvata—'pigeon': only spelling pdrdpata given in P.T.S. Diet.
10. For this meaning of parivena see Ch. IV, note 37.
11. Vitakka-malaka—'debating lodge': Pm. (p. 339) says:' "Kattha nu kho ajja
bhikkhdya caritabban" ti ddind vitakkamdlake' ('in a lodge for thinking in the
way beginning "Where must I go for alms today?" ').
12. Pindika-mamsa—'flesh of the calves' =janghapindikamarhsapadesa (Pm. 340).
Cf. Ch. VIII, §97; also AA. 417. Not in this sense in* P.T.S. Diet.
13. Kummasa—'jelly': usually rendered 'junket', but the Vinaya commentaries
give it as made of corn (yava).
14. Nagabala—z kind of plant; not in P.T.S. Diet.
15. Pavana—'draught': not in this sense in P.T.S. Diet.; see Ch. XVI, §37.
16. Dhatu—'ore': not in this sense in P.T.S. Diet. See also Ch. XV, §20.
17. ' "A certain one" is said with reference to the anal orifice. But those who
are scrupulously clean by nature wash their hands again after washing the mouth,
and so on' (Pm. 342).
18. ' "That sign": that object as the sign for development, which sign is called
physical nutriment and has appeared in the repulsive aspect to one who gives his
attention to it repeatedly in the ways already described. And there, while devel-
opment occurs through the repulsive aspect, it is only the dhammas on account
of which there comes to be the concept of physical nutriment that are repulsive,
not the concept. But it is because the occurrence of development is contingent
only upon dhammas with an individual essence, and because the profundity is
due to that actual individual essence of dhammas that have individual essences,
that the jhana cannot reach absorption in it through apprehension of the repulsive
aspect. For it is owing to profundity that the first pair of truths is hard to see*
(Pm. 342-43).
19. * "By characterizing individual essences': by making certain (upadhdrana)
of the specific characteristics of hardness, and so on. For this meditation subject
does not consist in the observing of a mere concept, as in the case of the earth
kasina as a meditation subject, neither does it consist in the observing of the
colour blue, etc., as in the case of the blue kasina as a meditation subject, nor in
the observing of the general characteristics of impermanence, etc., in formations,
as in the case of insight as a meditation subject; but rather it consists in the
observing of the individual essences of earth, and so on. That is why "by charac-
terizing individual essences" is said, which means "by making certain of the
specific characteristics of hardness, and so on" ' (Pm. 344).
20. * Herein, as regards 'earth element \ etc., the meaning of element is the
meaning of individual essence, the meaning of individual essence is the meaning
of voidness, the meaning of voidness is the meaning of not-a-living-being. So it
is just earth in the sense of individual essence, voidness and not-a-living-being
that is the element; hence it is earth element. So too in the case of the water
element, and the rest. The earth element is the element that is the foothold for the
conascent material states. Likewise the water element is the element of their
cohesion; the fire element is the element of their ripening; and the air element is
the element of their conveyance and distension' (Pm. 345).
To avoid confusion, it might be mentioned here that in 'physical' earth, fire,
water, and air, it would be held that all four elements are present in each equally,
but that in 'physical' earth the earth element is dominant in efficacy as the mode
of hardness; and correspondingly with water and the rest. See e.g. Ch. XIV, §45.
21. Kharigata—'harsh': not in P.T.S. Diet., but see khara.
22. 'What occurs in attendance (adhikicca) upon self (attd) by its pertaining to
the state that may be taken as self because it is included in one's own continuity
as internal (ajjhattaY (Pm. 347).
23. Jara— 'fever': not in P.T.S. Diet.; see A.v,100; Nd. 1,17.
24. Vitthambhana—'distension': the word most usually employed to describe
the air element. It is often rendered by 'supporting', a word earmarked here for
nissaya. The twofold function of the air element is (a) to uphold (sandhdrana)
by distending (vitthambhana) and preventing collapse (§92), and (b) to move
(samudirana), or more strictly, cause the appearance of motion (calana, see n.
37). In Ch. XIV, §61 it is said to cause thambhana, rendered by 'stiffening'; but
there is the description of the earth element as thaddha (e.g. §39; pp. of tham-
bhati, from which the n. thambhana comes), rendered by 'stiffenedness'. It may
also be noted that the word sandhdrana (upholding) is used to describe both the
earth element (Ch. XIV, §47) and the'air element (Ch. XIV, §61).
25. Drava-bhava—'fluidity': not in P.T.S. Diet.
26. Silesa—'cement': not in this meaning in P.T.S. Diet.; MA.i,37 sam—.
27. Dhammani—'rat snake': not in this sense in P.T.S. Diet.; see AA. 459.
28. Sippika—'bag' (?): not in this sense in P.T.S. Diet.
29. * "Because of bearing their own characteristics": these are not like the Pri-
mordial Essence (pakati—Skr. prakrti) and the self (atta) imagined by the theo-
rists, which are non-existent as to individual essence. On the contrary these do
bear their own characteristics, which is why they are elements' (Pm. 359). Capi-
tals have been used here and elsewhere though Indian alphabets do not justify it.
Appdyati—'to satisfy' is not in P.T.S. Diet.; see VbhA. 9.
30. ' "From resolution of these eight": the eight dhammas beginning with col-
our, when resolved by means of understanding, are apprehendable (upalabbhanti)
in the ultimate sense through mutual negation (annam-anna-vyatirekena); but
head hairs are not apprehendable in the ultimate sense through negation of colour
and so on. Consequently, the term of common usage "head hairs" is applied to
these dhammas in their co-arisen state; but if they are each taken separately
"There is no common-usage head hairs". The meaning is that it is a mere con-
ventional term. "Only a mere group of eight states" is said, taking the colour,
etc., which are real (bhuta—lit. 'become'), as a unity by means of the concept
(pannatti) "a head hair", not only because they are merely the eight states' (Pm.
360).
31. Paramanu—'the smallest atom'; see VbhA. 343. According to VbhA. the
size of a paramanu works out at 1/581,147,136th part of an ahgula (fingerbreadth
or inch). Pm. remarks (p. 361): 'Therefore ... a paramanu as a particle of space
is not the province of the physical eye, it is the province of the divine eye'.
32. Sangahita—'held together': not quite in this sense in P.T.S. Diet. 'Held
(gahita) by conjoining through cohesion and prevented from being scattered'
(Pm. 361).
33. 'Kept guarded (anurakkita) so that it may not lapse into a wet and slippery
state through the water element, which has trickling as its essence' (Pm. 361).
34. Parissavati—'to run away': not in P.T.S. Diet.;—vissarati (Pm. 361).
35. 'This is said with reference to the water element as a juice that helps
growth' (Pm. 361).
36. Samabbhahata—'propelled': see Ch. IV, note 38.
37. Abhinihdra—'conveying': not in this sense in P.T.S. Diet.' "Conveying" is
acting as cause for the successive arising at adjacent locations (desantaruppatti)
of the conglomeration of elements (bhutasahghata)
1
(Pm. 363). Elsewhere
Pm. (p. 359) says of the air element: ' "It blows" (§87): it is stirred; the meaning
is that the conglomeration of elements is made to move (go) by its action as
cause for successive arising at adjacent locations (points)', and 'Propelling
(samahbhdhana) is the act of causing the successive arising at adjacent locations
of material groups (rupa-kaldpaY (P- 362).
38. 'A great primary (mahdbhuta) is a great wonder (jnahanto abbhuto) be-
cause it shows various unreal things (abhutd), various wonders (abbhuta), and
various marvels (acchariya). Or alternatively: there are great wonders (abbhuta)
here, thus there are magicians. And spirits, etc., are huge (mahant) creatures
(bhuta) owing to being born from them, thus they are great primaries. Or alterna-
tively: this term "great primary" can be regarded as a generic term for all of
them. But earth, etc., are great primaries because they deceive, and because, like
the huge creatures, their standing place cannot be pointed to. The deception lies
in causing the apparent individual essences of blue-black, etc., and it lies in
causing the appearance of what has the aspect of woman and man, and so on.
Likewise their undemonstrability, since they are not found inside or outside each
other though they rely upon each other for support. For if these elements were
found inside each other, they would not each perform their particular functions,
owing to mutual frustration. And if they were found outside each other, they
would be already resolved (separate), and that being so, any description of them
as unresolved (inseparable) would be meaningless. So although their standing
place is undemonstrable, still each one assists the other by its particular func-
tion—the functions of establishing, etc., whereby each becomes a condition for
the others as conascence condition and so on' (Pm. 363).
39. This alludes to the length of duration of a moment of matter's existence,
which is described as seventeen times as long as that of consciousness (see
VbhA. 25f.).
40. 'The term "producing condition" refers to causing origination, though as a
condition it is actually kamma condition. For this is said: "Profitable and unprof-
itable volition is a condition, as kamma condition, for resultant aggregates and
for materiality due to kamma performed" (Ptn.1,5)' (Pm. 368).
41. * "For the rest": for consciousness-originated, and so on. It is indirectly
decisive-support condition because in the Patthana the decisive-support condi-
tion has only been given for immaterial dhammas, so there is, directly, no deci-
sive-support condition [in kamma] for material dhammas. However, because of
the words "With a person as decisive support" (M.i,107 ) and "With a grove as
decisive support" (M.i,106) in the Suttas, the decisive-support condition can be
indirectly understood according to the Suttas in the sense of "absence without" '
(Pm. 368).
42. Ugghdta—'exhilarated' and nigghdta—'depressed': neither word is in P.T.S
Diet.; Pm. glosses with ubbildvitatta and dinabhdvappatti respectively.
43. Reading yogivarasihassa kilitarh. Cf. Netti 'Siha-kilana\
44. The sense demands reading with Pm. appandpubbabhdgacittesu as a single
compound.
45. This is an allusion to M.i,179, etc. 'The process of existence in the round of
rebirths, which is a very cramped place, is crowded by the defilements of craving
and so on' (Pm. 371).
46. Siidana—'cleaning': not in P.T.S. Diet. See title of Majjhima Nikaya Com-
mentary. Another reading here is sodhana.
CHAPTER XII
1. Anenja—'imperturbability': a term normally used for the four immaterial
states, together with the fourth jhana. See also §16f., and M. Sutta 106.
2. Giribhandavahanapujd: Pm. (p. 375) says: 'Giribhandavahanapujd ndma
Cetiyagirirh ddirh katvd sakaladipe samudde ca ydva yojand mahati dipapujd
(it is a name for a great island-offering starting with the Cetiyagiri (Mihintale)
and extending over the whole island and up to a league into the sea)'. Mentioned
in AA. commentary to A. EkanipAta, i, 1; MA.ii,398; and Mahavamsa 34, 81.
3. These are the four headings of the roads to power (see §50).
4. I.e. one wants it to be known that he can practise jhana.
5. 'It counter-strikes (patiharati), thus it is a counter-stroke (pdtihariya—meta-
morphosis = miracle). What strikes out (harati), removes, what is counter to it
(patipakkha) is therefore called counter-striking (patihdriya), since what is counter-
striking strikes out anything counter (patipakkha) to itself. Patihdriya (counter-
striking) is the same as pdtihariya (counter-stroke = metamorphosis = miracle)'
(Pm. 379)
6. Sitd: not in this sense in P.T.S. Diet. Pm. (p. 383) says, 'It is the path
traversed by a ploughshare in ploughing that is called a sitd\ Another reading is
karisa (an area of land).
7. Visavitd—'majesty': not in P.T.S. Diet.; cf. passavati. Pm. (p. 385) glosses
with iddhiyd vividhdnisamsa-pasavandya. Cf. DhsA.109; DhsAA. (p. 84) glosses
thus visavitdyd ti arahatdya.
8. Further explanatory details are given in the commentary to the Iddhipada-
Vibhahga.
9. Aneja (or anenja)—'unperturbed': form not in P.T.S. Diet.
10. Angirasa—'the One with Radiant Limbs': one of the epithets for the Bud-
dha. Not in P.T.S. Diet.; see A.iii,239.
11. Dedication of what is to be given accompanied by pouring water over the
hand.
12. ' "They become of the kinds desired": they become whatever the kinds that
were desired: for they come to possess as many varieties in appearance, etc., as it
was wished they should have. But although they become manifold in this way by
being made the object in different modes of appearance, nevertheless it is only a
single resolution consciousness that occurs. This is its power. For it is like the
single volition that produces a personality possessed of many different facets
(see Ch. XIV, n.14). And there it is the aspiration to become that is a condition
for the differentiation in the kamma; and kamma-result is imponderable. And
here too it is the preliminary-work consciousness that should be taken as a condi-
tion for the difference. And the field of supernormal power is imponderable too'
(Pm. 390).
13. Certain grammatical problems arise about the case of the words dvibhdvam,
etc., both in the sutta passage and (more so) in the Patisambhida passage; they
are examined by Pm. (p. 390) but are not renderable into English.
14. Kutdgdra—'palanquin': not in this sense in P.T.S. Diet. See story at MA.v,90,
where it is told how 500 of these were made by Sakka's architect Vissakamma
for the Buddha to journey through the air in. The same word is also commonly
used in the Commentaries for the portable structure (catafalque) in which a bier
is carried to the pyre. This, built often in the form of a house, is still used now in
Ceylon and called ransivi-ge. See AA., commentary to A. Tikanipata 42, and to
A. Ekanipata xx, 38; also DhA.iii,470. Not in this sense in P.T.S. Diet.
15. The only book in the Tipitaka to mention the Twin Miracle is the
Patisambhidamagga (Ps.i,53).
16. Anathapindika's younger brother (Pm. 391).
17. Okdseti—'to scatter': P.T.S. Diet., this ref., gives 'to show', which does not
fit the context. Pm. glosses with pakirati.
18. Pm. (p. 394): 'Vadhu-kumdri-kannd-vatthdhi tividhdhi ndtakitthlhV.
19. ' "The ramparts of Sineru'\ the girdle of Sineru. There are, it seems, four
ramparts that encircle Sineru, measuring 5,000 leagues in breadth and width.
They were built to protect the realm of the Thirty-three against nagas, garudas,
kumbhandas and yakkhas. They enclose half of Sineru, it seems' (Pm. 394).
20. 'Only this is correct because instances of clung-to (kammically acquired)
materiality do not arise owing to consciousness or to temperature. Or alterna-
tively, 'clung-to' is intended as all matter that is bound up with faculties (i.e.
'sentient'), too. And so to take it as enlargement of that is likewise not correct.
Consequently, enlargement should be understood only in the way stated. Though
the clung-to and the unclung-to occur, as it were, mixed up in a single continuity,
they are nevertheless not mixed up in meaning. Herein, just as when a pint
measure (dlhaka) of milk is poured into a number of pints of water, though the
milk becomes completely mixed up with the water, and is present appreciably in
all, it is nevertheless not the milk that has increased there, but only the water.
And so too, although the clung-to and unclung-to occur mixed up together, it is
nevertheless not the clung-to that is enlarged. It should be taken that it is the
consciousness-born matter that is enlarged by the influence of the supernormal
power, and the temperature-born is enlarged pari passu' (Pm. 395).
21. ' "There is only the going of consciousness": there is only a going that is the
same as that of the mind. But how does the body, whose going [being that of
matter] is slow, come to have the same going as the mind, which quickly passes?
Its going is not the same in all respects; for in the case of converting the mind to
conform with the body, the mind does not come to have the same going as the
body in all respects. For it is not that the mind then occurs with the moment of a
material state, which passes slowly, instead of passing with its own kind of
moment, which is what establishes its individual essence. But rather the mind is
called "converted to accord with the going of the body" as long as it goes on
occurring in a continuity that conforms with the body until the desired place is
arrived at. This is because its passing occurs parallel with that of the body,
whose going is slow, owing to the resolution, "Let the mind be like this body".
And likewise, it is while the body keeps occurring in suchwise that its arrival at
the desired place comes about in only a few quick passes of the mind instead of
passing slowly, as in those who have not developed the roads to power—and this
mode of occurrence is due to the possession of the perception of lightness, to say
nothing of the resolve, "Let this body be like this mind"—that the body is called
"converted to accord with the going of the mind," not because it arrives at the
desired place in a single consciousness moment. And when taken thus the simile,
"Just as a strong man might stretch out his bent arm, or bend his outstretched
arm" (Vin.i,5) can be taken literally. And this must be accepted in this way
without reserve, otherwise there is conflict with the Suttas, the Abhidhamma and
the Commentary, as well as contradiction of natural law (dhammata). "Bhikkhus,
I see no other one thing that is so quickly transformed as the mind" (A.i,10)—
here it is material states that are referred to by the word "other" because they do
not pass quickly. And in the Abhidhamma only matter is called prenascence con-
dition and only consciousness postnascence condition. And wherever states
(dhamma) arise, there they dissolve. There is no transmigration to an adjacent
location (desantara-sankamana), nor does the individual essence become other.
For it is not possible to effect any alteration of the characteristics of dhammas by
force of the roads to power. But it is possible to effect alteration of the mode in
which they are present (bhava)' (Pm. 397).
22. *This should be regarded as implying that there is no sex or life faculty in it
either' (Pm. 398).
OF PURIFICATION
(VISUDDHIMAGGA)
BY
BHADANTACARIYA BUDDHAGHOSA
Translated from the Pali
by
BHIKKHU NANAMOLI
FIFTH EDITION
BUDDHIST PUBLICATION SOCIETY
Kandy Sri Lanka
CHAPTER IX
1. * "Fighting against the wall": having undertaken the precepts of virtue and
sat down on a seat in his room with the door locked, he was developing lov-
ingkindness. Blinded by lust arisen under cover of the lovingkindness, he wanted
to go to his wife, and without noticing the door he beat on the wall in his desire
to get out even by breaking the wall down1
(Pm. 286).
2. Reading dana-piyavacanadini with Sinhalese ed. (see four sangahavatthuni—
A. ii,32).
3. The Anguttara text has 'Let him ... reappear in a state of loss' and so on.
4. 'The eight great hells beginning with that of Sanjlva (see Ja.v, 266, 270). At
each of the four doors of the Great Unmitigated (Avici) Hell there are the four
beginning with the Ember (Kukula) Hell (M.iii,185), which make up the sixteen
prominent hells' (Pm. 291).
5. Sanku-patha—'set on piles': Pm. (p. 294) says: 'Sahku laggdpetvd te
dlambhitva gamanamaggo sahkupatho\ This disagrees with P.T.S. Diet, for this
ref.
6. Sana—'the bright principle': Skr. sattva\ one of the three principles in the
Sanikhya system, the other two being rajas (Pali: rajo) or turbulence and tamas
(Pali: tamo) or darkness. Not in P.T.S. Diet.
7. 'Here when the aggregates are not fully understood, there is naming
(abhidhdna) of them and of the consciousness of them as self (atta), that is to
say, the physical body or alternatively the five aggregates. "Derived from": ap-
prehending, gripping, making a support. "Since it is actually a mere concept":
because of presence (sabbhavato) as a mere concept in what is called a being,
though in the highest sense the "being" is non-existent' (Pm. 298). See also Ch.
VIII, n. 11
8. Harvard text reads
k
byapadarahita\ which would be renderable as 'free
from ill will'. Pm. (p. 299) supports a reading byabadha, which seems better.
9. For dutthulla see Ch. IV, note 36. Here the meaning is more likely to be
'bad' or 'lewd' than 'inert'.
10. Mudita—'gladness' as one of the divine abidings is always in the sense of
gladness at others' success. Sometimes rendered 'altruistic joy' and 'sympathetic
gladness'.
11. Kinati—'it combats': Skr. krndti—to injure or kill. P.T.S. Diet, gives this
ref. under ordinary meaning 'to buy', which is wrong.
12. So Pm. 309.
13. All texts read kassa (whose), which is confirmed in the quotation translated
in note 20. It is tempting, in view of the context, to read kammassa (kamma's),
but there is no authority for it. The statement would then be an assertion instead
of a question.
14. 'Greed is the near enemy of lovingkindness since it is able to corrupt owing
to its similarity, like an enemy masquerading as a friend' (Pm. 309).
15. Patihannati—'to be resentful': not in P.T.S. Diet.; the verb has been needed
to correspond to 'resentment' (patigha), as the verb 'to be inflamed with greed'
(rajjati) corresponds with 'greed' (raga).
16. Sambhavetva—'judging': not in this sense in P.T.S. Diet. Pm. (p. 313)
explains by parikappetva (conjecturing).
17. For which kinds of body contemplation give which kinds of concentration
see Ch. VIII, §43 and MA.i,247.
18. ' "Mere unification of the mind": the kind of concentrating (samddhdna)
that is undeveloped and just obtained by one in pursuit of development. That is
called "basic concentration", however, since it is the basic reason for the kinds
of more distinguished concentration to be mentioned later in this connexion. This
"mere unification of the mind" is intended as momentary concentration as in the
passage beginning "I internally settled, steadied, unified and concentrated my
mind" (M.i,116). For the first unification of the mind is recognized as momen-
tary concentration here as it is in the first of the two successive descriptions:
"Tireless energy was aroused in me ... my mind was concentrated and unified"
followed by "Quite secluded from sense desires ..." (M.i,21)* (Pm. 314).
19. ' "Thus developed": just as a fire started with wood and banked up with
cowdung, dust, etc., although it arrives at the state of a "cowdung fire", etc. (cf.
M.i,259), is nevertheless called after the original fire that was started with the
wood, so too it is the basic concentration that is spoken of here, taking it as
banked up with lovingkindness, and so on. "In other objects" means in such
objects as the earth kasina' (Pm. 315).
20. 'The beautiful' (subha) is the third of the eight liberations {yimokkha—see
M.ii,12; MA.iii,255).
21. Reading in both cases 'avijjamdna-gahana-dakkam cittam', not '-dukkham*.
' "Because it has no more concern (abhoga)": because it has no further act of
being concerned (abhujana) by hoping (asimsana) for their pleasure, etc., thus
"May they be happy". The development of lovingkindness, etc., occurring as it
does in the form of hope for beings' pleasure, etc., makes them its object by
directing [the mind] to apprehension of [what is existent in] the ultimate sense
[i.e. pleasure, etc.]. But development of equanimity, instead of occurring like
that, makes beings its object by simply looking on. — But does not the divine
abiding of equanimity itself too make beings its object by directing the mind to
apprehension of [what is existent in] the ultimate sense, because of the words
"Beings are owners of their deeds. Whose [if not theirs] is the choice by which
they will become happy ..."? (§96) — Certainly that is so. But that is in the
prior stage of development of equanimity. When it has reached its culmination, it
makes beings its object by simply looking on. So its occurrence is specially
occupied with what is non-existent in the ultimate sense [i.e. beings, which are a
concept]. And so skill in apprehending the non-existent should be understood as
avoidance of bewilderment due to misrepresentation in apprehension of beings,
which avoidance of bewilderment has reached absorption' (Pm.).
22. For the 'ten powers' and 'four kinds of fearlessness' see M. Sutta 12. For
the 'six kinds of knowledge not shared by disciples' see Ps.i,121f. For the 'eight-
een states of the Enlightened One' see Cp. Commentary.
CHAPTER X
1. 'A dog, it seems, was attacked in the forest by a boar and fled. When it was
dusk he saw in the distance a cauldron for boiling rice, and perceiving it as a
boar, he fled in fear and terror. Again, a man who was afraid of pisdca goblins
saw a decapitated palm stump at night in a place that was unfamiliar to him, and
perceiving it as a pisdca goblin, he fell down in his fear, horror and confusion'
(Pm. 320).
2. P.T.S. Diet., this ref. reads ydnaputosd for ydnapatoli, taking it as one
compound (see under ydna and mutoli), but this does not fit the context happily.
Pm. (p. 321) has: * "Ydnappatolikumbhimuknddinan" ti ogunthana-sivikadi-ydnam
mukharh = ydna-mukharh\ patoliyd kuddakadvdrassa mukharh = patoli-mukham;
kumbhi-mukhan ti paccekarh mukha-saddo sambandhitabbo\ Tliis necessitates
taking ydna separately.
3. These two quotations refer respectively to the first of the eight liberations
and the first of the eight bases of mastery. (See MA.iii,255ff.)
4. This explanation depends on a play on the word sahhd as the (subjective)
perception and as the (objective) sign, signal or label perceived.
5. See Ch. XIV, §129, description of perception aggregate, which is classified
in the same way as the consciousness aggregate. Those referred to here are the
fifteen fine-material kinds, corresponding to nos. (9M13), (57M61) and (81M85)
in Table II.
6. See Ch. XIV, §96f. nos. (34M38) and (50M54) in Table II.
7. *A [formed] dhamma with an individual essence is delimited by rise and fall
because it is produced after having not been, and because after having been it
vanishes. But space is called boundless since it has neither rise nor fall because it
is a dhamma without individual essence' (Pm. 323).
8. 'He should not give attention to it only as "Boundless, boundless"; instead
of developing it thus, he should give attention to it as "Boundless consciousness,
boundless consciousness" or as "Consciousness, consciousness" * (Pm. 324).
9. There is a play on the words natthi kind ('there is nothing') and akiheana
('non-owning'). At M.i,298 there occurs the expression 'Rdgo kho dvuso kiheano
(greed, friend, is an owning)', which is used in connexion with this attainment.
The commentary (MA.ii,354) says 'Rdgo uppajjitvd puggalam kincati, maddati,
palibujjhati, tasmd kiheano ti vutto (greed having arisen owns, presses, impedes,
a person, that is why it is called an owning)'. (Cf. MA.i,27; also Ch. XXI, §53
and note 19.) Pm. (p. 327) here says 'Kihcanan ti kihci pi
9
. The word kincati is
not in P.T.S. Diet.
10. Mahacca (see D.i,49 and DA.i,148); the form is not given in P.T.S. Diet.;
probably a form of mahatiya.
11. Sukhodaka—'tepid water': see Monier Williams Skr. Diet.; this meaning of
sukha not given in P.T.S. Diet.
CHAPTER XI
1. 'The word "perception" (sanna) is used for the dhamma with the character-
istic of perceiving (sanjanana), as in the case of "perception of visible objects",
"perception of sound", etc.; and it is used for insight, as in the case of "percep-
tion of impermanence", "perception of suffering", etc.; and it is used for serenity,
as in the passage, "Perception of the bloated and perception of visible objects,
have these one meaning or different meanings, Sopaka?" (?), and so on. Here,
however, it should be understood as the preliminary work for serenity; for it is
the apprehending of the repulsive aspect in nutriment, or the access jhana pro-
duced by means of that, that is intended here by "perception of repulsiveness in
nutriment" ' (Pm. 334-35).
2. A more detailed exposition of nutriment is given at MA.i, 107ff.' "/f nour-
ishes" (dfiaratiY: the meaning is that is leads up, fetches, produces, its own fruit
through its state as a condition for the fruit's arising or presence, which state is
called "nutriment condition". It is made into a mouthful (kabalarh kariyati), thus
it is physical (kabalinkdra). In this way it gets its designation from the concrete
object; but as to characteristic, it should be understood to have the characteristic
of nutritive essence (oja). It is physical and it is nutriment in the sense stated,
thus it is physical nutriment. So with the rest. It touches (phusati), thus it is
contact (phassa); for although this is an immaterial state, it occurs also as the
aspect of touching on an object (drammana—lit. 'what is to be leaned on'),
which is why it is said to have the characteristic of touching. It wills (cetayati),
thus it is volition (cetana); the meaning is that it arranges (collects) itself to-
gether with associated states upon the object. Mental volition is volition occu-
pied with the mind. It cognizes (vijdnati) by conjecturing about rebirth (see Ch.
XVII, §303), thus it is consciousness (vinndna = cognition)* (Pm. 335).
3. For the 'octad with nutritive essence as eighth' (ojatthamaka), see Ch.
XVIII, §5ff. and XX, §27ff.
4. Pm. (p. 355) explains attachment here as craving which is 'perilous because
it brings harm' (see e.g. D.ii,58-59), or in other words, 'greed for the five aggre-
gates (lust after five-aggregate experience)'. It cites the following: 'Bhikkhus,
when there is physical nutriment, there is greed (lust), there is delighting, there is
craving; consciousness being planted therein grows. Wherever consciousness
being planted grows, there is the combination of mind-and-matter. Wherever
there is the combination of mind-and-matter, there is ramification of formations.
Wherever there is ramification of formations, there is production of further be-
coming in the future. Wherever there is production of further becoming in the
future, there is future birth, ageing and death. Wherever there is future birth,
ageing and death, bhikkhus, the end is sorrow, I say, with woe and despair'
(S.ii,101; cf. S.ii,66). Approaching is explained as 'meeting, coinciding, with
unabandoned perversions [of perception] due to an object [being perceived as
permanent, etc., when it is not]'. That is 'perilous since it is not free from the
three kinds of suffering'. The quotation given is: 'Bhikkhus, due to contact of the
kind to be felt as pleasant, pleasant feeling arises. With that feeling as condition
there is craving, ... thus there is the arising of this whole mass of suffering' (cf.
S.iv,215). Reappearance is 'rebirth in some kind of becoming or other. Being
flung into a new becoming is perilous because there is no immunity from the
risks rooted in reappearance*. The following is quoted: 'Not knowing, bhikkhus,
a man forms the formation of merit, and his [rebirth] consciousness accords with
the merit [he performed]; he forms the formation of demerit; ... he forms the
formation of the imperturbable ...' (S.ii,82). Rebirth-linking is the actual linking
with the next becoming, which 'is perilous since it is not immune from the
suffering due to the signs of [the impending] rebirth-linking'. The quotation
given is: 'Bhikkhus, when there is consciousness as nutriment there is greed
(lust), there is delighting ...' (S.ii,102—complete as above).
5. ' "Twenty or thirty times": here some say that the definition of the number
of times is according to what is present-by-continuity (see Ch. XIV, §188). But
others say that it is by way of "warming up the seat" (see MA.i,255); for devel-
opment that has not reached suppression of hindrances does not remove the bod-
ily discomfort in the act of sitting, because of the lack of pervading happiness.
So there is inconstancy of posture too. Then "twenty or thirty" is taken as the
number already observed by the time of setting out on the alms round. Or
alternatively, from "going" up to "smearing" is one turn; then it is after giving
attention to the meditation subject by twenty or thirty turns in this way' (Pm.
339).
6. Paccattharana—'carpet': the word normally means a coverlet, but here, ac-
cording to Pm. (p. 339), it is 'a spread (attharana) consisting of a rug (cilimika)
to be spread on the ground for protecting the skin'.
7. For pamukha—'doorstep', perhaps an open upper floor gallery here, see Ch.
XIII, §6.
8. 7aTw£A—'bat' = khuddaka-vagguli (Pm. 339): not in P.T.S. Diet.; see Ch.
XIII, §97.
9. Pdrdvata—'pigeon': only spelling pdrdpata given in P.T.S. Diet.
10. For this meaning of parivena see Ch. IV, note 37.
11. Vitakka-malaka—'debating lodge': Pm. (p. 339) says:' "Kattha nu kho ajja
bhikkhdya caritabban" ti ddind vitakkamdlake' ('in a lodge for thinking in the
way beginning "Where must I go for alms today?" ').
12. Pindika-mamsa—'flesh of the calves' =janghapindikamarhsapadesa (Pm. 340).
Cf. Ch. VIII, §97; also AA. 417. Not in this sense in* P.T.S. Diet.
13. Kummasa—'jelly': usually rendered 'junket', but the Vinaya commentaries
give it as made of corn (yava).
14. Nagabala—z kind of plant; not in P.T.S. Diet.
15. Pavana—'draught': not in this sense in P.T.S. Diet.; see Ch. XVI, §37.
16. Dhatu—'ore': not in this sense in P.T.S. Diet. See also Ch. XV, §20.
17. ' "A certain one" is said with reference to the anal orifice. But those who
are scrupulously clean by nature wash their hands again after washing the mouth,
and so on' (Pm. 342).
18. ' "That sign": that object as the sign for development, which sign is called
physical nutriment and has appeared in the repulsive aspect to one who gives his
attention to it repeatedly in the ways already described. And there, while devel-
opment occurs through the repulsive aspect, it is only the dhammas on account
of which there comes to be the concept of physical nutriment that are repulsive,
not the concept. But it is because the occurrence of development is contingent
only upon dhammas with an individual essence, and because the profundity is
due to that actual individual essence of dhammas that have individual essences,
that the jhana cannot reach absorption in it through apprehension of the repulsive
aspect. For it is owing to profundity that the first pair of truths is hard to see*
(Pm. 342-43).
19. * "By characterizing individual essences': by making certain (upadhdrana)
of the specific characteristics of hardness, and so on. For this meditation subject
does not consist in the observing of a mere concept, as in the case of the earth
kasina as a meditation subject, neither does it consist in the observing of the
colour blue, etc., as in the case of the blue kasina as a meditation subject, nor in
the observing of the general characteristics of impermanence, etc., in formations,
as in the case of insight as a meditation subject; but rather it consists in the
observing of the individual essences of earth, and so on. That is why "by charac-
terizing individual essences" is said, which means "by making certain of the
specific characteristics of hardness, and so on" ' (Pm. 344).
20. * Herein, as regards 'earth element \ etc., the meaning of element is the
meaning of individual essence, the meaning of individual essence is the meaning
of voidness, the meaning of voidness is the meaning of not-a-living-being. So it
is just earth in the sense of individual essence, voidness and not-a-living-being
that is the element; hence it is earth element. So too in the case of the water
element, and the rest. The earth element is the element that is the foothold for the
conascent material states. Likewise the water element is the element of their
cohesion; the fire element is the element of their ripening; and the air element is
the element of their conveyance and distension' (Pm. 345).
To avoid confusion, it might be mentioned here that in 'physical' earth, fire,
water, and air, it would be held that all four elements are present in each equally,
but that in 'physical' earth the earth element is dominant in efficacy as the mode
of hardness; and correspondingly with water and the rest. See e.g. Ch. XIV, §45.
21. Kharigata—'harsh': not in P.T.S. Diet., but see khara.
22. 'What occurs in attendance (adhikicca) upon self (attd) by its pertaining to
the state that may be taken as self because it is included in one's own continuity
as internal (ajjhattaY (Pm. 347).
23. Jara— 'fever': not in P.T.S. Diet.; see A.v,100; Nd. 1,17.
24. Vitthambhana—'distension': the word most usually employed to describe
the air element. It is often rendered by 'supporting', a word earmarked here for
nissaya. The twofold function of the air element is (a) to uphold (sandhdrana)
by distending (vitthambhana) and preventing collapse (§92), and (b) to move
(samudirana), or more strictly, cause the appearance of motion (calana, see n.
37). In Ch. XIV, §61 it is said to cause thambhana, rendered by 'stiffening'; but
there is the description of the earth element as thaddha (e.g. §39; pp. of tham-
bhati, from which the n. thambhana comes), rendered by 'stiffenedness'. It may
also be noted that the word sandhdrana (upholding) is used to describe both the
earth element (Ch. XIV, §47) and the'air element (Ch. XIV, §61).
25. Drava-bhava—'fluidity': not in P.T.S. Diet.
26. Silesa—'cement': not in this meaning in P.T.S. Diet.; MA.i,37 sam—.
27. Dhammani—'rat snake': not in this sense in P.T.S. Diet.; see AA. 459.
28. Sippika—'bag' (?): not in this sense in P.T.S. Diet.
29. * "Because of bearing their own characteristics": these are not like the Pri-
mordial Essence (pakati—Skr. prakrti) and the self (atta) imagined by the theo-
rists, which are non-existent as to individual essence. On the contrary these do
bear their own characteristics, which is why they are elements' (Pm. 359). Capi-
tals have been used here and elsewhere though Indian alphabets do not justify it.
Appdyati—'to satisfy' is not in P.T.S. Diet.; see VbhA. 9.
30. ' "From resolution of these eight": the eight dhammas beginning with col-
our, when resolved by means of understanding, are apprehendable (upalabbhanti)
in the ultimate sense through mutual negation (annam-anna-vyatirekena); but
head hairs are not apprehendable in the ultimate sense through negation of colour
and so on. Consequently, the term of common usage "head hairs" is applied to
these dhammas in their co-arisen state; but if they are each taken separately
"There is no common-usage head hairs". The meaning is that it is a mere con-
ventional term. "Only a mere group of eight states" is said, taking the colour,
etc., which are real (bhuta—lit. 'become'), as a unity by means of the concept
(pannatti) "a head hair", not only because they are merely the eight states' (Pm.
360).
31. Paramanu—'the smallest atom'; see VbhA. 343. According to VbhA. the
size of a paramanu works out at 1/581,147,136th part of an ahgula (fingerbreadth
or inch). Pm. remarks (p. 361): 'Therefore ... a paramanu as a particle of space
is not the province of the physical eye, it is the province of the divine eye'.
32. Sangahita—'held together': not quite in this sense in P.T.S. Diet. 'Held
(gahita) by conjoining through cohesion and prevented from being scattered'
(Pm. 361).
33. 'Kept guarded (anurakkita) so that it may not lapse into a wet and slippery
state through the water element, which has trickling as its essence' (Pm. 361).
34. Parissavati—'to run away': not in P.T.S. Diet.;—vissarati (Pm. 361).
35. 'This is said with reference to the water element as a juice that helps
growth' (Pm. 361).
36. Samabbhahata—'propelled': see Ch. IV, note 38.
37. Abhinihdra—'conveying': not in this sense in P.T.S. Diet.' "Conveying" is
acting as cause for the successive arising at adjacent locations (desantaruppatti)
of the conglomeration of elements (bhutasahghata)
1
(Pm. 363). Elsewhere
Pm. (p. 359) says of the air element: ' "It blows" (§87): it is stirred; the meaning
is that the conglomeration of elements is made to move (go) by its action as
cause for successive arising at adjacent locations (points)', and 'Propelling
(samahbhdhana) is the act of causing the successive arising at adjacent locations
of material groups (rupa-kaldpaY (P- 362).
38. 'A great primary (mahdbhuta) is a great wonder (jnahanto abbhuto) be-
cause it shows various unreal things (abhutd), various wonders (abbhuta), and
various marvels (acchariya). Or alternatively: there are great wonders (abbhuta)
here, thus there are magicians. And spirits, etc., are huge (mahant) creatures
(bhuta) owing to being born from them, thus they are great primaries. Or alterna-
tively: this term "great primary" can be regarded as a generic term for all of
them. But earth, etc., are great primaries because they deceive, and because, like
the huge creatures, their standing place cannot be pointed to. The deception lies
in causing the apparent individual essences of blue-black, etc., and it lies in
causing the appearance of what has the aspect of woman and man, and so on.
Likewise their undemonstrability, since they are not found inside or outside each
other though they rely upon each other for support. For if these elements were
found inside each other, they would not each perform their particular functions,
owing to mutual frustration. And if they were found outside each other, they
would be already resolved (separate), and that being so, any description of them
as unresolved (inseparable) would be meaningless. So although their standing
place is undemonstrable, still each one assists the other by its particular func-
tion—the functions of establishing, etc., whereby each becomes a condition for
the others as conascence condition and so on' (Pm. 363).
39. This alludes to the length of duration of a moment of matter's existence,
which is described as seventeen times as long as that of consciousness (see
VbhA. 25f.).
40. 'The term "producing condition" refers to causing origination, though as a
condition it is actually kamma condition. For this is said: "Profitable and unprof-
itable volition is a condition, as kamma condition, for resultant aggregates and
for materiality due to kamma performed" (Ptn.1,5)' (Pm. 368).
41. * "For the rest": for consciousness-originated, and so on. It is indirectly
decisive-support condition because in the Patthana the decisive-support condi-
tion has only been given for immaterial dhammas, so there is, directly, no deci-
sive-support condition [in kamma] for material dhammas. However, because of
the words "With a person as decisive support" (M.i,107 ) and "With a grove as
decisive support" (M.i,106) in the Suttas, the decisive-support condition can be
indirectly understood according to the Suttas in the sense of "absence without" '
(Pm. 368).
42. Ugghdta—'exhilarated' and nigghdta—'depressed': neither word is in P.T.S
Diet.; Pm. glosses with ubbildvitatta and dinabhdvappatti respectively.
43. Reading yogivarasihassa kilitarh. Cf. Netti 'Siha-kilana\
44. The sense demands reading with Pm. appandpubbabhdgacittesu as a single
compound.
45. This is an allusion to M.i,179, etc. 'The process of existence in the round of
rebirths, which is a very cramped place, is crowded by the defilements of craving
and so on' (Pm. 371).
46. Siidana—'cleaning': not in P.T.S. Diet. See title of Majjhima Nikaya Com-
mentary. Another reading here is sodhana.
CHAPTER XII
1. Anenja—'imperturbability': a term normally used for the four immaterial
states, together with the fourth jhana. See also §16f., and M. Sutta 106.
2. Giribhandavahanapujd: Pm. (p. 375) says: 'Giribhandavahanapujd ndma
Cetiyagirirh ddirh katvd sakaladipe samudde ca ydva yojand mahati dipapujd
(it is a name for a great island-offering starting with the Cetiyagiri (Mihintale)
and extending over the whole island and up to a league into the sea)'. Mentioned
in AA. commentary to A. EkanipAta, i, 1; MA.ii,398; and Mahavamsa 34, 81.
3. These are the four headings of the roads to power (see §50).
4. I.e. one wants it to be known that he can practise jhana.
5. 'It counter-strikes (patiharati), thus it is a counter-stroke (pdtihariya—meta-
morphosis = miracle). What strikes out (harati), removes, what is counter to it
(patipakkha) is therefore called counter-striking (patihdriya), since what is counter-
striking strikes out anything counter (patipakkha) to itself. Patihdriya (counter-
striking) is the same as pdtihariya (counter-stroke = metamorphosis = miracle)'
(Pm. 379)
6. Sitd: not in this sense in P.T.S. Diet. Pm. (p. 383) says, 'It is the path
traversed by a ploughshare in ploughing that is called a sitd\ Another reading is
karisa (an area of land).
7. Visavitd—'majesty': not in P.T.S. Diet.; cf. passavati. Pm. (p. 385) glosses
with iddhiyd vividhdnisamsa-pasavandya. Cf. DhsA.109; DhsAA. (p. 84) glosses
thus visavitdyd ti arahatdya.
8. Further explanatory details are given in the commentary to the Iddhipada-
Vibhahga.
9. Aneja (or anenja)—'unperturbed': form not in P.T.S. Diet.
10. Angirasa—'the One with Radiant Limbs': one of the epithets for the Bud-
dha. Not in P.T.S. Diet.; see A.iii,239.
11. Dedication of what is to be given accompanied by pouring water over the
hand.
12. ' "They become of the kinds desired": they become whatever the kinds that
were desired: for they come to possess as many varieties in appearance, etc., as it
was wished they should have. But although they become manifold in this way by
being made the object in different modes of appearance, nevertheless it is only a
single resolution consciousness that occurs. This is its power. For it is like the
single volition that produces a personality possessed of many different facets
(see Ch. XIV, n.14). And there it is the aspiration to become that is a condition
for the differentiation in the kamma; and kamma-result is imponderable. And
here too it is the preliminary-work consciousness that should be taken as a condi-
tion for the difference. And the field of supernormal power is imponderable too'
(Pm. 390).
13. Certain grammatical problems arise about the case of the words dvibhdvam,
etc., both in the sutta passage and (more so) in the Patisambhida passage; they
are examined by Pm. (p. 390) but are not renderable into English.
14. Kutdgdra—'palanquin': not in this sense in P.T.S. Diet. See story at MA.v,90,
where it is told how 500 of these were made by Sakka's architect Vissakamma
for the Buddha to journey through the air in. The same word is also commonly
used in the Commentaries for the portable structure (catafalque) in which a bier
is carried to the pyre. This, built often in the form of a house, is still used now in
Ceylon and called ransivi-ge. See AA., commentary to A. Tikanipata 42, and to
A. Ekanipata xx, 38; also DhA.iii,470. Not in this sense in P.T.S. Diet.
15. The only book in the Tipitaka to mention the Twin Miracle is the
Patisambhidamagga (Ps.i,53).
16. Anathapindika's younger brother (Pm. 391).
17. Okdseti—'to scatter': P.T.S. Diet., this ref., gives 'to show', which does not
fit the context. Pm. glosses with pakirati.
18. Pm. (p. 394): 'Vadhu-kumdri-kannd-vatthdhi tividhdhi ndtakitthlhV.
19. ' "The ramparts of Sineru'\ the girdle of Sineru. There are, it seems, four
ramparts that encircle Sineru, measuring 5,000 leagues in breadth and width.
They were built to protect the realm of the Thirty-three against nagas, garudas,
kumbhandas and yakkhas. They enclose half of Sineru, it seems' (Pm. 394).
20. 'Only this is correct because instances of clung-to (kammically acquired)
materiality do not arise owing to consciousness or to temperature. Or alterna-
tively, 'clung-to' is intended as all matter that is bound up with faculties (i.e.
'sentient'), too. And so to take it as enlargement of that is likewise not correct.
Consequently, enlargement should be understood only in the way stated. Though
the clung-to and the unclung-to occur, as it were, mixed up in a single continuity,
they are nevertheless not mixed up in meaning. Herein, just as when a pint
measure (dlhaka) of milk is poured into a number of pints of water, though the
milk becomes completely mixed up with the water, and is present appreciably in
all, it is nevertheless not the milk that has increased there, but only the water.
And so too, although the clung-to and unclung-to occur mixed up together, it is
nevertheless not the clung-to that is enlarged. It should be taken that it is the
consciousness-born matter that is enlarged by the influence of the supernormal
power, and the temperature-born is enlarged pari passu' (Pm. 395).
21. ' "There is only the going of consciousness": there is only a going that is the
same as that of the mind. But how does the body, whose going [being that of
matter] is slow, come to have the same going as the mind, which quickly passes?
Its going is not the same in all respects; for in the case of converting the mind to
conform with the body, the mind does not come to have the same going as the
body in all respects. For it is not that the mind then occurs with the moment of a
material state, which passes slowly, instead of passing with its own kind of
moment, which is what establishes its individual essence. But rather the mind is
called "converted to accord with the going of the body" as long as it goes on
occurring in a continuity that conforms with the body until the desired place is
arrived at. This is because its passing occurs parallel with that of the body,
whose going is slow, owing to the resolution, "Let the mind be like this body".
And likewise, it is while the body keeps occurring in suchwise that its arrival at
the desired place comes about in only a few quick passes of the mind instead of
passing slowly, as in those who have not developed the roads to power—and this
mode of occurrence is due to the possession of the perception of lightness, to say
nothing of the resolve, "Let this body be like this mind"—that the body is called
"converted to accord with the going of the mind," not because it arrives at the
desired place in a single consciousness moment. And when taken thus the simile,
"Just as a strong man might stretch out his bent arm, or bend his outstretched
arm" (Vin.i,5) can be taken literally. And this must be accepted in this way
without reserve, otherwise there is conflict with the Suttas, the Abhidhamma and
the Commentary, as well as contradiction of natural law (dhammata). "Bhikkhus,
I see no other one thing that is so quickly transformed as the mind" (A.i,10)—
here it is material states that are referred to by the word "other" because they do
not pass quickly. And in the Abhidhamma only matter is called prenascence con-
dition and only consciousness postnascence condition. And wherever states
(dhamma) arise, there they dissolve. There is no transmigration to an adjacent
location (desantara-sankamana), nor does the individual essence become other.
For it is not possible to effect any alteration of the characteristics of dhammas by
force of the roads to power. But it is possible to effect alteration of the mode in
which they are present (bhava)' (Pm. 397).
22. *This should be regarded as implying that there is no sex or life faculty in it
either' (Pm. 398).
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