Digha Nikaya - Maha-nidana Sutta

DN 15
Maha-nidana Sutta
The Great Causes Discourse
Translated from the Pali by
Thanissaro BhikkhuPTS: D ii 55



Source: Transcribed from a file provided by the translator.



Copyright © 1997 Thanissaro Bhikkhu.
Access to Insight edition © 1997
For free distribution. This work may be republished, reformatted,
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Translator's Introduction
This is one of the most profound discourses in the Pali canon. It gives an
extended treatment of the teachings of dependent co-arising (paticca samuppada)
and not-self (anatta) in an outlined context of how these teachings function in
practice.
The first part of the discourse takes the factors of dependent co-arising in
sequence from effect to cause, tracing them down to the mutual dependency of
name-and-form (mental and physical activity) on the one hand, and consciousness
on the other. In connection with this point, it is worth noting that the word
"great" in the title of the discourse may have a double meaning: modifying the
word "discourse" — it's a long discourse — and modifying "causes," referring to
the fact that name-and-form and consciousness as causal factors can account for
everything describable in the cosmos.
After tracing the basic sequence of factors in the causal pattern, the discourse
then reviews their inter-relationships, showing how they can explain stress and
suffering both on the individual and on the social level.
The second part of the discourse, taking up the teaching of not-self, shows how
dependent co-arising gives focus to this teaching in practice. It begins with a
section on Delineations of a Self, classifying the various ways in which a sense
of "self" might be defined in terms of form. The scheme of analysis introduced
in this section — classifying views of the self according to the variables of
form and formless; finite and infinite; already existing, naturally developing
in the future, and alterable through human effort — covers all the theories of
the self proposed in the classical Upanisads, as well as all theories of self or
soul proposed in more recent times. The inclusion of an infinite self in this
list gives the lie to the belief that the Buddha's teachings on not-self were
denying nothing more than a sense of "separate" or "limited" self. The discourse
points out that even a limitless, infinite, all-embracing sense of self is based
on an obsession in the mind that has to be abandoned.
The following section, on Non-delineations of a Self, shows that it is possible
for the mind to function without reading a "self" into experience. The remaining
sections focus on ways in which this can be done by treating the sense of self
as it relates to different aspects of name-and-form. The first of these sections
— Assumptions of a Self — focuses on the sense of self as it relates to feeling,
one of the "name" factors in name-and-form. The next section — Seven Stations of
Consciousness — focuses on form, formlessness, and perception, which is another
one of the "name" factors that allows a place for consciousness to land and grow
on the "macro" level in the cycle of death and rebirth. The last section — Eight
Emancipations — focuses on form, formlessness, and perception on the "micro"
level in the practice of meditative absorption (jhana).
In each of these cases, once the sense of attachment and identification with
name-and-form can be broken, the mutual dependency between consciousness and
name-and-form is broken as well. This brings about total freedom from the limits
of "the extent to which there are means of designation, expression, and
delineation... the extent to which the sphere of discernment extends, the extent
to which the cycle revolves for the manifesting (discernibility) of this world —
i.e., name-and-form together with consciousness." This is the release at which
the Buddha's teachings are aimed.



Dependent Co-arising
I have heard that on one occasion the Blessed One was living among the Kurus.
Now, the Kurus have a town named Kammasadhamma. There Ven. Ananda approached the
Blessed One and, on arrival, having bowed down to the Blessed One, sat to one
side. As he was sitting there he said to the Blessed One: "It's amazing, lord,
it's astounding, how deep this dependent co-arising is, and how deep its
appearance, and yet to me it seems as clear as clear can be."
[The Buddha:] "Don't say that, Ananda. Don't say that. Deep is this dependent
co-arising, and deep its appearance. It's because of not understanding and not
penetrating this Dhamma that this generation is like a tangled skein, a knotted
ball of string, like matted rushes and reeds, and does not go beyond
transmigration, beyond the planes of deprivation, woe, and bad destinations.
"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for aging and
death?' one should answer, 'There is.'
"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition do aging and death come?' one
should say, 'Aging and death come from birth as their requisite condition.'
"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for birth?' one
should answer, 'There is.'
"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition does birth come?' one should
say, 'Birth comes from becoming as its requisite condition.'
"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for becoming?'
one should answer, 'There is.'
"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition does becoming come?' one should
say, 'Becoming comes from clinging as its requisite condition.'
"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for clinging?'
one should answer, 'There is.'
"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition does clinging come?' one should
say, 'Clinging comes from craving as its requisite condition.'
"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for craving?' one
should answer, 'There is.'
"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition does craving come?' one should
say, 'Craving comes from feeling as its requisite condition.'
"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for feeling?' one
should answer, 'There is.'
"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition does feeling come?' one should
say, 'Feeling comes from contact as its requisite condition.'
"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for contact?' one
should answer, 'There is.'
"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition does contact come?' one should
say, 'Contact comes from name-and-form as its requisite condition.'
"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for
name-and-form?' one should answer, 'There is.'
"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition does name-and-form come?' one
should say, 'Name-and-form comes from consciousness as its requisite condition.'
"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for
consciousness?' one should answer, 'There is.'
"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition does consciousness come?' one
should say, 'Consciousness comes from name-and-form as its requisite condition.'
"Thus, Ananda, from name-and-form as a requisite condition comes consciousness.
From consciousness as a requisite condition comes name-and-form. From
name-and-form as a requisite condition comes contact. From contact as a
requisite condition comes feeling. From feeling as a requisite condition comes
craving. From craving as a requisite condition comes clinging. From clinging as
a requisite condition comes becoming. From becoming as a requisite condition
comes birth. From birth as a requisite condition, aging, death, sorrow,
lamentation, pain, distress, and despair come into play. Such is the origination
of this entire mass of stress.
Aging and Death
"'From birth as a requisite condition come aging and death.' Thus it has been
said. And this is the way to understand how from birth as a requisite condition
come aging and death. If there were no birth at all, in any way, of anything
anywhere — i.e., of devas in the state of devas, of celestials in the state of
celestials, of spirits in the state of spirits, of demons in the state of
demons, of human beings in the human state, of quadrupeds in the state of
quadrupeds, of birds in the state of birds, of snakes in the state of snakes, or
of any being in its own state — in the utter absence of birth, from the
cessation of birth, would aging and death be discerned?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a
requisite condition for aging and death, i.e., birth.
Birth
"'From becoming as a requisite condition comes birth.' Thus it has been said.
And this is the way to understand how from becoming as a requisite condition
comes birth. If there were no becoming at all, in any way, of anything anywhere
— i.e., sensual becoming, form becoming, or formless becoming — in the utter
absence of becoming, from the cessation of becoming, would birth be discerned?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a
requisite condition for birth, i.e., becoming.
Becoming
"'From clinging as a requisite condition comes becoming.' Thus it has been said.
And this is the way to understand how from clinging as a requisite condition
comes becoming. If there were no clinging at all, in any way, of anything
anywhere — i.e., clinging to sensuality, clinging to precepts and practices,
clinging to views, or clinging to doctrines of the self — in the utter absence
of clinging, from the cessation of clinging, would becoming be discerned?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a
requisite condition for becoming, i.e., clinging.
Clinging
"'From craving as a requisite condition comes clinging.' Thus it has been said.
And this is the way to understand how from craving as a requisite condition
comes clinging. If there were no craving at all, in any way, of anything
anywhere — i.e., craving for sensuality, craving for becoming, craving for no
becoming — in the utter absence of craving, from the cessation of craving, would
clinging be discerned?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a
requisite condition for clinging, i.e., craving.
Craving
"'From feeling as a requisite condition comes craving.' Thus it has been said.
And this is the way to understand how from feeling as a requisite condition
comes craving. If there were no feeling at all, in any way, of anything anywhere
— i.e., feeling born of contact at the eye, feeling born of contact at the ear,
feeling born of contact at the nose, feeling born of contact at the tongue,
feeling born of contact at the body, or feeling born of contact at the intellect
— in the utter absence of feeling, from the cessation of feeling, would craving
be discerned?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a
requisite condition for craving, i.e., feeling.
Dependent on Craving
"Now, craving is dependent on feeling, seeking is dependent on craving,
acquisition is dependent on seeking, ascertainment is dependent on acquisition,
desire and passion is dependent on ascertainment, attachment is dependent on
desire and passion, possessiveness is dependent on attachment, stinginess is
dependent on possessiveness, defensiveness is dependent on stinginess, and
because of defensiveness, dependent on defensiveness, various evil, unskillful
phenomena come into play: the taking up of sticks and knives; conflicts,
quarrels, and disputes; accusations, divisive speech, and lies.
"And this is the way to understand how it is that because of defensiveness
various evil, unskillful phenomena come into play: the taking up of sticks and
knives; conflicts, quarrels, and disputes; accusations, divisive speech, and
lies. If there were no defensiveness at all, in any way, of anything anywhere,
in the utter absence of defensiveness, from the cessation of defensiveness,
would various evil, unskillful phenomena — the taking up of sticks and knives;
conflicts, quarrels, and disputes; accusations, divisive speech, and lies — come
into play?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a
requisite condition for the coming-into-play of various evil, unskillful
phenomena — the taking up of sticks and knives; conflicts, quarrels, and
disputes; accusations, divisive speech, and lies — i.e., defensiveness.
"'Defensiveness is dependent on stinginess.' Thus it has been said. And this is
the way to understand how defensiveness is dependent on stinginess. If there
were no stinginess at all, in any way, of anything anywhere, in the utter
absence of stinginess, from the cessation of stinginess, would defensiveness be
discerned?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a
requisite condition for defensiveness, i.e., stinginess.
(Similarly back through the chain of conditions: stinginess, attachment,
possessiveness, desire and passion, ascertainment, acquisition, and seeking.)
"'Seeking is dependent on craving.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way
to understand how seeking is dependent on craving. If there were no craving at
all, in any way, of anything anywhere — i.e., craving for sensuality, craving
for becoming, craving for no becoming — in the utter absence of craving, from
the cessation of craving, would seeking be discerned?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a
requisite condition for seeking, i.e., craving. Thus, Ananda, these two
phenomena [the chain of conditions leading from craving to birth, aging, and
death, and the chain of conditions leading from craving to quarrels, etc.], as a
duality, flow back into one place at feeling.
Feeling
"'From contact as a requisite condition comes feeling.' Thus it has been said.
And this is the way to understand how from contact as a requisite condition
comes feeling. If there were no contact at all, in any way, of anything anywhere
— i.e., contact at the eye, contact at the ear, contact at the nose, contact at
the tongue, contact at the body, or contact at the intellect — in the utter
absence of contact, from the cessation of contact, would feeling be discerned?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a
requisite condition for feeling, i.e., contact.
Contact
"'From name-&-form as a requisite condition comes contact. Thus it has been
said. And this is the way to understand how, from name-&-form as a requisite
condition comes contact. If the qualities, traits, themes, & indicators by which
there is a description of name-group (mental activity) were all absent, would
designation-contact with regard to the form-group (the physical properties) be
discerned?"
"No, lord."
"If the permutations, signs, themes, and indicators by which there is a
description of form-group were all absent, would resistance-contact with regard
to the name-group be discerned?"
"No, lord."
"If the permutations, signs, themes, and indicators by which there is a
description of name-group and form-group were all absent, would
designation-contact or resistance-contact be discerned?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a
requisite condition for contact, i.e., name-and-form.
Name-and-form
"'From consciousness as a requisite condition comes name-and-form.' Thus it has
been said. And this is the way to understand how from consciousness as a
requisite condition comes name-and-form. If consciousness were not to descend
into the mother's womb, would name-and-form take shape in the womb?"
"No, lord."
"If, after descending into the womb, consciousness were to depart, would
name-and-form be produced for this world?"
"No, lord."
"If the consciousness of the young boy or girl were to be cut off, would
name-and-form ripen, grow, and reach maturity?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a
requisite condition for name-and-form, i.e., consciousness."
Consciousness
"'From name-and-form as a requisite condition comes consciousness.' Thus it has
been said. And this is the way to understand how from name-and-form as a
requisite condition comes consciousness. If consciousness were not to gain a
foothold in name-and-form, would a coming-into-play of the origination of birth,
aging, death, and stress in the future be discerned?
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a
requisite condition for consciousness, i.e., name-and-form.
"This is the extent to which there is birth, aging, death, passing away, and
re-arising. This is the extent to which there are means of designation,
expression, and delineation. This is the extent to which the sphere of
discernment extends, the extent to which the cycle revolves for the manifesting
(discernibility) of this world — i.e., name-and-form together with
consciousness.
Delineations of a Self
"To what extent, Ananda, does one delineate when delineating a self? Either
delineating a self possessed of form and finite, one delineates that 'My self is
possessed of form and finite.' Or, delineating a self possessed of form and
infinite, one delineates that 'My self is possessed of form and infinite.' Or,
delineating a self formless and finite, one delineates that 'My self is formless
and finite.' Or, delineating a self formless and infinite, one delineates that
'My self is formless and infinite.'
"Now, the one who, when delineating a self, delineates it as possessed of form
and finite, either delineates it as possessed of form and finite in the present,
or of such a nature that it will [naturally] become possessed of form and finite
[in the future/after death], or he believes that 'Although it is not yet that
way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper
to say that a fixed view of a self possessed of form and finite obsesses him.
"The one who, when delineating a self, delineates it as possessed of form and
infinite, either delineates it as possessed of form and infinite in the present,
or of such a nature that it will [naturally] become possessed of form and
infinite [in the future/after death], or he believes that 'Although it is not
yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is
proper to say that a fixed view of a self possessed of form and infinite
obsesses him.
"The one who, when delineating a self, delineates it as formless and finite,
either delineates it as formless and finite in the present, or of such a nature
that it will [naturally] become formless and finite [in the future/after death],
or he believes that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into
being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a
self formless and finite obsesses him.
"The one who, when delineating a self, delineates it as formless and infinite,
either delineates it as formless and infinite in the present, or of such a
nature that it will [naturally] become formless and infinite [in the
future/after death], or he believes that 'Although it is not yet that way, I
will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say
that a fixed view of a self formless and infinite obsesses him.
Non-Delineations of a Self
"To what extent, Ananda, does one not delineate when not delineating a self?
Either not delineating a self possessed of form and finite, one does not
delineate that 'My self is possessed of form and finite.' Or, not delineating a
self possessed of form and infinite, one does not delineate that 'My self is
possessed of form and infinite.' Or, not delineating a self formless and finite,
one does not delineate that 'My self is formless and finite.' Or, not
delineating a self formless and infinite, one does not delineate that 'My self
is formless and infinite.'
"Now, the one who, when not delineating a self, does not delineate it as
possessed of form and finite, does not delineate it as possessed of form and
finite in the present, nor does he delineate it as of such a nature that it will
[naturally] become possessed of form and finite [in the future/after death], nor
does he believe that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into
being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a
self possessed of form and finite does not obsess him.
"The one who, when not delineating a self, does not delineate it as possessed of
form and infinite, does not delineate it as possessed of form and infinite in
the present, nor does he delineate it as of such a nature that it will
[naturally] become possessed of form and infinite [in the future/after death],
nor does he believe that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it
into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view
of a self possessed of form and infinite does not obsess him.
"The one who, when not delineating a self, does not delineate it as formless and
finite, does not delineate it as formless and finite in the present, nor does he
delineate it as of such a nature that it will [naturally] become formless and
finite [in the future/after death], nor does he believe that 'Although it is not
yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is
proper to say that a fixed view of a self formless and finite does not obsess
him.
"The one who, when not delineating a self, does not delineate it as formless and
infinite, does not delineate it as formless and infinite in the present, nor
does he delineate it as of such a nature that it will [naturally] become
formless and infinite [in the future/after death], nor does he believe that
'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This
being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a self formless and
infinite does not obsess him.
Assumptions of a Self
"To what extent, Ananda, does one assume when assuming a self? Assuming feeling
to be the self, one assumes that 'Feeling is my self' [or] 'Feeling is not my
self: My self is oblivious [to feeling]' [or] 'Neither is feeling my self, nor
is my self oblivious to feeling, but rather my self feels, in that my self is
subject to feeling.'
"Now, one who says, 'Feeling is my self,' should be addressed as follows: 'There
are these three feelings, my friend — feelings of pleasure, feelings of pain,
and feelings of neither pleasure nor pain. Which of these three feelings do you
assume to be the self?' At a moment when a feeling of pleasure is sensed, no
feeling of pain or of neither pleasure nor pain is sensed. Only a feeling of
pleasure is sensed at that moment. At a moment when a feeling of pain is sensed,
no feeling of pleasure or of neither pleasure nor pain is sensed. Only a feeling
of pain is sensed at that moment. At a moment when a feeling of neither pleasure
nor pain is sensed, no feeling of pleasure or of pain is sensed. Only a feeling
of neither pleasure nor pain is sensed at that moment.
"Now, a feeling of pleasure is inconstant, fabricated, dependent on conditions,
subject to passing away, dissolution, fading, and cessation. A feeling of pain
is inconstant, fabricated, dependent on conditions, subject to passing away,
dissolution, fading, and cessation. A feeling of neither pleasure nor pain is
inconstant, fabricated, dependent on conditions, subject to passing away,
dissolution, fading, and cessation. Having sensed a feeling of pleasure as 'my
self,' then with the cessation of one's very own feeling of pleasure, 'my self'
has perished. Having sensed a feeling of pain as 'my self,' then with the
cessation of one's very own feeling of pain, 'my self' has perished. Having
sensed a feeling of neither pleasure nor pain as 'my self,' then with the
cessation of one's very own feeling of neither pleasure nor pain, 'my self' has
perished.
"Thus he assumes, assuming in the immediate present a self inconstant, entangled
in pleasure and pain, subject to arising and passing away, he who says, 'Feeling
is my self.' Thus in this manner, Ananda, one does not see fit to assume feeling
to be the self.
"As for the person who says, 'Feeling is not the self: My self is oblivious [to
feeling],' he should be addressed as follows: 'My friend, where nothing
whatsoever is sensed (experienced) at all, would there be the thought, "I am"?'"
"No, lord."
"Thus in this manner, Ananda, one does not see fit to assume that 'Feeling is
not my self: My self is oblivious [to feeling].'
"As for the person who says, 'Neither is feeling my self, nor is my self
oblivious [to feeling], but rather my self feels, in that my self is subject to
feeling,' he should be addressed as follows: 'My friend, should feelings
altogether and every way stop without remainder, then with feeling completely
not existing, owing to the cessation of feeling, would there be the thought, "I
am"?'"
"No, lord."
"Thus in this manner, Ananda, one does not see fit to assume that 'Neither is
feeling my self, nor is my self oblivious [to feeling], but rather my self
feels, in that my self is subject to feeling.'
"Now, Ananda, in as far as a monk does not assume feeling to be the self, nor
the self as oblivious, nor that 'My self feels, in that my self is subject to
feeling,' then, not assuming in this way, he is not sustained by anything (does
not cling to anything) in the world. Unsustained, he is not agitated.
Unagitated, he is totally unbound right within. He discerns that 'Birth is
ended, the holy life fulfilled, the task done. There is nothing further for this
world.'
"If anyone were to say with regard to a monk whose mind is thus released that
'The Tathagata exists after death,' is his view, that would be mistaken; that
'The Tathagata does not exist after death'... that 'The Tathagata both exists
and does not exist after death'... that 'The Tathagata neither exists nor does
not exist after death' is his view, that would be mistaken. Why? Having directly
known the extent of designation and the extent of the objects of designation,
the extent of expression and the extent of the objects of expression, the extent
of description and the extent of the objects of description, the extent of
discernment and the extent of the objects of discernment, the extent to which
the cycle revolves: Having directly known that, the monk is released. [To say
that,] 'The monk released, having directly known that, does not see, does not
know is his opinion,' that would be mistaken. 1
Seven Stations of Consciousness
"Ananda, there are these seven stations of consciousness and two spheres. Which
seven?
"There are beings with diversity of body and diversity of perception, such as
human beings, some devas, and some beings in the lower realms. This is the first
station of consciousness.
"There are beings with diversity of body and singularity of perception, such as
the devas of the Brahma hosts generated by the first [jhana] and some beings in
the four realms of deprivation. This is the second station of consciousness. 2
"There are beings with singularity of body and diversity of perception, such as
the Radiant Devas. This is the third station of consciousness.
"There are beings with singularity of body and singularity of perception, such
as the Beautifully Lustrous Devas. This is the fourth station of consciousness.
"There are beings who,with the complete transcending of perceptions of
[physical] form, with the disappearance of perceptions of resistance, and not
heeding perceptions of diversity, [perceiving,] 'Infinite space,' arrive at the
dimension of the infinitude of space. This is the fifth station of
consciousness.
"There are beings who, with the complete transcending of the dimension of the
infinitude of space, [perceiving,] 'Infinite consciousness,' arrive at the
dimension of the infinitude of consciousness. This is the sixth station of
consciousness.
"There are beings who, with the complete transcending of the dimension of the
infinitude of consciousness, [perceiving,] 'There is nothing,' arrive at the
dimension of nothingness. This is the seventh station of consciousness.
"The dimension of non-percipient beings and, second, the dimension of neither
perception nor non-perception. [These are the two spheres.]
"Now, as for the first station of consciousness — beings with diversity of body
and diversity of perception, such as human beings, some devas, and some beings
in the lower realms: If one discerns that [station of consciousness], discerns
its origination, discerns its passing away, discerns its allure, discerns its
drawbacks, discerns the escape from it, would it be proper, by means of that
[discernment] to take delight there?"
"No, lord."
(Similarly with each of the remaining stations of consciousness and two
spheres.)
"Ananda, when knowing — as they actually are — the origination, passing away,
allure, drawbacks of — and escape from — these seven stations of consciousness
and two spheres, a monk is released through lack of clinging, he is said to be a
monk released through discernment.
Eight Emancipations
"Ananda, there are these eight emancipations. Which eight?
"Possessed of form, one sees forms. This is the first emancipation.
"Not percipient of form internally, one sees forms externally. This is the
second emancipation.
"One is intent only on the beautiful. This is the third emancipation.
"With the complete transcending of perceptions of [physical] form, with the
disappearance of perceptions of resistance, and not heeding perceptions of
diversity, [perceiving,] 'Infinite space,' one enters and remains in the
dimension of the infinitude of space. This is the fourth emancipation.
"With the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of space,
[perceiving,] 'Infinite consciousness,' one enters and remains in the dimension
of the infinitude of consciousness. This is the fifth emancipation.
"With the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of
consciousness, [perceiving,] 'There is nothing,' one enters and remains in the
dimension of nothingness. This is the sixth emancipation.
"With the complete transcending of the dimension of nothingness, one enters and
remains in the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception. This is the
seventh emancipation.
"With the complete transcending of the dimension of neither perception nor
non-perception, one enters and remains in the cessation of perception and
feeling. This is the eighth emancipation.
"Now, when a monk attains these eight emancipations in forward order, in reverse
order, in forward and reverse order, when he attains them and emerges from them
wherever he wants, however he wants, and for as long as he wants, when through
the ending of the mental fermentations he enters and remains in the
fermentation-free awareness-release and discernment-release, having directly
known it and realized it in the here and now, he is said to be a monk released
in both ways. And as for another release in both ways, higher or more sublime
than this, there is none."
That is what the Blessed One said. Gratified, Ven. Ananda delighted in the
Blessed One's words.



Notes
1. The various readings for this sentence all seem to be corrupt. The sense of
the paragraph, read in light of AN 10.96, demands that the view expressed in the
last sentence be about the monk released, unlike the four earlier views, which
are wrongly attributed to the monk released. In other words, the monk released
has no opinion on the question of whether the Tathagata does, doesn't, etc.,
exist after death. This might lead to the supposition that his lack of opinion
comes from a lack of knowledge or vision. The description of what he comes to
know in the course of gaining release shows that this supposition is
inappropriate. He does know, he does see, and what he knows and sees about the
limitations of language and concepts shows him that the question of the
existence of the Tathagata after death should be set aside.
Thus I would reconstruct the Pali of the final sentence in this paragraph as:
Tadabhiññaa vimutto bhikkhu na jaanaati na passati iti saa ditthi tadakallam.
2.This reading follows the Thai edition of the Pali canon. Other editions omit
the statement, "and some beings in the four realms of deprivation." However,
something like the Thai reading seems called for, inasmuch as the first station
of consciousness covers only some of the beings in the lower realms.
See also:
Bodhi, Bhikkhu, trans., The Great Discourse on Causation: The Maha Nidana
Sutta and its Commentaries (Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society,
1984).
Warder, A. K., Indian Buddhism (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980), Chapter 5.