Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
Honour to the Exalted One Arahant Buddha Supreme
POINTS OF CONTROVERSY
BOOK I
1. Of the Existence of a Personal Entity.
Controverted Point.—That the
£
person' is known in the
sense of a real and ultimate fact.
From the Commentary.—The Theravadin1 questions a Puggala-
vadin (one who believes in the existence of a personal entity, soul, or
perduring immortal essence in man) concerning his position. Who
among the eighteen schools of thought were Puggalavadins ? In the
Sasana the Vajjiputtakas and Sammitiyas, and many other teachers
besides, not belonging to the Sasana.
e
Person'2 means soul, being,
vital principle.
{
Is known':3 is approached and got at by the under-
standing, is cognized. 'Real': not taken as an effect of magic or
mirage, actual. ' Ultimate': highest sense, not taken from tradition,
or hearsay.
4
Known' as one of the
4
fifty-seven ultimates of our
conscious experience.
4
I.—THE EIGHT REFUTATIONS.
The First Refutation.
(i.) The Fivefold Affirmative Presentation.
[§ 1] Theravadin.—Is 'the person' known in the sense of
a real and ultimate fact ?
1
More literally,
4
one of ours': — sakavadin.
2
Used in its popular sense = homo in the Nikayas; puggal a in
the Abhidhamma Pitaka largely supersedes atta and other terms for
soul.
3
Literally, is got or found. Cf . Dialogues, ii. 166; Psalms of the
Sisters, 190: ' Mayest thou obtain.'
4
Five aggregates, twelve sense-organs and objects, eighteen elements,
twenty-two controlling powers. See Compendium of Philosophy,
Part VII.
Puggalavadin.—Yes.1
Th.—Is the person known in the same way2 as a real and
ultimate fact is known ?
P>—Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Th. Acknowledge your refutation: (i.) If the person be
known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed,
good sir, you should also say, the person is known in
the same way as [any other] real and ultimate fact [is
known].
(ii.) That which you say here is wrong, namely, (1) that
we ought to say, ' the person is known in the sense of a
real and ultimate fact,' but (2) we ought not to say, the
person is known in the same way as [any other] real and
ultimate fact [is known].
(iii.) If the latter statement (2) cannot be admitted,
then indeed the former statement (1) should not be
admitted.
(iv.) In affirming the former statement (1), while
(v.) denying the latter (2), you are wrong.
(ii.) The Fourfold Rejoinder.
[2] P.—Is the ' person' not known in the sense o f a
real and ultimate fact ?
Th.—No, it is not known.
3
P.—Is it unknown in the same way as any real and
ultimate fact is [known] ?
Th.—Nay, that cannot truly be said.
P.—Acknowledge the rejoinder:
4
(i.) If the person be not
'
1 c
Yes/ because the Exalted One, whose utterances were mutually
consistent, who taught no mere on-dits, and who himself had universal
knowledge, said in the Suttas handed down, that 'there is for instance
the person who is working for his own advantage,
3
and so on.—Comy.
2
Tato. This is an'instrumental'phrase : ki n t e 'puggal o pi
t en' aka r en a upalabbhatlt i V 'In the same way,' that is,
either as the factors of mind and body are known, by immediate con-
sciousness, or under one of the twenty-four relation-categories.-— Comy.
3
English idiom requires that the affirmative Amanta! be
rendered negatively.
4
Pati-kammam , ' re-action5
; hence, retort, rejoinder, rebutting,
repartee.
known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed,
good sir, you should also say : not known in the same way
as any real and ultimate fact is known.
(ii.) That which you say here is wrong, namely, that
(1) we ought to say ' the person is not known in the sense
of a real and ultimate fact,' and (2) we ought not to say:
' not known in the same way as any real and ultimate fact
is known.'
If the latter statement (2) cannot be admitted, then
indeed the former statement (1) should not be admitted
either.
In affirming (2), while denying (1), you are wrong.
(iii.) The Fourfold Refutation.
[3] P. (continues).—But if you imagine we ought to
affirm that (1) the person is not known in the sense of a
real and ultimate fact, but we ought not also to affirm that
(2) the ' person' is not known in the same way as [any] real
and ultimate fact [is known], then you, who have actually
assented to the very proposition contained in that negative
question,
1
must certainly be refuted in the following
manner:—let us then refute you, for you are well
refuted!
(i.) If (1) the 'person' is not known in the sense of a real
and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you should have
said [as well] that (2) the ' person' is not known2
in the
same way as any real and ultimate fact is known.
(ii.) What you affirm is false, namely, that the former
statement (1) should be affirmed, but that the latter
(2) should not be affirmed.
If the latter statement (2) is not to be affirmed, then
neither truly can the former (1) be affirmed.
That which you say here—(1) should be affirmed, but
not (2); this statement of yours is wrong.
1
Implied in tattha, there.
2
In P.T.S. ed. read n'upalabbhati .
(iv.) The Fourfold Application.
1
[4] P. (continues).—Ii this be a faulty refutation, look at
the parallel procedure in your own argument (§ 1). Thus,
according to us (1) was true (the person is known, etc.);
but (2) was not true (. . . known in the same way, etc.).
Now we, who admitted these propositions, do not consider
ourselves to have been refuted. [You say] you have refuted
us; anyway we are not well refuted. Your argument ran
that if we affirmed (1), we must also affirm (2); that if we
did not admit the truth of (2), neither could we admit the
truth of (1); that we were wrong in assenting to (1), while
denying (2).
(v.) The Fourfold Conclusion.
2
[5] P. (continues).—Nay (I repeat), we are not to be refuted
thus, (i) namely, that my proposition compels me to assent
to your
4
known in the same way,' etc.; (ii.) your pro-
nouncement that my proposition (1) coupled with my
rejection (2) is wrong;
3
(iii.) that i f I reject (2), I must
also reject (1); (iv.) that I must affirm both or none. This
refutation of yours is badly done. I maintain, on the other
hand, that my rejoinder was well done, and that my sequel
to the argument
4
was well done.
The Second Refutation.
(i.) The Fivefold Adverse Controversy.
[6] P.—Is the person not known in the sense of a real
and ultimate fact ?
Th.—No, it is not known . . . (continue as in § 1, reversing
the speakers, and substituting ' not known' for
6
known.'
1
Upanaya, or Upanayana, is the technical term in Buddhist
logic for the minor premiss, and means the leading-up-towards, the
subsumption.
2
Niggamana, 'going down or away a technical term in
Buddhist logic.
3
In the P.T. S. ed. n'upalabbhati, in this paragraph, according
to Br
, should be upalabbhati.
.
4
Patipadana—-i.e., katha-magga-patipadana.—Comy.
(ii.) The Fourfold Rejoinder.
[7] Th.—Is the person known in the sense of a real and
ultimate fact ?
P.—Yes . . . (continue as in § 2, reversing the speakers,
ancl substituting ' known ' for
6
not known.'
(iii.) The Fourfold Refutation.
[8] Th.—But i f you imagine we ought to affirm that ' the
person' is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact,
but that we ought not to affirm as well that the person is
known in the same way as [any other] real and ultimate
fact [is known], etc. . . . {continue as in § 3, reversing the
speakers, and substituting ' known '/or
6
not known').
(iv.) The Fourfold Application.
[9] Th. {continues).—If this be a faulty refutation, look at
the parallel procedure in your own argument (§ 6). Thus,
according to us (a) was true (a soul is not known, etc.);
but (b) was not true (. . . not known in the same way,
etc.). Now we, who admitted these propositions, do not
consider ourselves to have been refuted, etc.
(v.) The Fourfold Conclusion.
[10] Th. (continues).—Nay, I repeat, we are not to be
refuted as you claim to have refuted us . . . wherefore
your refutation was ill done, etc.
1
The Third Refutation.
[11]. Th.—Is the person known in the sense of a real
and ultimate fact ?
1
So far for what the Comy, calls pathama-suddhisacchi -
kattho :—the ' first' controversy 'merely' relating to the 'reality'
of the personal entity considered absolutely, or in itself. Its reality is
next considered in relation to space, to time, and, lastly, to things in
general. And under each of these four aspects, as we have already
seen above under the first, the argument is presented affirmatively and
negatively, thus making up the eight-faced views, or attha-mukha-
vada, of the controversy.
P.—It is.
Th.—Is the person known everywhere in that sense ?
P.—Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Th.—Acknowledge the refutation : If the person be known
in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good
sir, you ought to admit that the person is known in that
sense everywhere. You are wrong to admit the one propo-
sition (A) and deny the other (C). If (C) is false, (A) is
also false.
1
The Fourth Refutation.
[12] Th.—Is the person known in the sense of a real
and ultimate fact ?
P.—It is.
Th.—Is the person known always in that sense ?
P.—Nay, that cannot truly be said . . . (continue as
above, substituting ' always' for
e
everywhere ').
2
The Fifth Refutation.
[18] Th.—Is the person known . . . {as in § 11) . . . in
everything3
in the sense of a real and ultimate fact? {con-
tinue as in § 11, substituting £
in everything5
for 'every-
where ').
1
Complete, as in §§ 2-5. This section is termed okasasacchi -
kattho , or reality in respect of place. It deals with the errors
(1) that the soul or person is in the r u p a or material qualities (rupas -
mir) at t anar j s am an upassan a do sarj), so often repudiated in
the Nikayas; and (2) the living thing or principle (jivo) is different
from the body (sariram), also frequently mentioned in those books,
:—Comy.
2
This section is known as ' reality in respect of time.' According
to the Corny, the adherent's question refers to both the former and
later lives (of any given person), to the present remainder of life, and to
its final close (dharamana-parinibbutakalanca).
3
That is, in all the mental and bodily constituents, the organs and
objects of sense, etc. Corny. (for Khandhesuti , P.T.S. ed.,
p, 15, read sabbesuti) .
The , Sixth Refutation.
[14] P.—Is the person not known . . . (otherwise as in
§ 11) . . . everywhere in that sense ? . . . (substituting ' not
known ' for ' known
The Seventh Refutation.
[15] P.—Is the person not known . . . always in that
sense ? . . .
The Eighth Refutation.
[16] P.—Is the person not known .. . in everything
in that sense ? . . .
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