Kathavatthu - Of the Existence of a Personal Entity - Appeal to the Suttas

Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A

VIII. APPEAL TO THE SUTTAS.
1
[219] P.—Is it wrong to say 'the person is known in
the sense of a real and ultimate fact' ?
Th.— Yes.
P.—Is there not [one whom we call] mother ?
Th.—Yes.
P.—If there be, then indeed, good sir, it is right to say
'the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate
fact.' Again, is there not [one whom we call] father, are
there not brothers, sisters, nobles, brahmins, merchants,
serfs, householders, religious, devas, humans ?
Th.—Yes.
P.—If there be, then indeed, good sir, it is right to say
'the person is known,' etc.
[220] Th.—Granting there are mother's, fathers, etc.,
1
The final citation are led up to by several preliminary inquiries.
These, says the Comy., bear on kinship, status, career, rebirth, etc.


is it for this reason that yon insist thus respecting the
personal entity ?
P.—Yes.
Th.—Is there anyone who, not having been a mother,
becomes a mother ?
P.—Yes.
Th.—Is there anyone who, not having been a personal
entity, becomes one ?
P.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. ... »
(This pair of questions is then put concerning 'father,'
'brother' . . . 'deva,' 'human,' and answered as above.)
Th.—Granting the existence of a mother, is it for this
reason that the person is known in the sense of a real and
ultimate fact ?
P.—Yes.
Th.—Is there anyone who, having been a mother, is
no longer a mother ?
P.—Yes.
Th.—Is there anyone who, having been a personal
entity, is no longer one ?
P.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
This last pair of questions is then put with respect to
' father' and the rest, and answered as above.
[221] P.—Is it wrong to say 'the person is known in
the sense of a real and ultimate fact' ?
Th.—Yes.
P.—Is there no siu&41up,g as a ' stream-winner' (or
one who has entsr&il the first stage of the way to salvation) ?
Th.—Yes. "
P.— If there be such a thing, then indeed, good sir, it
is right to assent to the original preposition. Again, is
there no such thing as a ' once-returner,' a ' no-returner,'
an arahant,
1
one who is freed in both ways,
2
one who is
1
Or those who are in the second, third, and ultimate stages re-
spectively of the way to salvation.
2
Cf . Dialogues, ii 70 ; Puggala-Pannatti, I., § 30; viz., both tem-
porarily and permanently, from both body and mind, by Jhana and
the Path respectively.


emancipated by understanding,
1
one who has the testimony
within himself,
2
one who has arrived at right views, one
who is emancipated by faith, one who marches along with
wisdom,
3
one who marches along with faith 9
Th.—Yes.
P.—Then surely, good sir, it is right to affirm the first
proposition.
[222] Th.—Granted that there is such a thing as a
'stream-winner,' is it for that reason that the 'person' is
known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
P.—Yes.
Th.—Is there anyone who, not having been a stream-
winner, is one now ?
P.—Yes.
Th.—Is there anyone who, not having been a ' person/
is one now ?
P.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Th.—Again, granted that there is such an one as a
stream-winner, and that this is the reason for your
affirmation as to the personal entity, is there anyone who
having been a stream-winner, is so no longer ?
P.—Yes.
Th.—Is there anyone who, not having been a person, is
one now ?
P.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
These questions are now put regarding the other designa-
tions, and are answered similarly.
[223] P.—If [as you say] it be wrong to assert 'the
person is known, etc., . . .' are there not [the accepted
terms of] 1 the Four Pairs of men,' 'the Eight Individuals'?
4
1
Or intuition (panna).
2
Namely, that he has certain of the intoxicants destroyed. Pugg.
Pann., I. § 32. For the remaining designations see op. cit., § 33, f .
3
The Pugg. Pann. Comy, so paraphrases dhammanusari ;
'panna is borne along and goes before.' JPTS., 1914, p. 194.
These are all terms apparently involving a permanent personal entity,
from the opponent's point of view.
4
I.e., those in the four paths (see above, § 221), and these divided
into those who have attained one or other of the four paths and the
four ' fruits' or fruitions (see prev. page).


Th.—Yes.
P.—But if that be so, surely it is right to speak of the
' person' as known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.
[224] Th.—Granting that there are the Four, the Eight,
is it for this reason you assert the first proposition?
P.—Yes.
Th.—Do the Four, the Eight, appear because o f the
Buddha's appearing?
Yes.
Does the 'person' appear because of the Buddha's
appearing ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat the question.
Yes.
Then at the Buddha's final Nibbana, is the 'person'
annihilated, so that no personal entity exists ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[225] Th.—The person [you say] is known in the sense
of a real and ultimate fact—is the person conditioned?
1
Nay, that cannot truly be said. .. .
Is the person unconditioned ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. .. .
Is he neither ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat my question.
Yes.
Apart from the conditioned or the unconditioned, is there
another, a third alternative?
2
Nay, that cannot truly be said. .. .
I repeat my question.
1
This is an inquiry into the nature of 'a real and ultimate [or self-
dependent] fact.' Comy. ' Conditioned' (sankhata) is, in Buddhist
tradition, what has been prepared, brought about by something else,
made, has come together by conditions (Comy, on A., i. 152).
The opponent's desire to get puggala outside the category of all
phenomena brings him into a somewhat 'tight place.'
2
Koti , literally extreme, or point, or end.


Yes.
But was it not said by the Exalted One: ' There are,
bhikkhus, these two irreducible categories—what are the two?
The irreducible category of the conditioned, the irreducible
category of the unconditioned. These are the two ' ?1
Is the Suttanta thus ?
Yes.
Hence it is surely wrong to say that apart from the
conditioned and the unconditioned, there is another, a
third alternative.
[226] Th. (continues).—You say that the person is neither
conditioned nor unconditioned ? Are then the conditioned,
the unconditioned, the person, entirely different things ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Are the aggregates conditioned, Nibbana unconditioned,
the person neither conditioned nor unconditioned ?
Yes.
Then are the aggregates, Nibbana, and the person, three
entirely different things ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
(The last two questions are then applied to each aggregate
taken separately:—material qualities, feeling, perception,
mental co-efficients, consciousness).
[227] Th.—Is the genesis of the person apparent/ and its
passing away also, and is its duration distinctively ap-
parent ?
Yes.
[Then] is the person conditioned ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. .. .
It was said by the Exalted One: 'Bhikkhus, there are
these three characteristics of the conditioned: of conditioned
things the genesis is apparent, the passing away is apparent,
the duration2 amidst change is apparent.' Hence if these
three are characteristics of the person, this is also
1
Cf. Digha-Nik, Ill. 274.
2
Thitassa annathattang , literally 'duration's other-ness.'
Buddhaghosa paraphrases by jara, decay. Anguttara-Nik., i. 152.
See Note on Thiti, Appendix.


conditioned. Are these three characteristics not apparent
in the person ?
No, they are not apparent.
Then is the person unconditioned?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. .. .
It was said by the Exalted One: ' Bhikkhus, there are
these three characteristics of the unconditioned : of uncon-
ditioned things, bhikkhus, the genesis is not apparent, the
passing aivay is not apparent, the duration amidst change is
not apparent.'
1
Now if all these [as you say] do not charac-
terize the [notion of ] 'person,' the person is unconditioned.
[228] Th.—The person who has attained final Nibbana,
does he exist in the Goal,
2
or does he not exist therein?
He exists in the Goal.
Is then the person who has finally attained eternal ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Is „ the person who has attained final Nibbana and does
not exist in the Goal annihilated ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[228a] Th— On what does the person depend in order to
persist?
P.—He persists through dependence on coming-to-be.
3
Th.—Is [the state of] coming-to-be impermanent, con-
ditioned, arisen through a cause, liable to perish, to pass
away, to become passionless, to cease, to change?
P.—Yes.
1 Op. et loc. cit,
2
Parinibbuto puggalo atth' atthamhinatth ' atthamhi ?
The idiom is unusual for the Pitakas, and in this connection, we
believe, unique. The Comy, explains : 'atthang pucchati nib-
banang, " He asks about the goal (or the Good), Nibbana." P. rejects
both the following questions, lest he be thought either an Eternalist
or an Annihilationist.'
'Attained final Nibbana' could of course be
rendered more literally ' has utterly become extinct.'
3
Bhavang , or existence; but ' existence ' is better reserved for
atthita. The Comy, paraphrases by upapattibhavang, the
state of being reborn.


Th.—Is the person also impermanent, conditioned, arisen
through a cause, liable to perish, to pass away, to become
passionless, to cease, to change ?
P.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[229] P.—Is it wrong to say f
the person is known
in the sense of a real and ultimate fact
5
?
Th.—Yes.
P.—Is there no one who, on feeling pleasurable feeling,
knows that he is feeling it?
1
Th.—Yes.
P.—Surely, i f that be so, good sir, it is right to say
'the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate
fact' . . . and if he, on feeling painful feeling, knows that
he is feeling it—you admit this ?—it is right to say ' the
person is known,' etc. So also for neutral feeling.
[280] Th.—I note what you affirm. Now is it for this
reason that you maintain the person to be known in the
sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
P.—Yes.
Th.—Then is one who, on feeling pleasurable feeling,
knows he is feeling it, a personal entity, and is one who,
on that occasion, does not know, not a personal entity ?
P.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. .. .
Th.—You deny this also in the case of painful and
neutral feeling ?
P.—Yes, that cannot truly be said, . , .
Th.—But you maintain, because of this self-awareness,
that the person is known in the sense of a real and
ultimate fact ?
P.—Yes.
Th.—Is then pleasurable feeling one thing and the
self-conscious enjoyer another ?
P.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
(Same query and answer in the case of painful and neutral
feelings.)
1
' The earnest student (yogavacara) knows ; the fool and
average man does not.'—Comy.


[231] P.—You deny that the person is known in the
sense of a real and ultimate fact:—Is there then no one
who may be occupied in contemplating the [concept of]
body with respect to his physical frame ?
Yes.
.. . or in contemplating [the concept of] feeling, or
consciousness, or certain mental properties
1
with respect
to these in himself, respectively ?
Yes.
Then surely, good sir, it is right to say as I do with
respect to the person.
[232] Th.—Granting the carrying out by anyone o f the
four applications in mindfulness, is it for this reason that
you say as you do with respect to the personal entity ?
Yes.
Then is anyone when so engaged a person, and not,
when he is not so engaged ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[238] Th— Or again, granting [as above] .. . is
'body' one thing, the contemplator another? and so for
* feeling,' etc. ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[234] Th.—Is the person known in the sense o f a real
and ultimate fact ?
Yes.
Was it not said by the Exalted One:
'O Mogharajan ! look upon the world
As void [of soul],2 and ever heedful bide.

1
The reference is to the religious exercise in self-knowledge known
as the four Sati-patthana's , or * applications in mindfulness.'
These properties are traditionally explained as the cetasika -
dhamma (see below . . .), but Ledi Sadaw judges otherwise. See
Compendium, 179, n, 3. The Animist holds that introspective exercise
involves a persisting identical subject.
2
Cf . Samyutta-Nik., iv. 54, ' Void' implies' of soul.' ' Contemplate
the world of aggregates as void of entities.'-*-Comy.


Cut out the world's opinions as to soul.
So shalt thou get past death ; so an thou look,
The king of death shall no more look on thee'?1
Is it thus in the Suttanta ?
Yes.
Hence it is surely wrong to say that the person is known
in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.
[235] Th.—Is it the person [or soul] here who' looks upon' ?
Yes.
Does he contemplate with or without material qualities ?
With them.
Is that soul the same as that body ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
But if he contemplates without material qualities, is
that soul quite, different from that body ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Th.—[I ask again] is it the [soul or] person who con-
templates ?
Yes.
Does he contemplate when he has gone within, or does
he contemplate from without [the organism]?
He contemplates when he has gone within.
Is that soul that body?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Supposing he contemplates from without, is the soul one
thing, the body another ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. .. .
[236] P.—Is it wrong to say ' the person is known in
the sense of a real and ultimate fact' ?
Th.—Yes.
P.—Was not the Exalted One a speaker of truth,2
a speaker in season,3 a speaker of facts,3 a speaker of
words that are right,4 that are not wrong, that are not
ambiguous?
1
Sutta-Nipata, ver. 1119.
2
Dialogues, i. 4 ; Psalms of the Sisters, lxvi.
3
Digha-Nik., Ill. 175 ; Anguttara-Nik., v. 205.
4
Anguttara-Nik., 24; Iti-vuttaka, § 112.


Th.—Yes.
P.—Now it was said by the Exalted One : ' There is the
person who works for his own good . .
1
Is the Suttanta thus ?
Th.—Yes.
P.—Hence surely the person is known in the sense of a
real and ultimate fact.
[287] . . . again, it was said by the Exalted One:
' There is one person, bhikkhus, who, being reborn in this world,
is born for the good, for the happiness of many, to shoiv com-
passion on the world, for the advantage, the good, the happi-
ness of devas and of men'
2
Is the Suttanta thus ?
Th.—Yes.
P.—Hence surely the person is known in the sense of a
real and ultimate fact.
[288] Th.—Granting this, and also the veracity, etc., o f
the Exalted One:—it was said by the Exalted One:
6
All
things are without soul.'
3
Is the Suttanta thus ?
P.—Yes.
Th.—Hence surely it is wrong to say the person is
known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.
[239] . . . again, it was said by the Exalted One : ' He
does not doubt that misery arises, comes to pass, that misery
ceases, passes away, nor is he perplexed thereat. And there-
upon independent insight
4
" comes herein to him. Now this,
Kaccana, thus far is right views.'
5
Is the Suttanta thus ?
1
See § 74.
2
Anguttara-Nik, i. 22 ; quoted in Questions of King Milinda, ii. 56.
3
Atta . Dhammapada, ver. 279 ; Samyutta-Nik., iv. 28.
4
A-para-paccaya-nanang,
4
insight not conditioned by others.'
5
Samyutta-Nik., ii. 17; Ill. 135. The quotation does not obviously
bear on the controverted point to us, but to a Buddhist versed in his
Suttas the context (apparently a familiar one) arises: Insight comes
to him who has rejected the theories that the world is a persisting
entity, or a concourse of fortuitous illusions, being convinced that it is,
in its essentials, a cosmos of conditioned becoming.


P.—Yes.
Th.—Hence surely it is wrong to say ' the person is
known/etc.
[240] Th.—. . . again, was it not said by Bhikkhuni
Vajira to Mara the evil one:
' " Being "?1 What dost thou fancy by that word ?
'Mong false opinions, Mara, art thou strayed.
This a mere bundle of formations is.
Therefrom no "being" may est thou obtain.
For e'en as, when the factors are arranged,
The product by the name " chariot" is known,
So doth our usage covenant to say :
"A being," when the aggregates are there.
'Tis simply Ill that riseth, simply Ill
2
That doth persist, and then fadeth away.
Nought beside Ill there is that comes to be;
Nought else but Ill there is that fades away' ? 3
Is the Suttanta thus ?
P.—Yes.
[241] Th— . . . again, did not the venerable Ananda say
to the Exalted One: ' It is said, lord, " the world is void, the
world is void." Now in what way, lord, is it meant that the
world is void V [and did not the Exalted One reply:]
4
Inasmuch, Ahanda, as it is void of soul
4
and of what belongs
to soul,
6
therefore is the world called void. And wherein,
Ananda, is it void of soul and of what belongs to soul? The
eye, Ananda, is verily void of soul and of what belongs to soul,
so is visible object and the sense and contact of sight. So are
the other organs, and objects of the senses, and the other senses.
So is the co-ordinating organ, cognizable objects, mental con-
sciousness and contact. All are void of sotd and of what belongs
to soul. And whatever pleasurable, painf ul, or neutral feeling
1
Satta .
2
On this term see Ledi Sadaw, J.P.T.S., 1914, 133 i , and Mrs.
Rh. D., Buddhist Psychology, 1914, p. 83 f .
3
Samyutta-Nik., i. 134 f.; Pss. Sisters, 190. Her verses are not in
the Anthology of the Therls or Senior Sisters. She is not called Then,
but only Bhikkhuni.
4 Atta .
5 Attaniya.


arises, in relation to the senses, and the sense-co-ordinating
mind, that too is void of soul and of what belongs to soul.
It is for this, Ananda, that the world is said to be void' ?1
Is the Suttanta thus ?
P.—Yes.
[242] T7i.—. . . again, whereas you affirm that the person
is known, etc. . . . and we know the veracity, etc., of the
Exalted One, it was said by the Exalted One: ' Bhikkhus,
if there were sold, should I have that which belongs to a
soid f
2
Or if there were that which belongs to soul, should I
have a soul? In both cases ye would reply: "Yea, lord."
But both soul and that which belongs to soul being in very
truth and for ever impossible to be known, then this that is a
stage of opinion, namely : " that is the wo?ldt that is the soul,
this I shall hereafter become, permanent, constant, eternal,
unchangeable—so shall I abide even like unto the Eternal—
is not this, bhikkhus, absolutely and entirely a doctrine of
fools " Whatever it be not, lord, it surely is, absolutely
and entirely a doctrine of fools'" '
3
Is the Suttanta thus ?
P.—Yes.
[243] Th.— . . . again, it was said by the Exalted One:
6
There are these three teachers, Seniya, to be found in the
world—who are the three ? There is first, Seniya, that
kind of teacher who declares that there is a real, persistent
soid in the life that now is, and in that which is to come;
then there is the kind of teacher, Seniya, who declares that
there is a real, persistent soul in the life that now is, but not
a soul in a future life ; lastly, there is a certain teacher ivho
does not declare that there is a soul either in the life that now
is, nor in that which is to come. The first, Seniya, of these
three is called an Eternalist, the second is called an Anni-
hilationist ; the third of these, he, Seniya, is callecl the teacher,
who is Buddha supreme.
4
These are the three teachers to be
found in the world.
95
1
Samyutta-N., iv. 54.
2
Atta, attaniya .
3
Majjhima-Nik., i. 188.
4
More literally, perfectly enlightened (sammasambuddho) .
5
We cannot trace this quotation.


Is the Suttanta thus ?
P.—Yes.
Th.— . . . again, did the Exalted One speak of 'a
butter-jar'?
1
P.—Yes.
Th.—Is there anyone who can make a jar out of butter ?
P.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Th. . . . finally, did the Exalted One speak o f an oil-
jar, a honey-jar, a molasses-jar, a milk-pail, a water-pot, a
cup, flask, bowl of water, a 'meal provided in perpetuity,'
a ' constant supply of congey' ?
2
P.—Yes.
Th.—Is there any supply of congey that is permanent,
stable, eternal, not liable to change ?
P.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Th.—Hence it is surely wrong to say 4
the soul is known
in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.'
1
Nor this. But the Comy, remarks:
4
The following is adduced to
show that meaning is not always according to the form of what is said.
A gold jar is made of gold ; a butter-jar is not made of butter, nor is an
oil-jar made of oil, and so on. A meal instituted in perpetuity by
charity is not eternal and permanent as is Nibbana.
2
E.g., Vinaya, iv. 74; Jataka, i. 178 (trans., i. 60). The argument
is that to use such terms as puggala , being, etc., in their popular
conventional sense, as the Buddha did when teaching the laity, by no
means confers upon the transient aggregates so called any ultimate or
philosophical reality, any more than to speak of a constant supply of
food implies any eternal, immutable source. 'Given bodily and
mental aggregates/ concludes the Commentator in his peroration, ' it is
customary to say such and such a name, a family. This by popular
convention means " a person." Hereon it was said by the Exalted
One : " These are merely names, expressions, turns of speech, designa-
tions in common use in the world" (.Dialogues, i. 263). . . . The
Buddhas have two kinds of discourse, the popular and the philosophical.
The latter is, as a rule, too severe to begin with, therefore they take
the former first. But both first and last they teach consistently and
in conformity with truth according to the method selected.'