Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
5. Of Matter as a Moral Condition (hetu).1
Controverted Point.—That material qualities are moral
conditions.
From the Commentary.—'Condition' [hetu] may signify more
specially one of the moral conditions or motives and their opposites :
appetite—disinterestedness, hate—love, dulness—intelligence; or, more
generally, any condition or causal relation whatever, Now, the IJttara-
pathakas make no such distinction, but relying on the letter of the
Word th e four primary qualities2 are conditions [of secondary
qualities'']—claim that bodily or material qualities may be [moral]
conditions.
[1] Th —Your view implies that (i.) material qualities
must act as one or other of the sis motives of moral or
immoral conduct; (ii.) they have a mental object or idea,
having the properties of mental adverting, adjustment, etc.3
From both of these implications you dissent, hence you
cannot maintain your position.
[2-3] Indeed, you are ready to maintain the contrary of
(ii.), that proposition being quite true when applied to the
six moral conditions, but untrue of material qualities.
[4] U.—But are not the four primary qualities conditions
of the secondary material qualities that are derived from
them?3 Of course you assent. Hence, the four being
material, material qualities are conditions [however you
understand 'conditions'].
6. Matter and Concomitant Moral Conditions.
Controverted Point—That material qualities are accom-
panied by moral conditions.
1
On Buddhaghosa's analysis of hetu, see Bud. Psy. Eth., p. 274,
n. 1. The alternative meanings above are known as hetu-hetu, or
mula (root), and paccaya-hetu . On hetu, see Compendium,
p. 279.
2
Extended, cohesive, calorific, and mobile elements (Compendium,
p. 268, and above.
3
See VIII.
From the Commentary.—The foregoing dissertation applies here also.
[1] Th.—That is (i.) they must be accompanied by one or
more of the six motives or moral conditions, either good or
bad; (ii.) they have a mental object or idea, having the
properties of mental adverting, adjustment, etc. . . . (see
XVI. 5 [1-2]).
[2] If you admit that disinterestedness, love, and the
other four,1 as moral conditions, have a mental object and
involve mental adverting, adjustment, etc., then you must
describe material qualities in the same terms. [8] And i f
that be so, you cannot deny either attribute to material
qualities without equally denying it to the moral conditions.
[4] U.—But is not matter in causal relations ? You
agree. Then it is surely right to say material qualities are
accompanied by [moral conditions or] motives.
7. Of Matter as Morally Good or BacL
Controverted Point.—That material qualities are (i.) good
or moral, (ii.) bad or immoral.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Mahingsasakas and Sam-
initiyas, relying on the Word—'acts of body and speech are good or
bad'—and that among such acts we reckon intimations of our thought
by gesture and language,2 hold that the physical motions engaged
therein are [morally] good or bad.
[1] Th.—Do you mean to imply that material quali-
ties have a mental object, and the properties of mental
adverting, of adjustment, etc. ? Surely you agree that the
opposite is true? [2] And that, whereas you can predicate
those things of the three moral motives or conditions, and
of the five moral controlling powers, [3] they do not fit the
case of material qualities. .. .
(ii.) [4-6] The same argument holds good for material
qualities as immoral.
1
See XVI. 5, 'From the Commentary.'
2 Bud. Psy.Eth., p. 217; Vibhanga, p. 13.
[7] M.S.—But is not karma (moral action) of body and of
speech either good or bad ? Surely then material qualities
[engaged therein] are also either good or bad ?
8. Of Matter as Result.
Controverted Point.— That material qualities are results
[of karma].
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Andhakas and Sammitiyas,
hold that, just as consciousness and its concomitant attributes arise
because of karma that has been wrought, so also do material [i.e.,
corporeal] qualities arise as results [of karma].1
[1] Th.—Do you mean to imply that matter is of the
nature of feeling, pleasurable, painful, or neutral, that it
is conjoined with feeling, with mental reaction, and other
phases of consciousness, that it has the properties of mental
adverting, adjustment, etc. ? Is not the contrary the case?
If you assent, you cannot maintain your proposition.
[2] All those things are mental characteristics, not
material. But you wish to see in matter a 'result' of
karma, without the mental characters which are the pro-
perties of 'result.' .. .
[3] A.S.—But is not consciousness and its concomitant
attributes, which arise through actions done, 'result'?
Surely then material qualities, which arise through
actions done, are equally 'result' ?
9. Of Matter as belonging to the Material and the
Immaterial Heavens.
Controverted Point— That matter belongs to (i.) the
material heavens, (ii.) the immaterial heavens.
1
On 'result,' vipaka , as technically a conscious or mental phe-
nomenon, see above, VII. 7, 8.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Andhakas, hold that since
matter, which is the product o f actions clone in the world [and heavens]
of sense-desire, belongs therefore to that world, so if it be the product
of actions done in the material or immaterial heavens, it belongs
equally to those heavens.
[1] Th.—Then you must describe matter [in terms de-
scriptive of (i.) that is to say] as seeking attainment in
Jhana, as seeking rebirth on those planes, as living happily
under present conditions, as accompanied by a mind that
seeks that attainment and that rebirth, and that lives in
that happiness ; as coexistent with such a mind, associated,
conjoined with it, one with it in genesis, in cessation, in
physical basis, as having the same objects before it . . .
[2] and you must describe matter [in terms descriptive of
(ii.) that is to say] in the same terms as we apply to (i.).
But is not the contrary true as to both (i.) and (ii.) ? . . .
[3] A.—But is not matter which is due to actions done
in the world of sense-desires called 'belonging to'1 that
world? If that is so, then matter due to actions done in
either of the other worlds of existence should surely be
called ' belonging to' either the Material Heavens or the
Immaterial Heavens.
10. Of Desire for Life in the Higher Heavens.
Controverted Point.—That lust for life in Rupa or Arupa
spheres is included among the data thereof.
From the Commentary.—Bo think the Andhakas, and by the same
analogy as they hold the previously stated opinion (XIV. 7) with regard
to celestial lustings in general. That is a view they share with the
Sammitiyas, but this is theirs alone.
[1] Th.—Similar to [1] in XVI. 9.
[2] And you cannot maintain your view without admitting
that a corresponding lust for the objects of hearing, smell-
1 'Belonging to' is in Pali simply the name of the world in question
with adjectival import. On the extension of the term 'world of sense-
desire ' (kamavacara) , see Compendium, p. 81, n. 2.
ing, taste and touch is one of the data in the sphere of
each of these respectively.1
[3] If you cannot affirm the latter, you cannot make an
exception of the former.
[4] Next with regard to (ii.) lust for life on the Arupa
[immaterial] plane as a datum thereof—my first argument
used above (XVI. 9) holds good. [5, 6]. So does my second
used above (XVI. 10, 2). If your proposition is to stand,
then a desire for each sense-object must be among the
elemental data of the sphere of that particular object. You
cannot make an exception o f the desire for life in the
immaterial sphere.
[7] A.—But is not desire for life in the plane of sense
[kamadhatu] among the elemental data of that plane?2
Then surely you cannot make an exception as to desire
for life in the Rupa and Arupa spheres ?
1
Rupa may refer to (i.) matter, (ii.) visible object, (iii.) a sphere
or heaven of 'celestial' matter, where sight supersedes the more
animal senses. Lust for the objects of the other senses is introduced
in the argument not so much to oppose rupa as (ii.), to other sense-
objects, as to oppose conceivable if unfamiliar parallels —'datum
included in the sphere (or heaven) of sound,' smell, etc.—to the familiar
more ambiguous : ' datum included in the sphere (or heaven) of Rupa. '
2
Desire, 'lower' or higher, is always an element in the Kama loka
or world of matter, terrestrial, infernal, sub-celestial, but never, in
orthodox doctrine, in the Rupa or Arupa worlds.
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