Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
BOOK XIV
1. Of the Mutual Consecutiveness of Good and Bad.
Controverted Point—That a basis1 of bad thought is con-
secutive to a basis that is good, and conversely.
From the Commentary.—That which is good cannot directly and
immediately follow after what is bad, nor conversely. Such reciprocal
consecutiveness is anomalous. Some, however, like the Mahasanghi-
kas, hold that, inasmuch as one can both like and then dislike the
same thing, therefore there has been, in such a case, reciprocal con-
secutiveness. Good and bad thoughts cannot occur consecutively
during the stages of javana (apperception) in one and the same
process of cognition, inasmuch as each course of good or of bad
thought entails a distinct preliminary 'adverting' of consciousness.
[1] Th.—You are implying that the adverting,2 the
adjusting of the mind arising for ethically bad conscious-
ness is precisely the adverting and adjusting of the mind
arising for ethically good consciousness. You say 'No,'
while insisting on your proposition. Then you must mean
that the good consciousness can arise without our advert-
ing or adjusting the mind ? You maintain the opposite to
this ? Then, if the good consciousness in question arise
for a mind already adverted and adjusted, it must be
1
Literally, root, or conditioning state.
2
The seven terms characteristic of this work should here be supplied.
See, e.g., VII. 5, 2. The Commentary here for the first time explains
that 'adverting' (avattana=avajjana) is the turning of the
mind from the subconscious life-flux to full consciousness, and that
'adjusting' (or 'aiming,' panidhi ) is the further move on to a
definite mental object, and persistence thereon.
wrong to say that a basis of what is bad is consecutive to
what is good.
[2] Does what is bad arise for wrongly directed atten-
tion? You assent. Do you say as much o f the good
which, according to you, is consecutive thereto ? Is it not
truer to say that the good consciousness was preceded by
rightly directed attention ? You agree. Then that bad
thought cannot be immediately consecutive to this good
thought.
[3] Again, are you prepared to admit that the idea of
resignation follows immediately on that of sense-desires ?
That the idea of benevolence follows immediately on that
of malignity ? That the idea of . kindness follows imme-
diately on that of cruelty, the idea of love on that of
malevolence, pity on unkindness, sympathetic joy on
spleen, equanimity on resentment ? . . .
[4-6] The same argument is now applied to refute the
second half of the proposition, to wit, ' that a basis of what
is good is consecutive to a basis of what is bad'?
[7] M.—But if I am wrong, you will admit that one
can fall in and out of love with one and the same object ?
Surely then my proposition is right, that a bad thing is
consecutive to a good thing and conversely.1
2. Of the Development of Sense-Organs.
Controverted Point.—That the sense-mechanism starts
all at once to life in the womb.
From the Commentary.—Our doctrine teaches that at a [human]
rebirth the development of the embryo's sense-mechanism or mind is
not congenital, as in the case of angelic2 rebirth. In the human
embryo, at the moment of conception, the co-ordinating organ (mana
yatana) and the organ of touch alone among the sense-organs,
1
The parallel drawn is inconclusive, inasmuch as it refers to
passion and its opposite arising about the same object, not to the
consecution of the moral and the immoral.—Corny.
2
Opapatika .
are congenital. The remaining four organs (eye and ear mechanism,
smell and taste mechanism) take seventy-seven days to come to birth,
and this is partly through that karma which brought about conception,
partly through some other karma.1 But some, like the Pubbaseliyas
and the Aparaseliyas, believe that the sixfold sense-organism takes
birth at the moment of conception,, by the taking effect of one karma
only, as though a complete tree were already potentially contained in
the bud.
[1J Th.—Do you imply that the sense-mechanism
enters the womb with all its main and minor parts com-
plete, not deficient in any organ ? You deny . . . [Then
let us speak more in detail:] You admit that the organ
of sight starts by consciousness seeking rebirth ?2 Now,
you would not claim, for . that questing consciousness that
[at its taking effect] hands, feet, head, ears, nostrils,
mouth and teeth take their start? "Why claim an exception
in the case of the visual, or other sense-organs ?
[2] P. A.—Then you claim that four o f the sense-
organs—eye, ear, smell, taste — come later into being.
Are you implying that, to bring this about, one makes
karma in the mother's womb? You deny, but your
position implies it.
Th.—But you say, do you not, that in the embryo hair,
down, nails, teeth, bones, appear at a subsequent stage.
Do you imply a special embryonic karma done to bring
these to birth? You deny. Then why assail my posi-
tion ? [3] Or it may be you do not admit the subsequent
appearance of hair, etc.? But was it not said by the
Exalted One:
' At first the "kalala" takes birth, and thence
The "abbuda." Therefrom the " pes! " grows,
Developing as "ghana" in its turn.
Now in the "ghana " doth appear the hair,
The down, the nails. And whatsoever food
1
These are technically called janaka-karma and upattham-
baka-karma (reproductive and maintaining karmas). — Compen-
dium, p. 143 f . (A. 1, 2).
2
I.e., the potential resultant of some dying man's last conscious act.
And drink the mother of him takes, thereby
The man in mother's womb doth live aid grow '?1
Hence it is right to assign a later appearance to hair,
and so forth.
3. Of Immediate Contiguity in Sense.
Controverted Point—That one sensation follows another
asfan unbroken fused sequence.
From the Commentary.—In view of the swift alternations of seeing
and hearing at performances of dancing and singing, some, like the
Uttarapathakas, hold that the sense-cognitions arise in a mutually
unbroken succession.
[1] Th.—Do you imply that the mental adverting,
adjusting, etc.,2 conjured up by visual consciousness is the
same as that conjured up by auditory consciousness ?
Would you not affirm that this was wrong ? And i f wrong,
do you mean that the auditory consciousness brings about
no adverting or adjustment of mind ?3 Is not the opposite
true ? But if it be true, then your proposition falls.
[2] Again, you agree that ' visual consciousness ' occurs
to the person attending to a visible object. But you cannot
urge that auditory consciousness also occurs to such an
one attending to a visible object. .. . In other words, if
visual consciousness have only visible object as its object,
and nothing else, the unbrokenly succeeding auditory con-
sciousness must have the same kind of object only and
nothing else. .. .
Our doctrine says: 'Because of eye and visible objects
visual consciousness arisesCan you substitute the words
1
Samyutta-Nik., i. 206; Jataka, iv. 496; cf. Milinda, i. 63. The
Pali terms denote four stages in foetal growth.
2
I.e., can auditory consciousness possibly occur to one who has not
adverted or adjusted the mind ? The argument is similar to that in
XIV. 1. However swiftly one sense-operation follows another, it is
judged that 'adverting' is an essential preliminary in each.
3
See above, VIII. 9.
4
Samyutta-Nik., ii. 72 f.; cf. Majjhima Nik., i. 259.
'auditory consciousness' ? You deny this.1 But I repeat
the question, and ask, Is the Suttanta thus? Nay, you
say, the former quotation was alone right. But i f your
proposition be right, you are implying that the given
visual consciousness is none other than the given auditory
consciousness.
[3-4] The same argument holds whichever two of the
five kinds of sense we take.
[5] U. — But if I am wrong [consider any kind of
dramatic performance], when there is dancing, singing,
reciting, does not the spectator see objects, hear sounds,
smell odours, taste tastes, and touch tangibles ? Surely
then it is right to say that the five kinds of sense-cognition
arise in unbroken unitary sequence.2
1
As heterodox.
2 'The illustration is inconclusive, because it only alludes to a mixed
state of rapidly alternating grouped objects of mind, not to the succes-
sion in a unity.'—Comy. It is tantalizing that our historical materials
concerning a drama, which was apparently ultra-Wagnerian in pro-
viding stimuli for all the senses, are so slender.
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