Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
Before leaving the schools of the Commentary to discuss
the method of the Kathavatth u itself, a word is in
place to meet the inquiry that the general reader will
naturally raise: Where among all these schools does the
rise of Mahayanism come in ? The Chinese pilgrims
speak of Mahayanists and Hmayanists, of Mahasanghi-
kas, Mahirjsasakas, Sabbatthivadins, and Sammitiyas, of
Sthaviras, Lokottaravadins and of the Pubbasela and
Aparasela Yiharas.
1
The date assigned tofa-Hian is from
about A.D. 400. The Commentary, as we have it, written
either by Buddhaghosa, or, possibly, by ' one of his school '
(as one says of a picture), is probably half a century later.
Why are these well-known divisions in the Buddhist world
omitted by the latter writer ?
One thing seems fairly clear in this yet unsolved pro-
blem, namely, that Fa-Hian and Yuan-Chwang, whose
Chronicles brought the dual distinction into prominence,
will have given the Chinese versions of the names ' Maha '
and 4
Hina« Yana ' to institutions which they recognized as
such, either by firsthand observation or by hearsay—insti-
tutions which, in Buddhaghosa's school,, were known under
quite different titles. Of other theories put forward, it has
been suggested that the Vaipulya Sutras of the Mahayana
1
See the lists in Rhys Davids's ' Sects of the Buddhists.'
Sutras refer to the Yetulyakas of our Commentary.
1
That
the title of ' amplitude,' ' abundance,' bestowed on certain
Sutras, is convertible into, or from Yetulya, can scarcely
be seriously maintained. Nevertheless, it is possible that
the ' Great Emptiness ' school, to whom the Yetulyakas are
said to belong, may refer to a group which the vague term
Mahayanist served to cover. S u 111 1 a , empty, to wit, of
s v a b h a v a, essence or soul, came to serve, in Mahayanist
concepts, as tantamount to anicca . Again, the Yetul-
yakas appear in the controversies as Doeetists, and Maha-
yanism strongly tends that way.
1
The vague, fluid term,
Uttarapathakas, must certainly have included groups that
confessed Mahayanist views, since among those debated
is the peculiarly Mahayanist hypothesis of tathata:—
' thusness ' or ' suchness.'
2
And to the Mahasanghikas a
midway position between Maha- and Hma-Yana has been
assigned.
3
Certainly, their view of Buddhas persisting in
or pervading any part of the firmament
4
is Mahayanist in
tendency.
But the extension of kthe name Mahayanist was and is of
a vague and fluid kind. Those to whom it was applied
formed no close corporation. And this holds true of most
of the so-called < sects.' They frequently overlapped in
their heretical views, as the grouped table of these will
show. Rhys Davids
5
compares the relation of Mahayana
to Hlnayana schools with that of the various Roman and
Greek Catholic schools to those of the early Christians;
and the separateness between the '18' schools to that
between Low, Broad, and High Churchmen in the Anglican
Church. And it must be always borne in mind that all
those who were implicated in the controversies here set
forth were within the Sasana. All, as we should say, were
1
See SBE, xlix, part ii., p. 188 f.; Geiger, Mahavamsa transl.,
p. 259, and references there given. Vai- is Sanskritized ve-.
2
See Professor Anesaki's 'Docetism (Buddhist),' Ency. Religion
and Ethics.
3
XIX. 5.
4
Professor Anesaki, op. et loc. cit.
5
XXI. 6.
6
'Hinayana,' Ency. Religion and Ethics.
Buddhists. They may not, on certain matters, have been
' of us,' sakavadins , but they were certainly not 'hence
outside,' ito bahiddha, the term bestowed on teachers
of other creeds. These are only once included together
with Vajjiputtakas and Sammitiyas, and that is when the
almost universally accepted dogma of a persisting personal
or spiritual substrate is attacked (p. 18).
4
And many
other teachers not belonging to the Sasana,'
1
is the phrase.
Had these been throughout the interlocutors, the debates
could not have continued on the method adopted. Their
premisses differed too much from those to which members
of the Sasana were bound. In this common stock of
prescribed premisses lay the dialectical advantage of the
Theravadin or Sakavadin. In your thesis, he is always
saying or implying, you imply other theses, which commit
you to a rejection of this or that orthodox doctrine.
Hereby you virtually confess to sakkaya-ditthi , to
sassata-ditthi , uccheda-ditthi,
2
and so on.
Now one of the Sasana would be anxious to repudiate any
such imputation.
3
I here resist the temptation to be drawn aside by dis-
cussing the evolution of earlier attavada, ' self-, or soul-
theory,' into puggalavada . It bristles with interest,
but so also do the divided opinions as to infallibility or
perfectibility of the Arahant, as to the humanity or divinity
of the Buddha, or Buddhas, as to the real nature of
spiritual growth or progress, the meaning and scope of
the term £
Ariyan,' and many other points on which my
1
Sasana . . . bahiddha ca bahu annatitthiya. Ac-
cording to Wassiljew, Mahadeva, the heterodox bhikkhu, is called a
'tirthika'(titthiya); according to Rockhill, he was a 'paribbajaka.'
As either, he would be ito bahiddha , apasanda-bhedako.
2
Soul-theory, Eternal (-soul)-theory, Annihilation (of soul)-theory.
See, e.g., I. 138 f . (p. 19). The Pali-ist should note the usual sub-
stitution, in our Comy., of laddhi for the earlier (Pitakan) ditthi.
3
Cf. Rhys Davids on the Milinda apologetics contrasted with the
internecine debates of the K.V. Milinda (SBE.), ii., p. xxvi.
colleague has not sent me material for Appendix Notes.
In short—M. de la Yallee Poussin has the mot juste—'there
are so many " points " in the Katha-vatthu.'
1
And better
acquaintance with them will scarcely fail to stimulate
further discussion. More in place here will be Mr. S. Z.
Aung's remarks on the logical method of the dialectic on
which I touched just now.
In reply (he wrote, in August, 1914) to your request, I
think the best way is to present the logic of the Katha -
vatth u by a symbolical representation, e.g. in I. 1. § 1 :
Adherent.—Is A B ? (thapana)
Opponent,.—Yes.
Adh.—Is CD? papana)
Opp.—.No.
Adh.—But i f A be B, then [you should have
said] C is D.
That B can be affirmed of A, but not D of C, (ropana)
is false.
Hence your first answer is refuted.
Or according to European logic :—
If A is B, then C is D.
[But C is not D.]
Therefore A is not B.
In this conditional argument, the minor premiss (bracketed)
is suppressed.
The antecedent of the hypothetical major premiss is
termed t ha p an a, because the opponent's proposition, A
is B, is conditionally' established' for the purpose of refuta-
tion. The consequent of the hypothetical major premiss is
termed p a p a n a, because it is
£
gotten ' from the antecedent.
And the conclusion is termed ropana
2
because the
refutation is placed on the opponent. Next:—
If D be denied of C,
then B should have been denied of A.
[But you affirmed B of A.]
1
Op. cit., p. 423.
2
The three Pali words mean 'positing,' 'gaining,' 'lifting.'
[Therefore] that B can be affirmed of A, but not D of C, is
wrong.
Or according to European logic :—
If C is not D, then A is not B
[But A is B.]
Therefore C is D.
This is the Patiloma , inverse or indirect method,
as contrasted with the former or direct method, Anuloma .
In both methods the consequent is denied. But if we
reverse the hypothetic major in the latter method we get—
If A is B, C is D,
But A is B,
Therefore C is D.
By this indirect method the opponent's second answer is
re-established. Next:—
(§ 3) Opponent.—If A is not B, then C is not D.
But you said A is not B, but C is D.
But if B can be denied of A, D should be denied o f C.
(§) 4 Again (Opp.).—Is this bad refutation? Compare
it with yours (§ 1). There we affirmed B of A. You claimed
to refute us. But we were ill refuted, for see our reply in
§ 2, § 5. Not that way are we to be refuted. You, dear sir,
1
refuted badly, we refuted you well (in § 3). Hence our con-
clusion is sound.
These five sections (§§) constitute the First Refutation in
Anuloma-Paccanika-pakkha . The next five con-
stitute the Second Refutation in Paccanikanuloma-
pakkha. Thus there are two Refutations under each of
the four following aspects of this question of the person or
soul :—
(1) Taken by itself, absolutely.
(2) „ with reference to space.
(3) .„• » » » time
(4) „ „ „ „ things.
1
The courteous mode of address on both sides, and the absence of
any polemical asperities, is a pleasant feature in the dialogues. The
opponent, moreover, is sometimes allowed to have the last word.
Hence we get the so-called ' eight-faced view ' (a 11 h a -
mukha-vada).
1
Under 'Vacana-sodhana g '—the ' purging of terms,'
the Commentator
2
develops the principles of Identity,
Contradiction and Excluded Middle.
In the question, puggal o upalabbhati?—'i s the
person known [to exist] ?' we have two terms A, B. A is
either B or not B. If A = B, they both mean one and the
same thing. But i f A be not B, A is one thing, B another.
Aclh.—If [all] A is B, will you admit that, in the former
view, all B is A?
Opp.—No, but some B is A.
Hence it is clear that in and before Asoka's time, Bud-
dhist logic was conversant with the
4
distribution of terms,'
and the ' process of conversion.'
3
But I hold it highly probable that logic was regularly
taught in ancient Taxila (Pali: Takka-sila, ' Logic-Cliff')
before Aristotle's day. Reasons for this I have given else-
where.
In categorical syllogism our books have the following
technical terms, oithe antiquity of which we have no sure
record:—
(1) The udaharana : — Yo yo aggima so so
d h u m a v a—1e
Whatever is fiery, is smoky.'
(2) The upanayana : — Ayar j pabbat o dhu -
m a va—'This hill is smoky.'
(3) The niggama
4
: —Tasma tam aggima —
4
Therefore it is fiery.'
4
Smoky' in (1) and (2) is the h e t u (condition). And as a
fifth feature, an up a m a (metaphor) may be introduced:—
' Smoky like a hearth.' S. Z. A.5
1
Intended to be developed, when required, in every one of the kathas.
2
Mr. Aung accepts the tradition that he was Buddhaghosa.
3
The Yamaka is entirely an exercise in these processes. See vol. i.,
preface to PTS edition.
4
The three terms mean: (1) Instance, example, 'adducing';
(2)
4
leading up to,' subsuming; (3) departure or issue, cf. deduction
(ni[r]) = de; garna, going. .
5
S. Z. A. has not had the opportunity of revising this letter in print.
Since writing this, my collaborator lias discussed in a note
printed in the Appendix the logical doctrine denoted by the
term patisambhicla . Besides this, a four-fold logical
doctrine of definition is constantly used in Buddhaghosa's
Commentaries, and it may be seen, in the making, in the
Nettipakarana . But it does not appear, so far as I have
seen, in the Abhidhamma-pitaka.
1
Many of the Katha -
v a 11 h u dialogues are concerned with views built up,
according to the Commentary, on failure to distinguish amid
ambiguities in terms, e.g., I.3 ; IV. 4 ; V. 1 ; YII. 4 ; XII. 8,
and many others. The heretics, in short, fail in the
sagacity of the Vibhajjavadin. And the reader may often
feel he would willingly exchange the stereotyped ' eight-
faced method 5
of argument for discussion on the meanings
of terms, such as lends great interest to parts of the Com-
mentary. Had this been the method followed, we should
have learnt to what extent the scholastic logic o f definition
had taken shape when the Katha-vatthu was being com-
pleted. It can hardly have been invented when the
Dhamma-sangan i and Vibhang a were compiled.
A final note on our work. It is, I believe, the first trans-
lation of the Katha-vatth u in any European language.
Mr. Aung, at my request, took it in hand as soon as his
labours on the Compendium of Philosophy were completed,
i.e. in 1911. In about six months, working with both a
Burmese printed text, Dr. Arnold Taylor's text (PTS
1894-5), Minayeff's (PTS) Commentary, and Burmese trans-
lations of both text and Commentary, he had typed a draft
MS. of the first five discourses, amounting in bulk to one
half of the whole work.
f
I leave it to you,' he wrote, with
his wonted modesty,
£
to revise my very rough draft in any
manner you please. A wholesale revision may be neces-
sary.' . . . For nearly three years, however, I could not see
1
See my preface to Vibhanga,, and Buddhist Psychology (1914)}
pp. 139,183.
my way to carry through the translation without a break.
Nor was my distant fellow-labourer thenceforth able to find
leisure in which to finish the remaining eighteen vaggas.
Meanwhile we corresponded as to the form in which to
present the translation and experimented therein for many
months, with mutual suggesting and criticizing. Mr. Aung
was anxious that so historical a document as the ' Points of
Controversy' should be presented in a relatively attractive
form, freed as much as was justifiable from tedious repeti-
tions. We were not compiling a ' crib' for learners of Pali.
He agreed, however, that the first and most important
Kath a should be presented with all its back-and-forth
of dialogue exactly as it is in the original. It would serve
as a model of the dialectical method of the whole work.
But in the remaining discourses we decided to 'go one
better' than the editors of the Canon. We would not only take,
as they do, the various formulae of refutation 'as read,' signi-
fied in the original by the ever-recurring . . . p e . . . (etc.).'
We would further compress the form by extracting its
perpetual restatement of the controverted point, and put
the substance of the dialogue in the mouth of the refuter,
whether he were the orthodox or the heterodox speaker.
In venturing on this departure, we may have incurred
blame from purists, but we have saved readers some tedium
and loss o f time. We have also saved the funds of the
Society the expense of a second volume. The pages of the
PTS Pali text run to 687, in two volumes.
In allocating all that is spoken to Theravadin or opponent,
we have incurred here and there some risk o f error. Even
Burmese students of Abhidhamma do not always find it
easy to judge which is speaking. My colleague wrote in
1912 : ' The late Paya Gyi Sadaw of Henzada remarked to
me, that it is extremely puzzling at times to find out, in the
K.V., which is speaking. The book is not taught regularly
in Burmese Viharas, but is only read by Theras (seniors,
presbyters). Moreover the Burmese translations are not
well arranged, and are not divided into sections. Hence I
do not guarantee my accuracy in every case, and trust you
will also be careful, and correct me whenever I have slipped.'
1
As a rule the Commentary indicates which is the querist,
and which the respondent, but not always.
It was not till May, 1914, that we were able to resume
work on our translation. Our parts were reversed. Mr,
Aung revised my draft translation of books VI.-XXIIL, as
well as the proofs of books I.-Y. Each has contributed foot-
notes. Among those o f my colleague, when some on points
of great interest bulked too large, I consigned them, with
a few additions of my own, to the Appendix. The Indexes,
Tables, Diagrams, are mine; the Corrigenda mostly his.
On this wise, and for a third time it has been my good
fortune—or ' the result of my good deeds in a former birth'—
to complete, with such efficient help from the East, a first
English version of a work of Eastern thought. Where we
have failed to make the argument appear convincing, the
fault may lie in our grasp of the meaning, or in the render-
ing selected. Or the cause may lie deeper than this. It is
no simple task to enter on to the standpoints of the ancient
Indian mind. Our apparent equivalents in terms are not
always coincident in meaning with what that mind saw.
And further and finally, it should never be forgotten that,
in the Canonical books, we are not encountering the rela-
tively easeful and pliant play of an individual intellect—of
some Oriental Plato, Augustine, Aquinas--wielding a habile
stylus on his palmleaf, marshalling his points, breaking of f
to discuss a term, adapting his pace and his diction to refute,
convince, inspire. The word-architecture of the Canon
suggests the work of a race who, having for centuries built
only with wood and wattle and clay, producing, it might be,
quite artistic i f transient edifices, were suddenly to build
their shrines and temples in marble or granite. Something
of the stiff and jejune qualities, which we actually see in
archaic stone and marble constructions, characterizes the
late enshrining in the written word of the orally transmitted
doctrinal thesauri of Buddhism. Most strongly is this the
case with the intentionally bare and formal presentment of
1
For one such lapsus calami of ours, see Corrigenda, p. 47.
abstract tenets in the Abhidhamma books. The wood and
clay structures of the exegetical accompaniments—the
Commentaries—were continued probably for one or two
centuries side by side with the new stone and marble build-
ings. Then they, too, were written. But they were suffered
to groio. To drop metaphor, as the habit of ivriting literature
grew, the power not only of intellectual expression, but also
of the play of intellect itself grew. The great constructive
ideas did not necessarily increase. They belong to the
' creative evolution' of life itself. But the power to exploit
them, through visibly registered statements of and about
them, increased. Hence the advance in this direction that
we meet with in the Commentaries. The mind that could
express in words anything so relatively modern as the
sentence on p. 198 :—' That "what lies between" any two
visible objects, in the absence of other visible objects, is
"space":—this is an act of ideation, not of sense-cognition'
•—how differently would a mind, thus trained on a culture
of term-and-concept, have written out the ' heads' of the
Katha-vatthu , as compared with the archaic achieve-
ment of Moggaliputta-Tissa and his foregoers !
C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.
CHIPSTEAD, SURREY,
September, 1915.
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