THE PATH
OF PURIFICATION
(VISUDDHIMAGGA)
BY
BHADANTACARIYA BUDDHAGHOSA
Translated from the Pali
by
BHIKKHU NANAMOLI
FIFTH EDITION
BUDDHIST PUBLICATION SOCIETY
Kandy Sri Lanka
[THE TRUTH OF THE ORIGIN OF SUFFERING]
61. But in the description of the origin, the expression ydyarh tanhd
(that craving which) = ya ayam tanha. [As regards the expression] pro-
duces further becoming: it is a making become again, thus it is 'becom-
ing again' (punabbhava); becoming again is its habit, thus it 'produces
further becoming' (ponobbhavika). The expression nandiragasahagata
(accompanied by concern and greed) = nandiragena sahagata; what is
meant is that it is identical in meaning with delight and greed. Con-
cerned with this and that: wherever personality is generated there is
concern with that. The expression that is to say (seyyathidam) is a par-
ticle; its meaning is 'which is that'. Craving for sense desires, craving
for becoming, craving for non-becoming will be explained in the De-
scription of Dependent Origination (Ch. XVII, §§233ff.). Although this
is threefold, it should nevertheless be understood as 'the noble truth of
the origin of suffering', taking it as one in the sense of its generating the
truth of suffering.
[THE TRUTH OF THE CESSATION OF SUFFERING]
62. In the description of the cessation of suffering it is the cessation of
the origin that is stated by the words that which is ... of that same
craving, and so on. Why is that? Because the cessation of suffering
comes about with the cessation of its origin. For it is with the cessation
of its origin that suffering ceases, not otherwise. Hence it is said: [507]
'Just as a tree cut down grows up again
While yet its root remains unharmed and sound,
So with the tendency to crave intact
This suffering is ever reproduced' (Dh. 338).
63. So it is because suffering ceases only through the cessation of its
origin that, when teaching the cessation of suffering, the Blessed One
therefore taught the cessation of the origin. For the Perfect Ones behave
like lions.
15
When they make suffering cease and when they teach the
cessation of suffering, they deal with the cause, not the fruit. But the sec-
tarians behave like dogs. When they make suffering cease and when they
teach the cessation of suffering, by teaching devotion to self-mortifica-
tion, etc., they deal with the fruit, not the cause. This in the first place is
how the motive for teaching the cessation of suffering by means of the
cessation of its origin should be understood.
64. This is the meaning. Of that same craving: of that craving which, it
was said, 'produces further becoming', and which was classed as 'crav-
ing for sense desires' and so on. It is the path that is called fading away;
for 'With the fading away [of greed] he is liberated' (M.i,139) is said.
Fading away and cessation is cessation through fading away. Remain-
derless fading away and cessation is cessation through fading away that
is remainderless because of eradication of inherent tendencies. Or alter-
natively, it is abandoning that is celled fading away; and so the construc-
tion here can be regarded as 'remainderless fading away, remainderless
cessation.'
65. But as to meaning, all of them are synonyms for nibbana. For in the
ultimate sense it is nibbana that is called 'the noble truth of the cessation
of suffering'. But because craving fades away and ceases on coming to
that,
16
it is therefore called 'fading away' and 'cessation'. And because
there comes to be the giving up, etc., of that [craving] on coming to that
[nibbana], and since there is not even one kind of reliance here [to be
depended upon] from among the reliances consisting in the cords of
sense desires, etc., it is therefore called giving it up, relinquishing it,
letting it go, not relying on it.
66. It has peace as its characteristic. Its function is not to die; or its
function is to comfort. It is manifested as the signless; or it is manifested
as non-diversification.
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[DISCUSSION ON NIBBANA]
67. [Question 1.] Is nibbana non-existent because it is unapprehend-
able, like the hare's horn?
[Answer.] That is not so, because it is apprehendable by the [right]
means. For it is apprehendable [by some, namely, the nobles ones] by
the [right] means, in other words, by the way that is appropriate to it,
[the way of virtue, concentration, and understanding]; it is like the supra-
mundane consciousness of others, [which is apprehendable only by cer-
tain of the noble ones] by means of knowledge of penetration of others'
minds. Therefore it should not be said that it is non-existent because un-
apprehendable; for it should not be said that what the foolish ordinary
man does not apprehend is unapprehendable.
68. Again, it should not be said that nibbana does not exist. Why not?
Because it then follows that the way would be futile. [508] For if nib-
bana were non-existent, then it would follow that the right way, which
includes the three aggregates beginning with virtue and is headed by
right understanding, would be futile. And it is not futile because it does
reach nibbana.
[Q.2.] But futility of the way does not follow because what is reached
is absence, [that is, absence of the five aggregates consequent upon the
cutting off of the defilements].
[A.] That is not so. Because, though there is absence of past and
future [aggregates], there is nevertheless no reaching of nibbana [simply
because of that].
[Q.3.] Then is the absence of present [aggregates] as well nibbana?
[A.] That is not so. Because their absence is an impossibility, since
if they are absent their non-presence follows. [Besides, if nibbana were
absence of present aggregates too,] that would entail the fault of exclud-
ing the arising of the nibbana element with result of past clinging left, at
the path moment, which has present aggregates as its support.
[Q.4.] Then will there be no fault if it is non-presence of defilements
[that is nibbana]?
[A.] That is not so. Because it would then follow that the noble path
was meaningless. For if it were so, then, since defilements [can be] non-
existent also before the moment of the noble path, it follows that the
noble path would be meaningless. Consequently that is no reason; [it is
unreasonable to say that nibbana is unapprehendable, that it is non-
existence, and so on].
69. [Q.5.] But is not nibbana destruction, because of the passage begin-
ning 'That, friend, which is the destruction of greed ... [of hate ... of
delusion ... is nibbana]' (S.iv,251)?
[A.] That is not so, because it would follow that Arahantship also
was mere destruction. For that too is described in the [same] way begin-
ning 4
That, friend, which is the destruction of greed ... of hate ... of de-
lusion ... is Arahantship]' (S.iv,252).
And what is more, the fallacy then follows that nibbana would be
temporary, etc.; for if it were so, it would follow that nibbana would be
temporary, have the characteristic of being formed, and be obtainable re-
gardless of right effort; and precisely because of its having formed char-
acteristics it would be included in the formed, and it would be burning
with the fires of greed, etc., and because of its burning it would follow
that it was suffering.
[Q.6.] Is there no fallacy if nibbana is that kind of destruction subse-
quent to which there is no more occurrence?
[A.] That is not so. Because there is no such kind of destruction.
And even if there were, the aforesaid fallacies would not be avoided.
Also because it would follow that the noble path was nibbana. For the
noble path causes the destruction of defects, and that is why it is called
'destruction'; and subsequent to that there is no more occurrence of the
defects.
70. But it is because the kind of destruction called Cessation consisting
in non-arising', [that is, nibbana,] serves figuratively speaking as deci-
sive-support [for the path] that [nibbana] is called 'destruction' as a
metaphor for it.
[Q.7.] Why is it not stated in its own form?
[A.] Because of its extreme subtlety. And its extreme subtlety is es-
tablished because it inclined the Blessed One to inaction, [that is, to not
teaching the Dhamma (see M.i,186)] and because a noble one's eye is
needed to see it (see (M.i,510).
71. It is not shared by all because it can only be reached by one who is
possessed of the path. And it is uncreated because it has no first begin-
ning.
[Q.8.] Since it is, when the path is, then it is not uncreated.
[A.] That is not so, because it is not arousable by the path; it is only
reachable, not arousable, by the path; that is why it is uncreated. It is
because it is uncreated that it is free from ageing and death. It is because
of the absence of its creation and of its ageing and death that it is
permanent. [509]
72. [Q.9.] Then it follows that nibbana, too, has the kind of permanence
[claimed] of the atom and so on.
[A.] That is not so. Because of the absence of any cause [that brings
about its arising].
[Q.10.] Because nibbana has permanence, then, these [that is, the
atom, etc.] are permanent as well.
[A.] That is not so. Because [in that proposition] the characteristic
of [logical] cause does not arise. [In other words, to say that nibbana is
permanent is not to assert a reason why the atom, etc., should be perma-
nent.]
[Q.11.] Then they are permanent because of the absence of their
arising, as nibbana is.
[A.] That is not so. Because the atom and so on have not been estab-
lished as facts.
73. The aforesaid logical reasoning proves that only this [that is, nib-
bana] is permanent [precisely because it is uncreated]; and it is immate-
rial because it transcends the individual essence of matter.
The Buddhas' goal is one and has no plurality. But this [single goal,
nibbana,] is firstly called with result of past clinging left since it is made
known together with the [aggregates resulting from past] clinging still
remaining [during the Arahant's life], being thus made known in terms
of the stilling of defilement and the remaining [result of past] clinging
that are present in one who has reached it by means of development. But
[secondly, it is called without result of past clinging left] since after the
last consciousness of the Arahant, who has abandoned arousing [future
aggregates] and so prevented kamma from giving result in a future [exis-
tence], there is no further arising of aggregates of existence, and those
already arisen have disappeared. So the [result of past] clinging that
remained is non-existent; and it is in terms of this non-existence, in the
sense that 'there is no [result of past] clinging here' that that [same goal
is called] without result of past clinging left (see Iti. 38).
74. Because it can be arrived at by distinction of knowledge that suc-
ceeds through untiring perseverance, and because it is the word of the
Omniscient One, nibbana is not non-existent as regards individual
essence in the ultimate sense; for this is said: *Bhikkhus, there is an
unborn, an unbecome, an unmade, an unformed' (Iti. 37; Ud. 8O).
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This is the section of the definition dealing with the description of
the cessation of suffering.
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