Visuddhimagga - Notes IV

THE PATH
OF PURIFICATION
(VISUDDHIMAGGA)
BY
BHADANTACARIYA BUDDHAGHOSA
Translated from the Pali
by
BHIKKHU NANAMOLI
FIFTH EDITION
BUDDHIST PUBLICATION SOCIETY
Kandy Sri Lanka


CHAPTER VIII
1. Amplifications are from Pm., p. 236.
2. 'The word "etc." includes Nanda-yakkha, Nanda-manava, and others' (Pm.
236). See AA. Commentary to A. Dukanipata i, 3 and MA.iv,8.
3. For the expression updya-manasikdra—'attention as a [right] means' see
MA.i,64
4. This line is not in the Sutta-nipata, but see D.ii,120, note.
5. The Emperor Asoka is referred to. His name Asoka means 'Sorrowless'.
This story is in the Asokavadana and Divya., pp. 429-434.
6. The references for the names here and in the following paragraphs are:
Mahasammata (Ja.iii,454; ii,311), Mandhatu (Ja.ii,311), Mahasudassana (D.ii,
169f., Dalhanemi (D.iii,59f.), Nimi (Ja.vi,96f.), Jotika (Ch.XII,§41), Jatila
(Ch. XII, §41), Ugga (AA.i,394), Mendaka (Ch. XII, §41-42), Punnaka (Ch. XII,
§42), Vasudeva (Ja.iv,81f.), Baladeva'(ia.iv,81f.), Bhimasena (Ja.v,426), Yuddhit-
thila (Ja.v,426), Canura (Ja.iv,81).
7. Pabhuti—'etc.': this meaning is not in P.T.S. Diet; see §121.
8. Virtue, concentration, understanding, deliverance, knowledge and vision of
deliverance.
9. Patihitaya—'drawing on': not in P.T.S. Diet.; Pm. (p. 240) reads panitdya
and explains by pacedgatdya (come back).
10. Nayare—'can know': form not in P.T.S. Diet.; Pm. explains by ndyanu.
11. ' "Person" (atta-bhdva) is the states other than the already-mentioned life,
feeling and consciousness. The words "just these alone" mean that it is unmixed
with self (attd) or permanence' (Pm. 242). Atta-bhdva as used in the Suttas and
in this work is more or less a synonym for sakkdya in the sense of person (body
and mind) or personality, or individual form. See Pitaka refs. in P.T.S. Diet, and
e.g. this chapter §35 and Ch. IX, §54.
' "When consciousness dissolves, the world is dead'
1
: just as in the case of
the death-consciousness, this world is also called "dead" in the highest (ultimate)
sense with the arrival of any consciousness whatever at its dissolution, since its


cessation has no rebirth-linking (is "cessation never to return")- Nevertheless,
though this is so, "the highest sense this concept will allow (panhatti paramat-
thiyd)"—the ultimate sense will allow this concept of continuity, which is what
the expression of common usage "Tissa lives, Phussa lives" refers to, and which
is based on consciousnesses [momentarily] existing along with a physical sup-
port; this belongs to the ultimate sense here, since, as they say, "It is not the
name and surname that lives" (Pm. 242 and 801).
Something may be said about the word panhatti here. Twenty-four kinds are
dealt with in the commentary to the Puggalapannatti. The Puggalapannatti Sched-
ule gives the following six panhatti (here a making known, a setting out): of
aggregates, bases, elements, truths, faculties, and persons (Pug. 1). The commen-
tary explains the word in this sense as pahhdpana (making known) and thapana
(placing), quoting 'He announces, teaches, declares (panndpeti), establishes' (cf.
M.iii,248), and also 'a well-appointed (supahhatta) bed and chair' (?). It contin-
ues: 'The making known of a name (ndmapahhatti) shows such and such dham-
mas and places them in such and such compartments, while the making known
of the aggregates (khandha-pahhatti) and the rest shows in brief the individual
form of those making-known (pahhatti)\
It then gives six kinds of pannatti 'according to the commentarial method
but not in the texts': (1) Concept of the existent (vijjamdna-pahhatti), which is
the conceptualizing of (making known) a dhamma that is existent, actual, be-
come, in the true and ultimate sense (e.g. aggregates, etc.). (2) Concept of the
non-existent, which is, for example, the conceptualizing of 'female', 'male',
'persons', etc., which are non-existent by that standard and are only established
by means of current speech in the world; similarly 'such impossibilities as con-
cepts of a fifth truth or the other sectarians' Atom, Primordial Essence, World
Soul, and the like'. (3) Concept of the non-existent based on the existent, e.g. the
expression 'One with the three clear-visions', where the 'person' ('one') is non-
existent and the 'clear-visions', are existent. (4) Concept of the existent based on
the non-existent, e.g. the 'female form', 'visible form' (= visible datum base)
being existent and 'female' non-existent. (5) Concept of the existent based on
the existent, e.g. 'eye-contact', both 'eye' and 'contact' being existent. (6) Con-
cept of the non-existent based on the non-existent, e.g. 'banker's son', both being
non-existent.
Again two more sets of six are given as 'according to the Teachers, but not
in the Commentaries'. The first is: (1) Derivative concept (upddd-pahhatti); this,
for instance, is a 'being', which is a convention derived from the aggregates of
materiality, feeling, etc., though it has no individual essence of its own appre-
hendable in the true ultimate sense, as materiality, say, has in its self-identity and
its otherness from feeling, etc.; or a 'house' or a 'fist' or an 'oven' as apart from
its component parts, or a 'pitcher' or a 'garment', which are all derived from
those same aggregates; or 'time' or 'direction', which are derived from the
revolutions of the moon and sun; or the 'learning sign' or 'counterpart sign'
founded on some aspect or other, which are a convention derived from some real
sign as a benefit of meditative development: these are derived concepts, and this
kind is a 'concept' (pannatti) in the sense of 'ability to be set up' (pannapetabba


= ability to be conceptualized)', but not in the sense of 'making known'
(pahndpana). Under the latter heading this would be a 'concept of the non-
existent'. (2) Appositional concept (upanidhd-p.): many varieties are listed,
namely, apposition of reference ('second' as against 'first', 'third' as against
'second', 'long' as against 'short'); apposition of what is in the hand ('umbrella-
in-hand', 'knife-in-hand'); apposition of association ('earring-wearer', 'topknot-
wearer', 'crest-wearer'); apposition of contents ('corn-waggon', 'ghee-pot');
apposition of proximity ('IndasalA Cave', 'Piyangu Cave'); apposition of com-
parison ('golden coloured', 'with a bull's gait'); apposition of majority ('Padu-
massara-brahman Village'); apposition of distinction ('diamond ring'); and so
on. (3) Collective concept (samodhdna-p.), e.g., 'eight-footed', 'pile of riches'.
(4) Additive concept (upanikkhitta-p.), e.g. 'one', 'two', 'three'. (5) Verisimilar
concept (tajjd-p.): refers to the individual essence of a given dhamma, e.g.
'earth', 'fire', 'hardness', 'heat*. (6) Continuity concept (santati-p.): refers to the
length of continuity of life, e.g. 'octagenarian', 'nonagenarian'. In the second set
there are: (i) concept according to function (kicca~p.), e.g. 'preacher', 'expoun-
der of Dhamma'. (ii) Concept according to shape (santhdna-p.), e.g. 'thin', 'stout',
'round', 'square', (iii) Concept according to gender (lihga~p.)t e.g. 'female',
'male', (iv) Concept according to location (bhumi-p.), e.g. 'of the sense sphere',
'Kosalan'. (v) Concept as proper name (paccatta-p.)y e.g. Tissa' , 'Naga',
'Sumana', which are making-known (appellations) by mere name-making, (vi)
Concept of the unformed (asankhata-pannatti), e.g. 'cessation', 'nibbana', etc.,
which make the unformed dhamma known—an existent concept. (From com-
mentary to Puggalapannatti, condensed—see also DhsA.390f.) All this shows
that the word panhatti carries the meanings of either appellation or concept or
both together, and that no English word quite corresponds.
12. ' "But since the object is stated with individual essences": the breakup of
states with individual essences, their destruction, their fall—[all] that has to do
only with states with individual essences. Hence the Blessed One said: "Bhikkhus,
ageing-and-death is impermanent, formed, dependently arisen" (S.ii,26) ... If it
cannot reach absorption because of [its object being] states with individual es-
sences, then what about the supramundane jhanas and certain of the immaterial
jhanas? It was to answer this that he said "now with special development the
supramundane jhana" and so on' (Pm. 243). Kasina jhana, for example, has a
concept (panhatti) as its object (Ch. IV, §29) and a concept is a dhamma without
individual essence (asabhava-dhamma).
13. In the A. text the negative and positive clauses are in the opposite order.
14. Agaru—'aloes': not so spelt in P.T.S. Diet.; but see agalu.
15. Hatthasahkhalika—'the fingers of a pair of clasped hands', 'a row of fin-
gers, (angulipanti)—(Pm. 246).
16. 'For the penetration of the characteristic of foulness, for the observation of
repulsiveness as the individual essence' (Pm. 246).
17. 'The higher consciousness' is a term for jhana.
18. Pm. explains 'sati sati dyatane
1
 (rendered here by 'whenever there is occa-
sion') with 'tasmim tasmim pubbahetu-adi-karane sati' ('when there is this or


that reason consisting in a previous cause, etc.'); MA.iv,146 says: 'Sati sati
kdrane. Kim pan'ettha kdrananl ti. Abhihhd' va kdranam ('Whenever there is a
reason. But what is the reason here? The direct-knowledge itself is the reason).'
19. Aritthaka as a plant is not in P.T.S. Diet; see T.C.P. Diet.—Sinn, penela
uta.
20. There are various readings.
21. 'Galavdtaka,' here rendered by 'nape of the neck', which the context de-
mands. But elsewhere (e.g. Ch. VI, §47, Ch. VIII, §110) 'base of the neck'
seems indicated, that is, where the neck fits on to the body, or 'gullet'.
22. A measure of length, as much as a 'louse's head'.
23. Nisadapota—'rolling pin': (= sild-puttaka—Pm. 250). What is meant is proba-
bly the stone roller, thicker in the middle than at the ends, with which curry
spices, etc., are normally rolled by hand on a small stone slab in Ceylon today.
24. Kotthatthini—'shoulder-blade bones': for kottha (= flat) cf. kotthalika §97;
the meaning is demanded by the context, otherwise no mention would be made
of these two bones, and the description fits. P.T.S. Diet, under this ref. has
'stomach bone' (?). Should one read a-tikhina (blunt) or ati-khina (very sharp)?
25. Duttacchita—'badly pared': tacchita pp. of tacchati to pare (e.g. with an
adze); not in P.T.S. Diet.; see M.i,31,124; iii,166.
26. Panjara—'frame': not quite in this sense in P.T.S. Diet.
27. Sahkutitaghatapunnapatalakhanda—' a piece of curled-up toffee flake'. The
Sinhalese translation suggests the following readings and resolution: sahkuthita
(thickened or boiled down (?), rather than sahkutita, curled up); ghata-punna
([toffee?] 'full of ghee'); patala (flake or slab); khanda (piece).
28. Kilomaka—'midriff: the rendering is obviously quite inadequate for what
is described here, but there is no appropriate English word.
29. 0&/iagga-—'looped': not in this sense in P.T.S. Diet.; see obhahjati (Ch. XI,
§64 and P.T.S. Diet.).
30. Dakasitalika: not in P.T.S. Diet.; rendered in Sinhalese translation by helmaeli
(white edible water lily).
31. Mamsakasambupalivethanakilitthapdvdrapupphakasadisa: this is rendered
into Sinhalese by kunu mas kasala velu porond kadek pup ('an inflated piece (or
bag) of cloth, which has wrapped rotten meat refuse'). In P.T.S. Diet, pdvdra is
given as 'cloak, mantle' and (this ref.) as 'the mango tree'; but there seems to be
no authority for the rendering 'mango tree', which has nothing to do with this
context. Pupphaka (balloon) is not in P.T.S. Diet. (cf. common Burmese spelling
of bubbula (bubble) as pupphula).
32. It would be a mistake to take the renderings of these worms' names too
literally. Ganduppada (boil-producing worm?) appears only as 'earth worm' in
P.T.S. Diet., which will not do here. The more generally accepted reading seems
to take patatantuka and suttaka (tape-worm and thread-worm) as two kinds
rather than patatantusuttaka; neither is in P.T.S. Diet.
33. Kunapa—'ordure'; P.T.S. Diet, only gives the meaning 'corpse', which


does not fit the meaning either here or, e.g., at Ch. XI, §21, where the sense of a
dead body is inappropriate.
34. Kanduyati—'to itch': the verb is not in P.T.S. Diet.; see kandu.
35. Upadinna—'clung-to': see Ch. XIV, note 23.
36. Reference is sometimes made to the * hand-grasping question* (hattha-gahaka-
panha). It may be to this; but there is another mentioned at the end of the com-
mentary to the Dhatu-Vibhanga.
37. The allusion seems to be to the bases of mastery (abhibhdyatana—or better,
bases for transcendence); see M.ii,13 and MA.iii,257f.; but see §60.
38. * "Some" is said with reference to the inmates of the Uttara (Northern)
monastery [in Anuradhapura]' (Pm. 256).
39. 'The words "in all its aspects" refer to the sixteen bases; for these are only
found in total in this dispensation. When outsiders know mindfulness of breath-
ing, they only know the first four modes' (Pm. 257).
40. ' "The ascetic" is a stream-enterer, the "second ascetic" is a once-returner,
the "third ascetic" is a non-returner, the "fourth ascetic" is an Arahant' (MA.ii,4).
41. Kuta—'wild': P.T.S. Diet, this ref. gives 'useless', which misses the point.
Cf. MA'.ii,82; iv,198.
42. The nine kinds of abode (resting place) are the forest and the root of a tree
already mentioned, and a rock, a hill cleft, a mountain cave, a charnel ground, a
jungle thicket, an open space, a heap of straw (M.i,181).
43. 'In the hot season the forest is favourable, in the cold season the root of a
tree, in the rainy season an empty place. For one of phlegmatic humour, phleg-
matic by nature, the forest is favourable, for one of bilious humour the root of a
tree, for one of windy humour an empty place. For one of deluded temperament
the forest, for one of hating temperament the root of a tree, for one of greedy
temperament an empty place' (Pm. 258).
44. The amplification is from Pm. 258.
45. ' "Regarded as particles"', as a number of groups {kalapa)\ (Pm. 259). This
conception of the occurrence of breaths is based on the theory of motion as
'successive arisings in adjacent locations' (desantaruppatti); see note 54 below.
For 'groups' see Ch, XX, §2f.
46. ' "Zeal arises": additional zeal, which is profitable and has the characteris-
tic of desire to act, arises due to the satisfaction obtained when the meditation
has brought progressive improvement. "More subtle than before": more subtle
than before the already-described zeal arose; for the breaths occur more subtly
owing to the meditation's influence in tranquillizing the body's distress and
disturbance. "Gladness arises": fresh happiness arises of the kinds classed as
minor, etc., which is the gladness that accompanies the consciousness occupied
with the meditation and is due to the fact that the peacefulness of the object
increases with the growing subtlety of the breaths and to the fact that the medita-
tion subject keeps to its course. "The mind turns away": the mind turns away
from the breaths, which have reached the point at which their manifestation


needs investigating (see §177) owing to their gradually increasing subtlety. But
some say (see PsA. Sinhalese ed., p. 351): "It is when the in-breaths and out-
breaths have reached a subtler state owing to the influence of the meditation and
the counterpart sign; for when that has arisen, the mind turns away from the
normal breaths". "Equanimity is established"', when concentration, classed as
access and absorption, has arisen in that counterpart sign, then, since there is no
need for further interest to achieve jhana, onlooking (equanimity) ensues, which
is specific neutrality* (Pm. 260).
47. * "In these nine ways": that occur in the nine ways just described. "Long in-
breaths and out-breaths ... are a body": the in-breaths and out-breaths, which
exist as particles though they have the aspect of length, constitute a "body" in
the sense of a mass. And here the sign that arises with the breaths as its support
is also called "in-breath and out-breath" (cf. e.g. §206). "The establishment
(foundation) is mindfulness": mindfulness is called "establishment (foundation)—
(upatthdna)" since it approaches (upagantvd) the object and remains (titthati)
there. "The contemplation is knowledge": contemplation of the sign by means of
serenity, and contemplation of mentality-materiality by defining with insight the
in-breaths and out-breaths and the body, which is their support, as materiality,
and the consciousness and the states associated with it as the immaterial (mental-
ity), are knowledge, in other words, awareness of what is actually there (has
actually become). "The body is the establishment {foundation)": there is that
body, and mindfulness approaches it by making it its object and remains there,
thus it is called "establishment". And the words "the body is the establishment"
include the other (the mental) kind of body too since the above-mentioned com-
prehension by insight is needed here too. "But it is not the mindfulness": that
body is not called "mindfulness" [though it is called "the establishment"]. "Mind-
fulness is both the establishment {foundation) and the mindfulness" y being so
both in the sense of remembering (sarana) and in the sense of establishing
(upatitthana). "By means of that mindfulness": by means of that mindfulness
already mentioned. "And that knowledge": and the knowledge already mentioned.
"That body": that in-breath-and-out-breath body and that material body which is
its support. "He contemplates (anupassati)": he keeps re-seeing (anu anu pas-
sati) with jhana knowledge and with insight knowledge. "That is why 'Develop-
ment of the foundation {establishment) of mindfulness consisting in contempla-
tion of the body as a body' is said": in virtue of that contemplation this is said to
be development of the foundation (establishment) of mindfulness consisting in
contemplation of the body as a body of the kind already stated. What is meant is
this: the contemplation of the body as an in-breath-and-out-breath body as stated
and of the physical body that is its [material] support, which is not contemplation
of permanence, etc., in a body whose individual essence is impermanent, etc.—
like the contemplation of a waterless mirage as water—, but which is rather con-
templation of its essence as impermanent, painful, not-self, and foul, according
as is appropriate, or alternatively, which is contemplation of it as a mere body
only, by not contemplating it as containing anything that can be apprehended as
"I" or "mine" or "woman" or "man"—all this is "contemplation of the body".
The mindfulness associated with that contemplation of the body, which mindful-


ness is itself the establishment, is the "establishment". The development, the in-
crease, of that is the "development of the foundation (establishment) of mindful-
ness consisting in contemplation of the body" ' (Pm. 261).
The compound 'satipatthdna' is derived by the Patisambhida from sati (mind-
fulness) and upatthdna (establishment—Ps.i,182), but in the Commentaries the
resolution into sati and patthdna (foundation) is preferred (MA.i, 237-38). In the
118th Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya the first tetrad is called development of the
first foundation of mindfulness, or contemplation of the body (M. Sutta 10; D.
Sutta 22). The object of the Patisambhida passage quoted is to demonstrate this.
48. The beginning, middle and end are described in §197, and the way they
should be treated is given in §§199-201. What is meant is that the meditator
should know what they are and be aware of them without his mindfulness leav-
ing the tip of the nose to follow after the breaths inside the body or outside it,
speculating on what becomes of them.
49. * "In the first part of the system": in the first part of the system of develop-
ment; in the first two bases, is what is intended. Of course, arousing of knowl-
edge must be admitted to take place here too because of the presence of aware-
ness of the length and shortness of the breaths as they actually are (as they
actually become); and it is not hard to do that, for it is merely the taking account
of them as they occur. That is why it is put in the present tense here. But what
follows is as hard as for a man to walk on a razor's edge; which is why the future
tense is used for the subsequent stages in order to indicate the need for excep-
tional prior effort' (Pm. 263).
50. "Bodily formation": the in-breath and out-breath (see M.i,301). For although
it is consciousness-originated, it is nevertheless called "bodily formation" since
its existence is bound up with the kamma-born body and it is formed with that as
the means' (Pm. 263).
51. 'The faint sound itself as a sign is the "sign of the faint sounds"', it has that
as its object. What is meant? Of course, the faint sounds have ceased too then;
but the sign of the sounds has been well apprehended and so consciousness
occurs with the sign of fainter sounds as its object. For as from the outset he
ascertains with undistracted consciousness the sign of each sound as it ceases,
eventually his consciousness occurs in the end with the sign of ultra-subtle
sounds too as its object' (Pm. 266).
52. "As a meditation subject for a beginner" is said with reference to the seren-
ity (i.e. jhana) meditation subject; but the insight meditation subject applies to
the other tetrads too' (Pm. 266).
53. * "Buffeted by wind": if he gives much attention to the wind that has gone
inside, that place seems to him as if it were buffeted by the wind, as if filled with
fat' (Pm. 268). No further explanation is given.
54. ' "Following (anugamana)" is occurring along with (anu anu pavattana),
going after (anugacchana), by means of mindfulness through making the breaths
the object as they occur. Hence he said "And that is not by following after the
beginning, middle and end". "The navel is the beginning" because of their first
arising there. For the notion of a beginning (adi cintd) is here in the sense of first


arising, not in the sense of just arising [once only]. For they actually go on
arising throughout [the whole length] from the navel to the nose-tip; and wher-
ever they arise, there in that same place they dissolve, because there is no going
(movement) of dhammas. The ordinary term "motion" (gatisamanna) refers to
successive arisings in adjacent locations (desantaruppatti) according to condi-
tions. "The heart is the middle": near the heart, just above it is the middle. "The
nose tip is the end": the place where the nostrils are is the end; that is the limit of
the application of the ordinary term "in-breaths and out-breaths", for it is accord-
ingly that they are called "consciousness-originated", there being no production
externally of what is consciousness-originated* (Pm. 268).
55. Reading 'dgata-gata-vasena' with Pm. (p. 271).
56. The point made here is that if the breaths themselves get temporarily too
faint to be observed, he should carry on by observing the tip of the nose where
they normally touch till they become apparent again. He brings the meditation
back to mind for the moment, 'as the place (desato)' where they were last
noticed, instead of 'as breaths', which have temporarily vanished.
57. Those born in the world of unconscious beings in the fine-material Brahma-
world (D.i,28).
58. * "The sign" is the learning sign and the counterpart sign, for both are stated
here together. Herein, the three similes beginning with cotton are properly the
learning sign, the rest are both. "Some" are certain teachers. The similes begin-
ning with the "cluster of gems" are properly the counterpart sign' (Pm. 273).
59. * "Because of difference in perception": because of the difference in the
manner of perceiving that occurred before the arising of the sign' (Pm. 273).
60. 'Vibhdvayam' can mean 'to do away with' or 'to explain'. Either is appli-
cable here according to Pm. (p. 274).
61. For the 'Wheel-turning Monarch' (cakkavattin) see D. Sutta 26 and M.
Sutta 129.
62. ' "With the object": under the heading of the object. The happiness included
in the jhana that has that object is experienced "because of the experiencing of
the object". What is meant? Just as, when a man who is looking for a snake
discovers (experiences) its abode, the snake is, as it were, already discovered
(experienced) and caught, owing to the ease with which he will then be able to
catch it with charms and spells, so too, when the object, which is the abode of
the happiness, is experienced (discovered), then the happiness itself is experi-
enced (discovered) too, owing to the ease with which it will be apprehended in
its specific and general characteristics. "By his penetration of its characteris-
tics": by penetration of the specific and general characteristics of happiness. For
when the specific and general characteristics of anything are experienced then
that thing is experienced according to reality' (Pm. 276).
63. ' "Momentary unification of the mind": concentration lasting only for a
moment. For that too, when it occurs uninterruptedly on its object in a single
mode and is not overcome by opposition, fixes the mind immovably, as if in
absorption' (Pm. 278).


64. * "Delivering": secluding, separating, by means of deliverance consisting in
suppression; abandoning the hindrances, is the meaning. "At the actual time of
insight'*: at the time of contemplation of dissolution. For dissolution is the fur-
thest extreme of impermanence. So the meditator who is contemplating dissolu-
tion by its means sees under the heading of consciousness the whole field of
formations as impermanent, not as permanent; and because of the suffering
inherent in what is impermanent, and because of the absence of self in what is
painful, he sees that same whole field of formations as painful, not as pleasant,
and as not-self, not as self. But since what is impermanent, painful, and not-self
is not something to delight in, and what is not something to delight in is not
something to be greedy for, consequently he becomes dispassionate towards that
whole field of formations when it is seen in the light of dissolution as imperma-
nent, painful, not-self, he does not delight in it, and his greed for it fades away,
does not dye him. Now, as he thus becomes dispassionate and his greed fades
away, it is firstly by means of mundane knowledge only that he causes greed to
cease and does not arouse it. The meaning is that he does not bring about its
arising. Or alternatively, his greed having thus faded away, he causes by means
of his own knowledge the cessation of the unseen field of formations just as that
of the seen, he does not arouse it; the meaning is that he brings about only its
cessation, he does not bring about its arising. Having entered on this way, he
relinquishes, he does not grasp. What is meant? It is that this contemplation of
impermanence, etc., is called relinquishment as giving up and relinquishment as
entering into because it gives up defilements along with aggregate-producing
kamma-formations and because, by seeing the flaws in what is formed and by
inclining towards the opposite of what is formed, namely nibbana, it enters into
that nibbana. Consequently the meditator who has that contemplation gives up
defilements and enters into nibbana in the way stated. Herein, the contemplation
of what is impermanent as only impermanent is "contemplation of imperma-
nence"; this is a name for insight that occurs by taking formations of the three
[mundane] planes [and leaving aside the supramundane] as impermanent. "From
the perception of permanence": from the wrong perception that occurs perceiv-
ing formed things as permanent, eternal; also the various views should be re-
garded as included under the heading of perception. Likewise with the percep-
tion of pleasure and so on. "By means of the contemplation of dispassion": by
means of the contemplation that occurs in the mode of dispassion for formations.
"From delight": from craving accompanied by happiness. "By means of the con-
templation of fading away": by means of the contemplation that occurs similarly
in the mode of fading away; hence "delivering from greed" is said. "By means of
the contemplation of cessation": by means of the successive seeing of forma-
tions' cessation. Or contemplating cessation is contemplation such that forma-
tions cease only and do not arise with future renewal. For this is knowledge of
desire for deliverance grown strong. Hence he said "delivering from arousing".
Contemplation that occurs in the mode of relinquishing is "contemplation of
relinquishment". "From grasping": from taking as permanent, etc.; or the mean-
ing can also here be regarded as "from grasping rebirth-linking" ' (Pm. 279). See
Chs. XX and XXI


65. *What is called "permanent" is what is lasting, eternal, like nibbana. What
is called "impermanent" is what is not permanent, and is possessed of rise and
fall. He said "The five aggregates are 'the impermanent' ", signifying that they
are formed dhammas as to meaning. Why? "Because their essence is rise and
fall and change": the meaning is that their individual essences have rise and fall
and change. Herein, formed dhammas' arising owing to cause and condition,
their coming to be after non-existence, their acquisition of an individual self
(attaldbha), is "rise". Their momentary cessation when arisen is "fall". Their
changedness due to ageing is "change". For just as when the occasion of arising
dissolves and the occasion of dissolution [succeeds it] there is no break in the
object (vatthu), so also there is no break in the object on the occasion facing
dissolution, in other words, presence, which is what the term of common usage
"ageing" refers to. So it is proper that the ageing of a single dhamma is meant,
which is called "momentary ageing". And without any reservation there must be
no break in the object between the occasions of arising and dissolution, other-
wise it follows that one thing arises and another dissolves' (Pm. 280).
66. * "Destruction" is the vanishing of formations; it is the act of those forma-
tions' fading away, their disintegration, that is "fading away". Destruction itself
as fading away is "fading away as destruction"; this is momentary cessation.
Formations fade away absolutely here when this has been reached, thus it is
"absolute fading away"; this is nibbana' (Pm. 280).
67. 'The act of relinquishing as the act of giving up by means of substituting for
what should be abandoned its opposite quality or by cutting it off, is "relinquish-
ment as giving up". Likewise the act of relinquishing of self that takes place in
non-formation of kamma, which is the relinquishing of all substrata (circum-
stances) of becoming, being the entering into that [nibbana] either by inclination
towards it [in insight] or by having it as object [in the path] is "relinquishment as
entering into". "Through substitution of opposite qualities": here contemplation
of impermanence, firstly, gives up perception of permanence by abandoning
through substitution of the opposite [e.g. substituting perception of imperma-
nence for that of permanence in the case of all formed things]. And the giving up
in this way is in the form of inducing non-occurrence. For all kamma-formations
that are rooted in defilements due to apprehending (formations) as permanent,
and the kamma-resultant aggregates rooted in both which might arise in the
future, are abandoned by causing their non-occurrence. Likewise in the case of
perception of pain, and so on. "Through seeing the wretchedness of what is
formed": through seeing the fault of impermanence, etc., in the formed three-
plane field of formations. It is "the opposite of the formed" owing to its perma-
nence, and so on. When defilements are given up by the path, then kamma-for-
mations are called "given up" through producing (apddana) in them the nature of
not causing result, and aggregates rooted in them are called "given up" through
their being rendered fit for non-arising. So the path gives up all these, is what is
meant' (Pm. 281). The word pakkhandana (rendered by 'entering into') is used
to define the act of faith, and can also be rendered by 'launching out into' or by
'leap'.


68. 'In such pasages as "Dhammas that are concepts" (Dhs., p. 1; §1308) even a
non-entity (abhdva) is thus called a "dhamma" since it is borne (dhdnyati) and
affirmed (avadhdrlyati) by knowledge. That kind of dhamma is excluded by his
saying "Dhammas [means] individual essences'*. The act of becoming (bhavana),
which constitutes existingness (yijjamdnatd) in the ultimate sense, is essence
(bhdva); it is with essence {saha bhdvena), thus it is an individual essence
(sabhdva); the meaning is that it is possible (labbhamdnarupa) in the true sense,
in the ultimate sense. For these are called "dhammas (bearers)" because they
bear (dhdrana) their own individual essences (sabhdva), and they are called
"individual essences" in the sense already explained' (Pm. 282; cf. Ch. VII,
n.l).
In the Pitakas the word sabhdva seems to appear only once (Ps.ii,178). It
next appears in the Netti (p.79), the Milindapanha (pp. 90, 164, 212, 360). It is
extensively used for exegetical purposes in the Visuddhimagga and main com-
mentaries and likewise in the sub-commentaries. As has just been shown, it is
narrower than dhamma (see also Ch. XXIII, n.l8). It often roughly corresponds
to dhdtu (element—see e.g. Dhs A. 263) and to lakkhana (characteristic—see be-
low), but less nearly to the vaguer and (in Pali) untechnical pakati (nature), or to
rasa (function—see Ch. I, §21). The Atthasalirii observes: 'It is the individual
essence, or the generality, of such and such dhammas that is called their charac-
teristic' (DhsA. 63); on which the Mula Tika comments: 'The individual essence
consisting in, say, hardness as that of earth, or touching as that of contact, is not
common to all dhammas. The generality is the individual essence common to all
consisting in impermanence, etc.; also in this context (i.e. Dhs. §1) the character-
istic of being profitable may be regarded as general because it is the individual
essence common to all that is profitable; or alternatively it is their individual
essence because it is not common to the unprofitable and indeterminate [kinds of
consciousness]' (DhsAA. 63). The individual essence of any formed dhamma is
manifested in the three instants of its existence (atthitd, vijjamdnatd), namely,
arising, presence (= ageing) and dissolution. It comes from nowhere and goes
nowhere (Ch. XV, §15) and is borne by the mind. Dhammas without individual
essence (asabhdva-dhamma) include the attainment of cessation (see Ch. XXIII,
n.l8) and some concepts. Space and time belong to the last-mentioned. Of space
(akdsa) the Tika to the Majjhima Nikaya says: * Space, which is quite devoid of
individual essence, is called empty' (commenting on M. Sutta 106), while of
time (kdla) the Mula TikA says: Though time is determined by the kind of con-
sciousness [e.g. as specified in the first paragraph of the DhammasanganI] and is
non-existent (avijjamdna) as to individual essence, yet as the non-entity (abhdva)
before and after the moment in which those [conascent and co-present] dhammas
occur, it is called the "container (adhikarana)"; it is perceived (symbolized) only
as the state of a receptacle (ddhdra-bhdva) (DhsAA. 62). Of nibbana (for which
see Ch. XVI, §46ff.), which has its own individual essence, the Mula Tika says:
'Nibbana is not like other dhammas; because of its extreme profundity it cannot
be made an object of consciousness (dlambitum) by one who has not realized it.
That is why it has to be realized by change-of-lineage. It has profundity surpass-
ing any individual essence belonging to the three periods of time' (VbhAA. 38).


'Sabhdva' has not the extreme vagueness of its parent
 l
bhdva\ which can
mean anything between 'essence' (see e.g. DhsA. 61) and '-ness* (e.g. natthi-
bhdva = non-existingness—Ch. X, §35). This may be remembered when sabhdva
is defined as above thus: 'It is with essence (sahabhdvena), thus it is individual
essence (sabhdvaY (Pm. 282), and when it is defined again thus: 'A dhamma's
own essence or its existing essence (sako vA bhdvo samdno vA bhdvo) is its
individual essence (sabhdvaY (Pm. 433). Sabhdva can also be the basis of a
wrong view, if regarded as the sole efficient cause or condition of any formed
thing (Ch. XVI, n.23). The Sanskrit equivalent, sabhdva, had a great vogue and
chequered history in philosophical discussions on the Indian mainland.
This (unlike the word, dhamma, which has many 'referents') is an instance
in which it is of first importance to stick to one rendering. The word is a purely
exegeticai one; consequently vagueness is undesirable. 'Individual essence' has
been chosen principally on etymological grounds, and the word 'essence' (an
admittedly slippery customer) must be understood from the contexts in which it
is used and not prejudged. Strictly it refers here to the triple moment of arising
etc., of formed dhammas that can have such 'existence' in their own right and be
experienced as such; and if refers to the readability of nibbana. We are here in
the somewhat magical territory of ontology, a subject which is at present under-
going one of its periodical upheavals in Europe, this time in the hands of the
existentialists. Consequently it is important to approach the subject with an open
mind.
69. ' "Made" is generated. 'WOT SO made" is not made by any conditions at all'
(Pm. 281).
70. 'That dhamma possessing individual essence and having the characteristic
of being not formed is to be treated basically as 'Jading away", since it is there
that the dhamma of defilement fades away' (Pm. 282).
71. 'When they are being abandoned by the noble path, which occurs by mak-
ing nibbana its object, it is said that they are abandoned by reaching that [nib-
bana], which is why he said "Because on coming to it", and so on. Herein,
"vanity of conceit (mdna-mada)" is conceit (mdna) that occurs as conceiving
(mahnana) "I am superior" (Vbh. 353). "Vanity of manhood" is vanity about
being of the male sex. The words "such as" refer to vanity of birth, and so on
(Vbh. 345)' (Pm. 282).
72. Modern etymology derives the word nibbana (Skr. nirvana) from the nega-
tive prefix nir plus the root vA (to blow). The original literal meaning was proba-
bly 'extinction' of a fire by ceasing to blow on it with bellows (a smith's fire for
example). It seems to have been extended to extinction of fire by any means, for
example, the going out of a lamp's flame (nibbdyati—M.iii,245). By analogy it
was extended to the extinction of the five-aggregate process on the Arahant's
death (see Iti. 38). Nibbana is not the 'extinction of a self or of a living lasting
being', such a mistaken opinion being the annihilation view (see e.g. M.i,140;
, )
73. Some texts add lena (another word for shelter). Still others are given in the
Samyutta text.