A BUDDHIST MANUAL
Psychological Ethics,
FROM THE PALI
OF THE
DHAMMA-SANGANI
Translated by CAROLINE A. F. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A.
[PART II.
The Suttanta Pairs of Terms (suttantika-dukam).]^
[1296, 1297] Which are the states that
{a) partake of wisdom^'^
States which are the associates of wisdom.
Q)) partake of ignorance P
States which are the associates of ignorance.
[1298, 1299] Which are the states that have
(a) the likeness of lightning ?
*
^ This title is discussed in my Introduction.
2 Vijjabhagino, i.e., "they (the dhamma) partake
(bhajanti) of wisdom by way of association with it, they
versantur (vattanti) as parts or divisions of wisdom"
(Asl. 50). Of the eight modes of Buddhist vi j j a, viz. : know-
ledge born of insight (vipassanananam), the potency
(iddhi) of the *
mental image,' and the six forms of intuition
(abhinna)^the first only is here referred to (cf D. i., p. 76
et seq., and Childers, s.vv.). The reader will remember that
vijja is a term borrowed by Buddhist ethics from Brah-
manic doctrine. Cf. the expression tisso vijja, p. 358.
It is almost equivalent to our '
lore.' Six states are in the
Anguttara (iii. 334) said to be vij ja-bhagiya.
^ Ignorance respecting the Four Truths. Asl. 51.
* This and the following simile are gone into at some
length (Asl. 388), as follows: Stage 1. The traveller sets
out in the gloom. 2. He loses his way. 3. Lightning
flashes out and illumines. 4. The road is made plain
again. So to the '
noble '
disciple there is : (1) the incep-
tion of insight making for the first (second or third) Paths ;
(2) the obliteration of truth by darkness ; (3) the glory of
The science^ of the three lowest of the Noble Paths.
(h) the likeness of the thunderbolt ?
The science of the topmost Path, the Path of Arahatship.
[1300, 1301] Which are the states that are
(a) foolish P
Unconscientiousness and disregard of blame. Besides,
all bad states are foolish.
{!)) discreet ?^
Conscientiousness and fear of blame. Besides, all good
states are discreet.
[1302, 1303] Which are the states that are
(a) dark P
Unconscientiousness and disregard of blame. Besides,
all bad states are dark.
{h) bright ?
Conscientiousness and fear of blame. Besides, all good
states are bright.
the Path is revealed ; (4) the Four Truths are made plain.
But in the thunderbolt of the might of Arahatship won we
get the simile of (a) an all -penetrating power, {b) the
mystery of its coming. Cf that of the wind as applied to
Eegeneration, John iii. 8.
^ Pa nil a, elsewhere rendered 'wisdom.' See § 17
and cf. n. 3. '
Science '
is here to be understood, not so
much in its modern sense of organized knowledge and
organized methods of investigation and verification for the
attaining and establishing that knowledge, as in the Platonic
and Aristotelian sense of iiricrTrj/jbr), or the intellectual anti-
thesis to opinion.
^ Bala, its opposite being pandit a, which partakes of
paiina. See § 16, where the substantival form, pan-
d ice am, is rendered '
erudition,' and paraphrased (Asl. 147)
as panditassa bhavo, the state of a icise person, one
who has discernment, discretion, one who has '
chosen that
good part ' as contrasted with the '
average sensual person '
or foolish youth. With the answers cf. §§ 30, 31.
2 On kanha and sukka, used with ethical significance,
see M. i., 389 ; Dhp., ver. 87 ; Mil. 200. {Cf '
Questions of
King Milinda,' i. 284, n. 2.)
[1304, 1305] Which are the states that
(a) conduce to remorse ?^
Misconduct in act, word and thought. Besides, all bad
states conduce to remorse.
(/>) do not conduce to remorse ?
Good conduct in act, word and thought. Besides, no
good states conduce to remorse.
[1306] Which are the states that are synonymous ?^
1 Tapaniya. Whereas we, in 'remorse,' bring into
relief the *
a,yenbite of inwyt,' the Buddhist term refers to
the flush of heat when the deed ill done is realized as
such.
2 This and the subjects of the two following questions
are adhivacana, nirutti and paniiatti respectively.
The three are said (Asl. 51) to *
converge in meaning
'
(atthato ninnakarana), though their form is diverse.
In the phrase '
An increaser of luck is an increaser of
wealth ' the terms are mutually delimitated. This is
adhivacanarn. . . . In the phrase 'They construct (or
combine, abhisankharonti), brethren, and are therefore
"syntheses,"' there is a statement of fact together with
the cause, as in discourse (abhilapa). . . . In the phrase
'
the ratiocination, conception, disposition [of the mind] '
(see above, § 7), something is set out on this wise or that
;
and this is pafinatti.
It seems inferable from the foregoing that by adhiva-
canarn a simple equipollence of terms is to be effected.
'
Is '
or '
are,' in translating, must be understood simply
as = , and not as implying inclusion under a more general
notion. The word occurs at every turn in the Cy., and has
usually been rendered, in these footnotes, '
equivalent to.'
Cf. a good instance in Jat. i. 117 ; Div. 491.
The second example and the comment adumbrate what
we mean by explanation. But in the absence of the
context it is not easy to gather much respecting pafinatti
from the third passage cited. Coming to the answer
common to all three questions, the Cy. instances as the
things which are classed (sank ha), designated (samanna),
expressed, and current (voharo) the names 'I,' '
another,'
That which is an enumeration, that which is a designa-
tion, an expression, a current term, a name, a denomina-
tion, the assigning of a name, an interpretation, a distinc-
tive mark of discourse on this or that state.
[1306a] All states are processes of synonymous nomen-
clature.
[1307] Which are the states that are interpretative ?
Answer as in § 1306.
[1307a] All states are processes of interpretation.
[1308] "Which are the states that are expressions ?
Answer as in § 1306.
[1308a] All states are processes of expression.
In this connexion,
[1309] What is name ^
*aman,' *
cattle,' *
Tisso,' 'a bed,' 'a house,' etc. Name
is fourfold from the point of view of the grounds on which
it is bestowed, viz. : (1) given by general consent on a
special occasion (samanfia-namam), e.g., that of the
first King Mahasammato ; (2) given because of a personal
quality (guna-namam), e.g., versed - in - the - Vinaya ;
(3) given because of a private wish or fancy (kittima-
namam), e.g., naming of an infant; (4) not given; of
primeval origin ; primordially fortuitous (opapatika-
namani), e.g., 'moon,' 'earth,' etc. Seefurther § 1309, n.
Processes of nomenclature, etc. —adhivacanapatha,
etc.
There is no being, no compound, concludes the Com-
mentator, that is not somehow nameable. The very trees
in desert and hill country will be named by country-folk.
And if they admit to not knowing the name of any one
kind, it will get the name of the 'nameless.' Cf. our
OS innominatum, or the Pic Sans-nom, and the like.
'
Distinctive mark' is vyafijanam.
^ Here the Cy. makes use of its foregoing classification
of name-kinds to show under which head to rank nam a
when distinguished from rupa. Nama must, namely, be
understood as opapatika-name, thatis, all its constituents
The four skandhas and uncompounded element.
[IBIO] What is form?
The four great phenomena and the form which is derived
from them.^
[1311] What is ignorance ?
Ansiver as for '
dulness,' § 390 {omitting *
on that
occasion ').^
[1312] What is the craving for renewed existence ?
Answer as for the *
Fetter of the passion for renewed
existence,' § 1120.
[1313] What is speculative opinion about renewed
existence ?
Theories that both soul and world will be re-born, etc.
[1314] What is speculative opinion about existence not
being renewed ?
Theories that both soul and world will not be re-born,
etc.
must be so understood. Feeling, e.g., when it arises, is
not named on the grounds on which a new individual, or
an '
artificial kind '
—table, etc.—might be named. '
One
has not to take a name for it, saying, "Be thou called
feeling !" The name has arisen together with it ' (p. 392).
'
Uncompounded element ' is here spoken of again a
Nirvana. Ibid. See above, p. 166, n. 1.
^
Cf. § 584. The more concise form of question
:
tattha katamaip ... is now sustained till the end.
Hitherto it has only been used to cross-question the student
on the details of a given answer, on 'name,' for instance,
as part of the contents of the preceding answer. Hence
the translation of tattha by 'in this connexion ' (whatever
the term in question may mean elsewhere). It is not clear,
however, what is the force of tattha in these last fifty- seven
questions, the greater part of the subjects not having
occurred in the foregoing part of the manual.
- This pair of questions '
is included to show '
how the
mass of views in the following pairs is '
an upgrowth from
the root of the Round of Re-birth.' Asl. 392.
[1315] What is the sort of speculation known as
Eternalism ?
That both soul and world are eternal, etc.
[1316] What is the sort of speculation known as
Annihilation ?
That both soul and world will be dissolved, etc.
[1317] What is the sort of speculation known as the
Finite Theory . . . [1318] the Infinite Theory '?
That both soul and world are finite . . . infinite, etc.
[1319] What is the sort of speculation known as the
Theory of Origins . . . [1320] the Theory of the Here-
after ?
Theories concerning the ultimate past . . . concerning
futurity.
All this sort of opinion, walking in opinion, jungle of
opinion, wilderness of opinion, puppet-show of opinion,
scuffling of opinion, the Fetter of opinion, the grip and
tenacity of it, the inclination towards it, the being infected
by it, this by-path, wrong road, wrongness, this '
fording-
place,' this shiftiness of grasp—this is what is called specula-
tive opinion about renewed existence, and the rest.^
[1321] What is unconscientiousness ? . . . [1322] dis-
regard of blame ?
Answers as for the ninth and tenth 'bases of corruption,'
§§ 1238, 1239.
1 This, the Ditthi-formula (see §§ 381, 1099), is
appended as well to each of the foregoing answers on
speculative opinions. Of these, the first two (bhava and
vibhava) are, in the Cy. (p. 392), connected with the next
two respectively {cf. § 1099). All the eight are enumerated
and discussed in the Brahmajala Sutta. D. i. 13-40. The
Cy. itself refers to this Sutta in connexion with the last
two theories. See also 'Dialogues of the Buddha,' i. 26,
n. 3.
[1323] What is conscientiousness ?
The feeHng of conscientious scruple when scruples ought
to be felt, conscientious scruple at attaining to bad and evil
states.
[1324] What is the fear of blame?
The sense of guilt where a sense of guilt ought to be felt,
a sense of guilt at attaining to bad and evil states.^
[1825] What is contumacy ?2
The being surly, refractious, contumacious when that
which is in accordance with the Law has been said, con-
trariness, captiousness, want of regard, of consideration, of
reverence, of deference.^
[1326] What is friendship with evil?
To follow after, to frequent the company of, and associate
with,* such persons as are unbelievers, immoral, uneducated,
mean-spirited^ and witless f to resort to and consort with
1 See §§ 80, 31.
^ Dovacassata. For *
surly' the Cy. (p. 398) and K.
read dovacassayam.
^ The three first terms in the answer are in the original
simply different forms of the same abstract noun, viz. :
dovacassayam, dovacassiyam, dovacassata. The
fourth term is literally '
taking the opposite side.' The
fifth is literally *
gratification in antagonism.' The last is
described as due to a lack of the habit of placing others
before one's self. Asl. 393. The term in question the Cy.
finally dismisses with the remark that, if persisted in in the
foregoing fashion, it involves the four skandhas, especially
that of syntheses. So for the complex generalizations in
the following questions. They are not relatively simple
states involving one skandha only. (The editing in the
Cy. is here again very unfortunate.)
* Sevana, nisevana, samsevana. The prefixes,
according to the Cy., merely act as augmentatives.
^ Maccharino; addicted to the five sorts of meanness.
Asl. 394. See § 1122, n.
^ Duppanna.
them, to be devoted to them, enthusiastic about them,^ and
entangled with them.^
[1327] What is suavity ?
The being gentle, tractable, amenable^ when that which
is in accordance with the Law has been said, the refraining
from contradiction and from captiousness ; the showing
regard and consideration,* reverence and deference.
[1328] What is friendship with good ?
To follow after, frequent the company of, and associate
with, such persons as are believers, virtuous, well educated,
generous and intellectual ; to resort to and consort with
them, to be devoted to them, enthusiastic about them,
mixed up with them.
[1329-1332] What is skill in
((a) the Offences?
I (h) restoration from the Offences ?
(c) the Attainments ?
(d) recovery from the Attainments ?
That skill which is science, understanding, search,
research, etc.,^ when applied to
^ Bhajana, sambhajana, bhatti, sambhatti; all
meaning originally '
forming a part of,' '
belonging to.'
But the two former are paraphrased by upasankamana.
In the sense of devotion bhatti does not, I believe, occur
in the Nikayas. Perhaps its oldest appearance with this
import is in Jat. v. 340—where the Cy. gives as equivalent
sineho—and in the Svet. Upanishad 6. 23.
^ Tarn sampavankata (so K. and the Cy.), i.e.,
entanglement ; lit., hooked along with them—with those
persons, both in thought and deed. Asl. 394.
^ Sovacassayam (sic lege), sovacassiyam, sova-
cassata.
* Adariyam, adarata; omitted in the text, but
supplied in K. '
Cf. § 1325.
^ The passage elided here and in the following sections
is no doubt that in which science (paiina) is described,
§16 and passim. On *
skill ' or 'proficiency' (kusalata)
see Introduction viii., on '
good.'
(a) the Offences termed the Five Groups of Offences
and the Seven Groups of Offences ;^
(h) restoration from [the effects of] those Offences ;^
(c) a case of Attainment^ where * conception works
and thought discursive,' a case of Attainment
*
wherein is no working of conception, but only
of thought discursive,' a case of Attainment
'void of the working of conception and of
thought discursive '
;
(d) recovery from those Attainments.*
^ That is, the group of '
Apatti's termed Parajika,
Sanghadisesa, Pacittiya, Patidesaniya and Duk-
kata offences, and the group which, besides these, includes
Thullaccaya and Dubbhasita offences. Asl. 394;
cf. Vin. V. 91. The scientific procedure is described in the
Cy. as -pariccheda-janana-panna.
^ Apatti-vutthana, or rising up from an offence.
Buddhaghosa does not in this connexion explain the term,
but in his Cy. on the passage, found in nearly identical
words at Vin. iii. 112, and iv. 225 (which Cy. is found in
Minayeff, Pat. 69), he uses vutthana as a general term
covering all the three methods (parivasa, manatta,
abbhana) of expiation of, and release from, an offence
committed by a member of the Order. Cf. Childers,
s.v, sanghadiseso ; Vin. v. 118. See also infra, § 1332.
^ The Samapattis, or various stages of self-concentra-
tion, include the Jhanas—as here—and other forms of
sam ad hi, all pre-Buddhistic and all utilized in the body
of Buddhist doctrine and culture. It is noteworthy that
they are not here referred to as only eight in number—see
Childers, s.v. (for that matter, neither do they find a place
in the Atthaka-nipata of the Anguttara). Neither is it
clear that the three Samapattis quoted in the answer
coincide in all respects with the first three stages of five-
fold Jhana. If they do, and if we are to assume that the
term includes more than those three stages, then, by
Subhuti's inclusion of four Vimokhas, this would give us
nine samapattis. Again, in M. i. 301, &> fifth Vimokha—the
last—is spoken of as a Samapatti, this bringing the number
up to ten. Cf. M. i. 398-400.
* The kind of ability in emerging from (lit., rising out
[1333] What is proficiency in the Elements ?^
That proficiency which is science, understanding, search,
research, etc., when applied to the eighteen elements,
viz. : sight, visual object and visual cognition, hearing,
sound and auditory cognition, smell, odour and olfactory
cognition, taste, sapid object and gustatory cognition, body-
sensibility, the tangible and tactile cognition, mind, mental
object and representative cognition.
[1334] What is proficiency in attention 9^
That proficiency in attention which is science, under-
standing, etc., when applied to those elements.
[1335] What is skill in the spheres ?3
That skill which is science, understanding, etc., when
applied to the twelve spheres, namely, sight and visual
form, hearing and sound, smell and odorous object, taste
and sapid object, body- sensibility and the tangible, mind
and mental object.*
of -vutthana ; see supra, § 1330) one or another kind of
samadhi is, by the Cy., specified as a predetermination
of the time when the subject wished to arouse himself, and
the carrying out of this act of will—a time stated in terms
of the motions of celestial bodies. '
When the moon, sun,
constellations have gone to such and such a position I
shall awake.' See, on this use of vutthana, M. i. 302;
A. iii. 311 ; S. iii. 270. On the modes of Jhana here
specified, see supra, § 160 et seq. Skill in the Attainment
(samapatti) itself is explained as the science of effecting
discernment of the appana or central concept (in Jhana)
as well as of the parikamma or preliminaries.
1 Dhatuyo. The skill in this case is said to comprise
acquisition, attention, hearing and remembering (instruction
being entirely oral) and discrimination. Asl. 395.
2 Seep. 5, n. 1. ^ See § 597 et seq.
* In the last three modes of ability six factors common
to all are distinguished : acquisition, attention, hearing,
comparison (lit., measuring), penetration, contemplation.
Of these, all but the fifth are exercised on mundane objects
of thought ;
penetration is concerned with supramundane
matters ; attention and comparison can be exercised about
[1336] What is skill in the ' Conditioned Geneses '?
Science, understanding, etc., when applied to the
formula :
*
The syntheses come to pass because of ignor-
ance ; cognition comes to pass because of syntheses ; name
and form come to pass because of cognition ; the sixfold
sphere comes to pass because of name and form ; contact
comes to pass because of the sixfold sphere, feeling because
of contact, craving because of feeling, grasping because of
craving, renewed existence because of grasping, birth
because of renewed existence, old age and death, grief,
lamentation, distress, melancholy and despair come to pass
because of birth. Such is the uprising of this whole mass
of Ill.'i
[1337, 1338] What is skill in affirming ... in negating
[causal conjuncture]?
Science, understanding, etc., when applied to discern-
ing that, in a given conjuncture, certain states are . . .
are not, the cause and conditions of certain other states.^
[1339] What is upright ?
Uprightness, without deflexion, twist, or crookedness.
[1340] What is soft ?
That which is plasticity, gentleness, smoothness, pliancy,
lowliness of heart.^
a mixture of both spheres of thought. Asl. 395. (To get
this or any meaning out of the passage in question some
emendation of the Cy. as edited has been necessary.)
^ On this famous formula the Cy. merely remarks that
*
it will appear in the Vibhanga on the Paticcasamuppada.'
Asl. 395.
2 This species of skill (thanakusalata, atthana-
kusalata) constituted one of the Ten Powers of the
Buddha. See M. i. 69. The Cy. (p. 395) takes for illus-
tration sense-cognition as a series of specific results from
specific processes; also cause and effect in the vegetable
kingdom.
^ Ajjavo and maddavo, the terms in this and the
foregoing question, are synonymous with uj(j)ukata and
[1341] What is patience ?
That patience which is long-suffering, compliance,
absence of rudeness and abruptness, complacency of heart.^
[1342] What is temperance ?
That which is the absence of excess in deed, in word,
and in deed and word together.^
Besides, all moral self-restraint is temperance.
[1343] What is amity ?^
When all such speech as is insolent,* disagreeable,
grating, harsh to others, vituperative to others, bordering
muduta, §§ 50, 51, 44, 45. The one additional term
—
the last—is paraphrased as '
absence of conceit.' Asl. 395.
^ Patience (khanti) is one of the ten Paramitas.
Jat. i., pp. 22, 23. See also A. iii. 254, 255. The last three
synonyms are the opposites of the last three synonyms of
'hate.' See supra, §§ 418, 1060. Ajjavo, Java no,
maddavo, khanti and soraccam are, in A. iii. 248,
given as the dhamma of a thoroughbred horse.
^ Temperance (soraccam) is defined as *
to be well on
the hither side of wickedness,' to avoid transgression in the
three kinds in deed, in the four kinds in speech and in
one's mode of livelihood. See Khys Davids, '
Manual of
Buddhism,' p. 142. The three transgressions of the mind
are omitted, hence soraccam applies apparently only to
the self-expression of the individual. Asl. 396.
^ Sakhalyam, paraphrased by sammodaka and
mudu. Ibid. Cf, the usual formula for the exchange of
courtesies on greeting, e.g., M. i. 16.
* Andaka. This and the following terms occur in
M. i. 286. See Morris's Notes, J. P. T. S., 1884, 1886,
1889. Buddhaghosa's comment obviates the necessity
either for Kern's hypothesis that the word, when applied
to speech, should be read as kandaka, or for that of
Morris, that it should be read as candaka. He says
(Asl. 396): Just as in a defective (sadose) tree bosses
(andakani; excrescences, warts) protrude, so through
faultiness, by words of bragging and insolence, are swellings
(andaka) produced.
'Disagreeable' (asata) is omitted in the M. i. 286.
upon anger, not conducive to concentration, is put away,
and when all such speech as is innocuous,^ pleasant to the
ear,2 affectionate, such as goes to the heart, is urbane,^
sweet and acceptable to people generally—when speech of
this sort is spoken—polished, friendly and gentle language
—this is what is called amity.
[1344] What is courtesy ?
The two forms of courtesy: hospitality towards bodily
needs and considerateness in matters of doctrine. When
anyone shows courtesy it is in one or other of these two
forms.*
[1345] What is it to have the door of the faculties un-
guarded?^
*
Grating ' = kakkasa=(Asl. ibid.) putika. By a some-
what forced figure grating or rasping speech is compared
to the disagreeable sensation in the ear (so tarn not
kanna!) by the entrance of the crumbling pulverous
tissue of a rotten tree. *
Vituperative,' etc. (parabhi-
sajjani) ; as it were, a lurking branch of barbed thorns
wounding the limbs and obstructing passage. Ihid.
^ Innocuous = nel a = nidd OS a. Asl. 397.
2 I.e., by varied sweetness.
^ Pori, i.e., town-conversation, either because it is full
of good points (gun a), or used by persons of breeding, or
simply urban. For town- dwellers use fitting terms, calling
a father a father and a brother a brother. Ihid.
* Patisantharo, both amisena and dhammena, is
discussed at length by Buddhaghosa (Asl. 397-399). He
takes, as usual, the etymology of the term—a spreading
out or diffusion—and shows it as a covering or closing,
through kindness and generosity, of the gap there may be
between the having of the giver and the recipient of his
attentions. Both are supposed to be members of the Order,
and many of the hospitable and polite ministrations
described occur in Vin. ii. 210, 211. See also Mil. 409.
^Aguttadvarata. This and the contrary attitude in
§ 1347 constitute an important formula in Buddhist doctrine,
and occur in D. i. 70, M. i. 180, 269, etc. It is also quoted
K.V. 426, 464.
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