A BUDDHIST MANUAL
Psychological Ethics,
FROM THE PALI
OF THE
DHAMMA-SANGANI
Translated by CAROLINE A. F. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A.
APPENDIX I.
The Digest, or Condensed Paraphrase of Book III.
(§§ 981-1295), entitled Division of Exposition, or the
Elucidation (a 1 1 h u d d h a r o).
Immediately following the text of the Dhammasangani
itself is a supplement of some 230 questions and answers.
The questions are verbatim those of the '
Elimination '
Division, or Book III., taken in order, but without the
cross-questioning on the details of the various lists of
ethical factors or defects, such as the varieties of cause
(hetu), or of the *
Intoxicants,' etc. The answers are for
the most part more tersely worded than those in Book III.,
and couched in language more or less different, including
several terms that came into technical use after the earliest
ages of Buddhism.
No distinctive title is assigned to this supplement in the
Manual itself. It is probable that the final announcement
*Dhamma- sangani- ppakarani samatta'
refers, not to it, but to the entire work. In the '
Atthasa-
linl,' however (p. 409 et seq.), this section is pronounced to
be commentary, not text, and is termed the Atthakatha-
k a n cl a m, or expositional division ; and in an earlier
passage it was termed the fourth Vibhatti comprising
the atthuddharo (Asl. 6). The tradition is related that
it is the work of Sariputta, and was compiled by him with
the object of making clearer the contents of the 'Nik-
khepa-kandam' (Book III., i.e., virtually the whole
Manual) to a pupil who could not otherwise understand it.
This being so, and the answers throwing no new light on
to the subjects discussed, I have not thought it worth
while to translate them. At the same time, it seemed
advisable to sort out the specific, if not the individual,
diiferences in diction, so that the reader may lose nothing
that may prove of any value for the history either of the
terms or of the concepts of Buddhism. I have also given
translations of a few answers where the very difference in
the terms used to obtain a virtually equivalent statement
may prove helpful towards understanding the language of
the Manual itself.
In respect of Pali terms used, when there is need of re-
ferring collectively to the three modes, or worlds of all
rebirth, as well as to that higher life of saintly aspiration,
which is not concerned with rebirth, these four are no
longer distinctively spoken of as the avacaram of this
or that and the Unincluded, but are simply classed together
as *
the four bhumis.'
Again, 'Nirvana '(nibbanam) invariably replaces the
term 'uncompounded element.' See Appendix II.
'Form' replaces *
all form' (see § 983 passim), and
* fruits of the life of the recluse '
the word '
fruits of the
Paths.' (See § 992 passim}) The latter variation occurs
but once in the Manual itself, viz., at § 1016.
^
Frequent allusion is now made to those *
types '
of good
and bad thoughts distinguished and analyzed by Book I.
They are spoken of, not as cittani, but as cittuppada,
or genesis of thought, a term occurring only once in the
Manual, viz., as a title. (See above, p. 164.)
The skandhas, so frequently adduced in Book III., are
never mentioned.
The term '
co-Intoxicant ' (sasavo), is no longer used
except in the analysis of the Intoxicant Group.
The very frequent use of the ablative in -t o (when the
^ By an error presumably in the MSS., the printed text
has, in § 1597, jhanabalani for samannaphalani.
Cf.K.
^ Printed above by an error as [1015].
Manual would use a substantival adjective—for instance,
kamavacara-kusalato instead of kamavacaram
k u s a 1 a m—betrays the later idiom. The Manual itself
uses this ablative, I believe, but twice, viz., in §§ 1062,
1071 : Vipakato = as, or by way of, result.
The term kiriya , so seldom used in the Manual, is
now used extremely often.
>k ^A' ^; * >;j
Taking now the three questions respecting (a) good,
(b) bad, and (c) indeterminate states, with which Book III.
(§§ 981-983, and for that matter the Manual itself) opens,
we read the following concise replies, taken in order :
—
/
' {a) Good in the four planes (bhummisu).
{h) The twelve geneses of bad thought.
(c) Result in the four planes ; completed indeter-
minates^ in the three planes ;2 form also and
Nirvana.'
Now, on referring to the analysis of the twelve Types of
bad states (Book I., Part I., ch. ii.), it will be seen that
these cover the whole question, inasmuch as only one
*
plane '—that of sensuous existence— is involved. Good
and indeterminate dhammas, on the other hand, involve
all four planes, and cannot be answered simply in terms of
the eight types of good thoughts (ch. i.) in the one case,
nor of thought genesis in the other.
The next triad of questions (Book III., §§ 984-986) is
answered in language which occurs at only one other
passage in the whole work (§ 1268 et seq,), and which is of
a vagueness that makes any equivalent rendering welcome.
*
States associated with easeful feeling ' :
—
*
The four geneses of thought accompanied by happiness,
which belong to good (karma) in the sensuous universe.
The four, which belong to bad (karma). The six, which
^ Kiriyavyakatam. See Introduction viii.
^ I.e., excluding that of sense (see Book 1., Part III.,
ch. ii.).
belong to the results of good (karma) in the sensuous
universe, as well as the five belonging to completed
thought.^ The threefold and fourfold^ Jhana relating to
the heavens of Form whether it arise as good (karma),
result (of good karma), or as a completed state. The
threefold and fourfold Jhana relating to the Higher Ideal,
whether it arise as good (karma) or as result. The easeful
feeling herewith arisen is not reckoned in.'
'
States associated with distressful feeling ';
—
'
The two geneses of thought which are accompanied by
melancholy. Cognition of body, which is accompanied by
distress. The distressful feeling herewith arisen is not
reckoned in.'
*
States associated with neutral feeling ':
—
* The four geneses of thought accompanied by dis-
interestedness, which belong to good (karma) in the
sensuous universe. The six, which belong to bad (karma).
The ten, which belong to the results of good (karma) in
the sensuous universe.^ The six, which belong to the
results of bad (karma).^ The six, which belong to com-
pleted thought.^ The fourth Jhana, relating to the heavens
of Form, whether it arise as good (karma), result (of good
karma), or as a completed state. The four Jhanas con-
nected with Formless Existence,^ whether they arise as good
(karma), result (of good karma), or as completed states.
The Fourth Jhana relating to the Higher Ideal, whether it
arise as good (karma), or as result (of good karma). The
neutral feeling herewith arisen is not reckoned in.
*
It is not proper to say that these three modes of feeling
^ K. reads kamavacara - kusalassa vipakato ca
kiriyato ca panca. But reference to §§ 469 and 568
shows that the analysis gives six and five respectively.
2 Excluding the highest Jhana, as incompatible with
'easeful feeling.'
^ Eead kamavacara-kusalassa.
^ Four in § 556, one in § 562, one in § 564.
5 Five in § 566, one in § 574.
^ For artipavacara read aruppa. V. 71 etseq.
are associated either with themselves, or with form, or with
Nirvana.'
* -^ * -x- -x- *
The answers to questions §§ 1007-1012 are (with the excep-
tion of that to 1009) more precise than those there given :
—
*
States which may be put away by insight ':
—
'
The four geneses of thought which are associated with
views and opinions, the genesis of thought which is accom-
panied by perplexity.'
*
States which may be put away by culture [1007
J
':
—
*
The genesis of thought which is accompanied by excite-
ment.
'
The four geneses of thought which are accompanied by
lust, but disconnected with views and opinions, also the
two geneses of thought which are accompanied by melan-
choly :—these states may be put away either by insight or
by culture.'
'
States which may be put away neither by insight nor
by culture ':
—
*
Good in the four planes ; result in the four planes
;
completed indeterminates in three planes ; form also, and
Nirvana.'
States the causes of which may be put away by insight,
by culture, or by neither are described in the same terms.
Moho (dulness), however, is inexplicitly named as some-
thing the cause of which can be put away by neither.
* * ^ * * *
Questions 1022-1024 are answered in quite other terms
than those there used :
—
(a) '
States having limited objects of thought ':
—
'
All result of sensuous existence ; ideation that is com-
pleted action; representative cognition that is completed
action but not free of causes,^ and is accompanied by happi-
ness.'
(b) *
States having objects of thought of wider scope ':
—
* The sphere of infinite intellect ; the sphere where there
^ Kiriya-hetuka manovinnanadhatu.
is neither perception nor non-perception.' {Cf. §§ 267,
268.)
(c) *
States having infinite objects of thought :'
—
'
The four Paths that are the Unincluded, and the four
Fruits of the life of the recluse.'
'
The four geneses of thought which are disconnected
with knowledge and belong to good (karma) in the universe
of sense, also the four geneses of thought disconnected
with knowledge which are completed acts, and all bad
(karma):—these states may be (a) or (b), but not (c), and
may not be termed both (a) and (b).
'
[Again,] the four geneses of thought which are associated
with knowledge and belong to good (karma) in the universe
of sense, the four geneses of completed thoughts which are
associated with knowledge, the Fourth Jhana relating to
the universe of form, whether it arise as good (karma), or
as completed thought, and the representative cognition
which is completed and free from the causes and is accom-
panied by disinterestedness:—these states may be (a), or
(b), or (c), but it is not proper to call them (a) and (b) and (c).
'
[Lastly] the threefold and fourfold Jhana relating to the
heavens of Form, whether it arise as good (karma), or as
result, or as completed thought, the results of Fourth
Jhana, and the two first Jhanas connected with Formless
existence, viz., the spheres of Infinite Space and of Infinite
Nothingness :
—these states it is not proper to call (a) and
(b) and (c).
Form and Nirvana are without objects of thought.'
5<- ){• -X- -X- -X- -X-
One more group deserves quoting as giving answers not
in terms of the subject inquired into. This is the two
triads corresponding to §§ 1044-1049. The Atthakatha
has the following
:
'
States which are
(a) personal (or subjective),
(b) external,
(c) personal- external.'
'
With the exception of form which is not bound up with
faculties/ all states may be subjective or external or sub-
jective-external. Form which is not bound up with facul-
ties, and Nirvana are both external.'
*
States which have
(a) a subjective object of thought,
(b) an external object of thought,
(c) a subjective-external object of thought '
:
—
*
(a) The sphere of infinite intellection and the
sphere where there is neither perception
nor non-perception.
'
(b) The threefold and fourfold Jhana relating to
the heavens of Form, whether it arise as
good (karma), as result (of good karma), or
as completed thought, also results of Fourth
Jhana, the sphere of infinite space, the
four Paths that are the Unincluded and
the four Fruits of the life of the recluse :
—
—these states have an external object of
thought.
'Excepting form, states, good, bad, and in-
determinate relating to the sensuous uni-
verse, and the Fourth Jhana relating to
the heavens of Form, whether it arise as
good (karma), or as completed thought:
—
all these may be either (a), (b), or (c).
* But it is not proper to say that the sphere of
nothingness is all three.
'
Form and Nirvana are without objects of
thought.'
There is here a point of additional interest.
The second and fourth Aruppajjhanas are shown to
have been conceived as exercises of pure introspection, and
to be devoid of any implications of a World-Keason, or a
macrocosmic Perception, let alone any of the '
rapt soul
'
being caught up to other spheres.
^ Read, for Manindriyam, Anindriya-baddha-
rupan ca. By an oversight this sentence and the next
are printed in the text as if belonging to the previous triad.
APPENDIX II.
On that which is predicted about Uncompounded Element
(asankhata dhatu)in the Dhamma Sangani.
Uncompounded Element is classed as the fourth and last
species of the morally Indeterminate (avyakata m)—in
other words, of that conduct or state of mind which is
not productive of good or bad karma. But it alone,
of those four, does not receive separate and systematic
discussion, as is the case with the other three—Result,
Kiriya , and Form. The following predicates are elicited
incidentally in the course of Book III., which discusses
what may be called Applied Ethics. Again, whereas the
word Nirvana (nibbanam) is always substituted for
asankhata dhatu in that Atthakatha which is appended
as a supplement to the original text, the term '
uncom-
pounded element ' is not identified, in the Dhamma Sangani,
with the '
topmost fruit ' of the Paths, the arahatta-
p h a 1 a m, which is one aspect of the state called Nirvana
(cf. S. iv. 251, 252). The subject therefore seems to
demand further inquiry. It is to facilitate this that the
following results are appended, parallel more or less to the
table on Form, pp. 168-171. Cf. note, p. 166.
Uncompounded element is
indeterminate [983]
neither result nor productive of result [989]
neither the issue of grasping^ nor favourable
to it2 [992]
neither corrupt nor baneful [995]
1 Given also in [1212]. '^
Given also in [1220].
*
void of the working of conception and of
thought discursive [998]^
to be put away neither by insight nor by
culture [1008]
something the causes of which are to be put
away neither by insight nor by culture [1012]^
that which makes neither for the piling up
nor for the undoing of re- birth [1015]
neither appertaining nor not appertaining
to studentship [1017]^
infinite [1021]
perfected [1027]
that which does not entail fixed conse-
quences [1030]*
invisible and non-impingeing [1052]
not a cause [1072]
without a cause as concomitants [1074]
not associated with a cause [1076]
without material form [1092]
supra-mundane [1094]
not an Intoxicant [1102]
not co-Intoxicant [1104]
disconnected with the Intoxicants [1106]
not a Fetter [1124]
unfavourable to the Fetters [1126]
disconnected with the Fetters [1128]
not a Tie [1141]
not that which tends to become tied [1142]
disconnected with the Ties [1144]
not a Hindrance [1163]
disconnected with and unfavourable to the
Hindrances [1173]
not a Contagion [1176]
disconnected with the Contagion and un-
infected [1184]
without concomitant object of thought [1186]
not of the intellect [1188]
not involved in the life of sense [1190]
disconnected with thought [1192]
detached from thought [1194]
not sprung from thought [1196]
not something coming into being together
with thought [1198]
not consecutive to thought [1200]
not derived [1210]
without the attribute of Grasping [1218]
disconnected with Grasping, and not favour-
ing it [1228]
without the attribute of corruption [1240]
harmless [1242]
not corrupt [1243a]
disconnected with the Corruptions, and
harmless [1253]
not joyous [1273]
unaccompanied by joy [1275]
unaccompanied by ease [1277]
unaccompanied by disinterestedness [1279]
Unincluded [1287]
that by which there is no going away [1289]
something having no Beyond [1293]
not concomitant with war [1295]
In the Cy. on the Dhatu Katha nib ban am (Nirvana)
is always substituted forasankhato khandho.
THE END.
Showing posts with label Dhamma-Sangani. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Dhamma-Sangani. Show all posts
Monday, June 6, 2011
Dhamma-Sangani - THE DIVISION ENTITLED ELIMINATION - The Suttanta Pairs of Terms II
A BUDDHIST MANUAL
Psychological Ethics,
FROM THE PALI
OF THE
DHAMMA-SANGANI
Translated by CAROLINE A. F. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A.
When a certain individual sees an object with the eye^
he is entranced with the general appearance, or in the
details of it.^ He does not set himself to restrain that
which might give occasion for wicked states, covetous, de-
jected, to flow in over him, were he to dwell unrestrained
as to the sense of sight. He keeps no watch over his
faculty of sight, nor does he attain to mastery over it. And
so in like manner when he hears a sound with the ear . . .
smells an odour with the nose . . . tastes a sapid with the
tongue . . . feels a tangible with the body . . . recognises
a mental object with the mind, he is entranced with the
general appearance and in the details of it. He does not
set himself to restrain that which might give occasion for
wicked states, covetous, dejected, to flow in over him, were
he to dwell unrestrained as to the mental faculty. He
keeps no watch over the mental faculty, nor does he attain
to mastery over it. That these six faculties should be thus
^ K. omits puggalo, given in the printed text. The
latter omits it in the corresponding answer, § 1347.
2 This is a passage naturally calling for psychological
qualification from the Commentator (Asl. 399, 400). *
"Eye "
stands here for the total efiicient cause (karana-vasena),
namely, for that visual cognition which is the generally
accepted form-seeing capacity. As the Ancients have said
:
The eye does not see form, not being of the nature of
intellect (cittam); the intellect, not being of the nature of
eye, does not see form (the Cy. has here been wrongly
punctuated). One sees with the sense-embodied mind im-
pingeing on the *
door-object ' (dvararammane sam-
ghattanena pasadavatthukena cittena passati),
that is, with the aggregate organism, or apparatus, as
when we say, " he shoots with the bow." '
^ On nimittagahl and anuvyaiijanagahi, see notes
relating precisely to this passage in D. i. 70, in '
Dialogues
of the Buddha,' i. 80. The former term is, in the Attha-
salinT, defined as the act of one who, not content with
simply beholding what is attractive and so forth, or what
is characteristically female or male, grasps at it with
passionate desire.
unguarded, untended, unwatched over, unrestrained, is
what is called having the door of the faculties unguarded.
[1346] What is immoderation in diet?^
When anyone, through carelessness and without judg-
ment, takes food^ for purposes of sport,^ sensual excess,
personal charm and adornment, his insatiableness, im-
moderation, and want of judgment are what is called im-
moderation in diet.
[1347] What is it to have the doors of the faculties
guarded ?
When a certain individual sees an object with the eye
he is not entranced with the general appearance or the
details of it. He sets himself to restrain that which might
give occasion for wicked states, covetous, dejected, to flow
in over him, were he to dwell unrestrained as to the
sense of sight. He keeps watch over this faculty of sight,
and attains to mastery over it. And so in like manner,
when he hears a sound with the ear . . . smells an odour
with the nose . . . tastes a sapid with the tongue . . .
feels a tangible with the body . . . recognises an idea with
the mind, he is not entranced with the general appearance
and the details of it. He sets himself to restrain that
which might give occasion for wicked states, covetous,
dejected, to flow in over him, were he to dwell unrestrained
as to the mental faculty. He keeps watch over the mental
faculty, and attains to mastery over it. That these six
faculties should be thus guarded, tended, watched over,
^Bhojane amattanfiuta = a sustained indulging
without reflection . . . the ignoring of measure or bounds
therein. Asl. 402.
2 Aharam 'both edible and potable.' Asl. 401.
^ Davaya, etc. That is to say, that he may be able to
dance or do acrobatic feats, etc. Or like kings and
courtiers who feed to swell their '
pride of life '
and man-
hood, etc. Asl. 402, 403.
restrained, is what is called having the doors of the faculties
guarded.
[1348] What is moderation in diet ?
When anyone takes food with reflection and judgment,
not for purposes of sport, excess, personal charm and
attractions, but so as to suffice for the sustenance and
preservation of the body, for allaying the pangs [of hunger]^
and for aiding the practice of the higher life,^ and thinking
the while, '
I shall subdue that which I have been feeling
and shall cause no new feeling to arise,^ and maintenance
shall be mine, blamelessness also and comfort '
—this con-
tent, moderation, judgment in diet is what is called modera-
tion in diet.
[1349] What is forgetfulness ?^
^ Vihimsuparatiya. Vihimsa = abhutta-paccaya
uppaj janaka-khuda. Asl. 403.
2 Brahmacariyanuggahaya.
^ This formula (as Trenckner terms it, *Pali Misc.,' 74)
of abstemious living occurs M. i. 355 ; S. iv. 104, 176, etc.
;
also Mil. 367. The comments in the Asl. reveal a more
specific and less sublime interpretation of the vedana in
question than is taken by the translator of the last-named
passage (Khys Davids, '
Questions of King Milinda,' ii. 231).
According to the former, puranaii ca vedanam is
simply that due to one's not having dined, and navaii ca
vedanam to one's having dined too much, or to one's
having dined. Asl. 403, 404. Psychologically then, the
ideal state of one relieved of the craving of appetite would
seem to be, not the positive sensations of surfeit or of
having well dined, but the relatively negative state of not-
hungry, not-thirsty. Under 'comfort' (phasuviharo =
bhojanisamso) gourmands, who fail to acquire the same,
are described, with some gusto, under five current sobriquets
—'Hold, waistcoat!' 'Gyrator' (because unable to rise
after eating), etc. Abstemious procedure is also categorized
otherwise and in detail. Asl. 404.
^ In this answer (describing mutthasaccam) the text
requires some emendation. Anussati should be asati,
and the privative a should of course be dropped in a-
pilapanata, a-sammussanata. K. reads (here only)
Unmindfulness, lapse of memory, non-recollection, non-
remembrance, not bearing in mind, superficiality, oblivion.
[1350] What is lack of intelligence ?
Answer as for * ignorance '
or '
dulness,' § 1311, etc.
[1351] What is mindfulness ?
Answer as in § 14, omitting *
on that occasion.'^
[1352] What is intelligence?
Answer as for '
wisdom '
or '
science,' § 16. And see § 53.
[1353] What is the power of computation ?^
Answer as for 'wisdom,' § 16.
[1354] What is the power of cultivation ?
That which is the pursuing, the cultivating, the multiply-
ing of good states.
Moreover, the seven factors in the Great Awakening'^ are
the power of cultivation.
[1355] What is composure ?
Ansicer as for *
quiet,' §§ 11, 54.*
[1356] What is insight ?
Answer as for '
insight ' and *
wisdom,' §§ 55, 16.
pamussanata—not so the Cy.—and repeats asati after
appatissati. See § 14 and footnote.
1 K. reads for asammussanata, appamussanata.
Cf. preceding note.
2 Patisankhanabalam. This is not included in any
set of '
powers ' enumerated in the present work {cf. § 1,
etc.), nor does it form part ofpannabalani(§ 29). How-
ever, it is included in the eight very different kinds of
powers given in A. iv. 223, ranking as the specific balam
of the erudite or bahussuto. Cf the use of pati-
sankha in Vin. i. 213. In the present connexion it seems
as a correlative term to have superseded dassanam (in-
sight) ; see above, §§ 1002-1012, 1254-1267.
''
See §§ 285, 287, etc.
* In this and the following references the phrase * on that
occasion '
must be understood to be omitted.
[1357] What is *
the mark of composure '?i
Answer as for * quiet,' § 1357.
[1358] What is *
the mark of grasp '?
Ansiver as for 'grasp '
and 'energy,' §§ 56, 13.
[1359] What is grasp?
Answer as for *
the mark of grasp,' § 1358.
[1360] What is balance ?
Answer as for 'balance,' § 57.
[1361] What is moral failure ?2
Excess in deed, excess in word, excess in both together.
Moreover, all immorality is moral failure.
[1362] What is theoretic fallacy ?•'
*
There is no such thing as alms, or sacrifice, or offering;
there is neither fruit, nor result of good or evil deeds
;
there is no such thing as this world or the next ; there is
no such thing as mother, or father, or beings springing
into birth without them ; there are in the world no recluses
or brahmins who have reached the highest point, who have
attained the height, who, having understood and realized
by themselves alone both this world and the next, make
known the same '
—all this sort of speculation . . . this is
what is called theoretic fallacy. Moreover, all wrong views
are theoretic fallacies.
[1363] What is moral progress ?
Absence of excess in deed, in word, and in deed and word
together.'*
[1364] What is progress in theory ?
'
There is such a thing as alms, sacrifice, and offering
;
. . . fruit, and the result of good and evil deeds ; . . . this
^ Samatha-nimittam. Explained by Tarn akaram
gahetva puna pavattetabbassa samathassa ni-
mitta-vasena. Asl. 53.
2 Silavipatti. Cf §§ 1363, 1342.
^Ditthivipatti. Cf § 1215.
*Sila-sampada. Cf § 1342.
world and the next ; mother, father and beings springing
into birth without them ; . . . recluses and brahmins who
have reached the highest, who have attained the height,
who having understood and realized by themselves alone
both this world and the other world, make known the
same '
—all this sort of science, understanding, etc.^ . . .
this is what is called progress in theory. Moreover, all
right views are progress in theory. •
[1365] What is purity in morals ?
Absence of excess in deed, in word, and in deed and word
together.^
[1366] What is purity in theory ?
Knowledge of the specific nature of Karma ;^ knowledge
^ Continue as in § 16.
2
Cf. § 1363. Purity in theory would seem to indicate
perfection relative to progress in theory, while in moral
matters a similar distinction does not apparently hold.
The Cy. only explains this want of distinction by saying
that in § 1363 the si la of restraint of the Patimokkha is
alluded to, while in § 1365 visuddhi-sila is spoken of
.
^ K. reads here kammassakatam iianam—a curious
phrase. Buddhaghosa, to judge by his exposition, reads
kamma-ssakata-nanam (Asl. 406, 407) or -ssakata-,
or -ssakatam fianam (Asl. 406). The corresponding
adjective to this sakata or sakatarn occurs in the
passage quoted from the Sutta Pitaka by Nagasena (Mil. i.
45; cf. Khys Davids' trans., i. 101, n. 1; also Asl. 66),
namely, kammassaka (satta); i.e., according to the
translator's view, '
having each their own karma.' As this
passage occurs in the yet inedited 135th Sutta of the Maj-
jhima N., the Papanca Sudani may prove to have a more lucid
commentary on it than that given in the Atthasalini. The
latter is to this effect : [This phrase means] the science of
knowing that this karma (or action) is sakam, that karma is
not sakam. In this connexion all bad karma, whether it be
done by one's self or by another, is not sakam. How so?
Because it destroys utility and creates disutility. But good
karma, which has the reverse effect, is named sakam.
Just as a man with a full purse in the course of a journey
of the Truths in their due order ; the knowledge of him who
holds the Path ; the knowledge of him who holds the Fruit
of the Path.
(i.)^ The phrase '
Now purity of theory ' is equivalent to
that science, understanding . . . right theory (views) [de-
scribed above, § 16].
(ii*) In the phrase '
And as the struggle of him who holds
certain views, '^ '
struggle '
means that inception of energy
etc. [described above, § 13].
may stop at various cities where festivals are going on and,
determining what votive outlay he will make, takes part
accordingly in those festivals as his inclination prompts,
and safely emerges from the jungle, even so do beings who
are established in this knowledge of the sakatam of
karma, when they have heaped up much karma making for
transmigration, safely and at ease attain arahatship, even
to the extent of numbers innumerable.
Now if sakam mean here, as it usually does, '
one's
own,' that still seems no explanation of the assertion that
one's bad actions are not one's own. And how does the
parable bear out the assertion ?
^ With the foregoing question and answer the catechism
proper of the '
Dhamma Sangani ' comes to an end.
There follow eleven sundry phrases or terms, not made
the subject of any part of the catechism, and appended
here in the phraseology of a commentary. They are
severally either referred to some reply in the catechism, or
briefly expounded, and are probably all culled from the
Sutta Pitaka as technicisms of Buddhist ethics. Very
possibly they form one connected sentence, giving an
eloquent and concise description of the nature of Wisdom
and Emancipation. Buddhaghosa has nothing very en-
lightening on this fraction of ancient commentary included
in the text, but promises an explanation of at least the
division of the subject of '
agitation ' in the Commentary
on the '
Vibhanga.'
^Yatha ditthissa ca padhanam. It is just possible
one should read Yathaditthissa ; K., however, divides
the two words. The Cy. merely remarks that the energy
put forth is intelligent or scientific, and can be applied either
to worldly or to higher things.
(iii.) The phrase *
agitation '
implies dread of birth, dread
of old age, dread of sickness, dread of death.
(iv.) The phrase '
occasion of agitation '
means birth, old
age, sickness, death.
(v.) The phrase *
And the earnest struggle of him who is
agitated '
refers to [the four Eight Struggles] :
—When a
bhikkhu brings forth the desire (a) that bad and wicked
states which have not arisen should not arise, (6) that bad
and wicked states which have arisen should be put away,
(c) that good states which have not arisen should arise,
(d) that good states which have arisen should stand firm,
should not get confused, should be frequently practised,
made to abound, cultivated, and perfected—then he uses
endeavour, sets energy a-going, reaches forward in thought
and struggles.^
(vi.) The phrase '
And discontent in good states '
means
the longing for higher achievement in one who is dis-
satisfied over the cultivation of good states.^
(vii.) The phrase *
And the not shrinking back in the
struggle ' means the thorough and persevering and unrest-
ing performance, the absence of stagnation, the unfaltering
volition, the unflinching endurance,^ the assiduous pursuit,
exercise and repetition which attend the cultivation of good
states.
^ See A. ii. 15, 16, 74. It will be seen that the four
modes of will-culture described on p. 15 of A. ii. as the
Sammapadhanani (and quoted in the Dh. S.) are, on
p. 74, termed respectively the Struggles for Self-control,
for Eenunciation, for Cultivation (or Development) and for
Preservation. Yet on p. 16 a different connotation is given
to each of these four terms.
^ This and the next phrase (vii.) occur consecutively in
A. i. 50. The progress of sublime discontent in a pious
individual from giving small donations to the Order, then
greater gifts till he personally enters the Order and finally
wins the goal of Arahatship, is briefly described, Asl. 407.
The last attainment gives the winner the title of the
Greatly Content.
« Cf. § 13.
(viii.) The phrase 'Wisdom' means the threefold wisdom,
namely (a) reminiscent knowledge of one's former births,
(h) knowledge of the relapse and renascence of beings,
(c) the knowledge that makes an end of the Intoxicants.
(ix.) The phrase *
Emancipation ' means the twofold
emancipation, namely, (a) detachment of thought,^ and
(h) Nirvana.^
(x.) The phrase '
knowledge in making an end ' means
the knowledge he has who holds the Path.
(xi.) The phrase '
knowledge in origins ' means the know-
ledge he has who holds the Fruit of the Path.
End of the Division entitled 'Elimination.'
^ Cittassa ca adhimutti = vimutti (emancipation).
D. i. 174.
^ This is, I believe, the only passage in the original
Manual where the word occurs. This is interesting in
view of the fact that it occurs in what appears to be an
appendix of original Commentary, and also that the term
occurs so frequently in the old digest which follows in the
text. See Appendix I.
Psychological Ethics,
FROM THE PALI
OF THE
DHAMMA-SANGANI
Translated by CAROLINE A. F. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A.
When a certain individual sees an object with the eye^
he is entranced with the general appearance, or in the
details of it.^ He does not set himself to restrain that
which might give occasion for wicked states, covetous, de-
jected, to flow in over him, were he to dwell unrestrained
as to the sense of sight. He keeps no watch over his
faculty of sight, nor does he attain to mastery over it. And
so in like manner when he hears a sound with the ear . . .
smells an odour with the nose . . . tastes a sapid with the
tongue . . . feels a tangible with the body . . . recognises
a mental object with the mind, he is entranced with the
general appearance and in the details of it. He does not
set himself to restrain that which might give occasion for
wicked states, covetous, dejected, to flow in over him, were
he to dwell unrestrained as to the mental faculty. He
keeps no watch over the mental faculty, nor does he attain
to mastery over it. That these six faculties should be thus
^ K. omits puggalo, given in the printed text. The
latter omits it in the corresponding answer, § 1347.
2 This is a passage naturally calling for psychological
qualification from the Commentator (Asl. 399, 400). *
"Eye "
stands here for the total efiicient cause (karana-vasena),
namely, for that visual cognition which is the generally
accepted form-seeing capacity. As the Ancients have said
:
The eye does not see form, not being of the nature of
intellect (cittam); the intellect, not being of the nature of
eye, does not see form (the Cy. has here been wrongly
punctuated). One sees with the sense-embodied mind im-
pingeing on the *
door-object ' (dvararammane sam-
ghattanena pasadavatthukena cittena passati),
that is, with the aggregate organism, or apparatus, as
when we say, " he shoots with the bow." '
^ On nimittagahl and anuvyaiijanagahi, see notes
relating precisely to this passage in D. i. 70, in '
Dialogues
of the Buddha,' i. 80. The former term is, in the Attha-
salinT, defined as the act of one who, not content with
simply beholding what is attractive and so forth, or what
is characteristically female or male, grasps at it with
passionate desire.
unguarded, untended, unwatched over, unrestrained, is
what is called having the door of the faculties unguarded.
[1346] What is immoderation in diet?^
When anyone, through carelessness and without judg-
ment, takes food^ for purposes of sport,^ sensual excess,
personal charm and adornment, his insatiableness, im-
moderation, and want of judgment are what is called im-
moderation in diet.
[1347] What is it to have the doors of the faculties
guarded ?
When a certain individual sees an object with the eye
he is not entranced with the general appearance or the
details of it. He sets himself to restrain that which might
give occasion for wicked states, covetous, dejected, to flow
in over him, were he to dwell unrestrained as to the
sense of sight. He keeps watch over this faculty of sight,
and attains to mastery over it. And so in like manner,
when he hears a sound with the ear . . . smells an odour
with the nose . . . tastes a sapid with the tongue . . .
feels a tangible with the body . . . recognises an idea with
the mind, he is not entranced with the general appearance
and the details of it. He sets himself to restrain that
which might give occasion for wicked states, covetous,
dejected, to flow in over him, were he to dwell unrestrained
as to the mental faculty. He keeps watch over the mental
faculty, and attains to mastery over it. That these six
faculties should be thus guarded, tended, watched over,
^Bhojane amattanfiuta = a sustained indulging
without reflection . . . the ignoring of measure or bounds
therein. Asl. 402.
2 Aharam 'both edible and potable.' Asl. 401.
^ Davaya, etc. That is to say, that he may be able to
dance or do acrobatic feats, etc. Or like kings and
courtiers who feed to swell their '
pride of life '
and man-
hood, etc. Asl. 402, 403.
restrained, is what is called having the doors of the faculties
guarded.
[1348] What is moderation in diet ?
When anyone takes food with reflection and judgment,
not for purposes of sport, excess, personal charm and
attractions, but so as to suffice for the sustenance and
preservation of the body, for allaying the pangs [of hunger]^
and for aiding the practice of the higher life,^ and thinking
the while, '
I shall subdue that which I have been feeling
and shall cause no new feeling to arise,^ and maintenance
shall be mine, blamelessness also and comfort '
—this con-
tent, moderation, judgment in diet is what is called modera-
tion in diet.
[1349] What is forgetfulness ?^
^ Vihimsuparatiya. Vihimsa = abhutta-paccaya
uppaj janaka-khuda. Asl. 403.
2 Brahmacariyanuggahaya.
^ This formula (as Trenckner terms it, *Pali Misc.,' 74)
of abstemious living occurs M. i. 355 ; S. iv. 104, 176, etc.
;
also Mil. 367. The comments in the Asl. reveal a more
specific and less sublime interpretation of the vedana in
question than is taken by the translator of the last-named
passage (Khys Davids, '
Questions of King Milinda,' ii. 231).
According to the former, puranaii ca vedanam is
simply that due to one's not having dined, and navaii ca
vedanam to one's having dined too much, or to one's
having dined. Asl. 403, 404. Psychologically then, the
ideal state of one relieved of the craving of appetite would
seem to be, not the positive sensations of surfeit or of
having well dined, but the relatively negative state of not-
hungry, not-thirsty. Under 'comfort' (phasuviharo =
bhojanisamso) gourmands, who fail to acquire the same,
are described, with some gusto, under five current sobriquets
—'Hold, waistcoat!' 'Gyrator' (because unable to rise
after eating), etc. Abstemious procedure is also categorized
otherwise and in detail. Asl. 404.
^ In this answer (describing mutthasaccam) the text
requires some emendation. Anussati should be asati,
and the privative a should of course be dropped in a-
pilapanata, a-sammussanata. K. reads (here only)
Unmindfulness, lapse of memory, non-recollection, non-
remembrance, not bearing in mind, superficiality, oblivion.
[1350] What is lack of intelligence ?
Answer as for * ignorance '
or '
dulness,' § 1311, etc.
[1351] What is mindfulness ?
Answer as in § 14, omitting *
on that occasion.'^
[1352] What is intelligence?
Answer as for '
wisdom '
or '
science,' § 16. And see § 53.
[1353] What is the power of computation ?^
Answer as for 'wisdom,' § 16.
[1354] What is the power of cultivation ?
That which is the pursuing, the cultivating, the multiply-
ing of good states.
Moreover, the seven factors in the Great Awakening'^ are
the power of cultivation.
[1355] What is composure ?
Ansicer as for *
quiet,' §§ 11, 54.*
[1356] What is insight ?
Answer as for '
insight ' and *
wisdom,' §§ 55, 16.
pamussanata—not so the Cy.—and repeats asati after
appatissati. See § 14 and footnote.
1 K. reads for asammussanata, appamussanata.
Cf. preceding note.
2 Patisankhanabalam. This is not included in any
set of '
powers ' enumerated in the present work {cf. § 1,
etc.), nor does it form part ofpannabalani(§ 29). How-
ever, it is included in the eight very different kinds of
powers given in A. iv. 223, ranking as the specific balam
of the erudite or bahussuto. Cf the use of pati-
sankha in Vin. i. 213. In the present connexion it seems
as a correlative term to have superseded dassanam (in-
sight) ; see above, §§ 1002-1012, 1254-1267.
''
See §§ 285, 287, etc.
* In this and the following references the phrase * on that
occasion '
must be understood to be omitted.
[1357] What is *
the mark of composure '?i
Answer as for * quiet,' § 1357.
[1358] What is *
the mark of grasp '?
Ansiver as for 'grasp '
and 'energy,' §§ 56, 13.
[1359] What is grasp?
Answer as for *
the mark of grasp,' § 1358.
[1360] What is balance ?
Answer as for 'balance,' § 57.
[1361] What is moral failure ?2
Excess in deed, excess in word, excess in both together.
Moreover, all immorality is moral failure.
[1362] What is theoretic fallacy ?•'
*
There is no such thing as alms, or sacrifice, or offering;
there is neither fruit, nor result of good or evil deeds
;
there is no such thing as this world or the next ; there is
no such thing as mother, or father, or beings springing
into birth without them ; there are in the world no recluses
or brahmins who have reached the highest point, who have
attained the height, who, having understood and realized
by themselves alone both this world and the next, make
known the same '
—all this sort of speculation . . . this is
what is called theoretic fallacy. Moreover, all wrong views
are theoretic fallacies.
[1363] What is moral progress ?
Absence of excess in deed, in word, and in deed and word
together.'*
[1364] What is progress in theory ?
'
There is such a thing as alms, sacrifice, and offering
;
. . . fruit, and the result of good and evil deeds ; . . . this
^ Samatha-nimittam. Explained by Tarn akaram
gahetva puna pavattetabbassa samathassa ni-
mitta-vasena. Asl. 53.
2 Silavipatti. Cf §§ 1363, 1342.
^Ditthivipatti. Cf § 1215.
*Sila-sampada. Cf § 1342.
world and the next ; mother, father and beings springing
into birth without them ; . . . recluses and brahmins who
have reached the highest, who have attained the height,
who having understood and realized by themselves alone
both this world and the other world, make known the
same '
—all this sort of science, understanding, etc.^ . . .
this is what is called progress in theory. Moreover, all
right views are progress in theory. •
[1365] What is purity in morals ?
Absence of excess in deed, in word, and in deed and word
together.^
[1366] What is purity in theory ?
Knowledge of the specific nature of Karma ;^ knowledge
^ Continue as in § 16.
2
Cf. § 1363. Purity in theory would seem to indicate
perfection relative to progress in theory, while in moral
matters a similar distinction does not apparently hold.
The Cy. only explains this want of distinction by saying
that in § 1363 the si la of restraint of the Patimokkha is
alluded to, while in § 1365 visuddhi-sila is spoken of
.
^ K. reads here kammassakatam iianam—a curious
phrase. Buddhaghosa, to judge by his exposition, reads
kamma-ssakata-nanam (Asl. 406, 407) or -ssakata-,
or -ssakatam fianam (Asl. 406). The corresponding
adjective to this sakata or sakatarn occurs in the
passage quoted from the Sutta Pitaka by Nagasena (Mil. i.
45; cf. Khys Davids' trans., i. 101, n. 1; also Asl. 66),
namely, kammassaka (satta); i.e., according to the
translator's view, '
having each their own karma.' As this
passage occurs in the yet inedited 135th Sutta of the Maj-
jhima N., the Papanca Sudani may prove to have a more lucid
commentary on it than that given in the Atthasalini. The
latter is to this effect : [This phrase means] the science of
knowing that this karma (or action) is sakam, that karma is
not sakam. In this connexion all bad karma, whether it be
done by one's self or by another, is not sakam. How so?
Because it destroys utility and creates disutility. But good
karma, which has the reverse effect, is named sakam.
Just as a man with a full purse in the course of a journey
of the Truths in their due order ; the knowledge of him who
holds the Path ; the knowledge of him who holds the Fruit
of the Path.
(i.)^ The phrase '
Now purity of theory ' is equivalent to
that science, understanding . . . right theory (views) [de-
scribed above, § 16].
(ii*) In the phrase '
And as the struggle of him who holds
certain views, '^ '
struggle '
means that inception of energy
etc. [described above, § 13].
may stop at various cities where festivals are going on and,
determining what votive outlay he will make, takes part
accordingly in those festivals as his inclination prompts,
and safely emerges from the jungle, even so do beings who
are established in this knowledge of the sakatam of
karma, when they have heaped up much karma making for
transmigration, safely and at ease attain arahatship, even
to the extent of numbers innumerable.
Now if sakam mean here, as it usually does, '
one's
own,' that still seems no explanation of the assertion that
one's bad actions are not one's own. And how does the
parable bear out the assertion ?
^ With the foregoing question and answer the catechism
proper of the '
Dhamma Sangani ' comes to an end.
There follow eleven sundry phrases or terms, not made
the subject of any part of the catechism, and appended
here in the phraseology of a commentary. They are
severally either referred to some reply in the catechism, or
briefly expounded, and are probably all culled from the
Sutta Pitaka as technicisms of Buddhist ethics. Very
possibly they form one connected sentence, giving an
eloquent and concise description of the nature of Wisdom
and Emancipation. Buddhaghosa has nothing very en-
lightening on this fraction of ancient commentary included
in the text, but promises an explanation of at least the
division of the subject of '
agitation ' in the Commentary
on the '
Vibhanga.'
^Yatha ditthissa ca padhanam. It is just possible
one should read Yathaditthissa ; K., however, divides
the two words. The Cy. merely remarks that the energy
put forth is intelligent or scientific, and can be applied either
to worldly or to higher things.
(iii.) The phrase *
agitation '
implies dread of birth, dread
of old age, dread of sickness, dread of death.
(iv.) The phrase '
occasion of agitation '
means birth, old
age, sickness, death.
(v.) The phrase *
And the earnest struggle of him who is
agitated '
refers to [the four Eight Struggles] :
—When a
bhikkhu brings forth the desire (a) that bad and wicked
states which have not arisen should not arise, (6) that bad
and wicked states which have arisen should be put away,
(c) that good states which have not arisen should arise,
(d) that good states which have arisen should stand firm,
should not get confused, should be frequently practised,
made to abound, cultivated, and perfected—then he uses
endeavour, sets energy a-going, reaches forward in thought
and struggles.^
(vi.) The phrase '
And discontent in good states '
means
the longing for higher achievement in one who is dis-
satisfied over the cultivation of good states.^
(vii.) The phrase *
And the not shrinking back in the
struggle ' means the thorough and persevering and unrest-
ing performance, the absence of stagnation, the unfaltering
volition, the unflinching endurance,^ the assiduous pursuit,
exercise and repetition which attend the cultivation of good
states.
^ See A. ii. 15, 16, 74. It will be seen that the four
modes of will-culture described on p. 15 of A. ii. as the
Sammapadhanani (and quoted in the Dh. S.) are, on
p. 74, termed respectively the Struggles for Self-control,
for Eenunciation, for Cultivation (or Development) and for
Preservation. Yet on p. 16 a different connotation is given
to each of these four terms.
^ This and the next phrase (vii.) occur consecutively in
A. i. 50. The progress of sublime discontent in a pious
individual from giving small donations to the Order, then
greater gifts till he personally enters the Order and finally
wins the goal of Arahatship, is briefly described, Asl. 407.
The last attainment gives the winner the title of the
Greatly Content.
« Cf. § 13.
(viii.) The phrase 'Wisdom' means the threefold wisdom,
namely (a) reminiscent knowledge of one's former births,
(h) knowledge of the relapse and renascence of beings,
(c) the knowledge that makes an end of the Intoxicants.
(ix.) The phrase *
Emancipation ' means the twofold
emancipation, namely, (a) detachment of thought,^ and
(h) Nirvana.^
(x.) The phrase '
knowledge in making an end ' means
the knowledge he has who holds the Path.
(xi.) The phrase '
knowledge in origins ' means the know-
ledge he has who holds the Fruit of the Path.
End of the Division entitled 'Elimination.'
^ Cittassa ca adhimutti = vimutti (emancipation).
D. i. 174.
^ This is, I believe, the only passage in the original
Manual where the word occurs. This is interesting in
view of the fact that it occurs in what appears to be an
appendix of original Commentary, and also that the term
occurs so frequently in the old digest which follows in the
text. See Appendix I.
Dhamma-Sangani - THE DIVISION ENTITLED ELIMINATION - The Suttanta Pairs of Terms I
A BUDDHIST MANUAL
Psychological Ethics,
FROM THE PALI
OF THE
DHAMMA-SANGANI
Translated by CAROLINE A. F. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A.
[PART II.
The Suttanta Pairs of Terms (suttantika-dukam).]^
[1296, 1297] Which are the states that
{a) partake of wisdom^'^
States which are the associates of wisdom.
Q)) partake of ignorance P
States which are the associates of ignorance.
[1298, 1299] Which are the states that have
(a) the likeness of lightning ?
*
^ This title is discussed in my Introduction.
2 Vijjabhagino, i.e., "they (the dhamma) partake
(bhajanti) of wisdom by way of association with it, they
versantur (vattanti) as parts or divisions of wisdom"
(Asl. 50). Of the eight modes of Buddhist vi j j a, viz. : know-
ledge born of insight (vipassanananam), the potency
(iddhi) of the *
mental image,' and the six forms of intuition
(abhinna)^the first only is here referred to (cf D. i., p. 76
et seq., and Childers, s.vv.). The reader will remember that
vijja is a term borrowed by Buddhist ethics from Brah-
manic doctrine. Cf. the expression tisso vijja, p. 358.
It is almost equivalent to our '
lore.' Six states are in the
Anguttara (iii. 334) said to be vij ja-bhagiya.
^ Ignorance respecting the Four Truths. Asl. 51.
* This and the following simile are gone into at some
length (Asl. 388), as follows: Stage 1. The traveller sets
out in the gloom. 2. He loses his way. 3. Lightning
flashes out and illumines. 4. The road is made plain
again. So to the '
noble '
disciple there is : (1) the incep-
tion of insight making for the first (second or third) Paths ;
(2) the obliteration of truth by darkness ; (3) the glory of
The science^ of the three lowest of the Noble Paths.
(h) the likeness of the thunderbolt ?
The science of the topmost Path, the Path of Arahatship.
[1300, 1301] Which are the states that are
(a) foolish P
Unconscientiousness and disregard of blame. Besides,
all bad states are foolish.
{!)) discreet ?^
Conscientiousness and fear of blame. Besides, all good
states are discreet.
[1302, 1303] Which are the states that are
(a) dark P
Unconscientiousness and disregard of blame. Besides,
all bad states are dark.
{h) bright ?
Conscientiousness and fear of blame. Besides, all good
states are bright.
the Path is revealed ; (4) the Four Truths are made plain.
But in the thunderbolt of the might of Arahatship won we
get the simile of (a) an all -penetrating power, {b) the
mystery of its coming. Cf that of the wind as applied to
Eegeneration, John iii. 8.
^ Pa nil a, elsewhere rendered 'wisdom.' See § 17
and cf. n. 3. '
Science '
is here to be understood, not so
much in its modern sense of organized knowledge and
organized methods of investigation and verification for the
attaining and establishing that knowledge, as in the Platonic
and Aristotelian sense of iiricrTrj/jbr), or the intellectual anti-
thesis to opinion.
^ Bala, its opposite being pandit a, which partakes of
paiina. See § 16, where the substantival form, pan-
d ice am, is rendered '
erudition,' and paraphrased (Asl. 147)
as panditassa bhavo, the state of a icise person, one
who has discernment, discretion, one who has '
chosen that
good part ' as contrasted with the '
average sensual person '
or foolish youth. With the answers cf. §§ 30, 31.
2 On kanha and sukka, used with ethical significance,
see M. i., 389 ; Dhp., ver. 87 ; Mil. 200. {Cf '
Questions of
King Milinda,' i. 284, n. 2.)
[1304, 1305] Which are the states that
(a) conduce to remorse ?^
Misconduct in act, word and thought. Besides, all bad
states conduce to remorse.
(/>) do not conduce to remorse ?
Good conduct in act, word and thought. Besides, no
good states conduce to remorse.
[1306] Which are the states that are synonymous ?^
1 Tapaniya. Whereas we, in 'remorse,' bring into
relief the *
a,yenbite of inwyt,' the Buddhist term refers to
the flush of heat when the deed ill done is realized as
such.
2 This and the subjects of the two following questions
are adhivacana, nirutti and paniiatti respectively.
The three are said (Asl. 51) to *
converge in meaning
'
(atthato ninnakarana), though their form is diverse.
In the phrase '
An increaser of luck is an increaser of
wealth ' the terms are mutually delimitated. This is
adhivacanarn. . . . In the phrase 'They construct (or
combine, abhisankharonti), brethren, and are therefore
"syntheses,"' there is a statement of fact together with
the cause, as in discourse (abhilapa). . . . In the phrase
'
the ratiocination, conception, disposition [of the mind] '
(see above, § 7), something is set out on this wise or that
;
and this is pafinatti.
It seems inferable from the foregoing that by adhiva-
canarn a simple equipollence of terms is to be effected.
'
Is '
or '
are,' in translating, must be understood simply
as = , and not as implying inclusion under a more general
notion. The word occurs at every turn in the Cy., and has
usually been rendered, in these footnotes, '
equivalent to.'
Cf. a good instance in Jat. i. 117 ; Div. 491.
The second example and the comment adumbrate what
we mean by explanation. But in the absence of the
context it is not easy to gather much respecting pafinatti
from the third passage cited. Coming to the answer
common to all three questions, the Cy. instances as the
things which are classed (sank ha), designated (samanna),
expressed, and current (voharo) the names 'I,' '
another,'
That which is an enumeration, that which is a designa-
tion, an expression, a current term, a name, a denomina-
tion, the assigning of a name, an interpretation, a distinc-
tive mark of discourse on this or that state.
[1306a] All states are processes of synonymous nomen-
clature.
[1307] Which are the states that are interpretative ?
Answer as in § 1306.
[1307a] All states are processes of interpretation.
[1308] "Which are the states that are expressions ?
Answer as in § 1306.
[1308a] All states are processes of expression.
In this connexion,
[1309] What is name ^
*aman,' *
cattle,' *
Tisso,' 'a bed,' 'a house,' etc. Name
is fourfold from the point of view of the grounds on which
it is bestowed, viz. : (1) given by general consent on a
special occasion (samanfia-namam), e.g., that of the
first King Mahasammato ; (2) given because of a personal
quality (guna-namam), e.g., versed - in - the - Vinaya ;
(3) given because of a private wish or fancy (kittima-
namam), e.g., naming of an infant; (4) not given; of
primeval origin ; primordially fortuitous (opapatika-
namani), e.g., 'moon,' 'earth,' etc. Seefurther § 1309, n.
Processes of nomenclature, etc. —adhivacanapatha,
etc.
There is no being, no compound, concludes the Com-
mentator, that is not somehow nameable. The very trees
in desert and hill country will be named by country-folk.
And if they admit to not knowing the name of any one
kind, it will get the name of the 'nameless.' Cf. our
OS innominatum, or the Pic Sans-nom, and the like.
'
Distinctive mark' is vyafijanam.
^ Here the Cy. makes use of its foregoing classification
of name-kinds to show under which head to rank nam a
when distinguished from rupa. Nama must, namely, be
understood as opapatika-name, thatis, all its constituents
The four skandhas and uncompounded element.
[IBIO] What is form?
The four great phenomena and the form which is derived
from them.^
[1311] What is ignorance ?
Ansiver as for '
dulness,' § 390 {omitting *
on that
occasion ').^
[1312] What is the craving for renewed existence ?
Answer as for the *
Fetter of the passion for renewed
existence,' § 1120.
[1313] What is speculative opinion about renewed
existence ?
Theories that both soul and world will be re-born, etc.
[1314] What is speculative opinion about existence not
being renewed ?
Theories that both soul and world will not be re-born,
etc.
must be so understood. Feeling, e.g., when it arises, is
not named on the grounds on which a new individual, or
an '
artificial kind '
—table, etc.—might be named. '
One
has not to take a name for it, saying, "Be thou called
feeling !" The name has arisen together with it ' (p. 392).
'
Uncompounded element ' is here spoken of again a
Nirvana. Ibid. See above, p. 166, n. 1.
^
Cf. § 584. The more concise form of question
:
tattha katamaip ... is now sustained till the end.
Hitherto it has only been used to cross-question the student
on the details of a given answer, on 'name,' for instance,
as part of the contents of the preceding answer. Hence
the translation of tattha by 'in this connexion ' (whatever
the term in question may mean elsewhere). It is not clear,
however, what is the force of tattha in these last fifty- seven
questions, the greater part of the subjects not having
occurred in the foregoing part of the manual.
- This pair of questions '
is included to show '
how the
mass of views in the following pairs is '
an upgrowth from
the root of the Round of Re-birth.' Asl. 392.
[1315] What is the sort of speculation known as
Eternalism ?
That both soul and world are eternal, etc.
[1316] What is the sort of speculation known as
Annihilation ?
That both soul and world will be dissolved, etc.
[1317] What is the sort of speculation known as the
Finite Theory . . . [1318] the Infinite Theory '?
That both soul and world are finite . . . infinite, etc.
[1319] What is the sort of speculation known as the
Theory of Origins . . . [1320] the Theory of the Here-
after ?
Theories concerning the ultimate past . . . concerning
futurity.
All this sort of opinion, walking in opinion, jungle of
opinion, wilderness of opinion, puppet-show of opinion,
scuffling of opinion, the Fetter of opinion, the grip and
tenacity of it, the inclination towards it, the being infected
by it, this by-path, wrong road, wrongness, this '
fording-
place,' this shiftiness of grasp—this is what is called specula-
tive opinion about renewed existence, and the rest.^
[1321] What is unconscientiousness ? . . . [1322] dis-
regard of blame ?
Answers as for the ninth and tenth 'bases of corruption,'
§§ 1238, 1239.
1 This, the Ditthi-formula (see §§ 381, 1099), is
appended as well to each of the foregoing answers on
speculative opinions. Of these, the first two (bhava and
vibhava) are, in the Cy. (p. 392), connected with the next
two respectively {cf. § 1099). All the eight are enumerated
and discussed in the Brahmajala Sutta. D. i. 13-40. The
Cy. itself refers to this Sutta in connexion with the last
two theories. See also 'Dialogues of the Buddha,' i. 26,
n. 3.
[1323] What is conscientiousness ?
The feeHng of conscientious scruple when scruples ought
to be felt, conscientious scruple at attaining to bad and evil
states.
[1324] What is the fear of blame?
The sense of guilt where a sense of guilt ought to be felt,
a sense of guilt at attaining to bad and evil states.^
[1825] What is contumacy ?2
The being surly, refractious, contumacious when that
which is in accordance with the Law has been said, con-
trariness, captiousness, want of regard, of consideration, of
reverence, of deference.^
[1326] What is friendship with evil?
To follow after, to frequent the company of, and associate
with,* such persons as are unbelievers, immoral, uneducated,
mean-spirited^ and witless f to resort to and consort with
1 See §§ 80, 31.
^ Dovacassata. For *
surly' the Cy. (p. 398) and K.
read dovacassayam.
^ The three first terms in the answer are in the original
simply different forms of the same abstract noun, viz. :
dovacassayam, dovacassiyam, dovacassata. The
fourth term is literally '
taking the opposite side.' The
fifth is literally *
gratification in antagonism.' The last is
described as due to a lack of the habit of placing others
before one's self. Asl. 393. The term in question the Cy.
finally dismisses with the remark that, if persisted in in the
foregoing fashion, it involves the four skandhas, especially
that of syntheses. So for the complex generalizations in
the following questions. They are not relatively simple
states involving one skandha only. (The editing in the
Cy. is here again very unfortunate.)
* Sevana, nisevana, samsevana. The prefixes,
according to the Cy., merely act as augmentatives.
^ Maccharino; addicted to the five sorts of meanness.
Asl. 394. See § 1122, n.
^ Duppanna.
them, to be devoted to them, enthusiastic about them,^ and
entangled with them.^
[1327] What is suavity ?
The being gentle, tractable, amenable^ when that which
is in accordance with the Law has been said, the refraining
from contradiction and from captiousness ; the showing
regard and consideration,* reverence and deference.
[1328] What is friendship with good ?
To follow after, frequent the company of, and associate
with, such persons as are believers, virtuous, well educated,
generous and intellectual ; to resort to and consort with
them, to be devoted to them, enthusiastic about them,
mixed up with them.
[1329-1332] What is skill in
((a) the Offences?
I (h) restoration from the Offences ?
(c) the Attainments ?
(d) recovery from the Attainments ?
That skill which is science, understanding, search,
research, etc.,^ when applied to
^ Bhajana, sambhajana, bhatti, sambhatti; all
meaning originally '
forming a part of,' '
belonging to.'
But the two former are paraphrased by upasankamana.
In the sense of devotion bhatti does not, I believe, occur
in the Nikayas. Perhaps its oldest appearance with this
import is in Jat. v. 340—where the Cy. gives as equivalent
sineho—and in the Svet. Upanishad 6. 23.
^ Tarn sampavankata (so K. and the Cy.), i.e.,
entanglement ; lit., hooked along with them—with those
persons, both in thought and deed. Asl. 394.
^ Sovacassayam (sic lege), sovacassiyam, sova-
cassata.
* Adariyam, adarata; omitted in the text, but
supplied in K. '
Cf. § 1325.
^ The passage elided here and in the following sections
is no doubt that in which science (paiina) is described,
§16 and passim. On *
skill ' or 'proficiency' (kusalata)
see Introduction viii., on '
good.'
(a) the Offences termed the Five Groups of Offences
and the Seven Groups of Offences ;^
(h) restoration from [the effects of] those Offences ;^
(c) a case of Attainment^ where * conception works
and thought discursive,' a case of Attainment
*
wherein is no working of conception, but only
of thought discursive,' a case of Attainment
'void of the working of conception and of
thought discursive '
;
(d) recovery from those Attainments.*
^ That is, the group of '
Apatti's termed Parajika,
Sanghadisesa, Pacittiya, Patidesaniya and Duk-
kata offences, and the group which, besides these, includes
Thullaccaya and Dubbhasita offences. Asl. 394;
cf. Vin. V. 91. The scientific procedure is described in the
Cy. as -pariccheda-janana-panna.
^ Apatti-vutthana, or rising up from an offence.
Buddhaghosa does not in this connexion explain the term,
but in his Cy. on the passage, found in nearly identical
words at Vin. iii. 112, and iv. 225 (which Cy. is found in
Minayeff, Pat. 69), he uses vutthana as a general term
covering all the three methods (parivasa, manatta,
abbhana) of expiation of, and release from, an offence
committed by a member of the Order. Cf. Childers,
s.v, sanghadiseso ; Vin. v. 118. See also infra, § 1332.
^ The Samapattis, or various stages of self-concentra-
tion, include the Jhanas—as here—and other forms of
sam ad hi, all pre-Buddhistic and all utilized in the body
of Buddhist doctrine and culture. It is noteworthy that
they are not here referred to as only eight in number—see
Childers, s.v. (for that matter, neither do they find a place
in the Atthaka-nipata of the Anguttara). Neither is it
clear that the three Samapattis quoted in the answer
coincide in all respects with the first three stages of five-
fold Jhana. If they do, and if we are to assume that the
term includes more than those three stages, then, by
Subhuti's inclusion of four Vimokhas, this would give us
nine samapattis. Again, in M. i. 301, &> fifth Vimokha—the
last—is spoken of as a Samapatti, this bringing the number
up to ten. Cf. M. i. 398-400.
* The kind of ability in emerging from (lit., rising out
[1333] What is proficiency in the Elements ?^
That proficiency which is science, understanding, search,
research, etc., when applied to the eighteen elements,
viz. : sight, visual object and visual cognition, hearing,
sound and auditory cognition, smell, odour and olfactory
cognition, taste, sapid object and gustatory cognition, body-
sensibility, the tangible and tactile cognition, mind, mental
object and representative cognition.
[1334] What is proficiency in attention 9^
That proficiency in attention which is science, under-
standing, etc., when applied to those elements.
[1335] What is skill in the spheres ?3
That skill which is science, understanding, etc., when
applied to the twelve spheres, namely, sight and visual
form, hearing and sound, smell and odorous object, taste
and sapid object, body- sensibility and the tangible, mind
and mental object.*
of -vutthana ; see supra, § 1330) one or another kind of
samadhi is, by the Cy., specified as a predetermination
of the time when the subject wished to arouse himself, and
the carrying out of this act of will—a time stated in terms
of the motions of celestial bodies. '
When the moon, sun,
constellations have gone to such and such a position I
shall awake.' See, on this use of vutthana, M. i. 302;
A. iii. 311 ; S. iii. 270. On the modes of Jhana here
specified, see supra, § 160 et seq. Skill in the Attainment
(samapatti) itself is explained as the science of effecting
discernment of the appana or central concept (in Jhana)
as well as of the parikamma or preliminaries.
1 Dhatuyo. The skill in this case is said to comprise
acquisition, attention, hearing and remembering (instruction
being entirely oral) and discrimination. Asl. 395.
2 Seep. 5, n. 1. ^ See § 597 et seq.
* In the last three modes of ability six factors common
to all are distinguished : acquisition, attention, hearing,
comparison (lit., measuring), penetration, contemplation.
Of these, all but the fifth are exercised on mundane objects
of thought ;
penetration is concerned with supramundane
matters ; attention and comparison can be exercised about
[1336] What is skill in the ' Conditioned Geneses '?
Science, understanding, etc., when applied to the
formula :
*
The syntheses come to pass because of ignor-
ance ; cognition comes to pass because of syntheses ; name
and form come to pass because of cognition ; the sixfold
sphere comes to pass because of name and form ; contact
comes to pass because of the sixfold sphere, feeling because
of contact, craving because of feeling, grasping because of
craving, renewed existence because of grasping, birth
because of renewed existence, old age and death, grief,
lamentation, distress, melancholy and despair come to pass
because of birth. Such is the uprising of this whole mass
of Ill.'i
[1337, 1338] What is skill in affirming ... in negating
[causal conjuncture]?
Science, understanding, etc., when applied to discern-
ing that, in a given conjuncture, certain states are . . .
are not, the cause and conditions of certain other states.^
[1339] What is upright ?
Uprightness, without deflexion, twist, or crookedness.
[1340] What is soft ?
That which is plasticity, gentleness, smoothness, pliancy,
lowliness of heart.^
a mixture of both spheres of thought. Asl. 395. (To get
this or any meaning out of the passage in question some
emendation of the Cy. as edited has been necessary.)
^ On this famous formula the Cy. merely remarks that
*
it will appear in the Vibhanga on the Paticcasamuppada.'
Asl. 395.
2 This species of skill (thanakusalata, atthana-
kusalata) constituted one of the Ten Powers of the
Buddha. See M. i. 69. The Cy. (p. 395) takes for illus-
tration sense-cognition as a series of specific results from
specific processes; also cause and effect in the vegetable
kingdom.
^ Ajjavo and maddavo, the terms in this and the
foregoing question, are synonymous with uj(j)ukata and
[1341] What is patience ?
That patience which is long-suffering, compliance,
absence of rudeness and abruptness, complacency of heart.^
[1342] What is temperance ?
That which is the absence of excess in deed, in word,
and in deed and word together.^
Besides, all moral self-restraint is temperance.
[1343] What is amity ?^
When all such speech as is insolent,* disagreeable,
grating, harsh to others, vituperative to others, bordering
muduta, §§ 50, 51, 44, 45. The one additional term
—
the last—is paraphrased as '
absence of conceit.' Asl. 395.
^ Patience (khanti) is one of the ten Paramitas.
Jat. i., pp. 22, 23. See also A. iii. 254, 255. The last three
synonyms are the opposites of the last three synonyms of
'hate.' See supra, §§ 418, 1060. Ajjavo, Java no,
maddavo, khanti and soraccam are, in A. iii. 248,
given as the dhamma of a thoroughbred horse.
^ Temperance (soraccam) is defined as *
to be well on
the hither side of wickedness,' to avoid transgression in the
three kinds in deed, in the four kinds in speech and in
one's mode of livelihood. See Khys Davids, '
Manual of
Buddhism,' p. 142. The three transgressions of the mind
are omitted, hence soraccam applies apparently only to
the self-expression of the individual. Asl. 396.
^ Sakhalyam, paraphrased by sammodaka and
mudu. Ibid. Cf, the usual formula for the exchange of
courtesies on greeting, e.g., M. i. 16.
* Andaka. This and the following terms occur in
M. i. 286. See Morris's Notes, J. P. T. S., 1884, 1886,
1889. Buddhaghosa's comment obviates the necessity
either for Kern's hypothesis that the word, when applied
to speech, should be read as kandaka, or for that of
Morris, that it should be read as candaka. He says
(Asl. 396): Just as in a defective (sadose) tree bosses
(andakani; excrescences, warts) protrude, so through
faultiness, by words of bragging and insolence, are swellings
(andaka) produced.
'Disagreeable' (asata) is omitted in the M. i. 286.
upon anger, not conducive to concentration, is put away,
and when all such speech as is innocuous,^ pleasant to the
ear,2 affectionate, such as goes to the heart, is urbane,^
sweet and acceptable to people generally—when speech of
this sort is spoken—polished, friendly and gentle language
—this is what is called amity.
[1344] What is courtesy ?
The two forms of courtesy: hospitality towards bodily
needs and considerateness in matters of doctrine. When
anyone shows courtesy it is in one or other of these two
forms.*
[1345] What is it to have the door of the faculties un-
guarded?^
*
Grating ' = kakkasa=(Asl. ibid.) putika. By a some-
what forced figure grating or rasping speech is compared
to the disagreeable sensation in the ear (so tarn not
kanna!) by the entrance of the crumbling pulverous
tissue of a rotten tree. *
Vituperative,' etc. (parabhi-
sajjani) ; as it were, a lurking branch of barbed thorns
wounding the limbs and obstructing passage. Ihid.
^ Innocuous = nel a = nidd OS a. Asl. 397.
2 I.e., by varied sweetness.
^ Pori, i.e., town-conversation, either because it is full
of good points (gun a), or used by persons of breeding, or
simply urban. For town- dwellers use fitting terms, calling
a father a father and a brother a brother. Ihid.
* Patisantharo, both amisena and dhammena, is
discussed at length by Buddhaghosa (Asl. 397-399). He
takes, as usual, the etymology of the term—a spreading
out or diffusion—and shows it as a covering or closing,
through kindness and generosity, of the gap there may be
between the having of the giver and the recipient of his
attentions. Both are supposed to be members of the Order,
and many of the hospitable and polite ministrations
described occur in Vin. ii. 210, 211. See also Mil. 409.
^Aguttadvarata. This and the contrary attitude in
§ 1347 constitute an important formula in Buddhist doctrine,
and occur in D. i. 70, M. i. 180, 269, etc. It is also quoted
K.V. 426, 464.
Psychological Ethics,
FROM THE PALI
OF THE
DHAMMA-SANGANI
Translated by CAROLINE A. F. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A.
[PART II.
The Suttanta Pairs of Terms (suttantika-dukam).]^
[1296, 1297] Which are the states that
{a) partake of wisdom^'^
States which are the associates of wisdom.
Q)) partake of ignorance P
States which are the associates of ignorance.
[1298, 1299] Which are the states that have
(a) the likeness of lightning ?
*
^ This title is discussed in my Introduction.
2 Vijjabhagino, i.e., "they (the dhamma) partake
(bhajanti) of wisdom by way of association with it, they
versantur (vattanti) as parts or divisions of wisdom"
(Asl. 50). Of the eight modes of Buddhist vi j j a, viz. : know-
ledge born of insight (vipassanananam), the potency
(iddhi) of the *
mental image,' and the six forms of intuition
(abhinna)^the first only is here referred to (cf D. i., p. 76
et seq., and Childers, s.vv.). The reader will remember that
vijja is a term borrowed by Buddhist ethics from Brah-
manic doctrine. Cf. the expression tisso vijja, p. 358.
It is almost equivalent to our '
lore.' Six states are in the
Anguttara (iii. 334) said to be vij ja-bhagiya.
^ Ignorance respecting the Four Truths. Asl. 51.
* This and the following simile are gone into at some
length (Asl. 388), as follows: Stage 1. The traveller sets
out in the gloom. 2. He loses his way. 3. Lightning
flashes out and illumines. 4. The road is made plain
again. So to the '
noble '
disciple there is : (1) the incep-
tion of insight making for the first (second or third) Paths ;
(2) the obliteration of truth by darkness ; (3) the glory of
The science^ of the three lowest of the Noble Paths.
(h) the likeness of the thunderbolt ?
The science of the topmost Path, the Path of Arahatship.
[1300, 1301] Which are the states that are
(a) foolish P
Unconscientiousness and disregard of blame. Besides,
all bad states are foolish.
{!)) discreet ?^
Conscientiousness and fear of blame. Besides, all good
states are discreet.
[1302, 1303] Which are the states that are
(a) dark P
Unconscientiousness and disregard of blame. Besides,
all bad states are dark.
{h) bright ?
Conscientiousness and fear of blame. Besides, all good
states are bright.
the Path is revealed ; (4) the Four Truths are made plain.
But in the thunderbolt of the might of Arahatship won we
get the simile of (a) an all -penetrating power, {b) the
mystery of its coming. Cf that of the wind as applied to
Eegeneration, John iii. 8.
^ Pa nil a, elsewhere rendered 'wisdom.' See § 17
and cf. n. 3. '
Science '
is here to be understood, not so
much in its modern sense of organized knowledge and
organized methods of investigation and verification for the
attaining and establishing that knowledge, as in the Platonic
and Aristotelian sense of iiricrTrj/jbr), or the intellectual anti-
thesis to opinion.
^ Bala, its opposite being pandit a, which partakes of
paiina. See § 16, where the substantival form, pan-
d ice am, is rendered '
erudition,' and paraphrased (Asl. 147)
as panditassa bhavo, the state of a icise person, one
who has discernment, discretion, one who has '
chosen that
good part ' as contrasted with the '
average sensual person '
or foolish youth. With the answers cf. §§ 30, 31.
2 On kanha and sukka, used with ethical significance,
see M. i., 389 ; Dhp., ver. 87 ; Mil. 200. {Cf '
Questions of
King Milinda,' i. 284, n. 2.)
[1304, 1305] Which are the states that
(a) conduce to remorse ?^
Misconduct in act, word and thought. Besides, all bad
states conduce to remorse.
(/>) do not conduce to remorse ?
Good conduct in act, word and thought. Besides, no
good states conduce to remorse.
[1306] Which are the states that are synonymous ?^
1 Tapaniya. Whereas we, in 'remorse,' bring into
relief the *
a,yenbite of inwyt,' the Buddhist term refers to
the flush of heat when the deed ill done is realized as
such.
2 This and the subjects of the two following questions
are adhivacana, nirutti and paniiatti respectively.
The three are said (Asl. 51) to *
converge in meaning
'
(atthato ninnakarana), though their form is diverse.
In the phrase '
An increaser of luck is an increaser of
wealth ' the terms are mutually delimitated. This is
adhivacanarn. . . . In the phrase 'They construct (or
combine, abhisankharonti), brethren, and are therefore
"syntheses,"' there is a statement of fact together with
the cause, as in discourse (abhilapa). . . . In the phrase
'
the ratiocination, conception, disposition [of the mind] '
(see above, § 7), something is set out on this wise or that
;
and this is pafinatti.
It seems inferable from the foregoing that by adhiva-
canarn a simple equipollence of terms is to be effected.
'
Is '
or '
are,' in translating, must be understood simply
as = , and not as implying inclusion under a more general
notion. The word occurs at every turn in the Cy., and has
usually been rendered, in these footnotes, '
equivalent to.'
Cf. a good instance in Jat. i. 117 ; Div. 491.
The second example and the comment adumbrate what
we mean by explanation. But in the absence of the
context it is not easy to gather much respecting pafinatti
from the third passage cited. Coming to the answer
common to all three questions, the Cy. instances as the
things which are classed (sank ha), designated (samanna),
expressed, and current (voharo) the names 'I,' '
another,'
That which is an enumeration, that which is a designa-
tion, an expression, a current term, a name, a denomina-
tion, the assigning of a name, an interpretation, a distinc-
tive mark of discourse on this or that state.
[1306a] All states are processes of synonymous nomen-
clature.
[1307] Which are the states that are interpretative ?
Answer as in § 1306.
[1307a] All states are processes of interpretation.
[1308] "Which are the states that are expressions ?
Answer as in § 1306.
[1308a] All states are processes of expression.
In this connexion,
[1309] What is name ^
*aman,' *
cattle,' *
Tisso,' 'a bed,' 'a house,' etc. Name
is fourfold from the point of view of the grounds on which
it is bestowed, viz. : (1) given by general consent on a
special occasion (samanfia-namam), e.g., that of the
first King Mahasammato ; (2) given because of a personal
quality (guna-namam), e.g., versed - in - the - Vinaya ;
(3) given because of a private wish or fancy (kittima-
namam), e.g., naming of an infant; (4) not given; of
primeval origin ; primordially fortuitous (opapatika-
namani), e.g., 'moon,' 'earth,' etc. Seefurther § 1309, n.
Processes of nomenclature, etc. —adhivacanapatha,
etc.
There is no being, no compound, concludes the Com-
mentator, that is not somehow nameable. The very trees
in desert and hill country will be named by country-folk.
And if they admit to not knowing the name of any one
kind, it will get the name of the 'nameless.' Cf. our
OS innominatum, or the Pic Sans-nom, and the like.
'
Distinctive mark' is vyafijanam.
^ Here the Cy. makes use of its foregoing classification
of name-kinds to show under which head to rank nam a
when distinguished from rupa. Nama must, namely, be
understood as opapatika-name, thatis, all its constituents
The four skandhas and uncompounded element.
[IBIO] What is form?
The four great phenomena and the form which is derived
from them.^
[1311] What is ignorance ?
Ansiver as for '
dulness,' § 390 {omitting *
on that
occasion ').^
[1312] What is the craving for renewed existence ?
Answer as for the *
Fetter of the passion for renewed
existence,' § 1120.
[1313] What is speculative opinion about renewed
existence ?
Theories that both soul and world will be re-born, etc.
[1314] What is speculative opinion about existence not
being renewed ?
Theories that both soul and world will not be re-born,
etc.
must be so understood. Feeling, e.g., when it arises, is
not named on the grounds on which a new individual, or
an '
artificial kind '
—table, etc.—might be named. '
One
has not to take a name for it, saying, "Be thou called
feeling !" The name has arisen together with it ' (p. 392).
'
Uncompounded element ' is here spoken of again a
Nirvana. Ibid. See above, p. 166, n. 1.
^
Cf. § 584. The more concise form of question
:
tattha katamaip ... is now sustained till the end.
Hitherto it has only been used to cross-question the student
on the details of a given answer, on 'name,' for instance,
as part of the contents of the preceding answer. Hence
the translation of tattha by 'in this connexion ' (whatever
the term in question may mean elsewhere). It is not clear,
however, what is the force of tattha in these last fifty- seven
questions, the greater part of the subjects not having
occurred in the foregoing part of the manual.
- This pair of questions '
is included to show '
how the
mass of views in the following pairs is '
an upgrowth from
the root of the Round of Re-birth.' Asl. 392.
[1315] What is the sort of speculation known as
Eternalism ?
That both soul and world are eternal, etc.
[1316] What is the sort of speculation known as
Annihilation ?
That both soul and world will be dissolved, etc.
[1317] What is the sort of speculation known as the
Finite Theory . . . [1318] the Infinite Theory '?
That both soul and world are finite . . . infinite, etc.
[1319] What is the sort of speculation known as the
Theory of Origins . . . [1320] the Theory of the Here-
after ?
Theories concerning the ultimate past . . . concerning
futurity.
All this sort of opinion, walking in opinion, jungle of
opinion, wilderness of opinion, puppet-show of opinion,
scuffling of opinion, the Fetter of opinion, the grip and
tenacity of it, the inclination towards it, the being infected
by it, this by-path, wrong road, wrongness, this '
fording-
place,' this shiftiness of grasp—this is what is called specula-
tive opinion about renewed existence, and the rest.^
[1321] What is unconscientiousness ? . . . [1322] dis-
regard of blame ?
Answers as for the ninth and tenth 'bases of corruption,'
§§ 1238, 1239.
1 This, the Ditthi-formula (see §§ 381, 1099), is
appended as well to each of the foregoing answers on
speculative opinions. Of these, the first two (bhava and
vibhava) are, in the Cy. (p. 392), connected with the next
two respectively {cf. § 1099). All the eight are enumerated
and discussed in the Brahmajala Sutta. D. i. 13-40. The
Cy. itself refers to this Sutta in connexion with the last
two theories. See also 'Dialogues of the Buddha,' i. 26,
n. 3.
[1323] What is conscientiousness ?
The feeHng of conscientious scruple when scruples ought
to be felt, conscientious scruple at attaining to bad and evil
states.
[1324] What is the fear of blame?
The sense of guilt where a sense of guilt ought to be felt,
a sense of guilt at attaining to bad and evil states.^
[1825] What is contumacy ?2
The being surly, refractious, contumacious when that
which is in accordance with the Law has been said, con-
trariness, captiousness, want of regard, of consideration, of
reverence, of deference.^
[1326] What is friendship with evil?
To follow after, to frequent the company of, and associate
with,* such persons as are unbelievers, immoral, uneducated,
mean-spirited^ and witless f to resort to and consort with
1 See §§ 80, 31.
^ Dovacassata. For *
surly' the Cy. (p. 398) and K.
read dovacassayam.
^ The three first terms in the answer are in the original
simply different forms of the same abstract noun, viz. :
dovacassayam, dovacassiyam, dovacassata. The
fourth term is literally '
taking the opposite side.' The
fifth is literally *
gratification in antagonism.' The last is
described as due to a lack of the habit of placing others
before one's self. Asl. 393. The term in question the Cy.
finally dismisses with the remark that, if persisted in in the
foregoing fashion, it involves the four skandhas, especially
that of syntheses. So for the complex generalizations in
the following questions. They are not relatively simple
states involving one skandha only. (The editing in the
Cy. is here again very unfortunate.)
* Sevana, nisevana, samsevana. The prefixes,
according to the Cy., merely act as augmentatives.
^ Maccharino; addicted to the five sorts of meanness.
Asl. 394. See § 1122, n.
^ Duppanna.
them, to be devoted to them, enthusiastic about them,^ and
entangled with them.^
[1327] What is suavity ?
The being gentle, tractable, amenable^ when that which
is in accordance with the Law has been said, the refraining
from contradiction and from captiousness ; the showing
regard and consideration,* reverence and deference.
[1328] What is friendship with good ?
To follow after, frequent the company of, and associate
with, such persons as are believers, virtuous, well educated,
generous and intellectual ; to resort to and consort with
them, to be devoted to them, enthusiastic about them,
mixed up with them.
[1329-1332] What is skill in
((a) the Offences?
I (h) restoration from the Offences ?
(c) the Attainments ?
(d) recovery from the Attainments ?
That skill which is science, understanding, search,
research, etc.,^ when applied to
^ Bhajana, sambhajana, bhatti, sambhatti; all
meaning originally '
forming a part of,' '
belonging to.'
But the two former are paraphrased by upasankamana.
In the sense of devotion bhatti does not, I believe, occur
in the Nikayas. Perhaps its oldest appearance with this
import is in Jat. v. 340—where the Cy. gives as equivalent
sineho—and in the Svet. Upanishad 6. 23.
^ Tarn sampavankata (so K. and the Cy.), i.e.,
entanglement ; lit., hooked along with them—with those
persons, both in thought and deed. Asl. 394.
^ Sovacassayam (sic lege), sovacassiyam, sova-
cassata.
* Adariyam, adarata; omitted in the text, but
supplied in K. '
Cf. § 1325.
^ The passage elided here and in the following sections
is no doubt that in which science (paiina) is described,
§16 and passim. On *
skill ' or 'proficiency' (kusalata)
see Introduction viii., on '
good.'
(a) the Offences termed the Five Groups of Offences
and the Seven Groups of Offences ;^
(h) restoration from [the effects of] those Offences ;^
(c) a case of Attainment^ where * conception works
and thought discursive,' a case of Attainment
*
wherein is no working of conception, but only
of thought discursive,' a case of Attainment
'void of the working of conception and of
thought discursive '
;
(d) recovery from those Attainments.*
^ That is, the group of '
Apatti's termed Parajika,
Sanghadisesa, Pacittiya, Patidesaniya and Duk-
kata offences, and the group which, besides these, includes
Thullaccaya and Dubbhasita offences. Asl. 394;
cf. Vin. V. 91. The scientific procedure is described in the
Cy. as -pariccheda-janana-panna.
^ Apatti-vutthana, or rising up from an offence.
Buddhaghosa does not in this connexion explain the term,
but in his Cy. on the passage, found in nearly identical
words at Vin. iii. 112, and iv. 225 (which Cy. is found in
Minayeff, Pat. 69), he uses vutthana as a general term
covering all the three methods (parivasa, manatta,
abbhana) of expiation of, and release from, an offence
committed by a member of the Order. Cf. Childers,
s.v, sanghadiseso ; Vin. v. 118. See also infra, § 1332.
^ The Samapattis, or various stages of self-concentra-
tion, include the Jhanas—as here—and other forms of
sam ad hi, all pre-Buddhistic and all utilized in the body
of Buddhist doctrine and culture. It is noteworthy that
they are not here referred to as only eight in number—see
Childers, s.v. (for that matter, neither do they find a place
in the Atthaka-nipata of the Anguttara). Neither is it
clear that the three Samapattis quoted in the answer
coincide in all respects with the first three stages of five-
fold Jhana. If they do, and if we are to assume that the
term includes more than those three stages, then, by
Subhuti's inclusion of four Vimokhas, this would give us
nine samapattis. Again, in M. i. 301, &> fifth Vimokha—the
last—is spoken of as a Samapatti, this bringing the number
up to ten. Cf. M. i. 398-400.
* The kind of ability in emerging from (lit., rising out
[1333] What is proficiency in the Elements ?^
That proficiency which is science, understanding, search,
research, etc., when applied to the eighteen elements,
viz. : sight, visual object and visual cognition, hearing,
sound and auditory cognition, smell, odour and olfactory
cognition, taste, sapid object and gustatory cognition, body-
sensibility, the tangible and tactile cognition, mind, mental
object and representative cognition.
[1334] What is proficiency in attention 9^
That proficiency in attention which is science, under-
standing, etc., when applied to those elements.
[1335] What is skill in the spheres ?3
That skill which is science, understanding, etc., when
applied to the twelve spheres, namely, sight and visual
form, hearing and sound, smell and odorous object, taste
and sapid object, body- sensibility and the tangible, mind
and mental object.*
of -vutthana ; see supra, § 1330) one or another kind of
samadhi is, by the Cy., specified as a predetermination
of the time when the subject wished to arouse himself, and
the carrying out of this act of will—a time stated in terms
of the motions of celestial bodies. '
When the moon, sun,
constellations have gone to such and such a position I
shall awake.' See, on this use of vutthana, M. i. 302;
A. iii. 311 ; S. iii. 270. On the modes of Jhana here
specified, see supra, § 160 et seq. Skill in the Attainment
(samapatti) itself is explained as the science of effecting
discernment of the appana or central concept (in Jhana)
as well as of the parikamma or preliminaries.
1 Dhatuyo. The skill in this case is said to comprise
acquisition, attention, hearing and remembering (instruction
being entirely oral) and discrimination. Asl. 395.
2 Seep. 5, n. 1. ^ See § 597 et seq.
* In the last three modes of ability six factors common
to all are distinguished : acquisition, attention, hearing,
comparison (lit., measuring), penetration, contemplation.
Of these, all but the fifth are exercised on mundane objects
of thought ;
penetration is concerned with supramundane
matters ; attention and comparison can be exercised about
[1336] What is skill in the ' Conditioned Geneses '?
Science, understanding, etc., when applied to the
formula :
*
The syntheses come to pass because of ignor-
ance ; cognition comes to pass because of syntheses ; name
and form come to pass because of cognition ; the sixfold
sphere comes to pass because of name and form ; contact
comes to pass because of the sixfold sphere, feeling because
of contact, craving because of feeling, grasping because of
craving, renewed existence because of grasping, birth
because of renewed existence, old age and death, grief,
lamentation, distress, melancholy and despair come to pass
because of birth. Such is the uprising of this whole mass
of Ill.'i
[1337, 1338] What is skill in affirming ... in negating
[causal conjuncture]?
Science, understanding, etc., when applied to discern-
ing that, in a given conjuncture, certain states are . . .
are not, the cause and conditions of certain other states.^
[1339] What is upright ?
Uprightness, without deflexion, twist, or crookedness.
[1340] What is soft ?
That which is plasticity, gentleness, smoothness, pliancy,
lowliness of heart.^
a mixture of both spheres of thought. Asl. 395. (To get
this or any meaning out of the passage in question some
emendation of the Cy. as edited has been necessary.)
^ On this famous formula the Cy. merely remarks that
*
it will appear in the Vibhanga on the Paticcasamuppada.'
Asl. 395.
2 This species of skill (thanakusalata, atthana-
kusalata) constituted one of the Ten Powers of the
Buddha. See M. i. 69. The Cy. (p. 395) takes for illus-
tration sense-cognition as a series of specific results from
specific processes; also cause and effect in the vegetable
kingdom.
^ Ajjavo and maddavo, the terms in this and the
foregoing question, are synonymous with uj(j)ukata and
[1341] What is patience ?
That patience which is long-suffering, compliance,
absence of rudeness and abruptness, complacency of heart.^
[1342] What is temperance ?
That which is the absence of excess in deed, in word,
and in deed and word together.^
Besides, all moral self-restraint is temperance.
[1343] What is amity ?^
When all such speech as is insolent,* disagreeable,
grating, harsh to others, vituperative to others, bordering
muduta, §§ 50, 51, 44, 45. The one additional term
—
the last—is paraphrased as '
absence of conceit.' Asl. 395.
^ Patience (khanti) is one of the ten Paramitas.
Jat. i., pp. 22, 23. See also A. iii. 254, 255. The last three
synonyms are the opposites of the last three synonyms of
'hate.' See supra, §§ 418, 1060. Ajjavo, Java no,
maddavo, khanti and soraccam are, in A. iii. 248,
given as the dhamma of a thoroughbred horse.
^ Temperance (soraccam) is defined as *
to be well on
the hither side of wickedness,' to avoid transgression in the
three kinds in deed, in the four kinds in speech and in
one's mode of livelihood. See Khys Davids, '
Manual of
Buddhism,' p. 142. The three transgressions of the mind
are omitted, hence soraccam applies apparently only to
the self-expression of the individual. Asl. 396.
^ Sakhalyam, paraphrased by sammodaka and
mudu. Ibid. Cf, the usual formula for the exchange of
courtesies on greeting, e.g., M. i. 16.
* Andaka. This and the following terms occur in
M. i. 286. See Morris's Notes, J. P. T. S., 1884, 1886,
1889. Buddhaghosa's comment obviates the necessity
either for Kern's hypothesis that the word, when applied
to speech, should be read as kandaka, or for that of
Morris, that it should be read as candaka. He says
(Asl. 396): Just as in a defective (sadose) tree bosses
(andakani; excrescences, warts) protrude, so through
faultiness, by words of bragging and insolence, are swellings
(andaka) produced.
'Disagreeable' (asata) is omitted in the M. i. 286.
upon anger, not conducive to concentration, is put away,
and when all such speech as is innocuous,^ pleasant to the
ear,2 affectionate, such as goes to the heart, is urbane,^
sweet and acceptable to people generally—when speech of
this sort is spoken—polished, friendly and gentle language
—this is what is called amity.
[1344] What is courtesy ?
The two forms of courtesy: hospitality towards bodily
needs and considerateness in matters of doctrine. When
anyone shows courtesy it is in one or other of these two
forms.*
[1345] What is it to have the door of the faculties un-
guarded?^
*
Grating ' = kakkasa=(Asl. ibid.) putika. By a some-
what forced figure grating or rasping speech is compared
to the disagreeable sensation in the ear (so tarn not
kanna!) by the entrance of the crumbling pulverous
tissue of a rotten tree. *
Vituperative,' etc. (parabhi-
sajjani) ; as it were, a lurking branch of barbed thorns
wounding the limbs and obstructing passage. Ihid.
^ Innocuous = nel a = nidd OS a. Asl. 397.
2 I.e., by varied sweetness.
^ Pori, i.e., town-conversation, either because it is full
of good points (gun a), or used by persons of breeding, or
simply urban. For town- dwellers use fitting terms, calling
a father a father and a brother a brother. Ihid.
* Patisantharo, both amisena and dhammena, is
discussed at length by Buddhaghosa (Asl. 397-399). He
takes, as usual, the etymology of the term—a spreading
out or diffusion—and shows it as a covering or closing,
through kindness and generosity, of the gap there may be
between the having of the giver and the recipient of his
attentions. Both are supposed to be members of the Order,
and many of the hospitable and polite ministrations
described occur in Vin. ii. 210, 211. See also Mil. 409.
^Aguttadvarata. This and the contrary attitude in
§ 1347 constitute an important formula in Buddhist doctrine,
and occur in D. i. 70, M. i. 180, 269, etc. It is also quoted
K.V. 426, 464.
Dhamma-Sangani - THE DIVISION ENTITLED ELIMINATION - The Supplementary Set of Pairs
A BUDDHIST MANUAL
Psychological Ethics,
FROM THE PALI
OF THE
DHAMMA-SANGANI
Translated by CAROLINE A. F. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A.
[Chapter XIV.
The Supplementary Set of Pairs (pitthidukam).]
[1254] Which are the states that are to be put away by
insight ?
The Three Fetters, to wit : theory of individuality, per-
plexity and the contagion of mere rule and ritual.
[1255-1257] Identical with §§ 1003-1006.
[1258] Which are the states that are not to be put away
by insight ?
All states whatever, good, bad and indeterminate, except
the three afore-mentioned, whether they relate to the worlds
of sense, form or the formless, or to the life that is Unin-
cluded ; in other words, the four skandhas ; all form also
and uncompounded element.
[1259, 1260] Which are the states that are
{a) to he put aivay hy cultivation .^
All the remaining lust, hate and dulness as well as the
Corruptions united with them, the four skandhas associated
with them, and the action, bodily, vocal and mental,
springing from them.
(6) not to be put away by cultivation ^
Answer as for those states which are not to he put away hy
insight [§ 1258].
[1261] Which are the states the causes of which are to
be put away by insight ?
The Three Fetters, to wit : theory of individuality, per-
plexity and the contagion of mere rule and ritual.
[1262-1264] Identical with §§ 1003-1006.
[1265] Which are the states the causes of which are not
to be put away by insight ?
Answer as for those *
states which are not to be put away
by insight,' § 1258.
[1266, 1267] Which are the states the causes of which
are
(a) to he put away by cultivation ?
All the remaining lust, hate and dulness : these are the
causes that are to be put away^ by cultivation. And the
Corruptions united with them, the four skandhas associated
with them, and the action, bodily, vocal and mental,
springing from them, are the states the causes of which
are to be put away by cultivation.
(b) not to be put away by cultivation ?
Ansiver as for the '
states which are not to be put away
by cultivation,' § 1260.
[1268-1271] Which are the states
(a) *
wherein conception works '?
The four skandhas when associated with conception (the
latter not being included), [which springs up] in a soil
wherein conception works, either in the worlds of sense or
form, or in the life that is Unincluded.^
(b) *
void of the working of conception '?
The four skandhas when springing up in a soil void of
conception, either in the worlds of sense, form or the form-
less, or in the life that is Unincluded ; conception itself
also, and all form and uncompounded element.
^ In the text, for pahatabba-hetuka (first occurrence)
read pahatabba-hetu.
2
Cf this and following pairs with §§ 996-998 and p. 252,
n. 1. See also App. I., pp. 362, 363. In the text, arupa-
vacare should be omitted, and apariyapanne substi-
tuted for pariyapanne.
(c) * wherein works thought discursive '?
(d) * void of the working of thought discursive ' .?
Ansivers (substituting *
discursive thought ' for 'concep-
tion ') as in §§ 1268, 1269 respectively
.
[1272-1277] Which are the states that are
(a) joyous ?'^
(b) not joyous ?
(c) accompanied by joy ?
(d) unaccompanied by joy ?
{e) accompanied by ease ?
(f) unaccompanied by ease ?
Answers to each pair of questions analogous to those in
§§ 1268, 1269, *
joy '
or *
ease '
being substituted in due order
for *
conception.'
[1278, 1279] Which are the states that are
(a) accompanied by disinterestedness ?
The three skandhas of perception, syntheses and intellect,^
when associated with disinterestedness (the latter not being
included), [which springs up] in a soil congenial to it,
either in the worlds of sense, form or the formless, or in
the life that is Unincluded.
(b) unaccompanied by disinterestedness ?
The four skandhas [when springing up] in a soil uncon-
genial to disinterestedness, either in the worlds of sense or
form,^ or in the life that is Unincluded ; disinterested-
ness itself also, and all form and uncompounded element.
^ Sappitika. The term is used to qualify sukham,
A. i. 81. How far, if at all, its connotation is distinguish-
able from that of piti-sahagata (§ 1274) I cannot say.
In the answers to the positive terms arupavacare
should be omitted from the printed text. Cf, § 265 et seq.
2 Upekkha (disinterestedness) is a mode of vedana
or feeling, and is therefore not said to be associated with
itself.
^ In the printed text omit arupavacare.
[1281-1287] Which are the states that
{a) relate (belong) to the universe of sense /^
Take from the waveless deep of woe beneath up to the
heaven above of the Parinimittavasavatti gods inclusive
—
then whatever has there its range, and is therein included,
whether it be skandha, element or sphere^—form, feeling,
perception, syntheses, intellect : these are states that relate
(belong) to the universe of sense.
(b) do not relate (belong) to the universe of sense ?
The universe of form, that of the formless and the life
that is Unincluded.
(c) relate (belong) to the universe ofform ?
Take from the Brahma-world below up to the heaven
above of the Akanittha gods inclusive—then whatever
states, both of sense and intellect, have therein their range
and are therein included, whether they are states of one
who has attained [Jhana having potential good], or of one
in whom [resultant Jhana] has arisen, or of one living
happily under present conditions.
^
(d) do not relate (belong) to the universe ofform .^
The universe of sense, that of the formless and the life
that is Unincluded.
(e) relate (belong) to the universe of the formless ,^
Take from the entrance among the gods of '
the sphere
of inj&nite space '*
as the lower limit, and up to the entrance
^ Kamavacara. The avacaras are discussed in my
Introduction (vi).
^ Khandha-dhatu-ayatana (cf K.). I take this to be
an adjectival dvandva compound qualifying dhamma, but
the five following terms, the skandhas, to be in apposition
to dhamma.
•^
The three terms rendered by the last three peri-
phrases are samapannassa, uppannassa and dittha-
dhammasukhaviharissa. The Cy. (p. 888) explains
them as referring to kusala-jhanam, vipaka-jhanam
and kiriya-jhanam. The subject is further dealt with in
my Introduction (viii).
' See pp. 71-75.
above among the gods of *
the sphere where there is neither
perception nor non-perception '
—then whatever states, both
of sense and intellect, have therein their range and are
therein included, whether they are states of one who has
attained [Jhana having potential good], or of one in whom
[resultant Jhana] has arisen, or of one living happily
under present conditions : these are states that relate
(belong) to the universe of the formless.
(/) do not relate {belong) to the universe of the formless ?
The universe of sense,^ that of form, and the life that is
Unincluded.
(g) belong to the Included ?
Co-Intoxicant states, good, bad and indeterminate,
whether they relate to the worlds of sense, of form or of
the formless ; in other words, the five skandhas.
(h) belong to the Unincluded ?
The Paths, and the Fruits of the Paths, and uncom-
pounded element.
[1288, 1289] Which are the states by which
(a) there is a going mvay P
The four Paths that are the Unincluded.
(6) there is no going away ?
All states, good, bad and indeterminate, except those
four, whether they relate to the worlds of sense, form or
^ This is inadvertently omitted in the printed text.
2 Niyyanika. In § 277 et seq. the word has been
rendered *
whereby there is a going forth and onward,' the
Cy. leaving it somewhat vaguely defined, and the context,
both in that connexion and this, showing that the expres-
sion imports rather the quest of the Ideal than its attain-
ment. Here the Cy. is briefer and more emphatic (Asl. 50).
The word is said to signify, '
They, cutting off the root of
re-birth and making Nirvana their object, go down from
(niyyanti) that round of transmigration.' The good states
included under the opposite category will be those static
stages of attainment in the upward progress termed the
Fruits of the Paths.
the formless, or to the Hfe that is Unincluded ; in other
words, the four skandhas ; all form also, and uncompounded
element.
[1290, 1291] Which are the states that are
(a) fired in their consequences ?'^
The five acts that have immediate results, and those
wrong views that are fixed in their consequences ; the four
Paths also that are the Unincluded.
{h) not fixed in their consequences ?
Answer as in § 1289.
[1292, 1293] Which are the states that have
(a) something beyond P
Co-Intoxicant states, good, bad and indeterminate,
whether they relate to the worlds of sense, of form, or of
the formless ; in other words, the five skandhas.
(b) no '
beyond '
?
The four Paths that are the Unincluded, and the Fruits
of the Paths, and uncompounded element.
[1294, 1295] Which are the states that are
(a) concomitant with ivar P
1 See §§ 1028-1030.
^ Sa-uttar a = capable of transcending, of rejecting self
(or soul). Asl. 50. The term is applied to cittam in
D. i. 80. In the an-uttara dhamma this transcending
has been accomplished.
^ Sarana, '
an equivalent for those passions, etc., over-
come by which beings in divers ways incur weeping and
misery' . . .
' = together with fightings ' (saha ranehi).
Asl. 50. '
Dulness associated with lust is co-warring
(sarano) with lust, or, associated with hate, is co-warring
with hate.' Asl. 388. One is reminded of the Christian
parallel of '
fleshly lusts which war against the soul ' and
of TMV rjBovcov Tcbv arparevofievcov ev tol<^ fjueXeaiv vfxcbv,
although the concomitance in assault is in this case not
emphasized. In the Therigatha Subha turns the tables—
'
wars a good warfare '
—by fighting against the sensual
desires hostile to her progress (vv. 358, 360).
The three roots of bad (karma) : lust, hate and dulness
—and the Corruptions united with them ; the four skandhas
associated with them ; the action, bodily, vocal and mental,
springing from them.
(b) not concomitant with wa?^ ?
Good, bad and indeterminate states, whether they relate
to the worlds of sense, form or the formless, or to the life
that is Unincluded ; in other words, the four skandhas ; all
form also, and uncompounded element.
Psychological Ethics,
FROM THE PALI
OF THE
DHAMMA-SANGANI
Translated by CAROLINE A. F. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A.
[Chapter XIV.
The Supplementary Set of Pairs (pitthidukam).]
[1254] Which are the states that are to be put away by
insight ?
The Three Fetters, to wit : theory of individuality, per-
plexity and the contagion of mere rule and ritual.
[1255-1257] Identical with §§ 1003-1006.
[1258] Which are the states that are not to be put away
by insight ?
All states whatever, good, bad and indeterminate, except
the three afore-mentioned, whether they relate to the worlds
of sense, form or the formless, or to the life that is Unin-
cluded ; in other words, the four skandhas ; all form also
and uncompounded element.
[1259, 1260] Which are the states that are
{a) to he put aivay hy cultivation .^
All the remaining lust, hate and dulness as well as the
Corruptions united with them, the four skandhas associated
with them, and the action, bodily, vocal and mental,
springing from them.
(6) not to be put away by cultivation ^
Answer as for those states which are not to he put away hy
insight [§ 1258].
[1261] Which are the states the causes of which are to
be put away by insight ?
The Three Fetters, to wit : theory of individuality, per-
plexity and the contagion of mere rule and ritual.
[1262-1264] Identical with §§ 1003-1006.
[1265] Which are the states the causes of which are not
to be put away by insight ?
Answer as for those *
states which are not to be put away
by insight,' § 1258.
[1266, 1267] Which are the states the causes of which
are
(a) to he put away by cultivation ?
All the remaining lust, hate and dulness : these are the
causes that are to be put away^ by cultivation. And the
Corruptions united with them, the four skandhas associated
with them, and the action, bodily, vocal and mental,
springing from them, are the states the causes of which
are to be put away by cultivation.
(b) not to be put away by cultivation ?
Ansiver as for the '
states which are not to be put away
by cultivation,' § 1260.
[1268-1271] Which are the states
(a) *
wherein conception works '?
The four skandhas when associated with conception (the
latter not being included), [which springs up] in a soil
wherein conception works, either in the worlds of sense or
form, or in the life that is Unincluded.^
(b) *
void of the working of conception '?
The four skandhas when springing up in a soil void of
conception, either in the worlds of sense, form or the form-
less, or in the life that is Unincluded ; conception itself
also, and all form and uncompounded element.
^ In the text, for pahatabba-hetuka (first occurrence)
read pahatabba-hetu.
2
Cf this and following pairs with §§ 996-998 and p. 252,
n. 1. See also App. I., pp. 362, 363. In the text, arupa-
vacare should be omitted, and apariyapanne substi-
tuted for pariyapanne.
(c) * wherein works thought discursive '?
(d) * void of the working of thought discursive ' .?
Ansivers (substituting *
discursive thought ' for 'concep-
tion ') as in §§ 1268, 1269 respectively
.
[1272-1277] Which are the states that are
(a) joyous ?'^
(b) not joyous ?
(c) accompanied by joy ?
(d) unaccompanied by joy ?
{e) accompanied by ease ?
(f) unaccompanied by ease ?
Answers to each pair of questions analogous to those in
§§ 1268, 1269, *
joy '
or *
ease '
being substituted in due order
for *
conception.'
[1278, 1279] Which are the states that are
(a) accompanied by disinterestedness ?
The three skandhas of perception, syntheses and intellect,^
when associated with disinterestedness (the latter not being
included), [which springs up] in a soil congenial to it,
either in the worlds of sense, form or the formless, or in
the life that is Unincluded.
(b) unaccompanied by disinterestedness ?
The four skandhas [when springing up] in a soil uncon-
genial to disinterestedness, either in the worlds of sense or
form,^ or in the life that is Unincluded ; disinterested-
ness itself also, and all form and uncompounded element.
^ Sappitika. The term is used to qualify sukham,
A. i. 81. How far, if at all, its connotation is distinguish-
able from that of piti-sahagata (§ 1274) I cannot say.
In the answers to the positive terms arupavacare
should be omitted from the printed text. Cf, § 265 et seq.
2 Upekkha (disinterestedness) is a mode of vedana
or feeling, and is therefore not said to be associated with
itself.
^ In the printed text omit arupavacare.
[1281-1287] Which are the states that
{a) relate (belong) to the universe of sense /^
Take from the waveless deep of woe beneath up to the
heaven above of the Parinimittavasavatti gods inclusive
—
then whatever has there its range, and is therein included,
whether it be skandha, element or sphere^—form, feeling,
perception, syntheses, intellect : these are states that relate
(belong) to the universe of sense.
(b) do not relate (belong) to the universe of sense ?
The universe of form, that of the formless and the life
that is Unincluded.
(c) relate (belong) to the universe ofform ?
Take from the Brahma-world below up to the heaven
above of the Akanittha gods inclusive—then whatever
states, both of sense and intellect, have therein their range
and are therein included, whether they are states of one
who has attained [Jhana having potential good], or of one
in whom [resultant Jhana] has arisen, or of one living
happily under present conditions.
^
(d) do not relate (belong) to the universe ofform .^
The universe of sense, that of the formless and the life
that is Unincluded.
(e) relate (belong) to the universe of the formless ,^
Take from the entrance among the gods of '
the sphere
of inj&nite space '*
as the lower limit, and up to the entrance
^ Kamavacara. The avacaras are discussed in my
Introduction (vi).
^ Khandha-dhatu-ayatana (cf K.). I take this to be
an adjectival dvandva compound qualifying dhamma, but
the five following terms, the skandhas, to be in apposition
to dhamma.
•^
The three terms rendered by the last three peri-
phrases are samapannassa, uppannassa and dittha-
dhammasukhaviharissa. The Cy. (p. 888) explains
them as referring to kusala-jhanam, vipaka-jhanam
and kiriya-jhanam. The subject is further dealt with in
my Introduction (viii).
' See pp. 71-75.
above among the gods of *
the sphere where there is neither
perception nor non-perception '
—then whatever states, both
of sense and intellect, have therein their range and are
therein included, whether they are states of one who has
attained [Jhana having potential good], or of one in whom
[resultant Jhana] has arisen, or of one living happily
under present conditions : these are states that relate
(belong) to the universe of the formless.
(/) do not relate {belong) to the universe of the formless ?
The universe of sense,^ that of form, and the life that is
Unincluded.
(g) belong to the Included ?
Co-Intoxicant states, good, bad and indeterminate,
whether they relate to the worlds of sense, of form or of
the formless ; in other words, the five skandhas.
(h) belong to the Unincluded ?
The Paths, and the Fruits of the Paths, and uncom-
pounded element.
[1288, 1289] Which are the states by which
(a) there is a going mvay P
The four Paths that are the Unincluded.
(6) there is no going away ?
All states, good, bad and indeterminate, except those
four, whether they relate to the worlds of sense, form or
^ This is inadvertently omitted in the printed text.
2 Niyyanika. In § 277 et seq. the word has been
rendered *
whereby there is a going forth and onward,' the
Cy. leaving it somewhat vaguely defined, and the context,
both in that connexion and this, showing that the expres-
sion imports rather the quest of the Ideal than its attain-
ment. Here the Cy. is briefer and more emphatic (Asl. 50).
The word is said to signify, '
They, cutting off the root of
re-birth and making Nirvana their object, go down from
(niyyanti) that round of transmigration.' The good states
included under the opposite category will be those static
stages of attainment in the upward progress termed the
Fruits of the Paths.
the formless, or to the Hfe that is Unincluded ; in other
words, the four skandhas ; all form also, and uncompounded
element.
[1290, 1291] Which are the states that are
(a) fired in their consequences ?'^
The five acts that have immediate results, and those
wrong views that are fixed in their consequences ; the four
Paths also that are the Unincluded.
{h) not fixed in their consequences ?
Answer as in § 1289.
[1292, 1293] Which are the states that have
(a) something beyond P
Co-Intoxicant states, good, bad and indeterminate,
whether they relate to the worlds of sense, of form, or of
the formless ; in other words, the five skandhas.
(b) no '
beyond '
?
The four Paths that are the Unincluded, and the Fruits
of the Paths, and uncompounded element.
[1294, 1295] Which are the states that are
(a) concomitant with ivar P
1 See §§ 1028-1030.
^ Sa-uttar a = capable of transcending, of rejecting self
(or soul). Asl. 50. The term is applied to cittam in
D. i. 80. In the an-uttara dhamma this transcending
has been accomplished.
^ Sarana, '
an equivalent for those passions, etc., over-
come by which beings in divers ways incur weeping and
misery' . . .
' = together with fightings ' (saha ranehi).
Asl. 50. '
Dulness associated with lust is co-warring
(sarano) with lust, or, associated with hate, is co-warring
with hate.' Asl. 388. One is reminded of the Christian
parallel of '
fleshly lusts which war against the soul ' and
of TMV rjBovcov Tcbv arparevofievcov ev tol<^ fjueXeaiv vfxcbv,
although the concomitance in assault is in this case not
emphasized. In the Therigatha Subha turns the tables—
'
wars a good warfare '
—by fighting against the sensual
desires hostile to her progress (vv. 358, 360).
The three roots of bad (karma) : lust, hate and dulness
—and the Corruptions united with them ; the four skandhas
associated with them ; the action, bodily, vocal and mental,
springing from them.
(b) not concomitant with wa?^ ?
Good, bad and indeterminate states, whether they relate
to the worlds of sense, form or the formless, or to the life
that is Unincluded ; in other words, the four skandhas ; all
form also, and uncompounded element.
Dhamma-Sangani - THE DIVISION ENTITLED ELIMINATION - The Group on the Corruptions
A BUDDHIST MANUAL
Psychological Ethics,
FROM THE PALI
OF THE
DHAMMA-SANGANI
Translated by CAROLINE A. F. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A.
[Chapter XIII.
The Group on the Corruptions (kilesa-gocchakam).'J
[1229] Which are the states that have the attribute of
corruption ?^
^ On the term kilesa the Cy. is silent. It is true that
the word lies as near to the Buddhist believer as '
sin ' to
the Christian. As a rule, however, Buddhaghosa is too
Socratic to accept familiar terms without examination. In
this case he has confined his attention to the derivatives.
Incidentally, however—in discussing the meaning of * good
'
(above, § 1 ; Asl. 62)—he makes spiritual health to consist
in the absence of kilesa-disease, showing that kilesa was
co-extensive with evil or the absence of moral good. Of
the derivatives, only sankilittha is made to convey the
idea of impurity or foulness (see Childers, s.v. sankileso),
bad butter being so termed (Asl. 319). Elsewhere it is
paraphrased as 'possessed of sankileso,' while san-
kilesa (above, §§ 993-995; Asl. 42) is defined in close
agreement with the description of sankle9a in Bothl.
and Both {qudlen, heldstigen) :
*
the meaning is to trouble,
to torment,' while the corresponding adjective is described
as *
deserving sankilesa by persistently making self the
object of one's thoughts ... the term being an equivalent
for those things which are the conditions (or objects) of
sankilesa.' Corruption or impurity is, however, I believe,
approximately what this group of terms represents to modern
Buddhists ; nor have I been able to select an English word
adequate to render them in what seems to have been their
first intention, viz., *
torment ' (caused by moral unsound-
ness). '
Bases '
or vatthuni are states so called because
the Corruptions dwell (vasanti) in the (human) subject
The ten bases of corruption, to wit
:
lust, perplexity,
hate, stolidity,
dulness, excitement,
conceit, unconscientiousness,
speculative opinion, disregard of blame.
[1230-1237] In this connexion,
What is lust ? . , . hate ? , . . dulness ? . . . conceit f
. . . speculative opinion ? . . . perplexity .? . . . stolidity ?
. . . excitement ?^
Answers as m §§ 1059-1061, 1116-1118, 1156, 1159.
[1238] What is unconscientiousness ?
The absence of any feeling of conscientious scruple when
scruples ought to be felt; the absence of conscientious
scruple at attaining to bad and evil states.^
[1239] What is disregard of blame ?
The absence of any sense of guilt where a sense of guilt
ought to be felt, the absence of a sense of guilt at attaining
to bad and evil states.
These are the states which have the attribute of cor-
ruption.
[1240] Which are the states that have not the attribute
of corruption ?
All other states whatever (i.e., all except the afore-named
ten), good, bad and indeterminate, whether they relate to
the worlds of sense, form or the formless, or to the life
that is Unincluded ; in other words, the four skandhas, all
form also and uncompounded element.
[1241, 1242] Which are the states that are
(a) baneful ?
of them as immediate conditions (anantara-paccaya).
Asl. 386.
^ In the answer, vupasamo in the text should be
avupasamo.
''
See §§ 387, 388.
Co-Intoxicant states, good, bad and indeterminate,
whether they relate to the worlds of sense, of form or of
the formless ;^ in other words, the five skandhas.
(b) harmless ?
The Paths that are the Unincluded, and the Fruits of
the Paths, and uncompounded element.
[1243, 1243a] Which are the states that are
(a) corrupt?
The three roots of bad (karma), to wit, lust, hate,
dulness, as well as the Corruptions united with them, the
four skandhas associated with them, and the action, bodily,
vocal and mental, springing from them.
(h) not corrupt ?
Good and indeterminate states, whether they relate to
the worlds of sense, form, or the formless, or to the life
that is Unincluded ; in other words, the four skandhas ;
all form also, and uncompounded element.^
[1244-1247] Which are the states that are
(a) associated ivith the Corruptions ?
(b) disconnected with the Corruptions ?
J (c) both Corruptions and baneful ?
\^
(d) banefid but not themselves Corruptions V
Answers as in the corresponding pairs in the '
Graspings,'
§§ 1221-1224.
[1248, 1249] Which are the states that are
(a) both Corruptions and corrupt ?
The Corruptions themselves.
(b) corrupt but not themselves Corruptions ?
The states which by those ten states are made corrupt,
the ten themselves excepted ; in other words, the four
skandhas.
^ Apariyapanna should, of course, be omitted from'
the printed text.
^ This section is omitted, apparently inadvertently, in
the printed text. Cf. the Matika.
[1250-1253] Which are the states that are
{a) both Corruptions and associated with Corruptions ?
Lust, hate, conceit, speculative opinion, perplexity,
stolidity, excitement, unconscientiousness and disregard of
blame taken severally in conjunction with dulness, and
dulness in conjunction with each of them. Lust, also, in
conjunction with excitement, and conversely, and so for
the remaining eight bases. Lust, also, in conjunction with
unconscientiousness, and conversely, and so for the remain-
ing eight. Lust, also, in conjunction with disregard of
blame, and conversely, and so for the remaining eight.^
(b) associated with Corruptions but not themselves Cor-
ruptions P
{(c) disconnected with Ills but baneful ?
{d) disconnected with Ills and harmless ?
Answers to these three questions as in former groups. See
§§ 1226-1228, 1171-1173, etc.^
1 It is not very obvious, nor is any explanation volun-
teered by the Cy., why just the 3rd, 8th, 9th and 10th
Bases of Corruption are selected as the constant of two
factors in this connexion.
^ In the answer, supply ye dhamma after Tehi
dhammehi.
^ The First Path witnesses the overcoming of speculative
opinion and perplexity, the Third Path disposes of hate,
but it requires the Fourth Path to overcome the remaining
seven. Asl. 387.
Psychological Ethics,
FROM THE PALI
OF THE
DHAMMA-SANGANI
Translated by CAROLINE A. F. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A.
[Chapter XIII.
The Group on the Corruptions (kilesa-gocchakam).'J
[1229] Which are the states that have the attribute of
corruption ?^
^ On the term kilesa the Cy. is silent. It is true that
the word lies as near to the Buddhist believer as '
sin ' to
the Christian. As a rule, however, Buddhaghosa is too
Socratic to accept familiar terms without examination. In
this case he has confined his attention to the derivatives.
Incidentally, however—in discussing the meaning of * good
'
(above, § 1 ; Asl. 62)—he makes spiritual health to consist
in the absence of kilesa-disease, showing that kilesa was
co-extensive with evil or the absence of moral good. Of
the derivatives, only sankilittha is made to convey the
idea of impurity or foulness (see Childers, s.v. sankileso),
bad butter being so termed (Asl. 319). Elsewhere it is
paraphrased as 'possessed of sankileso,' while san-
kilesa (above, §§ 993-995; Asl. 42) is defined in close
agreement with the description of sankle9a in Bothl.
and Both {qudlen, heldstigen) :
*
the meaning is to trouble,
to torment,' while the corresponding adjective is described
as *
deserving sankilesa by persistently making self the
object of one's thoughts ... the term being an equivalent
for those things which are the conditions (or objects) of
sankilesa.' Corruption or impurity is, however, I believe,
approximately what this group of terms represents to modern
Buddhists ; nor have I been able to select an English word
adequate to render them in what seems to have been their
first intention, viz., *
torment ' (caused by moral unsound-
ness). '
Bases '
or vatthuni are states so called because
the Corruptions dwell (vasanti) in the (human) subject
The ten bases of corruption, to wit
:
lust, perplexity,
hate, stolidity,
dulness, excitement,
conceit, unconscientiousness,
speculative opinion, disregard of blame.
[1230-1237] In this connexion,
What is lust ? . , . hate ? , . . dulness ? . . . conceit f
. . . speculative opinion ? . . . perplexity .? . . . stolidity ?
. . . excitement ?^
Answers as m §§ 1059-1061, 1116-1118, 1156, 1159.
[1238] What is unconscientiousness ?
The absence of any feeling of conscientious scruple when
scruples ought to be felt; the absence of conscientious
scruple at attaining to bad and evil states.^
[1239] What is disregard of blame ?
The absence of any sense of guilt where a sense of guilt
ought to be felt, the absence of a sense of guilt at attaining
to bad and evil states.
These are the states which have the attribute of cor-
ruption.
[1240] Which are the states that have not the attribute
of corruption ?
All other states whatever (i.e., all except the afore-named
ten), good, bad and indeterminate, whether they relate to
the worlds of sense, form or the formless, or to the life
that is Unincluded ; in other words, the four skandhas, all
form also and uncompounded element.
[1241, 1242] Which are the states that are
(a) baneful ?
of them as immediate conditions (anantara-paccaya).
Asl. 386.
^ In the answer, vupasamo in the text should be
avupasamo.
''
See §§ 387, 388.
Co-Intoxicant states, good, bad and indeterminate,
whether they relate to the worlds of sense, of form or of
the formless ;^ in other words, the five skandhas.
(b) harmless ?
The Paths that are the Unincluded, and the Fruits of
the Paths, and uncompounded element.
[1243, 1243a] Which are the states that are
(a) corrupt?
The three roots of bad (karma), to wit, lust, hate,
dulness, as well as the Corruptions united with them, the
four skandhas associated with them, and the action, bodily,
vocal and mental, springing from them.
(h) not corrupt ?
Good and indeterminate states, whether they relate to
the worlds of sense, form, or the formless, or to the life
that is Unincluded ; in other words, the four skandhas ;
all form also, and uncompounded element.^
[1244-1247] Which are the states that are
(a) associated ivith the Corruptions ?
(b) disconnected with the Corruptions ?
J (c) both Corruptions and baneful ?
\^
(d) banefid but not themselves Corruptions V
Answers as in the corresponding pairs in the '
Graspings,'
§§ 1221-1224.
[1248, 1249] Which are the states that are
(a) both Corruptions and corrupt ?
The Corruptions themselves.
(b) corrupt but not themselves Corruptions ?
The states which by those ten states are made corrupt,
the ten themselves excepted ; in other words, the four
skandhas.
^ Apariyapanna should, of course, be omitted from'
the printed text.
^ This section is omitted, apparently inadvertently, in
the printed text. Cf. the Matika.
[1250-1253] Which are the states that are
{a) both Corruptions and associated with Corruptions ?
Lust, hate, conceit, speculative opinion, perplexity,
stolidity, excitement, unconscientiousness and disregard of
blame taken severally in conjunction with dulness, and
dulness in conjunction with each of them. Lust, also, in
conjunction with excitement, and conversely, and so for
the remaining eight bases. Lust, also, in conjunction with
unconscientiousness, and conversely, and so for the remain-
ing eight. Lust, also, in conjunction with disregard of
blame, and conversely, and so for the remaining eight.^
(b) associated with Corruptions but not themselves Cor-
ruptions P
{(c) disconnected with Ills but baneful ?
{d) disconnected with Ills and harmless ?
Answers to these three questions as in former groups. See
§§ 1226-1228, 1171-1173, etc.^
1 It is not very obvious, nor is any explanation volun-
teered by the Cy., why just the 3rd, 8th, 9th and 10th
Bases of Corruption are selected as the constant of two
factors in this connexion.
^ In the answer, supply ye dhamma after Tehi
dhammehi.
^ The First Path witnesses the overcoming of speculative
opinion and perplexity, the Third Path disposes of hate,
but it requires the Fourth Path to overcome the remaining
seven. Asl. 387.
Dhamma-Sangani - THE DIVISION ENTITLED ELIMINATION - The Group on Grasping
A BUDDHIST MANUAL
Psychological Ethics,
FROM THE PALI
OF THE
DHAMMA-SANGANI
Translated by CAROLINE A. F. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A.
[Chapter XII.
The Group on Grasping (upadana-gocchakam).]
[1213] Which are the states that have the attribute of
Grasping ?^
^ Upadana. This fundamental notion in Buddhist
ethics is in the Cy. (pp. 450 and 385), paraphrased by the
words *
they take violently, i.e., they take hold with a
strong grasp' (bhusam adiyanti . . . dalhagaham
ganhanti), the prefix upa being credited with augmenta-
tive import as in other terms, such as upayaso and
upakkuttho. This shows that, in so far as Buddha-
ghosa gives the traditional sense, the word, in the Buddhism
of his day, connoted rather the dynamic force of '
grasping '
than the static condition of '
attachment ' (e.g., Warren,
'Buddhism in Translations,' p. 189 et seq.) or *
cleaving
'
(Hardy, '
Manual,' 394). Nor does his comment ratify such
renderings as '
Hang ' or *
Lebenstrieb '
(Neumann, '
Die
Eeden Gotamo Buddhos,' pp. 104, 470). Fausboll's
*
seizures' (S. N. in S. B. E., x., p. 138) and Oldenberg's
'Ergreifen' ('Buddha,' 3rd ed., 269), on the other hand,
agree with Buddhaghosa.
The relation of the cognate term upadaniyo to
up ad an am (c/. §§ 655, 881, 1219) is most clearly set
forth in S. iv. 89 ; there the special senses are termed
upadaniya dhamma, and the passionate desire con-
nected therewith the upadana m. See also S. iv. 258.
Buddhaghosa makes no comment on upadaniyam when,
as in § 1219, it is applied to dhamma; but when it is a
question of rupam . . . upadaniyam (Dh. S., §§ 655,
881), he defines this as 'states which are favourable to
(hit a, lit., good for) the Graspings as objects by their
The four Graspings :
—the Grasping after sense, the
Grasping after speculative opinion, the Grasping after
mere rule and ritual, the Grasping after a theory of soul.
In this connexion,
[1214] What is the Grasping after sense ?
That sensual desire, sensual passion, sensual delight,
sensual craving, sensual cleaving, sensual fever, sensual
languishing, sensual rapacity, which is excited by the
pleasures of the senses.^
[1215] What is the Grasping after speculative opinion ?
*
There is no such thing as alms, or sacrifice, or offering ;'^
there is neither fruit, nor result of good, or of evil deeds ;
there is no such thing as this world, or the next f there is
no such thing as mother or father, or beings springing
into birth without them ;* there are in the world no
recluses or brahmins who have reached the highest point,
who have attained the height, who, having understood and
being bound up with grasping ; in other words, phenomena
which are the conditions of the mental objects of grasping
'
(upadanassa arammana-paccaya-bhutani). Asl. 42.
In the same connexion, rupam upadinnam (Dh. S.,
§ 653) is by Buddhaghosa defined as [states] which have
been got, laid hold of, taken (gahita), by way of fruition
—
heaped up by karma having the property of craving. Ibid.
None of the comments explains upadanamin the sense of
fuel, i.e., as the basis of re-birth ; each of the four Upadanas
is paraphrased simply by to grasp at sense (kamam
upadiyati), at speculation, etc.
1 See § 1114 and § 1097 ; also § 1153.
2 The Cy. explains these negations as merely meaning
that none of the three has an efficacy, any fruition.
Asl. 385.
^ Ignoring any deeper metaphysic that may have here
been implied, the Cy. explains these negations as held by
the inhabitant of another world respecting this, or by an
inhabitant here below respecting another world. Ibid.
^ Beings so born, continues the Cy., he assumes there
are none ; nor have one's former lives any efficacy over
one's subsequent parentage.
realized by themselves alone both this world and the next,
make known the same '^
—all this sort of speculation, this
walking in opinion, wilderness of opinion, puppet-show of
opinion, scuffling of opinion, this Fetter of opinion, the
grip and tenacity of it, the inclination towards it, the being
infected by it, this by-path, wrong road, wrongness, this
*
fording-place,' this shiftiness of grasp^—this is what is
called the Grasping after speculative opinion.
And with the exception of the Graspings after mere rule
and ritual and after soul-theory, all wrong views are in-
cluded in the Grasping after speculative opinion.
[1216] What is the Gi^asping after mere rule and ritual ?
Answer as for the '
Contagion of mere rule and ritual,'
§ 1005.3
[1217] What is the Grasping after soul- theory ?
Ansiver as for the * Theory of individuality,' § 1003.
[1218] Which are the states that have not the attribute
of Grasping ?
All other states whatever, good, bad and indeterminate
(except the foregoing), whether they relate to the worlds of
sense, or of form, or of the formless, or to the life that is
Unincluded ; in other words, the four skandhas ; all form
also and uncompounded element.
[1219] Which are the states that are favourable
Grasping ?
Co-Intoxicant states, good, bad and indeterminate
^ Buddhaghosa gives as typical forms of speculation
grasped at, *
Both the soul (self) and the world are eternal.'
These he calls the purimaditthim uttaraditthim {sic
lege), terms which, whether they mean *
earlier and subse-
quent heresies,' or 'Eastern and Northern views,' or both,
are equally interesting. The text, however, selects as a
typical current speculation the views put forward by Ajita
Kesakambali. See D. i. 55 and M. i. 402.
2 Cf § 381.
3 The '
bovine morality and practices ' noticed above
(§ 1005, n. 3) are again instanced in the Cy. Ibid.
whether they relate to the worlds of sense, form or the
formless ; in other words, the ^ve skandhas.
[1220] Which are the states that are not favourable to
Grasping ?
The Paths that are the Unincluded, and the Fruits of
the Paths ; and uncompounded element.
[1221-1224] Which are the states that are
(a) associated tvith Grasping ?
{b) disconnected ivith Grasping ?
(c) Grasping and also favourable to Grasping ?
(d) favourable to Gi^asping but not Grasping ?
Ansivers exactly analogous to those given to corresponding
questions in other Groups, e.g., §§ 1125, 1141, 1164.
[1225-1228] Which are the states that are
(a) both Grasping and associated with Grasping ?
The Grasping after speculation in conjunction with that
after sense is both, and conversely.
So is each of the other tivo Graspings in conjunction with
that after sense, and conversely.
(b) associated with Grasping but not Grasping ?
(c) disconnected with Grasping yet favourable to it?
(d) disconnected with Grasping and not favourable to it ?
Ansivers as in the Groups specified above, §§ 1125, 1141,
1164 et seq.^
^ The First Path disposes of all forms of Grasping save
the first, the extirpation of which is a task not finished till
all the four Paths have been traversed. Asl. 386. Contrast
with this §§ 1173 n., 1134 n., and 1112 n., where in every
case *
sense,' '
sensuality ' and '
sensual desire '
are in the
Cy. said to succumb in the Third or Anagami's Path.
Psychological Ethics,
FROM THE PALI
OF THE
DHAMMA-SANGANI
Translated by CAROLINE A. F. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A.
[Chapter XII.
The Group on Grasping (upadana-gocchakam).]
[1213] Which are the states that have the attribute of
Grasping ?^
^ Upadana. This fundamental notion in Buddhist
ethics is in the Cy. (pp. 450 and 385), paraphrased by the
words *
they take violently, i.e., they take hold with a
strong grasp' (bhusam adiyanti . . . dalhagaham
ganhanti), the prefix upa being credited with augmenta-
tive import as in other terms, such as upayaso and
upakkuttho. This shows that, in so far as Buddha-
ghosa gives the traditional sense, the word, in the Buddhism
of his day, connoted rather the dynamic force of '
grasping '
than the static condition of '
attachment ' (e.g., Warren,
'Buddhism in Translations,' p. 189 et seq.) or *
cleaving
'
(Hardy, '
Manual,' 394). Nor does his comment ratify such
renderings as '
Hang ' or *
Lebenstrieb '
(Neumann, '
Die
Eeden Gotamo Buddhos,' pp. 104, 470). Fausboll's
*
seizures' (S. N. in S. B. E., x., p. 138) and Oldenberg's
'Ergreifen' ('Buddha,' 3rd ed., 269), on the other hand,
agree with Buddhaghosa.
The relation of the cognate term upadaniyo to
up ad an am (c/. §§ 655, 881, 1219) is most clearly set
forth in S. iv. 89 ; there the special senses are termed
upadaniya dhamma, and the passionate desire con-
nected therewith the upadana m. See also S. iv. 258.
Buddhaghosa makes no comment on upadaniyam when,
as in § 1219, it is applied to dhamma; but when it is a
question of rupam . . . upadaniyam (Dh. S., §§ 655,
881), he defines this as 'states which are favourable to
(hit a, lit., good for) the Graspings as objects by their
The four Graspings :
—the Grasping after sense, the
Grasping after speculative opinion, the Grasping after
mere rule and ritual, the Grasping after a theory of soul.
In this connexion,
[1214] What is the Grasping after sense ?
That sensual desire, sensual passion, sensual delight,
sensual craving, sensual cleaving, sensual fever, sensual
languishing, sensual rapacity, which is excited by the
pleasures of the senses.^
[1215] What is the Grasping after speculative opinion ?
*
There is no such thing as alms, or sacrifice, or offering ;'^
there is neither fruit, nor result of good, or of evil deeds ;
there is no such thing as this world, or the next f there is
no such thing as mother or father, or beings springing
into birth without them ;* there are in the world no
recluses or brahmins who have reached the highest point,
who have attained the height, who, having understood and
being bound up with grasping ; in other words, phenomena
which are the conditions of the mental objects of grasping
'
(upadanassa arammana-paccaya-bhutani). Asl. 42.
In the same connexion, rupam upadinnam (Dh. S.,
§ 653) is by Buddhaghosa defined as [states] which have
been got, laid hold of, taken (gahita), by way of fruition
—
heaped up by karma having the property of craving. Ibid.
None of the comments explains upadanamin the sense of
fuel, i.e., as the basis of re-birth ; each of the four Upadanas
is paraphrased simply by to grasp at sense (kamam
upadiyati), at speculation, etc.
1 See § 1114 and § 1097 ; also § 1153.
2 The Cy. explains these negations as merely meaning
that none of the three has an efficacy, any fruition.
Asl. 385.
^ Ignoring any deeper metaphysic that may have here
been implied, the Cy. explains these negations as held by
the inhabitant of another world respecting this, or by an
inhabitant here below respecting another world. Ibid.
^ Beings so born, continues the Cy., he assumes there
are none ; nor have one's former lives any efficacy over
one's subsequent parentage.
realized by themselves alone both this world and the next,
make known the same '^
—all this sort of speculation, this
walking in opinion, wilderness of opinion, puppet-show of
opinion, scuffling of opinion, this Fetter of opinion, the
grip and tenacity of it, the inclination towards it, the being
infected by it, this by-path, wrong road, wrongness, this
*
fording-place,' this shiftiness of grasp^—this is what is
called the Grasping after speculative opinion.
And with the exception of the Graspings after mere rule
and ritual and after soul-theory, all wrong views are in-
cluded in the Grasping after speculative opinion.
[1216] What is the Gi^asping after mere rule and ritual ?
Answer as for the '
Contagion of mere rule and ritual,'
§ 1005.3
[1217] What is the Grasping after soul- theory ?
Ansiver as for the * Theory of individuality,' § 1003.
[1218] Which are the states that have not the attribute
of Grasping ?
All other states whatever, good, bad and indeterminate
(except the foregoing), whether they relate to the worlds of
sense, or of form, or of the formless, or to the life that is
Unincluded ; in other words, the four skandhas ; all form
also and uncompounded element.
[1219] Which are the states that are favourable
Grasping ?
Co-Intoxicant states, good, bad and indeterminate
^ Buddhaghosa gives as typical forms of speculation
grasped at, *
Both the soul (self) and the world are eternal.'
These he calls the purimaditthim uttaraditthim {sic
lege), terms which, whether they mean *
earlier and subse-
quent heresies,' or 'Eastern and Northern views,' or both,
are equally interesting. The text, however, selects as a
typical current speculation the views put forward by Ajita
Kesakambali. See D. i. 55 and M. i. 402.
2 Cf § 381.
3 The '
bovine morality and practices ' noticed above
(§ 1005, n. 3) are again instanced in the Cy. Ibid.
whether they relate to the worlds of sense, form or the
formless ; in other words, the ^ve skandhas.
[1220] Which are the states that are not favourable to
Grasping ?
The Paths that are the Unincluded, and the Fruits of
the Paths ; and uncompounded element.
[1221-1224] Which are the states that are
(a) associated tvith Grasping ?
{b) disconnected ivith Grasping ?
(c) Grasping and also favourable to Grasping ?
(d) favourable to Gi^asping but not Grasping ?
Ansivers exactly analogous to those given to corresponding
questions in other Groups, e.g., §§ 1125, 1141, 1164.
[1225-1228] Which are the states that are
(a) both Grasping and associated with Grasping ?
The Grasping after speculation in conjunction with that
after sense is both, and conversely.
So is each of the other tivo Graspings in conjunction with
that after sense, and conversely.
(b) associated with Grasping but not Grasping ?
(c) disconnected with Grasping yet favourable to it?
(d) disconnected with Grasping and not favourable to it ?
Ansivers as in the Groups specified above, §§ 1125, 1141,
1164 et seq.^
^ The First Path disposes of all forms of Grasping save
the first, the extirpation of which is a task not finished till
all the four Paths have been traversed. Asl. 386. Contrast
with this §§ 1173 n., 1134 n., and 1112 n., where in every
case *
sense,' '
sensuality ' and '
sensual desire '
are in the
Cy. said to succumb in the Third or Anagami's Path.
Dhamma-Sangani - THE DIVISION ENTITLED ELIMINATION - The Great Intermediate Set of Pairs
A BUDDHIST MANUAL
Psychological Ethics,
FROM THE PALI
OF THE
DHAMMA-SANGANI
Translated by CAROLINE A. F. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A.
[Chapter XI.
The Great Intermediate Set of Pairs (mahantara-
dukam).]^
[1185, 1186] Which are the states that have
(a) a concomitant object of thought P
The four skandhas.
(h) no concomitant object of thought ?
All form,^ and uncompounded element.
[1187, 1188] Which are the states that are
{a) of the intellect ?^
Cognition applied to sense-impressions ; the element of
ideation and the element of ideational cognition.
(h) not of the intellect ?
The skandhas of feeling, perception and syntheses ; all
form, moreover, and uncompounded element.
[1189, 1190] Which are the states that are
(a) involved in the life of sense ^^ '
1
Cf Chapter III. of this book. The Cy. refrains from
any remarks on the answers in this chapter.
2 Sarammana.
3 See p. 169 :'
' void of idea.' See K. V. 404.
* Citta. See § 1022. 'Cognition applied,' etc., is in
the original cakkhuvinnanam and the rest. When
'
sense '
drops out of account in the following pairs, I have
reverted to the approximately synonymous term *
thought.'
s Cetasika. See § 1022.
The skandhas of feeling, perception and syntheses.
(b) not involved in the life of sense ?
Intellect and all form and uncompounded element.
[1191, 1192] Which are the states that are
(a) associated tvith thought ?
The skandhas of feeling, perception and syntheses.
(b) disconnected with thought ?
All form and uncompounded element.
(Thought must not be described as associated or dis-
connected with itself.)^
[1193, 1194] Which are the states that are
(a) conjoined with thought ? ^
(b) detached from thought ?
Answers as in §§ 1191, 1192 respectively,
(Thought must not be described as conjoined with, or
detached from itself.)
[1195, 1196] Which are the states that are
(a) sprung from thought t
^
The skandhas of feeling, perception and syntheses
;
bodily and vocal intimation ; or whatever other form there
be which is born of thought, caused by thought, sprung
from thought, whether it be in the spheres of sights,
sounds, smells, tastes,* or the tangible, the elements of
space or fluidity, the lightness, plasticity or wieldiness of
1 This refinement in the Buddhist Logic of Terms is
usually expressed by the brief parenthesis governed by
thapetva, excepting. See, e.g., § 984 et seq,
^ Citta-samsattha. '
I.e., in a condition of continuity,
immediate contiguity, with thought.' Asl. 49. The con-
trary -visamsattha = * not in the condition of continuity,
immediate contiguity, with thought, although proceeding in
unity with it.' Ibid.
^ Citta-samutthana. Cf § 667.
* Easayatanam has been omitted in the text, appar-
ently by inadvertence.
form, the integration or subsistence of form, or bodily
nutriment.
{h) not sprung from thought?
Thought; also every other kind of form, and uncom-
pounded element.
[1197, 1198] Which are the states that
(a) come into being together ivith thought ?^
The skandhas of feeling, perception and syntheses
;
bodily and vocal intimation.
(h) do not come into being together with thought t
Thought ; also all other kinds of form,^ and uncom-
pounded element.
[1199, 1200] Which are the states that are
(a) consecutive to thought 1^
(b) not consecutive to thought ?
Answers as in the two foregoing answers respectively,
[1201, 1202] Which are the states that are
{a) conjoined with aiid sprung from thought ?^
The skandhas of feeling, perception and syntheses.
(b) not conjoined with and sprung from thought P
Thought itself ; all form also, and uncompounded
element.
^ Citta-sahabhuno.
^ I.e., except the two modes of intimation, which are
reckoned as *
form.' See § 596.
^ Cittanuparivattina.
* Citta-samsattha-samutthana. The Cy. reads this
and the terms in the two following pairs as dvandva com-
pounds.
^ The negative in the text is not distributed, and the
compound of attributes qualifying *
states ' must be taken
conjunctively. This is borne out by the answer. Cf
§§ 1196, 1198, also p. 204, n. 1.
Saha-bhuno is parsed as saha bhavanti, not bhuta.
Asl. 49.
[1203, 1204] Which are the states that
{a) are conjoined with and sprung from^ and that come into
being together loith, thought ?
(b) are not such as are conjoined with and sprung from
and as come into being together with thought ?^
Answers as in the two foregoing answers respectively.
[1205, 1206] Which are the states that are
(a) conjoined with and sprung from and 'consecutive to
thought
?
(b) not conjoined with, sprung from and consecutive to
thought?
Answers as in the two foregoing ansivers.
[1207, 1208] Which are the states that are
(a) of the self /
The spheres of the five senses and of ideation.
(b) external t
The spheres of the five objects of sense and of ideas.
^
[1209, 1210] Which are the states that are
(a) derived?
The spheres of the five senses . . . and bodily nutri-
ment.^
(b) not derived ?
The four skandhas, the four great phenomena and un-
compounded element.
[1211-1212] Which are the states that are
(a) the issue of grasping ?^
Co-Intoxicant good and bad states, whether they relate
to the worlds of sense, of form, or of the formless ; in other
words, the four skandhas, and such form as is due to karma
having been wrought.
^ See note 5, p. 320. ^ Dhammayatanam.
^
Cf § 596. * See M. i. 190.
(b) not the issue of grasping ?
Co-Intoxicant good and bad states, whether they relate
to the worlds of sense, of form, or of the formless ; in other
words, the four skandhas ; also such k i r i y a-thoughts as
are neither good, nor bad, nor the effects of karma ; the
Paths, moreover, that are the Unincluded and the Fruits
of the Paths, and uncompounded element.
Psychological Ethics,
FROM THE PALI
OF THE
DHAMMA-SANGANI
Translated by CAROLINE A. F. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A.
[Chapter XI.
The Great Intermediate Set of Pairs (mahantara-
dukam).]^
[1185, 1186] Which are the states that have
(a) a concomitant object of thought P
The four skandhas.
(h) no concomitant object of thought ?
All form,^ and uncompounded element.
[1187, 1188] Which are the states that are
{a) of the intellect ?^
Cognition applied to sense-impressions ; the element of
ideation and the element of ideational cognition.
(h) not of the intellect ?
The skandhas of feeling, perception and syntheses ; all
form, moreover, and uncompounded element.
[1189, 1190] Which are the states that are
(a) involved in the life of sense ^^ '
1
Cf Chapter III. of this book. The Cy. refrains from
any remarks on the answers in this chapter.
2 Sarammana.
3 See p. 169 :'
' void of idea.' See K. V. 404.
* Citta. See § 1022. 'Cognition applied,' etc., is in
the original cakkhuvinnanam and the rest. When
'
sense '
drops out of account in the following pairs, I have
reverted to the approximately synonymous term *
thought.'
s Cetasika. See § 1022.
The skandhas of feeling, perception and syntheses.
(b) not involved in the life of sense ?
Intellect and all form and uncompounded element.
[1191, 1192] Which are the states that are
(a) associated tvith thought ?
The skandhas of feeling, perception and syntheses.
(b) disconnected with thought ?
All form and uncompounded element.
(Thought must not be described as associated or dis-
connected with itself.)^
[1193, 1194] Which are the states that are
(a) conjoined with thought ? ^
(b) detached from thought ?
Answers as in §§ 1191, 1192 respectively,
(Thought must not be described as conjoined with, or
detached from itself.)
[1195, 1196] Which are the states that are
(a) sprung from thought t
^
The skandhas of feeling, perception and syntheses
;
bodily and vocal intimation ; or whatever other form there
be which is born of thought, caused by thought, sprung
from thought, whether it be in the spheres of sights,
sounds, smells, tastes,* or the tangible, the elements of
space or fluidity, the lightness, plasticity or wieldiness of
1 This refinement in the Buddhist Logic of Terms is
usually expressed by the brief parenthesis governed by
thapetva, excepting. See, e.g., § 984 et seq,
^ Citta-samsattha. '
I.e., in a condition of continuity,
immediate contiguity, with thought.' Asl. 49. The con-
trary -visamsattha = * not in the condition of continuity,
immediate contiguity, with thought, although proceeding in
unity with it.' Ibid.
^ Citta-samutthana. Cf § 667.
* Easayatanam has been omitted in the text, appar-
ently by inadvertence.
form, the integration or subsistence of form, or bodily
nutriment.
{h) not sprung from thought?
Thought; also every other kind of form, and uncom-
pounded element.
[1197, 1198] Which are the states that
(a) come into being together ivith thought ?^
The skandhas of feeling, perception and syntheses
;
bodily and vocal intimation.
(h) do not come into being together with thought t
Thought ; also all other kinds of form,^ and uncom-
pounded element.
[1199, 1200] Which are the states that are
(a) consecutive to thought 1^
(b) not consecutive to thought ?
Answers as in the two foregoing answers respectively,
[1201, 1202] Which are the states that are
{a) conjoined with aiid sprung from thought ?^
The skandhas of feeling, perception and syntheses.
(b) not conjoined with and sprung from thought P
Thought itself ; all form also, and uncompounded
element.
^ Citta-sahabhuno.
^ I.e., except the two modes of intimation, which are
reckoned as *
form.' See § 596.
^ Cittanuparivattina.
* Citta-samsattha-samutthana. The Cy. reads this
and the terms in the two following pairs as dvandva com-
pounds.
^ The negative in the text is not distributed, and the
compound of attributes qualifying *
states ' must be taken
conjunctively. This is borne out by the answer. Cf
§§ 1196, 1198, also p. 204, n. 1.
Saha-bhuno is parsed as saha bhavanti, not bhuta.
Asl. 49.
[1203, 1204] Which are the states that
{a) are conjoined with and sprung from^ and that come into
being together loith, thought ?
(b) are not such as are conjoined with and sprung from
and as come into being together with thought ?^
Answers as in the two foregoing answers respectively.
[1205, 1206] Which are the states that are
(a) conjoined with and sprung from and 'consecutive to
thought
?
(b) not conjoined with, sprung from and consecutive to
thought?
Answers as in the two foregoing ansivers.
[1207, 1208] Which are the states that are
(a) of the self /
The spheres of the five senses and of ideation.
(b) external t
The spheres of the five objects of sense and of ideas.
^
[1209, 1210] Which are the states that are
(a) derived?
The spheres of the five senses . . . and bodily nutri-
ment.^
(b) not derived ?
The four skandhas, the four great phenomena and un-
compounded element.
[1211-1212] Which are the states that are
(a) the issue of grasping ?^
Co-Intoxicant good and bad states, whether they relate
to the worlds of sense, of form, or of the formless ; in other
words, the four skandhas, and such form as is due to karma
having been wrought.
^ See note 5, p. 320. ^ Dhammayatanam.
^
Cf § 596. * See M. i. 190.
(b) not the issue of grasping ?
Co-Intoxicant good and bad states, whether they relate
to the worlds of sense, of form, or of the formless ; in other
words, the four skandhas ; also such k i r i y a-thoughts as
are neither good, nor bad, nor the effects of karma ; the
Paths, moreover, that are the Unincluded and the Fruits
of the Paths, and uncompounded element.
Dhamma-Sangani - THE DIVISION ENTITLED ELIMINATION - The Group on Contagion
A BUDDHIST MANUAL
Psychological Ethics,
FROM THE PALI
OF THE
DHAMMA-SANGANI
Translated by CAROLINE A. F. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A.
[Chapter X.
The Group on Contagion (paramasa-gocchakam).]
[1174] Which are the states that are contagious ?
The Contagion of speculative opinion.
In this connexion,
[1175] What is the '
Contagion of speculative opinion '?
Answer as for the 'Intoxicant of speculative opinion/
viz. :
'
To hold that the world is eternal, or that it is not
eternal,' etc. (§ 1099).
[1176] Which are the states that are not a Contagion ?
Answer as in the case of the '
states that are not Hin-
drances ' (§ 1163).
2
[1177, 1178] Which are the states that are
(a) infected ?
(b) uninfected ?
Answers as in the corresponding answers relating to the
Hindrances (§§ 1164, 1165).
^ The man, according to the Cy. (p. 49), who falls out of
the right attitude toward dhamma, i.e., who loses the
belief in their impermanence, etc., lays himself open to the
infectious touch of speculative views.
^ The one kind of Contagion is always for the sake of
symmetry referred to as plural, e.g., the states afore-named
(te dhamma thapetva). Asl. 385.
[1179, 1180] Which are the states that are
(a) associated with the Contagion ?
(b) disconnected with the Contagion ?
Answers as in the corresponding ansivers relating to the
Hindrances (§§ 1166, 1167).
[1181, 1182] Which are the states that are
(a) themselves Contagious and infected ?
The Contagion itself is both.
(b) infected but not Contagious ?
The states which are infected by the states afore-named
;
that is to say, with the exception of the latter, all co-
Intoxicant states whatever, good, bad and indeterminate,
whether they relate to the worlds of sense, form, or the
formless ; in other words, the five skandhas.
[1183, 1184] Which are the states that are
(a) disconnected with the Contagion, yet infected ?
(b) disconnected ivith the Contagion and uninfected ?
Answers as in the corresponding sections on the Hin-
drances (§§ 1172, 1173).
Psychological Ethics,
FROM THE PALI
OF THE
DHAMMA-SANGANI
Translated by CAROLINE A. F. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A.
[Chapter X.
The Group on Contagion (paramasa-gocchakam).]
[1174] Which are the states that are contagious ?
The Contagion of speculative opinion.
In this connexion,
[1175] What is the '
Contagion of speculative opinion '?
Answer as for the 'Intoxicant of speculative opinion/
viz. :
'
To hold that the world is eternal, or that it is not
eternal,' etc. (§ 1099).
[1176] Which are the states that are not a Contagion ?
Answer as in the case of the '
states that are not Hin-
drances ' (§ 1163).
2
[1177, 1178] Which are the states that are
(a) infected ?
(b) uninfected ?
Answers as in the corresponding answers relating to the
Hindrances (§§ 1164, 1165).
^ The man, according to the Cy. (p. 49), who falls out of
the right attitude toward dhamma, i.e., who loses the
belief in their impermanence, etc., lays himself open to the
infectious touch of speculative views.
^ The one kind of Contagion is always for the sake of
symmetry referred to as plural, e.g., the states afore-named
(te dhamma thapetva). Asl. 385.
[1179, 1180] Which are the states that are
(a) associated with the Contagion ?
(b) disconnected with the Contagion ?
Answers as in the corresponding ansivers relating to the
Hindrances (§§ 1166, 1167).
[1181, 1182] Which are the states that are
(a) themselves Contagious and infected ?
The Contagion itself is both.
(b) infected but not Contagious ?
The states which are infected by the states afore-named
;
that is to say, with the exception of the latter, all co-
Intoxicant states whatever, good, bad and indeterminate,
whether they relate to the worlds of sense, form, or the
formless ; in other words, the five skandhas.
[1183, 1184] Which are the states that are
(a) disconnected with the Contagion, yet infected ?
(b) disconnected ivith the Contagion and uninfected ?
Answers as in the corresponding sections on the Hin-
drances (§§ 1172, 1173).
Dhamma-Sangani - THE DIVISION ENTITLED ELIMINATION - The Group of the Hindrances
A BUDDHIST MANUAL
Psychological Ethics,
FROM THE PALI
OF THE
DHAMMA-SANGANI
Translated by CAROLINE A. F. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A.
[Chapter IX.
The Group of the Hindrances (nivarana-goccha-
kam).]
[1162] Which are the states that are Hindrances?
The six Hindrances, to wit, the Hindrance of sensual
desire, the Hindrance of ill will, the Hindrance of stolidity
and torpor, the Hindrance of excitement and worry, the
Hindrance of perplexity, the Hindrance of ignorance.^
In this connexion
[1153] What is the Hindrance of sensual desire '^
Answer as for the '
Intoxicant of sensuality,' § 1097.^
[1154] What is the Hindrance of ill will?
Answer as for the '
Tie of ill will,' § 1137.
[1155] What is the Hindrance of stolidity and torpor?
First distinguish between stolidity and torpor.^
^ In the Sutta Pitaka, the Hindrances form a category of
five, ignorance (avijja) being excluded. See the descrip-
tion in D. i. 71-74, and cf D. i. 246 ; M. i. 60, 144, 181,
269, 294, etc. ; A. iii. 63 ; S. v. 60, 94-98. This dis-
crepancy is not noticed by Buddhaghosa. See also § 1112,
etc. The Hindrances are to be understood as states which
muffle, enwrap or trammel thought. States, again, which
are nivaraniya are to be understood analogously to those
which are sannojaniya. Asl. 49.
2 '
Sensual thirst ' is again omitted, as in the description
of the corresponding Fetter, § 1114.
^ It is interesting to note that whereas the text calls
thinam (stolidity) a morbid state of the cittam and
middham a morbid state of the kayo, Buddhaghosa, in
In this connexion,
[1156] What is stolidity ?
That which is indisposition/ unwieldiness^ of intellect ;
adhering and cohering ; clinging, cleaving to, stickiness
;
stolidity, that is, a stiffening, a rigidity of the intellect^
—
this is called stolidity.
[1157] What is torpor .?*
That which is indisposition and unwieldiness of sense,
a shrouding, enveloping,^ barricading within^ ; torpor that
his Cy. on the Digha Nikaya (Sum. 211), speaks of
thinam as citta-gelaiinam (sickness or affection of
the mind), and of middham as cetasikagelannam.
The apparent inconsistency, however, will vanish if the
predominantly psychological standpoint of the Dhamma
Sangani be kept in mind. By kayo, as Buddhaghosa
reminds us (Asl. 378 ; see above, p. 43, n. 3), is meant
'
the three skandhas ' of feeling, perception and syntheses,
that is to say, the three through which we have subjective
experience of bodily states objectively conceived. And
cetasiko is the adjective corresponding to kayo taken
in this sense (§ 1022). Hence stolidity is confined to the
vinnana-skandha, which = c it tarn = (approximately) re-
presentative intellection, while torpor is a corresponding
affection of mind on its presentative and emotional side.
^ Akalyata, equivalent to gilanabhavo, Asl. 377,
where Maha Vibhanga, i. 62, is quoted.
2 See § 47.
^ '
The (stolid) mind cannot be maintained in any required
attitude or deportment. It is as inert as a bat hanging
to a tree, or as molasses cleaving to a stick, or as a lump
of butter too stiff for spreading' (Asl., ^M.). 'Attached
to' (linam) is paraphrased by avippharikataya pati-
kutitam, lit., bent back without expansion, where the
notion, as conceived by the Commentator, has something
akin to katukaficukata or niggardliness. See § 1122, n^ 2.
* Middham, derived by the Cy. from medhati ( ^med,
*
be fat ') ; there is a cognate notion in our * torpor,' cf.
repireiv, to be sated, and V^^-^P-
5 Onaho, pariyonaho. See Mil. 300; D. i. 246. In
the latter work, the a is short. In the Cy. (Asl. 378) the
is sleep, drowsiness; sleep,^ slumbering, somnolence—this
is called torpor.
Now this is the stolidity and this is the torpor which are
called *
the Hindrance of stolidity and torpor. '^
[1159] What is the Hindrance of excitement and worry ?
First distinguish between *
excitement ' and *
worry.'
In this connexion,
[1160] What is excitement P
That excitement of mind which is disquietude, agitation
of heart, turmoil of mind—this is called excitement.
[1161] What is worry 9^
simile is 'enveloping the senses (kayo) as a cloud the
sky.' In Sum. i. 135 the latter of the two terms is applied
to '
covering ' a drum.
^ Anto-samorodho. The Cy. explains that, as men
cannot get out of an invested city, so dhamma, blockaded
by torpor, cannot get out by expansion or diffusion).
^ There is no comment on this repetition of soppam.
^ The Commentator in his general remarks on this
Hindrance is at pains to point out that for the khina-
savo, or arahat, a periodical torpor or repose has ceased
to engender bad karma. The Buddha allowed an after-
dinner nap, for instance, at certain seasons (see M. i. 249),
as not in itself conducive to a bemuddling of the mind.
So powerful, however, is the Hindrance to the non-adept,
that its influence is not rooted out till the arahat Path is
gained. The arahat is fain to rest his frail body (lit., his
fingernail-kayo), but to him it is as unmoroX an act as the
folding up of leaves and blossoms at night. On overcom-
ing torpor see A. iv. 86.
3 See § 429.
* In its primary meaning kukkuccam is fidgeting, bad
deportment of hands and feet. See Jat. i. 119 ; ii. 142
;
also Sum. i. 1, 2. Hence mental fidget, the worry of
scruple (lit., *
the little sharp stone in a man's shoe.'
See Skeat's English Dictionary), the over-sensitive, over-
scrupulous conscience. In the frequent cases of kukkuc-
cam, respecting the keeping of the rules of the Order,
given in the Vinaya
—
'tassa kukkuccam ahosi'—or
kukkuccayanto—no blame seems to have attached to
the person m question. There was weakness in the anxiety
Consciousness of what is lawful in something that is un-
lawful ; consciousness of what is unlawful in something that
is lawful ; consciousness of what is immoral in something
that is moral ; consciousness of what is moral in something
that is immoral^—all this sort of worry, fidgeting, over-
scrupulousness, remorse of conscience, mental scarifying^
—this is what is called Worry.
Now this is the excitement and this is the worry which
are what is called *
the Hindrance of excitement and
worry.'
[1162] What is the Hindrance of ignorance ?
Answer as for 'dulness,' § 1061.
[1163] Which are the states that are not Hindrances?
Every state, good, bad and indeterminate, which is not
included in the foregoing [six] states, whether it relates to
the worlds of sense, of form, or of the formless, or to the
life that is Unincluded ; in other words, the four skandhas
;
all form also, and uncompounded element.
Which are the states that are
[1164] (a) favourable to the Hindrances P
felt by the non-robust conscience as to the letter of the
law ; on the other hand, there was loyalty to the Master's
decrees. Even the great Sariputta was not above such
scruples, when, on falling ill at a rest-house, he declined
to take food, in accordance with the 31st Pacittiya rule
(Vin. iv. 70). But Buddhaghosa quotes this as an instance
of praiseworthy scruple, to be distinguished, as *
Vinaya-
kukkuccam,' from the after-flush of burning anguish
(anutapo) accompanying the consciousness of having
done amiss, a feeling that is no longer possible for an
arahat. Asl. 384. Cf below, § 1304.
1 Things lawful (kappiyam) and unlawful are explained
as here referring merely to rules of routine in the Order,
e.g., to kinds of food, the dinner-hour, etc. By things
moral and immoral (avajjam, etc.) are meant acts of
virtue and of vice. Asl. 383.
2 See p. 117, n. 7.
^Nivaraniya, to be understood as analogous to
sannojanlya. Asl. 49.
Co-Intoxicant states, good, bad and indeterminate,
whether relating to the worlds of sense, form or the
formless ; in other words, the five skandhas.
[1165] (b) unfavourable to the Hindrances ?
The Paths that are the Unincluded and the Fruits of
the Paths, and uncompounded element.
Which are the states that are
[1166] {a) associated with the Hindrances ?
[1167] (h) disconnected with the Hindrances ?
Answers identical with those given to corresponding ques-
tions respecting the Intoxicants, §§ 1105, 1106.
Which are the states that are
[1168] {a) Hindrances themselves and favourable to the
Hindrances ?
The Hindrances themselves are both.
[1169] (6) favourable to the Hindrances, but not themselves
Hindrances ?
The states which are favourable to the Hindrances afore
named; that is to say, with the exception of the Hin-
drances, all co-Intoxicant states whatever, good, bad and
indeterminate, whether they relate to the worlds of sense,
form or the formless ; in other words, the five skandhas.
Which are the states that are
[1170] (a) both themselves Hhidrances and associated with
Hindrances ?
The following pairs are both themselves Hindrances and
associated with Hindrances : Sensual desire in conjunction
with ignorance, and conversely. Ill-will in conjunction
with ignorance, and conversely.
Stolidity and torpor,
Excitement,
Worry,
Perplexity,
taken successively, in conjunction with
ignorance, and conversely.
Sensual desire,
Ill-will,
Stolidity and torpor.
Excitement,
Worry,
Perplexity,
taken successively, in conjunction with
ignorance, and conversely.
[1171] {h) associated with Hindrances, hut not themselves
Hindrances ?
The states which are associated with the [six afore-
mentioned] states, the latter themselves being excepted ; in
other words, the four skandhas.
Which are the states that are
[1172] (a) disconnected with the Hindrances, hut favour-
able to them ?
The states which are disconnected with those [six] states
afore-named, that is to say, co-Intoxicant states, good, bad
and indeterminate, whether they relate to the worlds of
sense, form or the formless ; in other words, the five
skandhas.
[1173] (b) disconnected with the Hindrances and unfavour-
able to them ^
The Paths that are the Unincluded, and the Fruits of
the Paths, and uncompounded element.-^
1 Worry and perplexity are discarded in the First Path ;
sensual desire and ill-will in the Third Path; stolidity,
torpor and ignorance in the Fourth. Asl. 384. Insight
into the presence or absence of the (five) Hindrances is
termed, in A. i. 272, manosoceyyam.
Psychological Ethics,
FROM THE PALI
OF THE
DHAMMA-SANGANI
Translated by CAROLINE A. F. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A.
[Chapter IX.
The Group of the Hindrances (nivarana-goccha-
kam).]
[1162] Which are the states that are Hindrances?
The six Hindrances, to wit, the Hindrance of sensual
desire, the Hindrance of ill will, the Hindrance of stolidity
and torpor, the Hindrance of excitement and worry, the
Hindrance of perplexity, the Hindrance of ignorance.^
In this connexion
[1153] What is the Hindrance of sensual desire '^
Answer as for the '
Intoxicant of sensuality,' § 1097.^
[1154] What is the Hindrance of ill will?
Answer as for the '
Tie of ill will,' § 1137.
[1155] What is the Hindrance of stolidity and torpor?
First distinguish between stolidity and torpor.^
^ In the Sutta Pitaka, the Hindrances form a category of
five, ignorance (avijja) being excluded. See the descrip-
tion in D. i. 71-74, and cf D. i. 246 ; M. i. 60, 144, 181,
269, 294, etc. ; A. iii. 63 ; S. v. 60, 94-98. This dis-
crepancy is not noticed by Buddhaghosa. See also § 1112,
etc. The Hindrances are to be understood as states which
muffle, enwrap or trammel thought. States, again, which
are nivaraniya are to be understood analogously to those
which are sannojaniya. Asl. 49.
2 '
Sensual thirst ' is again omitted, as in the description
of the corresponding Fetter, § 1114.
^ It is interesting to note that whereas the text calls
thinam (stolidity) a morbid state of the cittam and
middham a morbid state of the kayo, Buddhaghosa, in
In this connexion,
[1156] What is stolidity ?
That which is indisposition/ unwieldiness^ of intellect ;
adhering and cohering ; clinging, cleaving to, stickiness
;
stolidity, that is, a stiffening, a rigidity of the intellect^
—
this is called stolidity.
[1157] What is torpor .?*
That which is indisposition and unwieldiness of sense,
a shrouding, enveloping,^ barricading within^ ; torpor that
his Cy. on the Digha Nikaya (Sum. 211), speaks of
thinam as citta-gelaiinam (sickness or affection of
the mind), and of middham as cetasikagelannam.
The apparent inconsistency, however, will vanish if the
predominantly psychological standpoint of the Dhamma
Sangani be kept in mind. By kayo, as Buddhaghosa
reminds us (Asl. 378 ; see above, p. 43, n. 3), is meant
'
the three skandhas ' of feeling, perception and syntheses,
that is to say, the three through which we have subjective
experience of bodily states objectively conceived. And
cetasiko is the adjective corresponding to kayo taken
in this sense (§ 1022). Hence stolidity is confined to the
vinnana-skandha, which = c it tarn = (approximately) re-
presentative intellection, while torpor is a corresponding
affection of mind on its presentative and emotional side.
^ Akalyata, equivalent to gilanabhavo, Asl. 377,
where Maha Vibhanga, i. 62, is quoted.
2 See § 47.
^ '
The (stolid) mind cannot be maintained in any required
attitude or deportment. It is as inert as a bat hanging
to a tree, or as molasses cleaving to a stick, or as a lump
of butter too stiff for spreading' (Asl., ^M.). 'Attached
to' (linam) is paraphrased by avippharikataya pati-
kutitam, lit., bent back without expansion, where the
notion, as conceived by the Commentator, has something
akin to katukaficukata or niggardliness. See § 1122, n^ 2.
* Middham, derived by the Cy. from medhati ( ^med,
*
be fat ') ; there is a cognate notion in our * torpor,' cf.
repireiv, to be sated, and V^^-^P-
5 Onaho, pariyonaho. See Mil. 300; D. i. 246. In
the latter work, the a is short. In the Cy. (Asl. 378) the
is sleep, drowsiness; sleep,^ slumbering, somnolence—this
is called torpor.
Now this is the stolidity and this is the torpor which are
called *
the Hindrance of stolidity and torpor. '^
[1159] What is the Hindrance of excitement and worry ?
First distinguish between *
excitement ' and *
worry.'
In this connexion,
[1160] What is excitement P
That excitement of mind which is disquietude, agitation
of heart, turmoil of mind—this is called excitement.
[1161] What is worry 9^
simile is 'enveloping the senses (kayo) as a cloud the
sky.' In Sum. i. 135 the latter of the two terms is applied
to '
covering ' a drum.
^ Anto-samorodho. The Cy. explains that, as men
cannot get out of an invested city, so dhamma, blockaded
by torpor, cannot get out by expansion or diffusion).
^ There is no comment on this repetition of soppam.
^ The Commentator in his general remarks on this
Hindrance is at pains to point out that for the khina-
savo, or arahat, a periodical torpor or repose has ceased
to engender bad karma. The Buddha allowed an after-
dinner nap, for instance, at certain seasons (see M. i. 249),
as not in itself conducive to a bemuddling of the mind.
So powerful, however, is the Hindrance to the non-adept,
that its influence is not rooted out till the arahat Path is
gained. The arahat is fain to rest his frail body (lit., his
fingernail-kayo), but to him it is as unmoroX an act as the
folding up of leaves and blossoms at night. On overcom-
ing torpor see A. iv. 86.
3 See § 429.
* In its primary meaning kukkuccam is fidgeting, bad
deportment of hands and feet. See Jat. i. 119 ; ii. 142
;
also Sum. i. 1, 2. Hence mental fidget, the worry of
scruple (lit., *
the little sharp stone in a man's shoe.'
See Skeat's English Dictionary), the over-sensitive, over-
scrupulous conscience. In the frequent cases of kukkuc-
cam, respecting the keeping of the rules of the Order,
given in the Vinaya
—
'tassa kukkuccam ahosi'—or
kukkuccayanto—no blame seems to have attached to
the person m question. There was weakness in the anxiety
Consciousness of what is lawful in something that is un-
lawful ; consciousness of what is unlawful in something that
is lawful ; consciousness of what is immoral in something
that is moral ; consciousness of what is moral in something
that is immoral^—all this sort of worry, fidgeting, over-
scrupulousness, remorse of conscience, mental scarifying^
—this is what is called Worry.
Now this is the excitement and this is the worry which
are what is called *
the Hindrance of excitement and
worry.'
[1162] What is the Hindrance of ignorance ?
Answer as for 'dulness,' § 1061.
[1163] Which are the states that are not Hindrances?
Every state, good, bad and indeterminate, which is not
included in the foregoing [six] states, whether it relates to
the worlds of sense, of form, or of the formless, or to the
life that is Unincluded ; in other words, the four skandhas
;
all form also, and uncompounded element.
Which are the states that are
[1164] (a) favourable to the Hindrances P
felt by the non-robust conscience as to the letter of the
law ; on the other hand, there was loyalty to the Master's
decrees. Even the great Sariputta was not above such
scruples, when, on falling ill at a rest-house, he declined
to take food, in accordance with the 31st Pacittiya rule
(Vin. iv. 70). But Buddhaghosa quotes this as an instance
of praiseworthy scruple, to be distinguished, as *
Vinaya-
kukkuccam,' from the after-flush of burning anguish
(anutapo) accompanying the consciousness of having
done amiss, a feeling that is no longer possible for an
arahat. Asl. 384. Cf below, § 1304.
1 Things lawful (kappiyam) and unlawful are explained
as here referring merely to rules of routine in the Order,
e.g., to kinds of food, the dinner-hour, etc. By things
moral and immoral (avajjam, etc.) are meant acts of
virtue and of vice. Asl. 383.
2 See p. 117, n. 7.
^Nivaraniya, to be understood as analogous to
sannojanlya. Asl. 49.
Co-Intoxicant states, good, bad and indeterminate,
whether relating to the worlds of sense, form or the
formless ; in other words, the five skandhas.
[1165] (b) unfavourable to the Hindrances ?
The Paths that are the Unincluded and the Fruits of
the Paths, and uncompounded element.
Which are the states that are
[1166] {a) associated with the Hindrances ?
[1167] (h) disconnected with the Hindrances ?
Answers identical with those given to corresponding ques-
tions respecting the Intoxicants, §§ 1105, 1106.
Which are the states that are
[1168] {a) Hindrances themselves and favourable to the
Hindrances ?
The Hindrances themselves are both.
[1169] (6) favourable to the Hindrances, but not themselves
Hindrances ?
The states which are favourable to the Hindrances afore
named; that is to say, with the exception of the Hin-
drances, all co-Intoxicant states whatever, good, bad and
indeterminate, whether they relate to the worlds of sense,
form or the formless ; in other words, the five skandhas.
Which are the states that are
[1170] (a) both themselves Hhidrances and associated with
Hindrances ?
The following pairs are both themselves Hindrances and
associated with Hindrances : Sensual desire in conjunction
with ignorance, and conversely. Ill-will in conjunction
with ignorance, and conversely.
Stolidity and torpor,
Excitement,
Worry,
Perplexity,
taken successively, in conjunction with
ignorance, and conversely.
Sensual desire,
Ill-will,
Stolidity and torpor.
Excitement,
Worry,
Perplexity,
taken successively, in conjunction with
ignorance, and conversely.
[1171] {h) associated with Hindrances, hut not themselves
Hindrances ?
The states which are associated with the [six afore-
mentioned] states, the latter themselves being excepted ; in
other words, the four skandhas.
Which are the states that are
[1172] (a) disconnected with the Hindrances, hut favour-
able to them ?
The states which are disconnected with those [six] states
afore-named, that is to say, co-Intoxicant states, good, bad
and indeterminate, whether they relate to the worlds of
sense, form or the formless ; in other words, the five
skandhas.
[1173] (b) disconnected with the Hindrances and unfavour-
able to them ^
The Paths that are the Unincluded, and the Fruits of
the Paths, and uncompounded element.-^
1 Worry and perplexity are discarded in the First Path ;
sensual desire and ill-will in the Third Path; stolidity,
torpor and ignorance in the Fourth. Asl. 384. Insight
into the presence or absence of the (five) Hindrances is
termed, in A. i. 272, manosoceyyam.
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