A BUDDHIST MANUAL
Psychological Ethics,
FROM THE PALI
OF THE
DHAMMA-SANGANI
Translated by CAROLINE A. F. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A.
[629] What is that form which is the sphere of taste ?
That taste which is derived from the four Great Phe-
nomena, is invisible and produces impact, such as the
taste of roots, stems, bark, leaves, flowers, fruits, of sour,
sweet,^ bitter,^ pungent,^ saline,^ alkaline,^ acrid,^ astring-
ent,^ nice and nauseous sapids,^ or whatever other taste
there is, derived from the four Great Phenomena, invisible
and producing impact — such tastes, invisible and pro-
ducing impact, as with the tongue, invisible and reacting,
one has tasted, tastes, will, or may taste . . .
[630] . . . against which taste, invisible and producing
impact, the tongue, invisible and impingeing, has impinged,
impinges, will, or may impinge . . .
[631] ... a taste which, invisible and producing impact,
has impinged, impinges, will, or may impinge on the
tongue, invisible and reacting ...
[632] ... in consequence of which taste and depending
•on the tongue, there has arisen, arises, will, or may arise
gustatory contact . . .
^ Buttermilk (takkambilam) is given as a typical
sour sapid, ghee from cow's milk (gosappi) as the type
of a sweet sapid. But, adds the Cy., sweet added to
astringent (kasavam) and kept standing will lose all its
sweetness, and so with raw sugar and alkaline substance.
Ghee, however, kept standing, while it loses colour and
smell, does not lose its taste. It therefore is the absolute
sweet (ekanta-madhuram) (Asl. 320).
^ E.g., as nimb-tree fruit {ibid.).
^ E.g., as ginger and pepper {ibid.).
* E.g., as sea-salt (ibid.).
^ E.g., as the egg-plant (vatinganakatiram), or as
green palm sprouts (cocoanut cabbage) (ibid.).
^ E.g., as the jujube, or the Feronia elejphantum, etc. (ibid.).
''
E.g., as the yellow myrobalan (haritakam). I am,
as before, indebted to Childers' Dictionary for all this
botanical knowledge.
^ Sadu asadu. See § 625, n. 1.
. . . and^ . . . born of that gustatory contact,
a feeling . . .
[or] a perception . . .
[or] thinking . . .
[or] gustatory cognition,
[further] having a taste as its object and depending on the
tongue, there has arisen, arises, will, or may arise
gustatory contact,
. . . and . . . born of that gustatory contact,
a feeling . . .
[o7'] a perception . . .
[or] thinking ...
[or] gustatory cognition
;
this that is taste, the sphere and constituent element of
taste—this is that form which is the sphere of taste.''^
[633] What is that form which is femininity (it thin
-
driyam) ?
That which is of the female, feminine in appearance,
feminine in characteristics, in occupation, in deportment,
feminine in condition and being—this is that form which
constitutes femininity.^
1 See § 624, n.
2 For the sphere of the tangible, see below, § 648.
^ Literally the in driyam—the faculty, potentiality of
the female. Under 'appearance,' which the Cy. (321)
rules to be here the import of lingam ( = santhanam,
cf. Mil. 133, 134), he indicates the physical proportions
in which the woman, generally speaking, differs from the
man—smaller hands, feet, and face, upper trunk less
broad, lower trunk broader. Characteristics (nimittam)
are that by which she is recognisable (sanj ananam), both
external bodily marks (no beard, e.g., nor tusks, which
would seem to include certain animals) and modes of
dressing. Under 'occupation' (kuttam = kiriya) there
is an allusion to girls' distinctive amusements—playing
with baskets, pestles [and mortars], and dolls (? literally,
little daughters, dhitalikaya kllanti), and spinning
thread with a mattikavakam, whatever that may be.
Under 'deportment,' the 'absence of breadth' (a visa-
[634] What is that form which is masculinity (purisin-
driyam)?
That which is of the male, masculine in appearance,
masculine in characteristics, in occupation, in deportment,
masculine in condition and being—this is that form which
constitutes masculinity.^
dam) in women's walking, standing, sitting, lying, and
eating is specified, all these being done more mincingly,
less assertively by women. If a man so deport himself, it
is said of him, '
He goes like a woman !' The *
condition
and being '
of the female, constituting her essential nature,
are '
born of karma, and take their source at conception.'
The other female characteristics are evolved by her '
poten-
tiality '
in the course of existence, just as the tree with all
its appurtenances is evolved in time from the seed. This
'
indriyam ' is discernible, not by the eye, but by the mind
(mano. It is an abstract idea). And it is not to the one
sex just what the faculties of sight and so forth are to the
other.
^ The priority of place given to the female is a form of
statement as characteristically Buddhist (not to say Indian)
as that of saying '
moon and sun.' Both no doubt have
their source very deep in the history, or prehistory, of
humanity. The Commentator gives the correlative oppo-
sites in describing male characteristics, down to the
'
swash-buckling and martial air,' which if a woman affect
she is said to '
go like a man.' Boys are said to occupy
themselves with their characteristic games of playing at
carriages and ploughs, and at making sand-banks round
puddles and calling them reservoirs.
He then remarks that these sexual distinctions have
been evolved during the course of life in primeval ages ;
since when, originating by way of conception and, some of
them, in the individual life, it happens that they get inter-
changed. He then quotes cases of hermaphroditism, said
to have occurred in the members of the Order.
He is mindful also, as we might expect, to appreciate
the sex to which he belongs, and makes a curious applica-
tion to it of the doctrine of karma. '
Of the two, the male
sex-marks are superior (uttamam), those of the female
inferior (hinam). Therefore the former disappear by
means of a very bad karma, while the latter are established
[635] What is that form which is vitality (jivitin-
driyam) ?
The persistence of these corporeal states, their sub-
sistence, their going on, their being kept going on, their
progress, continuance, preservation, life, life as faculty
—
this is that form which is vitality.^
[636] What is that form which is bodily intimation
(kaya vinnatti) ?
That tension, that intentness, that state of making the
body^ tense, in response to a thought, whether good, bad,
or indeterminate, on the part of one who advances, or
recedes, or fixes the gaze, or glances around, or retracts an
arm, or stretches it forth—the intimation, the making
known, the state of having made known—th^'s is that form
which constitutes bodily intimation.^
by a karma indifferently good. The latter, on the other hand,
disappear by means of a karma indifferently bad, while the
former are established by means of a very good karma.
*
Thus, both disappear by badness and are acquired by
goodness.'
Thus, our Commentator approximates more to Plato's
position than to that of the typical religious celibate, find-
ing woman not stronger to do evil, but rather the weaker in
heaping up either good or evil.
^ '
What there is to say, has been said already in con-
nexion with the faculty of vitality as related to incorporeal
(formless) states '
(Ask 323. See § 19).
'^
Kayo is said to =sariram; possibly to distinguish it
from kayo as used for *
body-sensibility,' or the tactile
sense (Asl. 324), or again from sense-experience generally
(p. 43, n. 3).
^ Kayavinfiatti is analyzed in a somewhat rambling
style by the Commentator. The gist of his remarks
amounts, I gather, to the following : In any communication
effected by bodily action—which includes communications
from animals to men, and vice versa—that which is made
known is one's condition (bhavo) at the time, one's self
(sayam), and one's intention (adhippayo); in other
words, the how, the who or what, and the what for. And
this is wrought by a bodily suffusion (vipphandanena).
He then classifies the kinds of thoughts which tend to
[637] What is that form which is intimation by language
(vacivinnatti)?
That speech, voice, enunciation, utterance, noise, making
noises, language as articulate speech, which expresses a
thought whether good, bad, or indeterminate—this is called
language. And that intimation, that making known, the
state of having made known by language—this is that form
which constitutes intimation by language.^
[638] What is that form which is the element of space
(akasa-dhatu)?
That which is space and belongs to space, is sky aijd
*
produce an intimation,' no others having this tendency.
They are
—
The eight good thoughts relating to the sensuous
universe (§§ 1-159), and
the thought concerning intuition (abhinila cittam).
The twelve bad thoughts (§§ 365-430).
The eight great kiriy a -thoughts,
the two limited kiriy a-thoughts,
the one kiriy a-thought relating to the universe of
form which has attained to intuition,
making eleven indeterminate thoughts.
Finally he refers us to his theory of 'Doors' (dvara-
katha). See my Introduction. (Asl. 323-4.)
^Vacivinnatti is dealt with verbatim as bodily in-
timation was, '
vocal noise '
being substituted for '
bodily
suffusion.' '
Making noises '
is to be understood as making
-a noise in a variety of ways. '
Articulate speech ' [lit.,
broken-up speech) is no mere jangle (bhango), but is
vocal utterance so divided as to serve for communication
(Asl. 325).
It is interesting to note in connexion with the problem
as to whether communication or registration of thought is
the historically prior function of language, that Buddha-
ghosa, for all his aptness to draw distinctions, does not
make any allusion here to intimation by language forming
only one of the functions of speech.
Still more curious, as being more germane to this
specific aspect of language, is it that he does not take into
account the oral communication of the registered ideas of
the race.
belongs to sky,^ is vacuum and belongs to vacuum, and is
not in contact'^ with the four Great Phenomena—this is
that form which is the element of space.
[639] What is that form which is lightness of form
(rupassalahuta) ?^
That lightness of form which is its capacity for changing
easily, its freedom from sluggishness and inertia—this is
that form which is lightness of form.
[640] What is that form which is plasticity of form ?
^ Buddhaghosa's etymology (Asl. 325) derives akaso
from '
unploughed'—what may not be ploughed, cut, or
broken—which recalls Homer's arpvyeTo<; aWrjp and arpu-
yeTT) ddXaaaa as well as the aKapirLo-ra Trehia of Euripides
(Asl. 326). 'Sky' he connects with striking—agham,
a-ghattaniyam—what is not strikable.
Akaso, he continues, is that which delimitates, or sets
bounds to forms, environing them and making them mani-
fest. Through it, in forms thus bounded, we get the
notions—hence above, hence below, hence across.
^ Asamphuttham catuhi mahabhiitehi. Although
space is in this work treated of apart from the four
elements, and does not, as a rule, count as a fifth element,
in the Pitakas, yet, in the Maha Eilhulovada Sutta (M. i.
423), when Gotama is discoursing to his son of the distri-
bution of the elements in the composition of the human
body, he co-ordinates akasadhatu with the four other
dhatus, to all appearance as though it should rank as a
fifth element. In the older Upanishads it is usually co-
ordinated with the four elements, though not, as such, in
a closed list. In the Taittiriya Up., however, it appears
as the one immediate derivative from the Atman ; wind, fire,
water, earth, plants, etc., proceeding, the first from aka^a^
the rest, taken in order, from each other.
The word asamphuttham is paraphrased by nijjata-
kam (or nissatam), and may mean that space does not
commingle with the four elements as they with each other.
'
Belongs to ' is, in the Pali, -gat am.
^ Cf, above, §§ 42-47, with this and the two following
answers. Supremely well-dressed hide is given as an
illustration of the plasticity of matter (Asl. 326).
That plasticity of form which is its softness, smoothness,
non-rigidity—this is that form which is plasticity of form.
[641] What is that form which is wieldiness of form ?
That wieldiness of form which is its serviceableness, its
workable condition—this is that form which is wieldiness
of form.^
[642] What is that form which is the integration (u p a-
c a y o) of form ?
That which is accumulation of form is the integration of
form^—this is that form which is the integration of form.
[643] What is that form which is the subsistence of
form (riipassa santati)?
That which is integration of form is the subsistence of
form. This is that form which is the subsistence of form.
[644] What is that form which is the decay of form
(rupassa jarata)?
That decay of form which is ageing, decrepitude, hoari-
ness, wrinkles, the shrinkage in length of days, the hyper-
maturity of faculties—this is that form which is the decay
of form.^
^ Gold which is suddhanta (? sudhanta, well-blown)
is given as typically '
wieldy '
material (ihicL).
^ Buddhaghosa evidently reads so rupassa upacayo
here (for yo), and in the next section sa rupassa (for ya)
(Asl. 827). This is only adopted by the text in §§ 732,
733. K. reads so and sa.
This and the following section formularize the cominj:^
into being of things. Integration is paraphrased (Asl. 327)
as the cumulative effect of the spheres (ayatananam
acayo) as they are reproduced over and over again. The
import of the term is v add hi, fulness of growth. Acayo,
or nibbatti, is to upacayo or vaddhi as the welling
up of water in a reservoir by a river's bank is to the
brimming over of the water, while santati or pavatti
(subsistence or persistence) is as the overflow and running
of the water. All are expressions for the phenomenon of
birth and growth (jatirupassa).
^ This is a stock formula, and occurs at M. i. 49 ; S. ii. 2,
and 42. The Cy. points out (Asl. 328) that the three terms,
[645] What is that form which is the impermanence of
form (rupassa aniccata)?
The destruction, disease, breaking-up, dissolution of
form, the impermanence which is decline—this is that
form which is the impermanence of form.^
[646] What is that form which is bodily (solid) nutriment
(kabalinkaro aharo)?^
Boiled rice, sour gruel, flour, fish, flesh, milk, curds,
butter, cheese, tila-oil, cane-syrup, or whatever else^ there
is in whatever region that by living beings may be eaten,
chewed, swallowed, digested into the juice* by which living
* decrepitude,' etc., show the phenomena that must take
place in the lapse of time ; the last two show the inference
that is to be drawn from them. For just as a flood or a
forest fire can be traced by the appearance of the grass and
trees in its track, so can we infer respecting our life and
faculties by the appearance of teeth, hair and skin.
^ This and the preceding section formularize the waning
and passing away of things. Birth-and-growth, decay and
death are by the Commentator likened to three enemies of
mankind, the first of whom leads him astray into a pit, the
second of whom throws him down, the third of whom cuts
off his head (Asl. 329).
2 Literally, morsel - made food. *
Bodily '
(or solid)
suffices to distinguish it from the three immaterial nutri-
ments. See p. 30.
^ Under these come roots and fruits. Asl. 330.
* On this section, where '
form ' is considered under
the aspect of sustaining growth, etc., the Commentator
gives a brief dissertation where an adumbration of physio-
logical truth is humorously illustrated. Whereas, he says
(Asl. 330-332), food is here first set out in terms of its
embodiment, in o j a we have the evolved essence of it. Now
whereas the former removes risk, the latter is a preserva-
tive. And the risk is this, that when no food is taken, the
karma-born heat within feeds on the walls of the belly,
making the owner cry out, *
I am hungry ;
give me some-
thing to eat !'
and only setting his intestines free when it
can get external food. The internal heat is likened to a
shadow-demon who, having got the entry into a man's
shadow, bites his head when hungry so that he cries out.
beings are kept alive—this is that form which is bodily
nutriment.
[All] this is form which is derived.
[End of] the Section on Derivatives. First Portion for
Eecitation in the Division on Form.
[' There is form which is not derived '
(no upada)].
[647] What is that form which is not derived ?i
The sphere of the tangible, the fluid element—this is
that form which is not derived.
[648] What is that form which is the sphere of the
tangible (photthabbayatanam)?
The earthy (solid) element, the lambent (calorific)
element, the gaseous (aerial) element'^ ; the hard and the
When other men come to help, the demon, quitting his
hold, preys on them.
In the case of coarse food, e.^., kudrusa grain, oja is
said to be weak and sustains but a short time, while if a
man drink ghee and the like he wants no other meal the
whole day. Living beings are then classified in an order
of increasing fineness in the food they live on, beginning
with crocodiles, who, they say, swallow pebbles, continuing
with peacocks, hyenas, and elephants, later with other
birds, then with borderers, town-dwellers, kings, and
ending with the Yama and Paranimmitavasavatti gods,
who enjoy food of supreme delicacy.
^ *
Just as derived form is derived in such and such a
way and in no other, so, to say it is not derived, is equi-
valent to saying it is not derivable.' Asl. 333.
Possibly the form of negative here employed (no up a da)
is a technical mark of the relatively unethical nature
of this aspect of r up am. An up a da, on the other hand,
is used with a philosophical import. Cf. D. i. 17 with
M. i. 148—anupada vimutto and anupada parinib-
banattham. See also below, §§ 1210 and 1213.
^ In keeping with the general psychological standpoint
of the present work, the things which are not derived jrom
(have no foothold or support in) other things are considered
soft ; the smooth and the rough ; pleasant (easeful) con-
tact, painful contact ; the heavy and the light^—such a
tangible, invisible and producing impact,^ as, with the
under the aspect of sense-percepts. They are tangibles or
intangibles. Element (dhatu) is now substituted for the
collective term used above, namely, great phenomena or
beings (mahabhutani, § 584 et seq. Both terms occur
together in A. i. 222. The latter term may be used to
denote great or wondrous derivatives of the four elements,
great either physically or ethically, as when (Vin. ii. 240)
the ocean and its '
great creatures ' serve to illustrate the
Dhamma and those wondrous phenomena, the human
beings who by way of it are seeking or have attained Nir-
vana. Dhatu, on the other hand, as the Cy. with un-
flagging '
mindfulness ' once more points out, indicates
absence of substratum or soul. Asl. 332.
On the essential characters of the four elements, see
below, §§ 962-965, also the following note.
^ The first two and last of these four pairs are so many
aspects or modes of the earth-element (Asl. 332), and are
paraphrased respectively as rigid and non-rigid, polished
and jagged (saw-like), weighty and non-weighty. These
correspond almost exactly to our modern view of the modes
of resistance, ^.6^, of active touch, or of skin-sensibility with
a co-efficient of muscular sense. The Buddhist view lacks,
as all but recent psychology has lacked, insight into the
presence of the muscular factor ; on the other hand, it is
logically more symmetrical in giving *
lightness ' where
Dr. Bain, e.g., gives 'pressure'—another positive.
Pleasant contact is defined as a tangible which is desired
on account of pleasant feeling; the opposite, in the case of
painful contact. Each of the three elements furnishes
instances of either : In connexion with solidity there is the
pleasant contact felt when a soft-palmed attendant is doing
massage to one's feet, and the opposite when his hands are
hard. Erom '
caloric,' or the flame-element, we may get
the pleasure of a warming-pan in winter, or the reverse, if
it is applied in summer. From the aerial element, we may
get the pleasure of fanning in summer, or the discomfort
of it in winter. Asl. 332, 333.
'
The Cy. here discusses a point of attention in sense-
perception which is interesting as adumbrating modern
body-sensibility, invisible and reacting, one has touched,
touches, will, or may touch . . .
[649] . . . against which tangible, invisible, and pro-
ducing impact, the body-sensibility, invisible and reacting,
has impinged, impinges, will, or may impinge . . .
[650] . . . such a tangible, invisible and producing
impact, as has impinged, impinges, will, or may impinge
against the body-sensibility, invisible and reacting . . .
European theories respecting consciousness and subcon-
sciousness (Asl. 333). In a concrete object of sense, the
three modes of the tangible, i.e,, the three elements (solid,
hot, airy), may all of them be present. Now do they all
come *
at one stroke ' into the field of consciousness
(apatham)? They do. Thus come, do they impinge on
the body- sense ? They do. When it has thus made them
a (mental) object, does cognition of body arise at one blow?
It does not. Why? Thus: Mental objects are made
either by deliberate sensing or by intrusion. (The latter
term—ussado—is more literally extrusion, or prominence,
but either word shows that involuntary, as contrasted with
voluntary attention is meant.) Now when one is de-
liberately testing the hardness or softness of a ball of boiled
rice by pressure, heat and vapour are present, but it is the
solid to which one gives attention. If hot water be tested
by the hand, though there is solid and vaporous (matter),
it is heat that occupies the attention. If one lets the
breeze blow on the body at the window in hot weather,
solid and heat are present, but it is the aerial element that
is attended to. Or take involuntary impressions : If you
stumble, or knock your head against, a tree, or bite on a
pebble, heat and wind are present, but the intrusive object
is solid matter. So analogously for walking on something
hot, or being deafened by a hurricane. The three elements
are not apprehended as such at the same instant. And
with regard to the extended surface of the body-sentience,
cognition of body arises only in that spot where the
sentient surface is impinged upon, e.g., when a shoulder-
wound is bathed (? dressed ; cf. Vin. ii. 115 and Transl.)
with a quill, the kaya-pasado of the shoulder is impinged
upon, or intensified, and there cognition arises. And where
the pasado is most powerfully impressed, there cognition
arises first.
[651] ... in consequence of which tangible and depend-
ing on the body-sensibility, there has arisen, arises, will,
or may arise
bodily contact . . .
and . . . born of that bodily contact,
a feeling ...
[or] a perception . . .
[or] thinking . . .
[or] cognition of body . . .
[further,] having a tangible as its object and depending on
the body(-sensibility), there has arisen, arises, will, or
may arise
bodily contact . . .
and . . . born of that bodily contact,
a feeling . . .
[or] a perception ...
[or] thinking . . .
[or] cognition of body ;
this that is the tangible, the sphere and element of the
tangible—this is that form which is the sphere of the
tangible.^
[652] What is that form which is the fluid (aqueous)
element (apodhatu)?
That which is fluid and belongs to fluid, that which is
^ Buddhaghosa goes on, with reference to the senses
generally, to give a psychological account of the passing
from one group of sensations or '
object of thought ' to
another in terms not far removed from what would now be
used to describe the '
movement of attention '
(Asl. 334).
We pass from one object to another (a) from deliberate
inclination, or (h) from a sensation of preponderating im-
pressiveness (ajjhasayato va visayadhimattato va).
E.g., (a) from saluting a shrine, a believer forms the in-
tention of entering to do homage to a statue and contem-
plate the carvings and paintings, (b) While contemplating
some vast tope, a man is struck by the sound of music, and
is then affected by flowers and incense brought near.
viscid^ and belongs to viscous, the cohesiveness of form^
—this is that form which is the fluid element.
[All] this is that form which is not derived.
[653] What is that form^ which is the issue of grasping
(upadinnam) ?*
^ Literally, oil (sneho). Cf. the description with that
of akasadhatu, § 638.
^ This is the aspect of the moist or liquid element in
an object compact of several elements. The one essential
'mark' of apo-dhatu is paggharanam, flowing. See
§ 963. But '
cohesiveness of form means the cohering
condition of some concrete in which there is superfluity of
solid' (Asl. 335). For it is' by the cohesive force of the
fluid element that lumps of iron or what not are made
rigid. Similarly in the case of stones, mountains, palms,
tusks, horns, etc.
Hence Buddhaghosa passes on to discuss the mutually
related spheres of the elements and their apparent approxi-
mations to each other, as in viscous things, e.g., or con-
gealed liquid, or boiling water. Corrupt MSS., however,
render parts of the disquisition hard to follow. His con-
clusion is that whereas the elements may vary in their
condition as phenomena, their essential mark never alters,
however latent it may be. And he quotes a yet unedited
sutta (Atthanaparikappa sutta), but which is repeated
in A. i. 222, that it is easier for the four elements to change
their essential character, than for the seeker of Nirvana
(the Noble Student) to alter his high estate (Asl. 336).
^ Here follow the remaining pairs of correlated terms,
making up the categories of form under the Dual Aspect.
* Literally, '
which has been grasped at ' or '
laid hold
of.' This and the cognate terms are discussed under the
'
Group on Grasping,' § 1213 et seq. It is disappointing to
find that, with the exception of two items in the list of
things '
grasped at,' or come into being through the action
of karma (the two phrases are approximately equivalent),
the Cy. does not discuss the inclusion of any. One would
have liked to hear, e.g., why, of all sense-objects, sounds
alone are *
not the issue of grasping ' {cf. the heresy con-
cerning sound as result [of karma, K. V. 466], and why the
elements of space and of fluidity may and may not be the
The spheres of sight, hearing, smell, taste, body-sensi-
bility, femininity, masculinity, vitality, or whatever form
there exists through karma having been wrought, whether
it be in the spheres of visible forms, odours, tastes, or the
tangible ; the element of space, the fluid element, the in-
tegration or the subsistence of form,^ or bodily nutriment
—
this is that form which is the issue of grasping.
[654] What is that form which is not the issue of
grasping ?
The sphere of sound, bodily and vocal intimation, light-
ness, plasticity and wieldiness of form, decay and imper-
manence of form, or whatever other form exists which is
not due to karma having been wrought, whether it be in
the sphere of visible forms, smells, tastes, or the tangible
;
the element of space or that of fluidity ; the integration or
the subsistence of form, or bodily nutriment—this is that
form which is not the issue of grasping.
[655] What is that form which is both the issue of
grasping and favourable to grasping (upadinn'upada-
niyam) ?
The spheres of the five senses, femininity, masculinity
and vitality, or whatever other form exists through karma
having been wrought, whether it be in the spheres of
issue of grasping, or what they have to do with it in any
way.
Concerning the two items above mentioned, how is it,
asks the Cy. (337), Hhat " decay and impermanence " are
classed with respect to what is due, and what is not due
to the performance of karma ? They are classed with
what is not the issue of grasping. That which has sprung
from conditions other than karma is included under " not
due to the performance of karma. . .
." And as these two
forms arise neither from karma, nor from form-producing
conditions other than karma, they are therefore not classi-
fied with reference to karma. How they are acquired will
become evident later.'
^ For rupasantati read rupassa santati.
visible forms, odours, tastes or the tangible, in the elements
of space or fluidity, in the integration or the subsistence of
form or in bodily nutriment—this is that form which is both
the issue of grasping and favourable to grasping.
[656] What is that form which is not the issue of grasp-
ing, but is favourable to grasping (anupadinn' upada-
niyam) ?^
The sphere of sounds, bodily and vocal intimation, the
lightness, plasticity, wieldiness, decay and impermanence
of form, or whatever other form exists which is not due to
karma having been wrought, whether it be in the sphere
of visible forms,^ smells, tastes, the tangible, in the element
of space or of fluidity, in the integration, or the subsis-
tence of form, or in bodily nutriment—this is that form
which is not the issue of grasping but is favourable to
grasping.
[657] What is that form which is visible ?
The sphere of visible forms—this is that form which is
visible.
[658] What is that form which is invisible ?
The sphere of vision . . . and bodily nutriment—this is
that form which is invisible.^
^ The privative prefixed to the first half of this dvandva-
compound does not apply to the latter half. All form is
upadaniyam—see § 595 and t/. Dh. S. § 1538. Hence to
get, as we do, a positive answer would, if upadaniyam were
to be taken negatively, be a very patent infringement of the
law of contradiction. The distributed negative is given by
anupadinnanupiidaniyani as in § 992.
^ I have elided saddayatanam, and, on the next line,
inserted apodhatu, as consistent with § 654. C/. §§ 747,
750, and K.
^ The answer in § 658 recurs with its elided passage
very often, but it is not easy to point out the foregoing
answer of which it is an abbreviation. For §§ 653, 655
include *
visible form,' 'which is absurd.' And they do
not include '
sound,' which is invisible. I suggest that
[659] What is that form which reacts and impinges^
(sappatigham) ?
The spheres of vision, hearing, smell, taste, body-sensi-
bility ; the spheres of visible forms, sounds, smells, tastes,
tangibles—this is that form which reacts and impinges.
[660] What is that form which does not react or
impinge ?
Femininity . . . and bodily nutriment—this is that form
which does not react or impinge.
[661] What is that form which is faculty (indriyam) ?
The faculties (or personal potentialities)^ of vision, hear-
ing, smell, taste, body-sensibility, femininity, masculinity,
vitality—this is that form which is faculty.
[662] What is that form which is not faculty ?
The spheres of visible form . . . and bodily nutriment
—
this is that form which is not faculty.^
§ 596 is referred to, with the implication that *
the sphere
of visible form ' must be omitted. All the other terms in
§ 596, if understood as strictly abstract sensibility or sen-
sation, or as abstract ideas, are inaccessible to sight. Even
in kabalinkaro aharo, it is only the vatthu, or em-
bodiment of the concept of nutriment, that is visible. And
similarly, whereas one's bodily gestures are visible, the
* intimation '
given is a matter of inference, a mental con-
struction.
^ Both terms have been applied in the detailed theory of
sense given in § 597 et seq.
^ Keeping to § 596 as the norm for these abbreviated
replies, we may assume that these two (§§ 659 and 660)
divide out that answer between them. Impact and reac-
tion, as here understood, belong exclusively to the sphere
of sensation. The term patigho has an emotional and
moral significance elsewhere in this work, and means re-
pulsion, repugnance. See § 1060.
^ § 596 would seem to be divided also and differently by
the indriyam sections. What is na indriyarn, not
having hvva^i^, are thus the five kinds of sense-objects,
intimation, space, the three modes of form, and the course
[663] What is that form which is Great Phenomenon
(mahabhutam)?
The sphere of the tangible and the element of fluidity
—
this is that form which is Great Phenomenon.
[664] What is that form which is not Great Pheno-
menon ?
The sphere of vision . . . and bodily nutriment—this is
that form which is not Great Phenomenon.^
[665] What is that form which is intimation (vinnatti)?
Bodily and vocal intimation ^—this is that form which is
intimation.
[666] What is that form which is not intimation ?
The sphere of vision . . . and bodily nutriment—this is
that form which is not intimation.
[667] What is that form which is sprung from thought
(citta-samutthanam)^ ?
of the evolving rebirth of form as represented in abstract
idea.
^ This pair of relatives coincides with the first pair of
attributes taken inversely: forms underived and derived
(pp. 172-97).
^ See above, §§ 636, 637. The abbreviated answer con-
cerning the other relative will presumably be the entire
list given in § 596, with the exception of the two modes of
intimation.
3 Cf. below, §§ 1195, 1196, and above, § 636, note.
Here, after being silent over the last ten questions, the
Cy. resumes its parable (p. 337), without, however, throw-
ing much light on these to us obscure distinctions. This
and the next two pairs of questions and answers refer to
form of some kind as brought into relation with an intelli-
gent agent. And the purest instance of this is those groups
of phenomena which are brought into play when the agent
is expressing himself. The expression or intimation itself,
it says, does not spring directly from thought, but it is said
nevertheless to have its source in thought because those
phenomena (of gesture and speech) on which the intima-
Bodily and vocal intimation, or whatever other form
exists that is born of thought, caused by thought, has its
source in thought, whether it be in the sphere of visible
forms, sounds, odours, tastes or tangibles, in the spatial,
or the fluid element, in the lightness, plasticity, wieldiness,
integration or subsistence of form, or in bodily nutriment
—
this is that form which is sprung from thought.
[668] What is that form which is not sprung from
thought ?
The sphere of the five senses, femininity, masculinity
and vitality, the decay and the impermanence of form, or
whatever other form exists that is not born of thought,
not caused by thought, does not have its source in thought,
whether it be in the sphere of visible forms, sounds, odours,
tastes, or tangibles, in the spatial or fluid element, in the
lightness, plasticity, wieldiness, integration or subsistence
of form, or in bodily nutriment—this is that form which is
not sprung from thought.
[669] What is that form which comes into being together
with thought (citta-saha-bhu)?
[670] What is that form which does not come into being;
together with thought ?
Answers as in the preceding pair of relatives.
[671] What is that form which is consecutive to
thought (cittanuparivatti)?
[672] What is that form which is not consecutive to
thought ?
Answers as in the preceding pair of relatives.
tion depends are immediately prompted by thought, just as
we say that old age and death '
are '
impermanence (in
virtue of their forming part of the content of that idea).
While there is thought, there is also expression of thought.
But the concomitance stated in § 669 is not to be under-
stood like that arising between thought and feeling and
other mental processes. He is probably referring to the
mental complex indicated above in § 1 and the like.
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