A BUDDHIST MANUAL
Psychological Ethics,
FROM THE PALI
OF THE
DHAMMA-SANGANI
Translated by CAROLINE A. F. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A.
[BOOK II.
Form (rupakandam).
Introductory.]
[583] Which are the states that are indeterminate ?^
The results of good and bad states taking effect in the
universe of sense, in that of form, in that of the formless
or in [the life] which is Unincluded,^ and as connected with
the skandhas of feeling, perception, syntheses, and intellect f
as well as those states known as kiriya which are neither
good, nor bad, nor the result of karma ; all form, moreover ;
^ The subject of the Ethically Indeterminate has not
been exhausted by the inquiry into Vipako and Kiriya.
It includes two other species : Form (or External Phe-
nomena) and Nirvana (Uncompounded Element). (Asl.
296.) Hence it is that the following inquiry into '
Form '
as objective and subjective phenomenon is led up to by a
question connecting it with the foregoing inquiry into the
genesis of '
thought,' which is presented from the point of
view of a-rupino dhamma, or formless (incorporeal)
states of consciousness.
^ Apariyapanna. This term, which is often employed
in Book III, and which is intended to convey a sense of
the '
apartness ' of the pursuit of the Highest from all
lower aims, is dealt with below (§ 992).
^ I follow, here as often elsewhere, the punctuation of K.
In this identical answer later on, however, K. is self-incon-
sistent, placing a colon before, and a comma after, the
enumeration of the skandhas. See § 983. One or the other
is probably an inadvertency.
and [finally] Uncompounded Element^—these are states
that are indeterminate.
[684] In this connexion what is '
all form '
(s a b b a m
rupam) ?
The four great phenomena ^ and that form which is
derived from the four great phenomena—this is what is
called '
all form.'^
[584-594] Here follows the Mdtikd, or table of contents of
the following analysis of Form, considered under quantitative
categories—the usual Buddhist method. That is to say,
Form is considered, first, under a number of single, uncorre-
lated qualities, then under dichotomized qualities, then under
^ Asankhata ca dhatu. This term, which both
Buddhaghosa and the original Atthakatha (see § 1,376 in
printed text of Dh. S.) identify with Nirvana, occurs often
in this connexion with its opposite '
all form '
{v. p. 168, n. 3)
in Book III. I do not know whether this, so to speak, cos-
mological conception of the Ethical Ideal occurs in the older
books of the Pitakas, or whether, indeed, the commentators
have not laid upon the physical term more than it was
intended to bear—a connotation that derives perhaps from
the *
scholastic ' ages of Buddhism. For example, in
§§ 1016-1018 of the present work, to identify uncompounded
element with Nirvana, just after it has been opposed to the
*
topmost fruit of arahatship,' would apparently land the
compilers in a grave inconsistency. I have yet to meet with
a passage in the first two Pitakas which establishes the
identification. In the Milinda-panho, giving the traditional
doctrine of an age half-way between Pitakas and Com-
mentaries, we can see the theory of Nirvana as the one
asankhatam developing. See pp. 268 seq. Cf also K. V.
317-30.
2 Mahabhutani, that is, the four elements, literally, the
things-that-have-become, die grossen Geivordenen, ra ycyvo-
fieva—a far more scientific term than elements or oroixeca.
See further below, §§ 597, 647 et seq.
^ The various implications of the term rupam, such
as objective phenomena, concrete or compound, the object
of the sense of sight, material existence without sensuous
appetite, etc., are discussed in my Introduction (ii.).
qualities which, taken singlyy give inclusion, inclusion under
the opposite, or exclusion from both ; or which, taken in pairs,
aford three combinations. We then get pairs of qualities
taken together, affording four combinations. After that comes
consideration of Form under 7nore inductive classifications,
e.g., the four elements and, fifthly, their derivatives, and so on,
as given below.
[Chapter I.
Exposition of Form under Single Concepts (ekaka-
niddeso).]
[595] All form is that which is
not a cause,
not the concomitant of a cause,
disconnected with cause,^
conditioned,^
compound,^
endowed with form,*
mundane,^
co-Intoxicant,^
^ Na hetum eva. On the Commentator's analysis of
the meanings of '
cause,' see under § 1053. The special
connotation here is that ' form '
as such is not the ground
or *
root,' or psychical associate of any moral or immoral
result. Asl. 303. The two following terms are dealt with
under §§ 1074, 1076.
^ Sappaccayam. Cf. § 1083.
^ Sankhatam. This quality is involved in the pre-
ceding quality. See § 1085. See also above, p. 166, n. 1.
* Eupiyam, or rupam eva. The table of contents
(§ 584) gives the former ; K. has here the latter. Either
the one or the other has been omitted from the present
section of the printed text. The Cy. gives the latter term
—Eupam eva ti rupino dhamma, etc. Asl. 304.
^ Lokiyam; the antithesis of lokuttaram. Cf.
§ 1093.
^ Sasavam. See § 1096 et seq.
favourable to
the Fetters,^
the Ties,
the Floods,
the Bonds,
the Hindrances ;
infected,^
favourable to grasping,^
belonging to corruption,*
indeterminate,
void of idea,^
neither feeling, nor perception, nor synthesis,*
disconnected with thought,
neither moral result, nor productive of moral
result,^
uncorrupted yet belonging to corruption,^
not that ' where conception works and thought
discursive,^
not that * wherein is no working of conception,
but only of thought discursive,'
void of 'the working of conception and of
thought discursive,'
^ Saiinojaniyam, etc. This and the four following
terms are severally discussed in connexion with the ethical
metaphors of Fetters and the rest. See § 1113 et seq.
- Paramattham. See § 1174: et seq.
^ Upadaniyam. See § 990 and § 1213 et seq.
* Sankilesikam. See § 993 and § 1229 et seq.
^ Anarammanam, the idea or mental object belonging,
of course, to the arupa-dhammo.
6 Acetasikam. See § 1022.
7 See § 989.
8 See § 994.
^ Na savitakka-savicaram. This and the two
following technical terms mark off '
form '
from the mental
discipline of Jhana, even though Jhana may be practised
for the sake of passing from a sensuous existence to the
'
universe of Form.' Cf. §§ 160, 168, 161, and 996-998.
not * accompanied by joy,'
not * accompanied by ease,'
not *
accompanied by disinterestedness,'^
not something capable of being got rid of
either by insight or by cultivation,
not that the cause of which may be got rid of
either by insight or by cultivation,
neither tending to, nor away from, the
accumulation involving re-birth,
belonging neither to studentship nor to that
which is beyond studentship,
limited,^
related to the universe of sense,
not related to the universe of form,^
nor to that of the formless,
included,
not of the Unincluded,*
not something entailing inevitable retri-
bution,^
unavailing for (ethical) guidance,
cognizable when apparent^ by the six modes
of cognition.
'
Cf. §§ 999-1001. These are all mental states,
characterizing the other four skandhas, not the rirpak-
khandho. Similarly, the four following doctrinal ex-
pressions are only applicable to mental and moral
categories. Cf. §§ 1007-1118.
2 Parittam. See § 1019.
. * Eead na riipavacaram.
* See p. 165, n. 2.
*
^ This and the following term belong to ethical, im-
material categories of thought. See §§ 1028-1030 and
1291 ; also 1288, 1289, and 277.
* I.e., remarks the Commentator, when it is present (in
consciousness). *
For, strictly speaking, with reference to
visual and other sense-cognition, they {read na hi tani)
do not cognize the past and future ; that is the function of
representative cognition (manovinfianam) ' (Asl. 304).
impermanent/
subject to decay.
Such is the category of Form considered by way of single
attributes.^
^ An ice am, '
inasmuch as, having fallen into this stream
of sense-cognition it (' form ') has become mere flotsam, has
become something gone, something that is not ' (ibid.). This
shows well the idealist or psychological standpoint of the
Buddhist tradition. Form is impermanent for the individual
perceptive consciousness.
- The Cy. gives as the reason for there being no cate-
chism on each of the foregoing attributes the fact that there
is no correlated opposite, as in the next category, from which
each term is to be differentiated (Asl. 303). This, in view
of the procedure in Book I., is scarcely adequate. However,
every term is examined in the sequel, as the foregoing notes
will have indicated.
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