A BUDDHIST MANUAL
Psychological Ethics,
FROM THE PALI
OF THE
DHAMMA-SANGANI
Translated by CAROLINE A. F. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A.
[BOOK I.
THE GENESIS OF THOUGHTS
(Cittuppada-kandam).
I
PART I.—GOOD STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS,
Chapter I.
The Eight Main Types of Thought relating to the
Sensuous Universe (Kamavacara-attha-mahacit-
tani).p
I.
[1] Which are the states that are good 9^
When a good thought concerning the sensuous uni-
verse^ has arisen, which is accompanied by happiness and
associated with knowledge/ and has as its object a
^ The brackets enclosing this and all other headings
indicate that the latter have been transposed from the
position they occupy in the text. There each heading
stands at the end of its section.
^
See Introduction. ^ Ibid.
* Nana-sampayuttani. According to the Cy., a good
thought deserves to be thus distinguished on three grounds
:
from the karma it produces, from the maturity of the
faculties it involves, and from the remoteness of mental
and moral infirmity which it implies (Asl. 76). Sam-
payuttam—lit., con -yoked—is, in the Kathavatthu,
quoted by the Cy. (p. 42), described as including the
following relations (between one '
state ' and another)
:
concomitant (sahagata), connate (sahajata), contiguous
sight, a sound, a smell, a taste, a touch,- a [mental] state,^
or what not,* then there is
(i) contact (§ 2),
(ii) feeling (§ 3),
(sarnsattha), having a common origin (ekuppada), a
common cessation (ekanirodha), a common basis or
embodiment (ekavatthuka),a common object of attention
(ekarammana). In the present work the term is sub-
sequently rendered by 'connected,' e.g., in § 1007, etc. The
preceding adjectival phrase, somanassa-sahagatam,
which I have rendered *
accompanied by happiness,' is
virtually declared by the Cy. to be here equivalent to
somanassa-sampayuttam, inasmuch as it is to be
interpreted in its fullest intension. Of its five distinguish-
able shades of meaning, the one here selected is that of
'conjoined' (samsattham). And of the four distinguish-
able connotations of 'conjoined,' the one here selected is
that of 'connate.' Hence 'accompanied by' means here
'connate.' And further, inasmuch as the concomitance is
not between two corporeal phenomena, or between a
corporeal and an incorporeal phenomenon, it is of that
persistent and thoroughgoing kind—persisting beyond the
common origin—which is described under the word
*
associated.'
Thus far the intricate Buddhaghosa. But I have yet to
discover any attempt to analyze the laws governing the
process of association between mental states, such as we
first find in Aristotle.
On '
happiness,' see §§ 10, 18.
^ Ruparammanam, saddarammanarn, etc., i.e,,
either as a present sensation or as a representative image
relating to the past or future ; in the language of Hume,
as an impression or as an idea ; in the more comprehensive
German term, as Vorstellung (Asl. 71). See Introduc-
tion.
^ Literally, an object that is tangible—the standard
Pali term.
^ Dhammarammanam—the 'object,' that is, of re-
presentative imagination or ideation (ma no, cittam,
Asl., 71), just as a thing seen is the object of sight.
Buddhaghosa rejects the opinion that a dhammaram-
manam is something outside the range of the senses, and
cites M. i. 295, where Sariputta declares that, whereas
(iii) perception (§4),
(iv) thinking (§ 5),
(V) thought (§ 6),
(vi) conception (§ 7),
(vii) discursive thought (§8),
(viii) joy (§ 9),
(ix) ease (§ 10),
(x) self-collectedness (§11),
(xi) the faculty of faith (§ 12),
(xii) the faculty of energy (§ 13),
(xiii) the faculty of mindfulness (§ 14),
(xiv) the faculty of concentration (§ 15),
(xv) the faculty of wisdom (^ 16),
each sense has its specific field, the mano has all these
five fields as its scope. At the moment when an object
enters '
the door of the eye ' or other sense, it enters also
the door of the ideating faculty causing the consciousness,
or one's being, to vibrate (bhavangacalanassa paccayo
hoti), just as the alighting bird, at the same moment,
strikes the bough and casts a shadow {ibid. 72).—As we
might say, presentative cognition is invariably accompanied
by representative cognition.—Then, in the course of the
mental undulations arising through this disturbance by
way of sense impact, one of these eight psychoses termed
Mahacittani may emerge. * But in pure representative
cognition (suddha-manodvare) there is no process of
sensory stimulation,' as when we recall past sense-experi-
ence.—The process of representation is illustrated in detail,
and completes an interesting essay in ancient psychology.
In the case of seeing, hearing, and smell, past pleasant
sensations are described as being simply revived during a
subsequent state of repose. In the case of taste and touch,
it is present disagreeable sensations which suggest certain
contrasted experience in the past. But the commentator
is not here interested in '
association by contrast ' as such.
* Lit., '
or whatever [object the thought] is about.' The
gist of the somewhat obscure comment is that, while no
new class of objects is here to be understood over and
above those of present or past sensations, there is no serial
or numerical order in which these " become material for
thought.
(xvi) the faculty of ideation (§ 17),
(xvii) the faculty of happiness (§ 18),
(xviii) the faculty of vitality (§ 19)
;
(xix) right views (§ 20),
(xx) right intention (§21),
(xxi) right endeavour (§ 22),
(xxii) right mindfulness (§ 23),
(xxiii) right concentration (§ 24)
;
(xxiv) the power of faith (§ 25),
(xxv) the power of energy (§ 26),
(xxvi) the power of mindfulness (§ 27),
(xxvii) the power of concentration (§ 28),
(xxviii) the power of wisdom (§ 29),
(xxix) the power of conscientiousness (§ 30),
(xxx) the power of the fear of blame (§ 31)
;
(xxxi) absence of lust (§ 32),
(xxxii) absence of hate (§ 33),
(xxxiii) absence of dulness (§ 34)
;
(xxxiv) absence of covetousness (§ 35),
(xxxv) absence of malice (§ 36),
(xxxvi) right views^ (§ 37)
;
(xxxvii) conscientiousness (§ 38),
(xxxviii) fear of blame (§ 39)
;
(xxxix, xl) serenity in sense and thought (§§ 40, 41),
(xli, xlii) lightness in sense and thought (§§ 42, 43),
(xliii, xliv) plasticity in sense and thought (§§ 44, 45),
(xlv, xlvi) facility in sense and thought (§§ 46, 47),
(xlvii, xlviii) fitness in sense and thought (§§ 48, 49),
(xlix, 1) directness in sense and thought (§§ 50, 51)
;
(li) mindfulness (§ 52),
(Hi) intelligence (§53)
(liii) quiet (§ 54)
1 According to Buddhaghosa the '
states ' numbered
xxxiv-vi are considered as equivalents of those numbered
xxxi-iii respectively, but as taken under another aspect.
In the prior enumeration the threefold '
root of good '
is
set out ; in the latter, reference to the * path of karma '
is
understood (Asl. 129).
(liv) insight (§ 55),
(Iv) grasp (§ 56),
(Ivi) balance (§ 57).
Now these—or whatever other incorporeal, causally in-
duced states^ there are on that occasion—these are states
that are good.
[2] What on that occasion is contact (p h a s s o) ?^
^ Nine other states, according to the Cy., are here im-
plied as factors in this psychosis, viz., desire (or conation,
or volition, chando), resolve (adhimokkho), attention
(manasikaro), equanimity (tatramaj jhattata), pity
(karuna), sympathy (mudita), abstinence from evil con-
duct in act, speech, and mode of livelihood. And the
opening words of this and similar supplementary clauses
in the text are coined into a technical term—ye-va-
panaka, 'the or-whatever ' [states],—to signify such
groups.
The Cy. then '
defines '
the nine : desire, qualified as
orthodox desire (dhammachando), to distinguish it from
ethically undesirable desire {cf. § 1097, etc.), is the wish to
act, the stretching forth the hand of the mind {cf. ope^is:)
to grasp the object in idea. Kesolve is steadfastness,
decision, the being unshaken as a pillar. Attention is
movement, direction of the mind, confronting the object.
Equanimity—lit., the mean (medium) state—is the being
borne along evenly, without defect or excess, without
partiality. Pity and sympathy are described in § 258 et
seq. The last three give those three factors of the Eight-
fold Path unrepresented in the analysis of the thought
(Asl. 132, 133).
It is not without interest to note that in this supple-
mentary category all the purely psychological states are
wholly, or at least mainly, volitional or emotional.
^ Touch or contact must be understood in a very general
sense, as the outcome of three conditions : an impingeing
sentient organ, an impingeing agency conceived as external
to the sentient organ, and impact or collision. The similes
in Mil. 60 of the rams and the cymbals are quoted in the
Cy. The eye and its object are the usual illustration, but
the representative imagination (mano or cittam) and its
object are included as proceeding by way of contact, only
without impact (sanghattanam). The real causal con-
nexion in every case—so I understand the, to me, obscurely
The contact which on that occasion is touching, the
being brought into contact, the state of having been
brought into touch with—this is the contact that there
then is.
[3J What on that occasion is feeling (vedana) ?^
The mental pleasure, the mental ease, which, on that
occasion, is born of contact with the appropriate element of
representative intellection f the pleasurable, easeful sensa-
worded comment to say (Asl. 109)—is mental, even though
we speak of an external agency, just as when lac melts
with heat we speak of hot coals as the cause, though the
heat is in the lac's own tissue.
*
Contact ' is given priority of place, as standing for the
inception of the thought, and as being the sine qua non of
all the allied states, conditioning them much as the roof-
tree of a storied house supports all the other combinations
of material {iUd, 107).
•^
Vedana is a term of very general import, meaning
sentience or reaction, bodily or mental, on contact or im-
pression. Sensation is scarcely so loyal a rendering as
feeling, for though vedana is often qualified as 'born of the
contact ' in sense-activity, it is always defined generally as
consisting of the three species—pleasure (happiness), pain
(ill), and neutral feeling—a hedonistic aspect to which the
term 'feeling' is alone adequate. Moreover, it covers
representative feeling.
This general psychical aspect of vedana, as distinct from
sensations localized bodily
—
e.g., toothache—is probably
emphasized by the term 'mental' (cetasikam) in the
answer. The Cy. points out that by this expression
( = cittanissitattam) 'bodily pleasure is eliminated'
(Asl. 139). It also illustrates the general scope of
vedana by the simile of a cook who, after preparing a
number of dishes for his lord, tastes each critically to test
them, the lord partaking of whichever he pleases. The
cook represents all the associated states in the thought-
complex, each functioning in one specific way. Vedana,
the master, '
enjoys the essence (taste) of the object ' as a
whole.
2 Tajja-manovifinanadhatu. Tajj a is paraphrased
by anucchavikfi, sarupa. Cf. A. i. 207; S. iv. 215;
M. i. 190, 191 ; Mil. 53. On the remainder of the com-
tion which is born of contact with thought ; ^ the pleasurable,
easeful feeling which is born of contact with thought—this
is the feeling that there then is.
[4] What on that occasion is perception (s a ii n a) ?2
The perception, the perceiving, the state of having per-
ceived which on that occasion is born of contact with the
pound term, see § 6. And on the hedonistic expressions in
the answer, see § 10.
^ Ceto-samphassajam . . . vedayitam. The latter
term (experience) is, more literally, that which is felt, das
Empfundene. Ceto, cittam are used interchangeably
in the Cy. on these terms (see § 6). The *
contact ' is that
between idea or object and thought, or the ideating agency,
conceived as analogous to the impact between sense-organ
and sense-object. In consequence of this contact or pre-
sentation, emotional affection arises in consciousness.
'^
The apparently capricious way in which the intension
of the term sanna is varied in the Pitakas makes it difficult
to assign any one adequate English rendering. In the
Mahavedalla Sutta (M. i. 293) and elsewhere (c/. Mil. 61)
it is explained as the relatively simple form of intellection
or cognition which consists in the discernment, recognition,
assimilation of sensations
—
e.g., of colours, as 'blue,' etc.
—
the process termed in modern English psychology sense-
perception, except that it is not quite clear that, in Buddhist
psychology, as in English, the perception is made only on
occasion of sense-stiimdation. The answer, indeed, in our
§ 4 alludes to representative activity only. In the Maha-
parinibbana Sutta, however {cf. A. v. 105), sanna stands
for the intellectual realization of a number of highly
complex concepts, such as impermanence, non-substan-
tiality, etc. In the Potthapada Sutta (D. i. 180-187), again,
the sanna discussed is clearly what we should call con-
sciousness, whether as opposed to the unconsciousness of
trance, or as the raw material of nanam, or as conceivably
distinct from the soul or Ego. Lastly, in a more popular
sense the term is used (notably in the Jatakas and in
commentators' similes) for sign, mark, or token.
Here, if we follow the Cy. (Asl. 110), sail ii a means simply
that sense-perception which discerns, recognises and gives
class-reference to (upatthita-visaya), the impressions
of sense. Its procedure is likened to the carpenter's recog-
nition of certain woods by the mark he had made on each;
appropriate element of representative intellection —this
is the perception that there then is.
[5] What on that occasion is thinking (cetana) ?^
The thinking, the cogitating, the reflection, which is born
of contact with the appropriate element of representative
intellection—this is the thinking that there then is.
[6] What on that occasion is thought (cittam) ?
to the treasurer's specifying certain articles of jewelry by
the ticket on each ; to the wild animal's discernment in the
scarecrow of the work of man. The essence of saiina is
said to be recognition by way of a mark. In this notion of
mark and marking lies such continuity of thought as may
be claimed for the various uses of the term. The bare fact
of consciousness means ability to discriminate—that is, to
mark. To mark is to perceive. And the ideas or concepts
of '
impermanence,' '
impurity,' and the like, were so many
acts of marking, though of a highly '
re-representative '
character. Sanna, no less than cittam (see Intro-
duction), and 'thought,' stands for both faculty and any
act or product of that faculty. And it is even objectified
so far as to signify further the result of any such act
—
that is, in its connotation of mark or sign.
It is, I believe, when connoting the more specific sense
of faculty, or of skandha, that it may safely be rendered by
'
perception '
or '
marking,' and may be taken to mean the
relatively '
superficial,' '
transient ' (Asl. 110, 111) play of
cognition when concerned with objects of sense. In ch. xiv.
of the Visuddhi Magga—in a passage the late Henry C.
Warren was good enough to transcribe for me—sanna is
in this way, and this way only, distinguished from viiina-
nam and panna. The latter terms stand for cognition at
(as we might say) a relatively higher and a still higher
power, in virtue of the greater depth and complexity of the
concepts they were exercised about (see §§6, 16).
1 There is no more difficult problem in interpreting the
Dhamma Sangani than to get at the grounds on which its
compilers, and subsequently its commentator, saw fit to set
out mutually independent descriptions of terms etymologi-
cally so identical as cetana and cittam. The only
parallel that suggests itself to me is the distinction drawn,
during a long period in British philosophy, between *
reason-
ing '
and '
reason '
—that is, between deductive inference and
the nous, or noetic function. Both pairs of terms are quite
The thought which on that occasion is ideation, mind,
heart, that which is clear, ideation as the sphere of mind,
the faculty of mind, intellection, the skandha of intellec-
tion, the appropriate element of representative intellection
—this is the thought that there then is.
popular in form. Compare, e.g., in the Nidana-katha
(Jat. i. 74), Buddha's reply to Mara :
'
I have here no con-
scious (or intelligent) witness. . . . Let this . . . earth, un-
conscious though it be, be witness. . . . Sacetano koci
sakkhi, etc. . . . ayam acetanapi . . . pathavi sak-
khlti.' Again, in A. i., p. 224, the import seems simple
and quite untechnical :
*
Their thoughts (cetana) and
hopes (lit., thinking and hoping) are fixed on lower things.'
Hence I have kept to terms popular in form. This does
not justify the use of terms so undifferentiated as 'thinking'
and '
thought ' ;
yet I have returned to them, after essaying
half a dozen substitutes, for various reasons. They show
the close connection between the Buddhist pair of terms,
instead of obscuring it ; they are equally popular and vague
in form and extension; the import of cetana has much in
common with a psychological account of thinking ; no term
misfits cittam less than * thought,' unless it be *
heart,'
on which see Introduction. It is unfortunate that Buddha-
ghosa does not give a comparative analysis of the two, as he
does in the case of vitakka-vicara and piti-sukham.
Under cetana he expatiates in forcible similes, describing it
as a process of activity and toil, and as a co-ordinating, order-
ing function. He likens it to an energetic farmer, bustling
about his fifty-five labourers (the fifty-five co-constituents
in the thought-complex) to get in the harvest ; to a senior
apprentice at the carpenter's, working himself and supervis-
ing the tasks of the others ; to the leader of a warrior band,
fighting and inciting. To these notions the definition of
Nagasena (Mil. 61) only adds that of preparing (abhisan-
kharanam), the other qualifying term being merely a
denominative form (as if we should say '
thinkifying ')
.
In so far, then, as '
thinking ' connotes representative,
co-ordinative intellection, it coincides with cetana. In its
narrower, technical sense of intellection by way of general
notions, it does not (see Introduction). Any way, to call it
*
thinking ' is sufficiently indefinite, and does not preclude
the rendering of it elsewhere by such terms as ' reflecting,'
*
cogitating,' '
considering,' etc. But the problem has still
[7] What on that occasion is conception (vitakko)?^
The ratiocination, the conception, which on that occasion
is the disposition,^ the fixation, the focussing,^ the applica-
to be solved of how it is related to such terms as sarin a,
c it tarn, and vinnanam. With regard to skandha, it is
classed, not with cittam, but under the sankhara-
skandha, § 62.
Cittam, together with the terms in which it is de-
scribed, is discussed in my Introduction.
^ Vitakko and vicaro is another pair of terms which it
is hard to fit with any one pair of English words. It is very
possible that academic teaching came to attach a more preg-
nant and specialized import to them than was conveyed in
popular and purely ethical usage. Cf, M. i., Suttas xix.
and XX., where vitakka would be adequately rendered by
ideas, notions, or thoughts. In Asl. 114, 115, on the other
hand [cf. Mil. 62, 63), the relation of the two to cittam
and to each other is set out with much metaphor, if with
too little psychological grasp. Vitakko is distinctively
mental procedure at the inception of a train of thought, the
deliberate movement of voluntary attention. As a king
ascends to his palace leaning on the arm of favourite or
relative, so thought ascends to its object depending upon the
conceptive act (vitakko; Asl. 114). Other metaphorical
attributes are its impingeing upon, circum-impingeing upon
(paryahanam), the object, and, again, bringing it near.
Hence in selecting '
conception '
in preference to 'reasoning,'
by which vitakko has often been translated, I wished to
bring out this grasping, constructive, reaching-out act of the
mind, this incipient fetch of the imagination, elaborated in
the Buddhist scholastic analysis of the term ; but I had no
wish to read our own logical or psychological import of con-
ception as intellection by way of general notions, or the like,
into the Eastern tradition. Yet just as conception may be
so used as to include 'reasoning' or 'ratiocination,' so
vitakko is, in the reply, described by takko, the term used
for ratiocinative procedure, argument, or logic {cf. D. i.
12, 21). 'What,' asks the Cy., 'does one reason about
(takkesi) ? About a pot, a cart, the distance of anything.
Well, vitakko is a stronger reasoning.'
2 On *
disposition,' '
right intention,' see § 21.
'^Appana vyappana, the latter an intensive form of
the former (Asl. 142, 143). In the '
Yogavacara's Manual
'
(p. xi and passim) appana denotes the dawn of the desired
tion of the mind,^ right intention—this is the conception
that there then is.
[8] What on that occasion is discursive thought
(vicaro) ?^
The process, the sustained procedure (vicaro), the
progress and access [of the mind] which on that occasion
is the [continuous] adjusting and focussing of thought^
—
this is the discursive thought that there then is.
[9] What on that occasion is joy (pit i) ?*
concept during the practice of regulated meditation. Bud-
dhaghosa defines it thus:—ekaggam cittam arammane
appenti.
^ Cetaso abhiniropana = arammane cittam . . .
patitthapeti (ibid.)
^Vicaro, as compared with vitakko, was used to express
the movement and maintenance of the voluntary thought-
continuum, as distinguished from the initiative grappling
with the subject of reflection. Examining in detail, as com-
pared with grasping the whole, is also read into it by com-
mentators (Asl. 114). It is a pounding up (anumajja-
nam), as well as a linking together. Metaphors are
multiplied, to show its relation to vitakko. It is as the
reverberation of the beaten drum or bell is to the beating;
as the planing movement of the bird's wings after the
initial upsoaring ; as the buzzing of the bee when it has
alighted on the lotus; as the scouring of the dirty bowl
when clutched; as the manipulating hand of the potter,
vitakko being represented by the hand which holds the
clay to the wheel, and so on. * Investigation ' would well
represent the sustained activity ;
'
analysis,' the cogitation in
details ;
'
discursive thought ' gives some of the import of
both, without introducing modern and Western implications.
^ Like the adjusting of bow and arrow. '
Focussing ' is
anupekkhamano.
^ Piti, as distinguished from sukham, is explicitly ex-
cluded from the skandha of feeling, considered as the
irreducible hedonic constituent, and referred to the
composite psychoses of the sankhara skandha. It con-
notes emotion, as distinct from bare feeling ; that is to say,
piti is a complex psychical phenomenon, implying a
'
central psycho-physical origin ' and a widely diffused
'
somatic resonance '
(ef. Sully, '
The Human Mind,' ii. 56).
The joy which on that occasion is gladness, rejoicing at,
rejoicing over, mirth and merriment, feHcity,^ exultation,
transport of mind^—this is the joy that there then is.
[10] What on that occasion is ease (s u k h a m) ?^
It arises out of a present idea, and suffuses the whole
being. By Buddhaghosa's day it was divided into five
species : the thrill of joy, just causing *
the flesh to creep '
;
the flash of joy, like lightning ; the flood of joy, like the
breakers on a sea-shore ; ecstasy or transport, in which
the subject could float in the air ; and overwhelming
suffusing joy (Asl. 115, 116). Instances are related of the
fourth species (ubbega-piti), the inspiring idea being
'Buddharammanam^ (see also Visuddhi Magga, ch. iv.
;
*Yogavacara's Manual,' vii.). The same word (ubbego) is
used to describe the anguish or trembling over guilt
discovered. See below, § 31 n.
^ Vitti, meaning literally, as the Cy. points out,
prosperity, wealth, and used here by analogy as a state
conditioned by a source of pleasure. '
Happiness arises to
him who is joyful through his joy, as it arises to the
wealthy through his rice-possessions.' (Asl. 143.)
^ Attamanata cittassa. Buddhaghosa, who did not
know the true etymology of this term, is ready as ever with
a guess : attano manata, or mentality of one's self, not
of another, subjective experience. If I am pained or
pleased, that is peculiarly my aft'air (ibid.). Psychologically
it is interesting to note that he is prepared to find this
intimate, subjective reference in a state of intense feeling.
*
Feeling is subjective experience jjar excellence . . . our
feelings . . . are all our own.' (Sully, '
The Human
Mind,' ii. 2 ; G. C. Eobertson, '
Elements of Psychology,'
185-188.)
^ To contrast piti with sukham, Buddhaghosa draws
a charming picture of the traveller who, fordone with
journeying through a desert, hears with joy of a pool in a
grove, and with joy comes upon it, and who, on drinking,
bathing, and resting in the shade is filled with ease.
Sukham, it is true, is not bare quiescence ; it is positive,
pleasurable feeling, and may have active concomitants; its
*
essence ' is expansion or increase ( u p a b r u h a n am ) . But
just as dukkham means, not so much pain as ill-being or
misery, so does sukham mean well-being or sane and
sound csenaesthesis. And as *
joy '
is the satisfaction of
The mental pleasure, the mental ease which on that
occasion is the pleasant, easeful experience born of contact
with thought, the pleasant, easeful feeling born of contact
with thought—this is the ease that there then is.
[11] What on that occasion is self-collectedness (cittass'
ekaggata)?!
The stability, solidity, absorbed steadfastness of thought^
which on that occasion is the absence of distraction,
gaining (potentially or actually) what we desire, so is 'ease'
the enjoyment of the flavour (French, savourer) of what
we have gained (Asl. 117). See further § 60. '
Mental
ease' (cetasikam sukham) is perhaps more correctly
somanassam, rendered (§ 1, etc.) by 'happiness,'
sukh am being sometimes distinguished as bodily (kayikam)
only. See S. v. 209.
1 'Citt' ekaggata, the one-peaked condition of mind,
is a name for concentration (samadhi),' says the Cy.
(p. 118). And accordingly, whereas under § 15 it gives
no further description of samadhi, it here applies to
citt' ekaggata the metaphors used in Mil. 38 to illustrate
samadhi, viz., the centre part of a tent-shaped hut, and a
chieftain leading his army. It then adds that '
this
samadhi, which is called self-collectedness, has, as its
characteristic mark, the absence of wandering, of distrac-
tion ; as its essence, the binding together of the states of
mind that arise with it, as water binds the lather of soap
;
and as its concomitants, calmness, or wisdom—for it is
said, " he who is at peace he understands, he sees things as
they really are "—and ease. The steadfastness of thought
is likened to the steadiness of a lamp-flame in a windless
place.' See '
Yogavacara's Manual,' p. xxvi.
^ These three cognate terms are in the text cittassa
thiti santhiti avatthiti. According to the Cy. (p. 143),
the standing unshaken in or on the object (arammane)
connoted by thiti is modified by the prefix sam to imply
kneading together (sampindetva) the associated states in
the object, and by the prefix ava to imply the being im-
mersed in the object. The last metaphor is in Buddhist
doctrine held applicable to four good and three bad states
—
faith, mindfulness, concentration ( = self-collectedness) and
wisdom ; craving, speculation and ignorance, but most of
all to self-collectedness.
balance,^ imperturbed mental procedure, quiet,^ the faculty
and the power of concentration, right concentration—this
is the self-collectedness that there then is.
[12] What on that occasion is the faculty of faith
(saddhindriyam)?^
The faith which on that occasion is a trusting in, the
professing confidence in,* the sense of assurance, faith,^
^ Avisaharo, avikkhepo [v. § 57). Distraction and
loss of equilibrium are attributed to the presence of '
excite-
ment and perplexity ' (§§ 425, 429 ; Asl. 144).
^ Samatho. Distinguished as of three species : mental
calm (so used here) ; legal pacification, or settlement
;
calm in all the sanskaras, by which, according to the Cy.
(144), is meant the peace of Nirvana.
^ On *
faculty,' see Introduction.
Faith is characterized and illustrated in the same terms
and approximately the same similes as are used in Mil.,
pp. 34-60. That is to say, it is shown to be a state of
mind where the absence of perplexity sets free aspiration
and energy. It is described as trust in the Buddha and
his system. There is, however, no dwelling just here on
any terminus ad quern, as St. Paul did in speaking of
'
the prize for the mark of the high calling,' etc., towards
which he pressed in ardent faith. There is, rather, an
insistence on that self-confidence born of conviction of the
soundness of one's methods and efforts which is, as it were,
an aspect of faith as a vis a tergo. In the simile of the
stream, the Cy. differs from Trenckner's version of the
Milinda to the extent of making the folk afraid to cross
because of alligators and other monsters, till the hero takes
his sword and plunges in. See the note on '
faith ' in the
translation of Mil. i. 56.
* I.e., in the Buddha, the Doctrine and the Order.
Buddhaghosa is only interested in making the etymology
bear on ethics, and compares the '
downward plunge ' of
confidence (o-kappana) in the attitude of faith to the
'
sinking '
in *
mindfulness,' the '
grounded stand ' in '
con-
centration,' and the '
sounding '
penetration of '
wisdom '
Asl. 144, 145).
^ The Cy. puts forward an alternative explanation of the
repetition in the description of this and following com-
pounds of the first term of the compound, viz., ' faith.'
faith as a faculty and as a power—this is the faith that
there then is.
[13] What on that occasion is the faculty of energy
(viriyindriyam) ?^
The mental inception^ of energy which there is on that
occasion, the striving and the onward effort, the exertion
According to the former, it is the method of Abhidamma
to set out in isolation the adjectival part of a compound on
which the substantival part depends: faith-faculty = faith
(faculty of). According to the latter, the identity between
the two abstractions, faith and faith-faculty, is brought
out. The case of woman and attribute of femininity, it
remarks, is different. (This may be a groping after the
distinction between concrete and abstract.)
^ Viriyam is by Buddhaghosa connected with (a) vira,
the dynamic effectiveness which is the essence of the genus
'
hero '
(viro), (b) iriya, vibrating movement. He charac-
terizes it by the two notions, '
supporting '
and '
grasping
at,' or * stretching forward' (pag^aho), and, again, by
'exerting' (ussahanam). Of. Mil. 36; Sum. Vil. 63.
And he cites the same similes as nppear in the Milinda.
He seems to have wished, as modern psychologists have
done, to account for the two modes of conscious effort
:
Resistance and Free Energy. But he also emphasizes the
fact that the energy in question is mental, not bodily
(pp. 120 et seq., 145).
2 Arambho (c/. ar am man am), overt action as distin-
guished from inaction, hence action at its inception, is dis-
tinguished by the Cy. as having six different implications,
according as there is reference to karma, to a fault com-
mitted, to slaying or injury, or to action as such (k iriya),
or energy as such.
I do not pretend that the four following pairs of words
fit those in the text exactly. They are mere approximations.
'Endeavour' is vayamo, the term representing 'energy'
in the Noble Eightfold Path. '
Unfaltering ' effort
(asithila-parakkamata) is the attitude of one who has
made the characteristic Buddhist vow : Verily may skin
and nerve and bone dry up and wither, or ever I stay my
energy, so long as I have not attained whatsoever by
human vigour, energy, and effort is attainable ! (M. i. 480).
The desire sustained—lit., not cast down—is that felt on
an occasion for making good karma.
and endeavour, the zeal and ardour, the vigour and forti-
tude, the state of unfaltering effort, the state of sustained
desire, the state of unflinching endurance, the solid grip of
the burden, energy, energy as faculty and as power, right
endeavour—this is the energy that there then is.
[14] What on that occasion is the faculty of mindfulness
(satindriyam) ?i
The mindfulness which on that occasion is recollecting,
calling back to mind ; the mindfulness^ which is remember-
ing, bearing in mind, the opposite of superficiality^ and
of obliviousness ; mindfulness as faculty, mindfulness as
power, right mindfulness—this is the faculty of mindfulness
that there then is.
1 Buddhaghosa's comment on sati, in which he closely
follows and enlarges on the account in Mil. 37, 38, shows
that the traditional conception of that aspect of conscious-
ness had much in common with the Western modern theory
of conscience or moral sense. Sati appears under the
metaphor of an inward mentor, discriminating between
good and bad and prompting choice. Hardy went so far
as to render it by '
conscience,' but this slurs over the in-
teresting divergencies between Eastern and Western
thought. The former is quite unmystical on the subject of
sati. It takes the psychological process of representative
functioning (without bringing out the distinction between
bare memory and judgment), and presents the same under
an ethical aspect. See also under hiri, §30; and the
notion as described in '
Questions of Milinda,' 38, n. 2.
2 The threciold mention of sati in the reply (c/. § 12)
agrees with K., but not with Puggala Panfiatti (p. 25). It
is not noticed by the Cy.
^Apilapanata. The Atthasalini solves the problem pre-
sented by this term (see Milinda (S.B.E.), vol. i., p. 58, n. 2)
by deriving it from pilavati, to float, and interprets:
—
* not floating on the surface like pumpkins and pots on the
water,' sati entering into and plunging down into the
object of thought. Cf. § 11, n. 2 ; § 12, n. 2, in which
connection the term is again used. The positive form occurs
m/m, §1349. P. P.has(a)vilapanata (21,25). (Asl. 147;
cf. 405.) I should have rendered the word by *
profundity,"
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