A BUDDHIST MANUAL
Psychological Ethics,
FROM THE PALI
OF THE
DHAMMA-SANGANI
Translated by CAROLINE A. F. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A.
[PART III—INDETERMINATE STATES OF CONSCIOUS-
NESS.^
Chapter I.
On Effect, or Result (vipako).
A. Good Karma.
1. In the sensuous universe.
(a) The Five Modes of Cognition considered as effects of
good (kusalavipakani pane a-v innanani).]
(i.) [431] Which are the states that are indeterminate ?
When, as the result of good karma ^ having been wrought,
having been stored up in connexion with the sensuous
universe, visual cognition has arisen, accompanied by dis-
interestedness,^ and having as its object something seen,
then there is
contact, thinking,
feeling, thought,
perception, disinterestedness,
self-collectedness
;
^ Dhamma avyakata. The term and its treatment
are discussed in my Introduction. Cf. Vis. Magga, ch. xiv.
^ Kammam; literally, action, work, deed.
^ In this and the two following sections (2 and 3)
upekkha is apparently used as a psychological term only,
without ethical implication, and signifies simply neutral
feeling.
the faculties of
ideation,
disinterestedness,
vitality.
These, or whatever other ^ incorporeal, causally induced
states there are on that occasion—these are states that are
indeterminate.
[432] Question and answer on *
contact ' as above, passim.
[433] What on that occasion is feeling ?
The mental [condition], neither pleasant nor unpleasant,
which on that occasion is born of contact with the appro-
priate element of visual cognition ; the sensation, born of
contact with thought, which is neither easeful nor painful
;
the feeling, born of contact with thought, which is neither
easeful nor painful—this is the feeling that there then is.
[434] What on that occasion is perception ?
The perception, the perceiving, the state of having per-
ceived, which on that occasion is born of contact with the
appropriate element of visual cognition—this is the per-
ception that there then is.
[435] What on that occasion is thinking ?
The thinking, the cogitating, the reflection which on
that occasion is born of contact with the appropriate
element of visual cognition—this is the thinking that there
then is.
[436] What on that occasion is thought ?
The thought which on that occasion is ideation, mind,
heart, that which is clear, ideation as the sphere of mind,
the faculty of ideation, intellect, the skandha of intellect,
the appropriate element of visual cognition—this is the
thought that there then is.
[437] What on that occasion is disinterestedness ?
Answer as for '
feeling,' § 436, omitting the phrase ' which
is born of contact with the appropriate element of visual
cognition.'
^ There will be but one of these, viz., attention (Asl. 262).
[438] What on that occasion is self-collectedness ?
The persistence of thought^ which there is on that
occasion—this is the self-collectedness that there then is.
[439] What on that occasion is the faculty of ideation ?
Answer as for *
thought,' § 436.
[440] What on that occasion is the faculty of dis-
interestedness ?
Answer as in § 437.
[441] What on that occasion is the faculty of vitality ?
Answer as in § 19.
Or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced states
there are on that occasion—these are the states that are
indeterminate.
[Summary.]
[441a] Now, on that occasion
the skandhas are four,
the spheres are two,
the elements are two,
the nutriments are three,
the faculties are three,^
contact counts as a single factor,
etc.
{Continue as in § 58],
^ In the text omit . . . pe . . . after thiti, as in § 424,
and for the same reason (Asl. 262).
^ Jhana and the Path, says the Cy. (262), are not in-
cluded in the summary ; and why ? Jhana at its extremity
has conception (vitakko), and the Path at its extremity
has cause (hetu). Hence, it is not consistent to include
Jhana in a thought that has no conceptual activity, or the
Path, when the thought is not causally effective.
This remark throws a little light on to the problem of
indeterminate states. In vitakko the mind is working
towards an end good or bad ; in the Path the first factor
(right views) is synonymous with *
absence of dulness,'
which is the cause or root of good (§ 1054). Neither
vitakko nor am oho is, therefore, a possible constituent
in a cognition which is inefficacious to produce good or bad
karma.
the faculty of ideation counts as a single factor,
the element of visual cognition counts as a single factor,
the sphere of [mental] states counts as a single factor,
etc.
[Continue as in § 58.]
! [442] What on that occasion is the skandha of syn-
theses ?
Contact,
thinking,
self-coUectedness,
the faculty of vitality,
or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced states there
are on that occasion, exclusive of the skandhas of feeling,
perception and intellect—these are the skandha of syn-
theses.
(ii.-v.) [443] Which are the states that are indeter-
minate ?
When, as the result of good karma having been wrought,
having been stored up in connexion with the sensuous
universe,
auditory cognition,
olfactory cognition, or
gustatory cognition
has arisen, accompanied by disinterestedness, and having
as its object
a sound,
a smell, or
a taste
respectively ... or
cognition of body
has arisen, accompanied by ease, and having as its object
something tangible,^
then there is
contact, thinking,
feeling,^ thought,
perception, ease,
self-collectedness
;
the faculties of
ideation,
ease,
vitality.
Now, these, or whatever other incorporeal, causally
induced states there are on that occasion—these are states
that are indeterminate.
[444] Question and answer on *
contact ' as above, passim,
[445] What on that occasion is feeling ?
The bodily pleasure, the bodily ease, which on that
occasion is born of the appropriate element of the cog-
nition of body; the pleasurable, easeful sensation which
^ Or '
a touch '
(v. p. 2, n. 2). The view that the cogni-
tion of something tangible has a positive hedonic concomit-
ant—pleasant or, if the karma be bad (§ 556), unpleasant
—
as compared with the neutral feeling attending other kinds
of sense-cognition (under the given circumstances), is of
psychological interest. And the comment it evokes is not
less so. Touch, or body-sensibility, is, the Cy. explains
(263), the one sense through which the four elements with-
out and within the individual come into direct contact. Other
cognition is secondary, inasmuch as the other senses are
derived (up a da). They are as balls of cotton-wool on four
anvils, deadening the impact of the hammer. In touch the
wool is beaten through, and the reaction is stronger. Cf.
this with the theory of sense below, §§ 596-632. Neverthe-
less, the ease or the distress is so faintly marked, that the
cognition remains '
indeterminate.'
The constituent states, contact, etc., refer only to the
last-named species of cognition. In the case of the other
four *
disinterestedness ' would have to be substituted for
'
ease.'
2 Vedana has dropped out of the printed text.
is born of contact with the body ; the pleasurable, easeful
feeling which is born of contact with the body—this is the
feeling that there then is.
[446] What on that occasion is perception ?
The perception, the perceiving, the state of having
perceived, which on that occasion is born of contact with
appropriate element of the cognition of body—this is the
perception that there then is.
[447] What on that occasion is thinking ?
The thinking, the cogitating, the reflection, which on that
occasion is born of contact with the appropriate element
of the cognition of body—this is the thinking that there
then is.
[448] What on that occasion is thought ?
The thought which on that occasion is ideation, mind,
heart, that which is clear ; ideation as the sphere of mind,
the faculty of ideation, intellect, the skandha of intellect,
the appropriate element of the cognition of body—this is
the thought that there then is.
[449] What on that occasion is ease ?
The bodily pleasure, the bodily ease which on that occa-
sion is the pleasant, easeful sensation born of contact with
the body ; the pleasant, easeful feeling born of contact with
the body—this is the ease that there then is.
[450-453] What on that occasion is self-collectedness^
. . . the faculty of ideation 2 . . . of ease . . . of vitality?
Answers as in §§ 438, 448, 449 and 441 respectively.
Or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced states
there are on that occasion—these are states that are in-
determinate.
^ In § 450 omit ... pe ... in the text after thiti.
2 In § 451 supply kaya- before vinnanadhatu. The
state manindriyam is, it is true, one of representative
cognition only, but it is occupied, under the given circum-
stances, with a kaya-viniianam. The 'door of mano'
has as its object any or all of the objects of the five senses.
[Summary.]
[453a] Now, on that occasion
the skandhas are four,
etc.
[Continue as in § 441a, substituting '
the element of the
cognition of body' Jm- * the element of visual cognition.']
^ ^ * * * *
[454] What on that occasion is the skandha of syn-
theses ?
Answer as in § 442.
^ * ^ * * *
[{b) Good (karma) taking effect in ideation (kusalavi-
paka manodhatu).]
[455] Which are the states that are indeterminate ?
When, as the result of good karma having been wrought,
having been stored up in connexion with the sensuous
universe, an element of ideation^ has arisen, accompanied
by disinterestedness, and having as its object a sight, a
sound, a smell, a taste, something tangible, or what not,
then there is
contact, thought,
feeling, conception,
^ Once more the Cy. points out (263) the significance
of the affix -dhatu (element), as meaning the absence of
entity (nissatta), the *
emptiness' or phenomenal char-
acter of the ideational faculty. Cf. above, p. 33, n. The
characteristics of mano are here set out. See Introduc-
tion (Theory of Intellection). The theory of a sensorium
commune here alluded to is practically identical with that
adopted by Aristotle in the *
De Sensu.' '
The basis (or
site, vatthu) of this kind of thought is a constant, namely,
the heart ; the objects of the " doors " (or of the idea-door)
are not constants. Whereas they come in one after
another, this is the locus (thanam), which has the function
of receiving them into unity ' (ekasampaticchana-
kiccam).
The process of cognition is completed by manovinna-
nadhatu (see below).
perception, discursive thought,
thinking, disinterestedness,
self-collectedness
;
the faculties of
ideation,
disinterestedness,
vitality.
These, or whatever other ^ incorporeal, causally induced
states there are on that occasion—these are states that are
indeterminate.
[456] Question and ansiver on * contact ' as above, passim,
[457] What on that occasion is feeling ?
The mental [condition], neither pleasant nor unpleasant,
which on that occasion is born of contact with the appro-
priate element of ideation ; the sensation, born of contact
with thought, which is neither easeful nor painful ; the
feeling, born of contact with thought, which is neither
easeful nor painful—this is the feeling that there then is.
[458-460] What on that occasion is perception . . .
thinking . . . thought?
Answers as in §§ 446-448, suhstituting 'element of idea-
tion '/or ' element of the cognition of body.'
[461] What on that occasion is conception ?
The ratiocination, the conceiving which on that occasion
is the disposition, the fixation, the focussing, the application
of the mind^—this is the conception that there then is.
[462] What on that occasion is discursive thought ?
The process, the sustained procedure, the progress and
access [of the mind] which on that occasion is the con-
tinuous adjusting and directing of thought—this is the
discursive thought that there then is.
^ These (Asl. 264) include two others, resolve and atten-
tion. Cf. above, p. 5, n. 1.
2 Inasmuch, says the Cy. (264), as this thought is neither
good nor bad (in its effect), intention (sankapj^o), either right
or wrong, is not included in the connotation of its component
vitakko. Cf. §§ 7 and 371, also p. 125, n. 2.
[463-467] What on that occasion is disinterestedness
. . . self-collectedness . . . the faculty of ideation . . .
of disinterestedness ... of vitality?
Answers as m §§ 437, 438, 460, 440,^ 441 respectively.
[Summary.] \
[467a] Now, on that occasion
the skandhas are four,
the spheres are two,
the elements are two,
the nutriments are three,
the faculties are three,
contact counts as a single factor,
etc.
[Continue as in § 58.]
the faculty of ideation counts as a single factor,
the element of ideation counts as a single factor,
etc.
* * * * * *
[468] What on that occasion is the skandha of syn-
theses ?
Contact, discursive thought,
thinking, self-collectedness,
conception, the faculty of vitality.
Or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced states
there are on that occasion, exclusive of the skandhas of
feeling, perception and intellect—these are the skandha of
syntheses.
^ The references given in the text will prove, on examina-
tion, to be for the most part misleading.
(c) Good (karma) taking effect in representative intellec-
tion (kusala-vipakamanoyiniianadhatu).
(i.) When accompanied by happiness,
[469] Which are the states that are indeterminate ?
When, as the result of good karma having been wrought,
having been stored up in connexion with the sensuous
universe, an element of representative cognition^ has
arisen, accompanied by happiness and having as its object
^ The function of the manovinnanadhatu is dis-
cussed in the Introduction (Theory of Intellection). As a
resultant state, it is here said (Asl. 264), when '
accom-
panied by happiness,' to eventuate in two sets of circum-
stances :
* Standing in the doors of the five senses, it
accomplishes the task (or function, kiccarn) of deciding
(santirana) as to that idea (or percept) which the element
of ideation, just expired, received on the expiry of that
sense-cognition which constituted the result of good karma.'
Again :
*
When the action of the six doors (senses and
ideation) results in a more impressive idea, this becomes
what is called the idea' (tad-arammanam), i.e., 'the
object of the impulse' (Javanam), and the element of
representative cognition is drawn away to fix itself on that
object. So a vessel crossing a strong current avails to
turn the latter aside for a moment, though its natural
course is a flowing downward. The normal flow of the
intellect is, so to speak, down the stream of the individual
life (bhavangam ev' otarati). And it is this normal
functioning of the intellect which alone is here taken into
account.
The further stage of cognition immediately preceding
any outgoing or conative impulse such as seems to be
meant by the word Java nam {cf. Sum. 194; Abh. S.
iii. 3)—I allude to that of '
establishing ' (or full assimila-
tion, as we might say—votthappanam)—is not here
explicitly mentioned. But it is probably implied in the
phrase santlranadi, *
deciding and the rest' And it is
discussed a few pages further on (Asl. 269, 272).
a sight, a sound, a smell, a taste, something tangible, the
idea [of any of these], or what not, then there is
contact, conception,
feeling, discursive thought,
perception, joy,
thinking, ease,
thought, self-collectedness
;
the faculties of
ideation,
happiness,
vitality.
These, or whatever other, etc.
[Continue as in § 455.]
[470-482] These thirteen constituent states are described
as in §§ 2-11 and 17-19, with the exception of *
conception'
(vitakko) and * self-collectedness '
(cittas s'ekag-
gata), which are described with the restricted connotation
used m §§ 461, 464.
[Summary.]
[482a] Identical tvith § 467a, but *
the element of repre-
sentative cognition ' (manovinnanadhatu) m^ist be
substituted for *
the element of ideation.'^
X- ¥r * ^ * *
[483] What on that occasion is the skandha of syn-
theses ?
Contact, discursive thought,
thinking, joy,
conception, self-collectedness
;
the faculty of vitality.
Or whatever incorporeal, causally induced states there
are on that occasion, exclusive of the skandhas of feeling,
^ The reference to [58] in the text is again incorrect, for
there is to be no rehearsal of either Jhana or Path. Cf
p. 125, n. 2, and Asl. 264.
perception and intellect—these are the skandha of syn-
theses.
(ii.) When accompanied by disinterestedness.
[484] Which are the states that are indeterminate ?
When, as the result of good karma having been wrought,
having been stored up in connexion with the sensuous
universe, an element of representative cognition^ has
arisen, accompanied by disinterestedness, and having as
its object a sight, etc. (cf. above, § 469] . . . then there is
contact, thought,
feeling, conception,
perception, discursive thought,
thinking, disinterestedness^
self-collectedness
;
the faculties of
ideation,
disinterestedness,
vitality.
These, or whatever other, etc.
[Continue as in § 469.]
^ This sort of resultant cognition is said to take effect
or occur on five sorts of occasions : (i.) The conception
of infirm offspring, viz., blind, deaf, imbecile or insane,
hermaphrodite or neuter; (ii.) during the span of one
individual lifetime (bhavangam) ; (iii.) in the decision
(santiranam) respecting an idea where the object causes
neither pleasure nor pain ; (iv.) when the *
that-object
'
(tadarammanam) of absorbing impressiveness arises
{cf. § 469, n.) ; (v.) when death opens the way to renewed
existence (cuti). It will be seen that these five correspond
to the first, second, tenth, thirteenth and fourteenth occa-
sion on which vinnanas occur, according to the Visuddhi
Magga (chap. xiv. ; see Warren's 'Table of Contents,'
J. P. T. S., 1891-93, p. 130). It is possible that the
absence of explanatory matter in our Cy. is due to the
existence of a full treatment by Buddhaghosa in the former
earlier work.
[485-496] These Thirteen states are described as in the
foregoing section (i.), except that the questions and answers
on '
feeling' and '
disinterestedness,' as given in §§ 152-154,
must he substituted for those on *
feeling,' *joy,' and the
'faculty of happiness' given in §§ 471, 477, and 481.
*
Ease '
is omitted,
[Summary.]
[496a] Terms identical ivith those in § 482a.
* -H- -X- * -X- -if-
[497] The skandha of syntheses is identical ivith the content
stated in § 483, hut with the omission o/* joy.'
[(d) The Eight Main Types of Kesults (attha maha-
vipaka).]
[498] Which are the states that are indeterminate ?
When, as the result of good karma having been wrought,
having been stored up in connexion with the sensuous uni-
verse, an element of representative cognition has arisen,
(i.) accompanied by happiness and associated with know-
ledge . . .
(ii.) accompanied by happiness, associated with know-
ledge, and prompted by a conscious motive . . .
(iii.) accompanied by happiness and disconnected with
knowledge . . .
(iv.) accompanied by happiness, disconnected with know-
ledge, and prompted by a conscious motive ...
(v.) accompanied by disinterestedness and associated
with knowledge ...
(vi.) accompanied by disinterestedness, associated with
knowledge, and prompted by a conscious motive . . .
(vii.) accompanied by disinterestedness and disconnected
with knowledge . . .
(viii.) accompanied by disinterestedness, disconnected
with knowledge, and prompted by a conscious motive, and
having as its object a sight, a sound, a smell, a taste,
something tangible, or what not, then there is contact^
. . . balance. These, or whatever other incorporeal,
causally induced states there are on that occasion—these
are states that are indeterminate.
[498a] That absence of lust which is the root of in-
determinateness . . . that absence of hate which is the
root of indeterminateness . . . that absence of dulness
which is the root of indeterminateness . . . these are
states that are indeterminate.'-
[2. In the universe of Form.]
[499] Which are the states that are indeterminate ?
When, that he may attain to the heavens of Form,
he cultivates the way thereto, and aloof from sensuous
appetites, etc.,^ enters into and abides in the First Jhana
. . . then there is contact, etc.^ Now, these . . . are
states that are good. But when, as the result of just this
^ It is difficult in the present stage of knowledge respect-
ing the Buddhist (academic) theory of the Indeterminate
and of Yipako to supply any safe reference for the elided
states here supposed to be rehearsed. The following section
(see note) seems to indicate that at least tliree more states
than those enumerated in the kinds of indeterminates just
discussed are to be included, namely, the absence of lust,
of hate, and of dulness. But the Cy. is not at all lucid
(pp. 265, 266), and breaks away into a long rambling dis-
cussion on casuistical views respecting vipTiko.
2 This highly elliptical paragraph, in which I have
supplied the third *root,' inadvertently omitted in the text,
but required by the context (see above, §§ 32-34; K.,
Asl. 267, 268), is presumably intended to show wherein
the niddesa, or descriptive exposition of certain of the
constituent states of each of the Eight Types of Kesult
differ from those given in each of the corresponding Eight
Types of Good Thoughts (^§ 1-159).
3 See § 160. * Continue as in § 160.
good karma having been wrought, having been stored up
in connexion with the universe of Form, he, aloof from
sensuous appetites, etc., enters into and abides in the First
Jhana . . . then there is contact, etc. And these . . .
are states that are indeterminate.
[500] Repeat, substituting the formulce of the remaining
Jhanas on the Fourfold System, and of all the Jhanas on the
Fivefold System,
[3. In the universe of the Formless.]
[501] Which are the states that are indeterminate ?
When, that he may attain to the heavens of the Form-
less, he cultivates the way thereto, and so, by passing
wholly beyond all consciousness of form, by the dying out
of the consciousness of sensory reaction, by turning the
attention from any consciousness of the manifold, he enters
into and abides in that frame of mind which is accom-
panied by the consciousness of a sphere of unbounded
space—even the Fourth Jhana, to gain which all sense of
ease must have been put away, etc. [continue as in § 265]
—
then the contact . . . the balance that arises, these . . .
are states that are good.^
But when, as the result of just this good karma having
been wrought, having been stored up in connexion with the
universe of the Formless, he, by passing wholly beyond all
consciousness of form, by the dying out of the conscious-
ness of sensory reaction, by turning the attention from
any consciousness of the manifold, enters into and abides
in that rapt meditation which is accompanied by the
consciousness of a sphere of unbounded space—even the
Fourth Jhana, to gain which all sense of ease must have
been put away, etc. [continue as above] . . . then the
^ In the printed text the . . . pe . . . here should be
omitted, as is done in §§ 503, 504. Omit likewise in § 502.
contact^ . . . the balance that arises, these . . . are states
that are indeterminate.
[502-504] Here follow in succession the other three * Jhanas
connected with Formless Existence' (§§ 266-268), namely
^
*
the Sphere of Infinite Intellection,' *
the Sphere of
Nothingness,' and '
the Sphere where there is neither
Perception nor Non-perception,' each having the Fourth
Jhana as its '
result,' as in the formula stated in § 501.
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