Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
4. Of Assurance.
Controverted Point.—That one who has not made sure
has the insight for entering the Path of Assurance.
1
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Uttarapathakas, at present
hold this view on these grounds : The Exalted One judged that 'anyone
who will enter on the right Path of Assurance
2
is capable of pene-
trating the Truths.' Therefore only the average worldling who has
not made sure has the religious insight requisite for entering.
[1] Th.—If one who has not made sure has the insight
for entering the Path of Assurance, then his opposite—one
who has made sure—must have the insight for not entering
it.
3
If you deny, your proposition falls through. If, by it,
you maintain that one who has made sure has not the in-
sight for not entering that Path, then you imply that one
who has not made sure has not the insight for entering
iihereon. Which, by your proposition, is wrong.
[2] Again, if one who has not made sure has the insight
for entering the Path of Assurance, do you then admit that
one who has made sure is in the same intellectual stage?
4
You deny. And if you admit, on the contrary, that one
who has made sure has not [i.e., no longer] the insight
1
' Assurance (niyama) is a synonym of the Path ' [to Arahant-
ship].—Comy. The expression 'made sure,' niyato , is applied to
those who have entered on it, and are ' assured of' eventual attainment.
2
Sammatta-niyama . Cf . Samyutta-Nik, iii. 225 (the last
•clause is different) ; and Anguttara-Nik., i. 121.
3
Literally, for entering the opposite path of non-assurance.
4
'Inasmuch as for the initial purpose of the Path he no longer
.needs the requisite insight.'—Comy.
T.S. V.
for entering, then you must surely deny that insight also
to one who has not made sure.
[3] Again, in affirming that one who has not made sure
has the insight for entering the Path of Assurance, do you
admit that he has also the insight for not entering it?
You deny, that is, you affirm he has not the insight for
not entering it. Do you equally admit then that he has not
the insight for entering it ? You deny. . . 1
[4] Does your proposition mean that there is a Path of
Assurance for one who has not made sure of entering?
2
You deny. Yet you admit that there is insight for enter-
ing upon it! Does this insight consist in applications of
mindfulness and all the other factors of Enlightenment ?
You must deny, and [5] affirm that there is no such
Assurance. How then can your proposition stand ?
[6] You do not grant to one who is only in the prior
stage of adoption3
the insight of the First Path? Or to
one who is practising for the insight of the First . . .
Fourth Fruition the insight of that Fruition ? How then
can you allow the insight of entering on the Path of
Assurance to one who has not made sure ?
[7] U.—If I am wrong, you must on the other hand
admit that the Exalted One knows that a person, M or N,
will enter the true Path of Assurance, and is capable of
penetrating the Truths.
1
We have given a full, if slightly free, rendering of this curious,
bout of ancient dialectic. At the end of each section the sectary is
brought up against the same rejoinder, compelling him either to.
contradict his proposition or to withdraw it, This may be shown
diagrammatically, A=one-who-has-made-sure ; B, entering-on-the-
'Path'; C, insight-for; a, b, c standing for the respective contradictories.
We then get,
§1: aBC (thesis), AbC, Abc, aBc
§2: aBC, ABC, ABc, aBc
§3: aBC, abC, abc, aBc
2
The Path proper being reserved for one who has made sure.
3
Gotrabhu puggalo . See V. 1, § 1.
5. Of Analytic Insight
1
Controverted Point.—That all knowledge is analytic.
From the Commentary.—It is a belief of the Andhakas that in an
Ariyan (that is, one who has 'made sure,'
is in some Stage of the Path or
Way) all 'knowledge' whatsoever is supramundane or transcendental.
2
Hence they conclude that it is also analytic.
[1] Th.—Then you must admit that popular knowledge
is analytic—which you deny. For if you assent, then all who
have popular, conventional knowledge, have also acquired
analytic insight—which you deny. The same argument
holds good i f 'knowledge in discerning the thought of
another' be substituted for 'popular . . . knowledge.'
3
[2] Again, if all knowledge is analytic, then a fortiori
all discernment is analytic. Or, if you can assent to that,
you must therewith admit that the discernment of one
who attains Jhana by any of the elemental, or colour
'artifices,' who attains any of the four more abstract
Jhanas, who gives donations, who gives to the Order any
of the four necessaries of life, is analytic. But this you
deny.
[3] A.—If I am wrong, you admit that there is such
a thing as [spiritual or] supramundane discernment;
is that not analytic ?
Th.—That I do not deny.
4
A.—Then my proposition is true.5
1
Patisambhida , or analysis; literally, 'resolving, continued
breaking-up.' On the four branches in this organon, see Appendix:
Patisambhida .
2
See p. 134, n. 4.
3
See pp. 180, 181.
4
The Theravadin does not of course mean that all 'supramundane'
knowledge is analytic. There is analytic, and there is intuitive supra-
mundane knowledge.
5
Namely, for Ariyans. This is another little joust of logomachy :
What is the extension of the term nana, knowledge (see II . 2) ? And
what is the nature of an 'Ariyan' ?
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