Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
BOOK XV
1. Of Correlation as specifically fixed.
Controverted Point.—That one phenomenon can be re-
lated to another in one way only.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Mahasanghikas, hold that
if anything be correlated to another as its moral condition or motive
(hetu),1
it is not correlated to that other by way of [subject-]object,
or of contiguity, or of immediate succession.2 Or again, if anything
be correlated to another as its object, it is not correlated to that other
by way of contiguity, or immediate succession.
[1] Th.—Bat take the attitude of investigation,3 is not
that correlated both as moral condition and as dominance ?
You assent. Then your proposition falls through.
Again, is not predominant desire-to-do the dominant
factor in coexistent mental states? If so, we ought to
admit a dual correlation by way of [i.] dominance, [ii.] co-
existence. [2] The same holds wfren energy is the dominant
factor. Or if dominant energy be considered as 'controlling
power' or faculty (indriya) , we ought to admit a dual
correlation by way of dominance and controlling power.
Or if we consider dominant energy as a factor of the Path,4
we ought to admit a dual correlation by way of dominance
and path or means (magga). [3] The same holds when
apperception4 is the dominant factor. Or if dominant con-
sciousness be considered as nutriment (or cause, ahara) ,
1
See Compendium, p. 279 f .
2
Ibid., 191, § 7.
3
Vimangsa. Ibid., 177, n. 3. This in terms of hetu is
amoha=panna=intelligence, understanding, insight.
4
Citta in this connection is an abbreviation for javana-citta,
apperceptional consciousness.
we ought to admit a dual correlation by way of dominance
and nutriment. [4] The argument holds when we consider
conscious dominance as controlling power, or investigation
as a dominant factor, or, again, as part of the Path, or
means.
Once more, if, on adequately revering an Ariyan
phenomenon,1 reflection arises having that phenomenon
as its dominant object, we ought here to admit the dual
relation—dominance and object.
[5] Or again, if this or that previous moral consciousness
be related to this or that subsequent moral consciousness
as consecutive, and is also repeated, have we not to admit
here the dual correlation of contiguity and repetition ?2
[6] The same being valid for immoral states ? [7] The
same correlation being valid if, for moral, or immoral, we
substitute ' inoperative' or 'unmoral' states ?
[8] M:—Nevertheless, you admit the definitely distinct
modes of correlation, such as 'moral condition, or hetu, '
contiguity, immediate succession? Then surely my pro-
position is right.
2. Of 'Reciprocal3 Correlation.
Controverted Point—That whereas actions are conditioned
by ignorance, we may not stay that ignorance is conditioned
by actions.
1
Dhamma ; i.e., a Path, a Fruit, Nibbana, corruptions ex-
tirpated, or not yet extirpated. On this specific culture see Com-
pendium, pp. 58, 69.
2
Asevana , from asevati , to serve over and over again (a + si,
or si, to bind, hence to be a pendant, or dependent), is a difficult term to
translate. In the Compendium (p. 192, § 12) we used ' succession/ but
repetition, or even retention, is in some respects better. The Burmese
translators render by 'repetition so as to form a habit' ; hence,
habitual repetition.
3
Anna-m-anna, or one-another. The discourse shows that a
classification of relations in recent philosophy has been anticipated.
See Hon. Bertrand Russell's Our Knowledge of the External World,
etc., London, 1914, p. 47. See Appendix: Paccaya.
From the Commentary.—This view, held, for instance, by the
Mahasanghikas, is met by the opposite doctrine that there is a
reciprocal conditioning obtaining between ignorance and actions, and
so on.1
[1] Th.—But is not ignorance coexistent with action ?2
If so, here is a reciprocal correlation [namely, of coexist-
ence].
[2] Again, ' grasping is conditioned by craving.' Now, is
it wrong to say that craving is conditioned by grasping ?3
Yes, you say. But the argument above is valid here also.
[3] M.—'Birth, bhikkhus, is conditioned by decay and
death, the tendency to become is conditioned by birth'—is
the Suttanta thus ?
Th.—No.
M.—Neither is the reciprocal conditioning correlation
between ignorance and activities reciprocal, nor that be-
tween craving and grasping.
[4] Th.— 'Mind and body, bhikkhus, are conditioned by
rebirth-consciousness, and this by mind and body'—is the
Suttanta thus ?4
M.—Yes.
Th.—Then the conditioning relation may be reciprocal.
3 .Of Duration.5
Controverted Point.—That duration is predetermined.
From the Commentary.—Taking the word duration (addha ) in
the sense of period of time, they6 who hold this opinion base it on the
1
Namely, in the Paticca-samuppada formula; see VI. 2.
2
Sankharena. 'Here only non-meritorious activity is meant.
The correlation between this and ignorance may he analyzed into
"related by way of co-existence, reciprocity, presence, continuance,
association."'—Comy.
3
Here 'grasping' excludes kama-grasping (which=tanha).—
Comy. On the four 'graspings' see Bud. Psy. Eth., pp. 323 f .
4
Samyutta-Nik., iii. 114.
5
The opponent evidently uses addha . in this sense, suggestive of
M. Bergson's concept of time.
6
No adherents are named. Possibly the Andhakas. See above, XI. 8.
Sutta quoted below. The argument seeks to show that no interval
whatever is predetermined,, except as mere time-notion. But matter,
etc., when meaning the five aggregates (bodily and mental) is pre-
determined.
[1] Th.—Then must duration be one of the five aggre-
gates, which of course it is not. This holds good whether
you take past,1 [2] future, or present duration. [3] Now,
you say that any past aggregate, bodily or mental, consti-
tutes past duration; any future, any present aggregate,
future or present duration respectively. Then are there
five past durations, five future, five present durations ? . . .
[4] fifteen durations in all? Or, if they are regarded as
twelve past, future, present organs-and-objects-of-sense,
are there thirty-six durations in all ? . . .
[5] Or if we consider them as eighteen elements, are
there fifty-four durations? or as controlling powers,2 are
there sixty-six durations?
[6] Opp.—But was it not said by the Exalted One:
'There are these three subjects of discourse,3 bhikkhus—
which are the three ? One may talk about past time :
" Thus was it in times past." Or abo ut future time : " Thus
will it be in future times" Or about the present: "Thus is
it now at present "' ? 4
Hence surely duration is predetermined ?
1
Insert Amanta in PTS edition.
2
See above, p. 15 f .
3
Kathavatthuni .
4 Anguttara-Nik., i. 197. Cf. p. 95, § 60
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