OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
II. COMPARATIVE INQUIRY.
Comparison with other Realities, simply treated.
2
[17] Th.—Is the person known in the sense o f a real
and ultimate fact, and is material quality3 also known in
the sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
•P.—Yes,
Th.—Is material quality one. thing and the person
another?
P.—Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Th.—Acknowledge the refutation : If the person and
material quality be each known in the sense of real and
ultimate facts, then indeed, good sir, you should also have
admitted that they are distinct things. You are wrong to
1
This and the next two sections, opened by the opponent, are to be
completed as in §§ 6-10.
2
Suddhika-sacchikattha-samsandana .
3
Rupam , i.e., the material khandha , or aggregate in the con-
stituents of personality; the twenty-eight properties of matter con-
sidered as qualities of body mentally presented. On the rendering
cf. Compendium, Part VI., and p. 271 f .
admit the former proposition and not the latter. If the
latter cannot be admitted, neither should the former be
affirmed. To say that the person and material quality are
both known in the sense o f real and ultimate facts, but
that they are not mutually distinct things, is false.
[18-73] The same form of controversy is then pursued con-
cerning fifty-five other real and ultimate facts, or aspects of
them, namely :—
the other aggregates (khandha's)
[18] feeling
[19] perception 1
[20] coefficients (sankhara's)
[21] consciousness ;
the twelve sense factors
(ayatana's);
[22] the organ of sight
[23] „ of hearing
[24] „ of smell
[25] „ of taste
[26] „ of touch
[27] visible object
[28] sound
[29] odour
[30] taste
[31] tangible object
[32] mind (sensus communis)
[33] cognizable object;
the eighteen elements
[34] eye as subjective element
[35-8] ear, nose, tongue, body
as subjective element
[39-43] sights, sounds, odours, tastes, touches as objec-
tive element;
[44-8] visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile cog-
nition as subjective element,
[49] mind as subjective element,
[50] mind-cognizing as subjective element,
[51] cognizables as objective element;
1
Oil the import of this term cf. Compendium, p. 15.
2 16., p. 182, n. % 3
Ib., p. 183 f .
the twenty-two controlling powers (indriya's)
[52-7]
1
the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, \
mind as controlling power,
[58-60] female sex, male sex, life as con-
trolling power,
[61-5] pleasure, pain, joy, grief, hedonic
indifference as controlling power,
[66-70] the controlling powers: faith, \
energy, mindfulness, concentration, under-
standing,
[71-8] the controlling powers [known as]
(i.) the thought, ' I shall come to know the
unknown,' (ii.) the coming to know, (iii.) the
having known. /
[74] P.—Is the person not known in the sense of a
real and ultimate fact ?
Th.—It is not.
P.—Did the Exalted One say: ' There is the person
who works for his own good?'
2
And is material quality
known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
Th.—Yes.
P.—Is material quality one thing and the person another ?
Th.—Nay, that cannot be truly said.
P.—Acknowledge this rejoinder :
3
If the Exalted One
said:
4
There is the person who works for his own good,'
and if material quality be known in the sense o f a real and
ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you should also have
admitted that material quality and the person are two
distinct things. You are wrong in admitting the truth of
the former statement while you deny that of the latter. If
material quality and person are not two distinct facts, then
neither can you also saytthat the Exalted One predicated
anything concerning a
4
person.' Your position is false.
4
[75-129] The controversy is now repeated with the succes-
1
Compendium, p. 175 f .
2
From a category of four sorts of persons (puggala) , occurring
in three of the four (e.g., Digha, iii. 232; Majjhima, i. 341,
411; Anguttara, ii. 95), though not with the phrase Atthi, ' There is.'
3
Namely, to § 17. Complete as in §§ 3-16.
sive substitution of each of the real and ultimate facts named
in §§ 18-73 for ' material quality.'
Comparison ivith other Realities continued by
Way of Analogy.
[180] Th.—Material quality is (you have admitted)
known as a real and ultimate fact. Feeling, too, is known as
such. Now, is material quality one thing and feeling another?
P.—Yes.
Th.—Is the person known also in the sense of a real
.and ultimate fact, as material quality is known ?
P.—Yes.
Th.—Then, is material quality one thing, person another
thing ?
P.—Nay, that cannot truly be admitted.
Th.—Acknowledge the refutation : If material quality
and feeling are both known as real and ultimate facts, and
yet are two different things, then analogously, i f the person
.and material quality are both known as real and ultimate
facts, they, good sir, can equally be two different things.
Your position in admitting the first pair of propositions,
but not the second pair, is false. If you cannot admit
the second pair, neither should you have admitted the
first pair. Your position is false.
1
[131-138] The same argument is then applied to the case of
,each of the other three khandhas, substituted for feeling.
[184] The permutations of the five aggregates (khandhas)
.are proceeded ivith as in § 130, thus:
material quality and feeling
the person and material quality J are replaced by
feeling and perception,
the person and feeling J next by
feeling and the coefficients, \
the person and feeling J ' next by
feeling and consciousness, V .
the person and feeling J after which
1
TMs discourse may be completed as in §§ 2-16.
T.S. V .
perception, coefficients, and consciousness in their turn
replace feeling.
[135] Next each of the 12 Ayatanas, the 18 Dhatus, and
tlte 22 Indriyas is used in turn to illustrate the analogy, thus :
organ of sight and organ of hearing,
tbe person and organ of sight, J etc., is the first
grouping in the Ayatana-analogies, the last grouping in the
Indriya-analogies being
the controlling power of' one who has come to know,' and
that of
£
the coming to know,'
the person and the controlling power of' one who has come
to know.'
[136] P.—Material quality is known [you have ad-
mitted] in the sense o f a real and ultimate fact. Is
material quality one thing, feeling another thing ?
Th.—Yes.
P.—Was it said by the Exalted One: ' There is the
person who works for his own good ?"'
1
And is material
quality known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?
Th.—Yes.
P.—[Well then,] is material quality one thing, the
person another ?
Th.—Nay, that cannot truly be said.
P.—Acknowledge the rejoinder:
2
If material quality
and feeling are known as real, ultimate facts, and are
different things, then why are not ' the person'—a term used
by the Exalted One—and material quality also two different
things? Your position is false. You admit the truth of
the first pair of propositions, but not that of the analogous
second pair. If you deny the truth of the second pair,,
you should not admit the truth of the analogous first
pair.
(The discourse may be completed as in §. § 8-16.)
1
Cf . § 74. The opponent still assumes that the Buddha used the
word 4
puggala
J
in the sense of a permanent ultimate entity.
2 I.e., to § 180.
[187] The 'wheel' (cakka)1 of all the other ultimate
facts—other khandhas, ayatanas, etc.—now revolves about
this quotation, as it revolved in §§ 181-135.
Comparison by the Fourfold Method.
[138] Th.—Is 'the person' known in the sense of a
real and ultimate fact ?
P.—Yes.
Th.—(i.) Is material quality the person ?
P.—Nay, that cannot truly be said.
2
Th.—Acknowledge the refutation: If the former pro-
position is true, you should also, good sir, have admitted
the latter. If you cannot affirm that material quality is
the person, neither should you have admitted that the
person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.
Your position is false.
[139] Th.—You admit the former proposition, (ii.) Now,
is the person [known as being] in material quality ? (iii.) Is
it known as being apart from material quality? (iv.) Is
material quality known as being in the person ?
3
P.—Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Th.—Acknowledge the refutation : If the person is
indeed known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact,
then, good sir, you should also have admitted one of these
other three propositions. Your position is false. If you
cannot admit any one o f those three propositions [as to
where or how the person is known], then indeed, good sir,
you should not assent to the original proposition—that the
person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.
[140-141] The ' wheel' is then turned for all the remaining
' real and ultimate facts' in relation to £
person' .. . is
1
Commentarial term (pron.: chakka ) for a repeated formula.
In the text, p. 20,1. 1, read Ajanahipatikammam).
2
The opponent sees he is in danger of admitting himself a Nihilist
(ucchedavada , or materialist), and negates.—Comy.
3
The opponent here fears to assent to the sakkayaditthi , or
heresy of individuality, often condemned in the Suttas. See below,
pp. 44 n., 45 n. 3.
feeling the person ? .. . is the person . . . in feeling ? . . .
apart from feeling? .. . is feeling .. . in the person?
. . . is the organ of sight the person ? . . . and so on.
[142] P.—Is the person not known in the sense of a
real and ultimate fact ?
Th,—It is not so known.
P.—(i.) Is material quality the person ?
Th— Nay, that cannot truly be admitted.
P.—Acknowledge the rejoinder:
1
If the person is not
so known as you state, then you should have admitted
that material quality and person are the same.
2
If you
cannot admit the latter proposition, neither can you assert
the former. . . .
[143] P.—Is the person not known in the sense of a
real and ultimate fact ?
Th.—It is not so known.
P.—(ii.) Is the person known as being in material
quality? (iii.) Or as being apart from material quality?
(iv.) Or is material quality known as being in the person ?
Th.—Nay, that cannot truly be admitted.
P.—Acknowledge the rejoinder:
3
If the person is not
known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then, good
sir, you should admit that it is known [in association with
material quality] as advanced in the other propositions.
If one of these cannot be admitted, neither should you
have asserted the first proposition.
4
(This and the preceding § may be completed as in §§ 8-16.)
[144-145] The
i
wheel
9
is then turned as indicated in
§§140-141.
1
I.e., to § 138.
2
' Material quality,'or any other of the fifty-seven ultimates. If
'puggala ' is not a separate ultimate, it must be identifiable with
one of them—admitting the fact that puggal a is—did not the
Exalted One say so ?
3
I.e., to § 189.
4
It being still asserted (by P.) that puggal a is a real, etc., fact.
The Burmese editions repeat the supposed evidence given in § 74.
Associated Characteristics.
[146] Th.—Is 'the person' known in the sense o f a real
and ultimate fact ?
P.—Yes.
Th.—Is ' the person' related, or is it absolute ? Is ' the
person ' conditioned, or is it unconditioned ? Is it eternal ?
or is it temporal? Has it external features ? or is it
without any ?
P.—Nay, these things cannot truly be predicated about
it. . . . (Continue as in § 1: ' Acknowledge the refuta-
tion/ etc.
1
[147] P.—Is
4
the person' unknown in the sense of a
real and ultimate fact ?
Th.—It is.
P.—Was it said by the Exalted One: ' There is the
person who works for his own good5
. . . ?
Th.—Yes.
P.—Is the person related, or is it absolute ? conditioned
or unconditioned ? eternal or temporal ? with the marks or
without them ? ' " '
Th.—Nay, these things cannot truly be predicated
about it.
2
P.—Acknowledge, etc.
3
. . . {complete as in § 2 and in
§§3-16).
1
The text lias here the eliding . . . p e . . . The Corny. remarks :
Inasmuch as anything considered in its real, ultimate sense is, except
Nibbana, bound up in relations (p a c c a y a), happens only as con-
ditioned by relations, .arises, ceases, and has no perduring essence, and,
finally,has the character known as (leg. sankhatassa ) the reason
for happening, therefore it is asked : Has the person also these
characteristics ?
2
Because (1) as an entity ' person' is non-existent; (2) with person'
as a concrete bundle of phenomena (the ' person' of the quotation)
the original thesis is not really concerned.
3
The text again breaks of f with its . . . p e . . . (etc.).
To clear the Meaning of the Terms.
1
•
[148] Th.—Is ' the person' known, and conversely, is
that which is known the person ?
P.—The person is known. Conversely, of that which
is known some is ' person,' some is not ' person.'
Th.—Do you admit this with respect to the subject
.also: of that which is person, is some known and some
not known ?
P.—Nay, that cannot truly be said . . . (continue as
before).
[149] Th.—Does ' person' mean a reality and con-
versely ?
P.—'Person' is a reality. Conversely, reality means
in part person, in part not person.
Th.—Do you admit this with respect to the subject
also: that 'person means in part reality, in part non-
reality'?
P.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[150] Th.—Does the person exist, and conversely ?
P.—The person exists. Conversely, of the existent
some is person, some is not person.
Th.—Oi the person is some existent, some non-existent ?
P.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[151] Query repeated with an equivalent major term.
2
[152] Th.—Is person something that is, and conversely ?
XReply similar to the foregoing.)
1
An inquiry into how far the middle term, such as 'that which is
known,' is' distributed' with respect to the subject, or is coincident with
it. The Comy, explains that ke-hi-ci , ' some,' is [not instrumental,
but] equal to koci, hi being merely a particle. ' For me the person
is, and the Buddha said so, but not all that is known [as ultimately
real] is person.' The fact that 'atthi,
5
'is/ 'exists,'is not used in
Pali merely as a copula, gives the term, as meaning separate existence
in fact, not only in thought, a greater emphasis than our own 'is.'
2
Samvijjamano, an equivalent of the preceding vijjamano.
All are equivalents for upalabbhati,
£
is known,' or found.—Comy.
[153] Th:—Does the person exist, and conversely, is
that which exists not all person?1
P.—Yes.
Th.—Can you substitute 'not exist(s)' for 'exist(s)'?
P.—No. .. .
Inquiry into Term-or-Concept.
2
[154] Th.— Is one who has material quality in the
sphere of matter
3
a ' person ' ?
Yes.
Is one who experiences desires o f sense in the sphere of
sense-desire "a person5
?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[154*] Are those who have material qualities in the
sphere of matter ' persons' ?
Yes.
Are those who experience desires of sense in the sphere
of sense-desire ' persons' ?
1
On this section the Commentator as follows: The opponent has
just admitted that the existent [the real ultimate existent] is greater
in extension than £
soul.
7
The Theravadin, having his assent to this,
now connects it with his assertion about the Buddha's statement:
You quoted that saying:
4
There are (souls or) persons working for
their own good' . . . only on account of the term, and this you took
as implying that soul exists [as a. real ultimate]. But the Bhagava.
also said, in the Sutta Nipata (1116) : ' Consider, Mogharaja, that the
world is empty of soul (at t a).
J
. . . Hence, by the quotation, it is
as easy to deny soul (puggalo natthi) as to affirm it (puggalo
atthi) , or, to say 'that which exists not is all persons (natthi
sabbo puggalo) , as to say that 'that which exists is not all
persons' (atthi na sabbo puggalo) . The Comy, explains this
last clause as equivalent to 'some existent things are persons, some
not / The converse in English is better expressed by £
all existent
things are not persons.'
2
Pannatti . See p. 1, n.
3
Dhatu stands here, spatially considered, for loka, hence
'sphere' for 'element.' Cf. Yam, i. 374. Henceforth the text gives
only the opening of the
unnecessary.
Nay, that cannot truly be said. .. . .
[154*] Is one who is without material qualities in the
sphere of the Immaterial a
4
person'?
Yes.
Is one who experiences desires of sense in the sphere of
sense-desire a person?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. .. .
[154'] Are those who have no material qualities in the
Immaterial sphere ' persons ' ?
Yes.
Are those who experience sense-desires in the sphere of
of sense-desire ' persons' ?
Nay, that cannot truly be admitted.
[155] Th.—According to you one who has material
qualities in the sphere of matter is a
4
person'; one who has
no material qualities in the Immaterial sphere is a 'person':
does anyone deceasing from the Rupa sphere get reborn in
the Immaterial sphere ?
Yes.
Is the ' person' who had material qualites [then] anni-
hilated, and does the person with no material qualities
come into being ?
Nay, that cannot truly be admitted. .. .
Queries repeated, substituting ' being51
for 'person.'
[156] Applying the terms 'physical frame,'
2
and 'body'
3
indiscriminately to our body, are these identical, one in
meaning, the same, the same in denotation, the same in
origin ?
Yes.
1
S a 11 o. Both are equivalent expressions for
f
soul.' See § 1, n. 2.
2
Kayo , literally, as in nikayo , a group, collection, congeries.
In psychology, the whole sentient surface, organ and seat of touch.
We lack a synonym for 'body'; cf. Korper, Leib.
3
The unusual phrase kayang appiyang karitva is, in the
Comy., paraphrased by kayang appetabbang alliyapetab -
bangekibhavang upanetabbang avibhajitabbang katva
'taking [the two terms as applied to] body not in a separate but a
cohesive sense, i.e., in one and the same sense, without dis-
tinguishing.'
Are the terms ' personal entity/
1
or ' soul/
2
as applied
without distinction to the individual, identical, one in
meaning, the same, the same in denotation, the same in
origin ?
Yes.
Is ' physical frame' different from ' personal entity'
(or ' individual') ?
Yes.
Is ' soul
5
one thing, ' body5
another ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Acknowledge the refutation: If there be this identity
and coincidence between3
' physical frame ' and 'body';
and if there be this identity and coincidence between
' individual' (or personal entity) and ' soul'; if, further,
' physical frame' is different from ' individual' (or personal
entity), then indeed, good sir, it should also have been
admitted that ' soul' is different from ' body.'
You are wrong in (1) admitting the identity between
' physical frame ' and ' body/ (2) admitting the identity
between ' personal entity5
and ' soul/ (3) admitting the
difference between ' physical frame' and ' personal entity/
while (4) you deny the difference between 'body' and
' soul.'
If you cannot admit (4), neither should you have
admitted (1), (2), (8). You cannot admit (1), (2), (8), while
denying (4).
[157] P.—Are the terms ' physical frame ' and ' body '
applied to body without distinction of meaning, identical,
one in meaning, the same, the same in denotation, the
same in origin ?
Th.—Yes.
P.—Was it said by the Exalted One : ' There is the indi-
vidual [or person] who works for his own good ?'
1
Puggalo .
2
Jivo . The etymology of jivo—'living' thing—reveals, better
than our ambiguous ' soul,' the difficulty of denying jivo of a living
or live body.
3
The text here and below [§ 157] repeats the details of the identity,
intensive and extensive.
Th,— Yes.
P.—Is
4
physical frame ' one thing, ' individual' (or
4
personal entity') another ?
Th.—Nay, that cannot truly be said.
P.—Acknowledge my rejoinder r
1
If there be this identity
and coincidence between ' physical frame
5
and ' body and
if it was said by the Exalted One
4
There is the individual,
etc.
2
. . then indeed, good sir, it should also have been
admitted that ' physical frame' is one thing and ' indi-
vidual ' or ' personal entity' another. You are wrong in
admitting the first two propositions and denying the third.
If you cannot admit the third, neither should you have
admitted the first two . . . {complete the discourse as in
§§ 3-16).
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