Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
VI. ETHICAL GOODNESS.
Examination continued by Reference to Human Action, called
also ' The Section on Ethical Goodness'
[200] P.—Are ethically good and bad actions known [to
exist]?1
Th.—Yes.
P.—Are both the doer of ethically good and bad deeds,
and he who causes them to be done2 known [to exist] ?
Th.—Nay, that cannot truly be said . . .3 (complete in
the usual way, viz., that the former admission involves accept-
ance of what is denied).
[201] Th.—Admitting that ethically good and bad deeds
are known [to exist], do you assert that the doer and the
instigator are also known [to exist] ?
P.—Yes.
Then is he who made the doer, or inspired the instigator,
known [to exist] ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said.4 . . .
I ask you again.
Yes.5
But if the one be thus maker, etc., of the other, is there
then no making an end of ill, no cutting of f the cycle of life
renewed, no final Nibbana without residual stuff of life?6
1 This might, less literally, run : Are there such things as ethically
good, etc., actions ? Sceptical views in the age of the Nikayas denied
the inherent goodness and badness of conduct—denied their happy and
painful results. These are stated in Abhidhamma also.— Bud. Psych.
Ethics, § 1215, p. 825, n. 1; Vibhanga, p. 392.
2 I.e., by commanding, instructing, and other methods.—Corny.
3 I.e., not as a persisting, identical, personal entity.
4 Denial from fear of the heresy of creation by a god (Anguttara-
Nik.,i. 173 f.; Vibhanga, 367).—Corny.
5 Assented to because parents 'make' doers, teachers also.—Corny.
6 The idea is that ' each previous soul would be the inevitable maker
of its successor.'—Corny.
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
If good and bad deeds are known [to take place], is the
doer, is the instigator, of those deeds known to exist ?
Yes.
Is the person or soul known to exist, and his maker or
inspirer also ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat my question:—if good and bad deeds. . . .
Yes.
Then is Nibbana [also] known to exist, and the maker
and the maker's maker as well ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Then, again, if these things be as you say, is the earth
known to exist, and its maker and his maker also ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Or the ocean ?—or Sineru, chief of mountains ?—or
water?—or fire?—or air?—or grass, brush, and forest?
and the maker of each and his maker also ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Again, if good and bad deeds being known to exist, doer
and instigator are also known to exist, are those deeds one
thing, and doer and instigator quite another thing ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said.
1
. . .
[202] P.—Is the effect of ethically good and bad deeds
known to take place ?
Th.—Yes.
P.—Is one who experiences the effect of such deeds
known to exist ?
Th.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. .. .
[203] Th.—Admitting that both these propositions are
true, is one who enjoys the first-named person known to
exist? ,
P.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Th.—1 repeat the question.
1
Denied lest assent be shown to the heresy: the soul is that which
has mental properties or co-efficients (cf. Majjh.-N., i. 299: Bud.
Psych. Eth., p. 257 f).—Corny.
P.—Yes.
1
Th.—If the one and the other be so, is there no making
an end of ill, no cutting of f the cycle o f life renewed,
no final Nibbana without residual stuff o f life ?
P.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Th.—Again, admitting both those propositions to be true,
does the person exist, and the en j oyer o f that person also
exist?
2
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Again, admitting both those propositions to be true, is
Nibbana known to exist, and one who experiences it also ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Or again, is the earth, the ocean, Sineru chief of moun-
tains, water, fire, air, grass, brush, and forest, known to
exist, and one who experiences any of them known also to
exist ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
3
Or [finally] is the result of ethically good and bad deeds
one thing and he who experiences those results another ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
4
[204] P.—Is celestial happiness known to exist ?
Th.—Yes.
P.—Is one who is experiencing celestial happiness known
to exist ?
Th.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[205] Th:—Assuming both propositions to be true, is
one who enjoys that experiencer known to exist?
P.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. .. .
1
Eeflecting that a mother may embrace her child, a wife her husband,
who has experienced, or felt, and thus meet the question.—Corny.
2
If effects be not only external phenomena, if one subjectively
experiencing, or enjoying them be assumed, this enjoyer, now as
himself in turn an effect, would be enjoyed by another experiencer.
In this. way there would be an endless series of persons or souls
(puggala parampara).—Corny.
3
It is not clear why the P. should here negate. The Corny, adds
that these questions are put with ordinary meaning (samannena).
Cf . p. 46, n. 1.
4
Lest he be accused of that feature in the heresy of individuality:
The soul has feeling.'—See 56 (fol.), n. 1.
I repeat the question.
Yes.
If the one and the other be so, is there no making an
end of ill, no cutting of f the cycle of life, no final Nibbana
without residual stuff of life ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Again, assuming both those propositions to be true, is the
person known to exist and the en j oyer o f the person also ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Again, assuming that celestial happiness and those en-
joying it are both known to exist, is Nibbana known, and
one enjoying it known also to exist?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Or again, assuming as before, are the earth, the ocean,
Sineru chief of mountains, water, fire, air, grass, brush, and
forest known to exist and those enjoying them ?
1
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Or again, assuming as before, is celestial happiness one
thing, the en j oyer another thing?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[206] P.—Is human happiness known to exist?
Th.—Yes.
Is the enjoyer of human happiness known to exist ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. , . .
[207] Th.—Is both human happiness and the enjoyer
of it known to exist ?
P.—Yes.
Is one who enjoys the enjoyer known to exist ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat my question.
Yes. ' " . '
If the one and the other be so, is there no making an
end of ill, no cutting of f the cycle of life, no final Nibbana
without residual stuff of life ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
(The dialogue is then completed, as in § 205, on celestial
happiness.)
i As such they are objects of consciousness, but not subjective
ultimates.—Corny.
[208] P.—Is the misery of the lower planes1 known to
exist ?
Th.—Yes.
Is the experiencer of that misery known to exist ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. .. .
[209] Th.—Do you admit both these propositions ?
P.—Yes.
Is the enjoyer of the sufferer of that misery known to
exist ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat my question.
Yes.
If the one and the other be so, is there no making an
end of ill, etc.? (complete in full as in §§ 205, 207).
[210, 211] Th.—Is the misery of purgatory known ?
(iComplete as in § § 204, 205, 207.)
[212] Th.—Are ethically good and bad acts (karmas)
known to exist ? And the doer of them also ? And the
instigator also? And the enjoyer of the effect—is he also
known to exist ?
P.—Yes.
Is he who does the acts the same as he who experiences
the effect ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said.^ . . .
I repeat my question.
Yes
3
Then, are happiness and misery self-caused ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Then, admitting you still assent to my first propositions,
is the doer a different [person] from the enjoyer [of the
effect]?
1
Apaya , i.e., purgatory, animal kingdom, Petas, or unhappy,
hungry' shades,' and Asuras, or titans.
2
He fears to contradict the Suttas.—See Samyutta Nik., ii. 94 ;
' To say, one-and-the-same both acts and is affected by the result, is
not true.'—Corny.
3
In the Suttas it is said: he has pleasure both here and hereafter.
—-Corny.
Nay, that cannot truly be said.
1
. . .
I repeat my question.
Yes.
2
Then, are happiness and misery caused by another ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Admitting you still assent to the first propositions, does
the same and another do the deeds, does the same and
another enjoy (the results) ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. .. .
I repeat my question.
Yes.
Then is happiness and is misery both self-caused and
produced by another ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. .. .
Admitting that you still assent to the first propositions,
does neither the same [person] both do the deeds and
experience the results, nor one [person] do the deeds and
another experience the results ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat my question.
Yes, neither the same, nor two different persons.
Then are happiness and misery not self-causing nor
caused by something else?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. .. .
Admitting, finally, that you still assent to the first propo-
sitions, namely, that ethically good and bad actions ; as well
as the doer of them, and the instigator of the doer, are known
to exist, [I have now asked you four further questions :]
(1) Is he who does the act the same as he who experi-
ences the effect ? .
(2) Are doer and experiencer two different persons ?
(3) Are they the same and also different persons ?
(4) Are they neither the same nor different persons ?
[You have answered to each:] No. [I have then repeated
1
Samyutta-Nik., ii. 94: ' To say, one acts, another reaps the fruit,.
is not true.'
2
Fancying that as deva he surely enjoys the result of his actions -
when a man.—Corny.
the question. You have then said] : Yes. I have then
put four questions:
(1) Are happiness and misery self-caused ?
(2) Are they the work of another ?
(3) Are they both one and the other ?
(4) Are they, arising through a cause, self-caused, or the
work of another ? [And you have replied]: No. . . .
[213] P.—Is there such a thing as karma (action taking
effect)?
Th—Yes.
P.—Is there such a thing as a maker of karma ?
Th.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. .. .
[214] Th.—Is there such a thing as both karma and
the maker of karma ?
P.—Yes.
Is there a maker of that maker?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat the question.
Yes.
Then if the one and the other exist, is there no making
an end of ill, no cutting of the cycle of life, no final
Nibbana without residual stuff of life?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Again, since you assent to both the first propositions, is
1)here both a person and a maker of the person ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Or . . . is there both Nibbana and*a maker thereof? . . .
or the earth, ocean, Sineru, water, fire, air, grass, brush and
.forest, and the maker thereof ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. .. .
.. . Or is karma one thing, the maker of it another? .
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[215] P.—Is there such a thing as result of action ?
•Th.—Yes. '
P.—Is there such a thing as an enjoyer of the result?
Th.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
T.S. v.
[216] Th.—Do you maintain then that there are both
results and enjoyer thereof?
P.—Yes.
Is there an enjoyer of that enjoyer?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. .. .
I repeat my question.
Yes.
Then, if this and that be so, is there no making an end
of ill, no . . . etc. (complete in full similarly to § 214, and
ending:—)
You maintaining that there is both result and en j oyer
thereof, is then result one thing, and the enjoyer of it
another?
Nay, that cannot truly be said . . . (complete as usual).
VII. SUPERNORMAL POWER.
Examination into 'Soul' continued by reference to Super-
intellectual Power.
[217] P.—Is it wrong to say ' the person [or soul]
is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact' ?
Th.—Yes.
P.—Have there not been those who could transform
themselves by magic potency ?
1
Th.—Yes.
pB—if that be so, then indeed, good sir, it is right to
say ' the person [or soul] is known in the sense of a real
and ultimate fact.' Again, have there not been those who
could hear sounds by the element of celestial hearing, .
or know the mind of another, or remember previous lives,
1
On iddhi , and this kind of it, called vikubbana-iddhi
see Compendium, p. 61; Patisambhida-magga, ii. 210 ; Atthasalini,
91; Visuddhi-magga, ch. xii. The opponent fancies a soul or inner
principle can achieve magical efficacy only with respect to such
matter as is bonnd up with human power of control. In the third
question are enumerated the other five forms of the so-called chal -
abbinna , or 'sixfold super-knowledge.'—Corny.
or see visible objects by the celestial eye, or realize the
destruction of the 'intoxicants' ?
Th,—Yes.
P.—If these things be so, then indeed, good sir, it is
right to say 4
the person is known in the sense of a real
and ultimate fact.'
[218] Th.—Granting that there have been those who
could transform themselves by magic potency, is it for that
reason that the person is known in the sense of a real and
ultimate fact ?
P.—Yes.
Th.—When one has through magic potency transformed
himself, was he then the personal entity, and not when
not so transforming himself ?
P.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
This question is asked, and so answered, in the case of the
other five modes ,of super-intellectual faculty named above.
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