Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
4. Of Ill (dukkha) and Sentient Organisms.
Controverted Point.—That Ill is wholly bound up with
sentience.
From the Commentary.—'Ill' [dukkha ] must be understood in
two ways: as bound up with and as not bound up with life
[indriya's] , According to the former, Ill is referred to the seat of
suffering; according to the latter, Ill covers liability to trouble through
the law of impermanence with its ' coming to be and passing away.'
But the Hetuvadins, for instance, do not draw this distinction. They
hold that painful sentience alone constitutes that dukkha , to under-
stand which the holy life, according to the teachings of the Exalted
One, is led.
[1] Th.—But you commit yourself to saying this: that
only that which is bound up with sentience is impermanent,
and conditioned, has arisen through a cause, is liable to
perish, to pass away, to lose desire, to cease, to change.1
But are not all these terms suitable to insentient things?2
You assent; but you refute your proposition in so doing.
[2] You mean, do you not, that what is not bound up
with sentience is impermanent, etc., and yet is not Ill.3
But if you call 'what is bound up with sentience' equally
impermanent, etc., must you not also say that 'this is not
ill.' ? If you deny, [and by your proposition you must
deny], then must you not contrariwise include ' that which
is not bound up with sentient life' under the notion of what
'is ill' ?
[3] Did not the Exalted One call whatever is imperma-
nent Ill ? And is not the insentient also impermanent ?
[4] H. — You deny the accuracy of my proposition.4
1
These all making up the content of the idea of Ill or sorrow or
suffering. Cf. Ledi Sadaw, JPTS, 1914, p. 133.
2
E.g., the earth, a hill, a rock, are insentient, and also impermanent.
—Comy.
3
Br. omits 'not.'
4
'Insentient objects cause both physical pain (dukkha) and
grief (domanassa ) to a sentient subject; for instance, fire in hot
weather, or air in cold weather. Again, the destruction of property,
etc., is always a source of mental pain. Hence the insentient may
be called " Ill" even without a reference to the idea of impermanence ;
but as they are not produced by karma and corruption, they cannot be
said to constitute the Ariyan fact of " Ill." Moreover, the destruction
of grass, wood, etc., and of such physical things as seed, etc., does not
constitute the Ariyan fact of the "cessation of Ill." It is the
sentient that is both Ill and also an Ariyan fact. But the insentient
is the former only, and not the latter. The Theravadin in denying
the Hetu va. din's proposition shows this difference.'—Comy.
But you are thereby committed to this: that just as the
higher life is lived under the Exalted One for understand-
ing Ill as bound up with sentient life, it is also lived for
the purpose of understanding Ill that is not bound up with
sentient life.
Th.—Nay, that cannot truly be said.
H.—And you are further committed to this : that just as
Ill that is bound up with sentient life, once it is thoroughly
understood, does not again arise, neither does it again arise
when it is not bound up with sentient life and is thoroughly
understood.
You deny1 . . . but I hold my proposition stands.
5. Of 'save only the Ariyan Path.'
Controverted Point.—That save only the Ariyan Path, all
other conditioned things may be called ' I1L'
From the Commentary.—This is held by such as the Hetuvadins,
because the Ariyan Path was stated by the Exalted One in the Four
Truths as 'a course going to the cessation of Ill.'2
[1] Th.—Then you call the Cause of Ill3 also Ill? If
you deny, you cannot maintain your proposition. If you
assent, do you mean that there are but three Truths?4 If
you deny, your proposition falls. If you assent, do you not
contradict the words of the Exalted One, that the Truths
are four—Ill, Cause of Ill , Cessation of Ill , Way going to
the Cessation of Ill ?
[2] If now you admit that the Cause of Ill is also Ill , in
what sense do you judge it to be so ?
1
Albeit the Theravadin makes these two denials, it is nevertheless
orthodox to include impermanent insentient things in the category
of Ill . Hence his denials must not be taken as proving the opponent's
proposition.—Comy.
2
In his first sermon, Buddhist Suttas (SBE, XI.), 148 f.; Vinaya
Texts, i. 95 ; also in the Nikayas, passim.
3 The Second Truth.
4 I.e., are the First and Second equal to each other?
H.—In the sense of impermanence.
Th.—But the Ariyan Path, is that impermanent ?
H.—Yes.
Th.—Then is not that also Ill ? . . .
You say then that the Path is impermanent but not Ill ,
while the Cause of Ill is both impermanent and Ill . [It is
impossible for you to maintain such a position]. . . .
[3] H.—But if the Path be ' a way going to the cessation
of Ill, ' I maintain that, when we speak of all other con-
ditioned things as Ill , this Ariyan Path is excepted.
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