Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
6. Of inducing [Insight] by saying 'Sorrow!'
Controverted Point.—That induction [of insight] by the
word 'sorrow!' is a factor of an'd included in the Path.
From the Commentary.—An opinion of the Pubbaseliyas is that
repeating the word 'dukkha! ' induced insight (nanang) , and was
thus a factor and part of the Path [of salvation].
1
They admit it as
true for those only who are qualified to win insight (vipassaka).
Th. Then you must also affirm that all who utter that
word are practising2
the Path, which is absurd.
Or if you do affirm this, notwithstanding, then you must
also affirm that the average foolish person, in uttering that
word, is practising the Path, and, again, that matricides,
parricides, murderers o f Arahants, those that shed blood
[of Buddhas], those that cause schism in the Order, in
uttering the word ' sorrow !' are practising the Path, which
is absurd.
7. Of the Duration of Consciousness.
3
Controverted Point.—That a single [unit of] consciousness
lasts for a day.
From the Commentary.—The Theravadin puts this question to correct
the belief of the Andhakas, whose secession is narrated above, that,
judging by the apparent continuity both of consciousness in Jhana
and of sub-consciousness, a single state of consciousness lasted for a
length of time,
[1] Th.—If your proposition is true, does one-half of the
day belong to the 'nascent moment,' and one-half to the
1
I.e., the Four-staged Path : Stream-Winning, etc., not the Ariyan
Eightfold Path. Cf. Dhamma-sangani, §§ 283-92. (This is incor-
rectly stated to be the latter path in the translation, p. 84, n. 1.)
2
Bhaventi , making to become, developing.
3
In the appended title, p. 208, of PTS text, read cittatthiti -
katha, as in the Commentary.
'cessant moment'?1 You say no; but you have im-
plied it. A similar admission is involved in affirming
that a state of consciousness lasts two days, or four days
or eight, ten, or twenty days, or a month, or two, four,
eight, or ten months, or a year, or any number of years, or
any number of aeons.
[2] Are there other phenomena beside mind which arise
and cease many times during one day? Yes, you say?
Then do you contend that they come and go as quickly as
mind? If you say no, then your proposition falls. If
you say they do, was it not said by the Exalted One: ' I
consider, bhikkhus, that there is no phenomenon that comes
and goes so quickly as mind. It is not easy to find a simile
to show ho w quickly mind comes and goes' ?2
Again : 'Just as a monkey faring through the dense forest
catches one bough, and, letting it go, catches another, and then
another, even so, bhikkhus, with what is called thought, or
mind, or consciousness, by day as by night, one arises tvhen
another perishes' ?3
[4] [Take the content of a state of consciousness:]
does any visual consciousness or other sense-consciousness
last a whole day, or any bad thought, such as conscious-
ness accompanied by passion, hate, ignorance, conceit,
error, doubt, sloth, distraction, impudence, or indiscretion ?
If not, then neither can consciousness be said to last a
day.
[5] Does one hear, smell, taste, touch, apprehend men-
tally by means of the same [unit of] consciousness as one
sees? Or see, hear, etc., or touch by means of the same
[unit of] consciousness as one apprehends mentally ? You
1
Any citta (unit of consciousness) came to be orthodoxly con-
sidered as consisting of three ' moments': nascent, static, cessant.
This grew apparently out of the older twofold division of nascent
(uppada) and cessant (vaya, bhanga) , such as is here alone
adduced.
2
Anguttara-Nik., i. 10.
3
Samyutta-Nik., ii. 95. Cf . Hume: perceptions ' succeed each
other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and
movement. . . (p. 534, Green and Grose ed.).
say 'no.' Then you cannot affirm that one [and the same
unit of ] consciousness lasts a whole day.
[6] Similarly, if you deny that one moves backward with
the same [unit of ] consciousness as one moves forward,
and vice versa, you cannot affirm your proposition. A
similar argument applies to looking backward, looking
forward, and to bending, extending by means of the same
unit of consciousness.
1
[7] In the case of the devas who have reached the realm
of space-infinity, does any unit of consciousness last their
whole lifetime ? You affirm it does, yet you deny a similar
duration in the case of humanity. You deny it also in the
case of all devas o f the plane of sense-desires, and of all
devas o f the higher or Exipa plane,
2
why not of those of
the first-named non-Eupa plane?
[8] You affirm, I say, this duration of a unit of conscious-
ness during the 20,000 geons o f the Arupa-deva's life, yet
you deny an analogous duration in a unit o f human con-
sciousness, lasting, say, for 100 years, and you deny it in
the case of all those devas o f the Kamaloka and Rupaloka,
whose lifetime varies from 500 years in the Four Great
Kings to 16,000 ©ons of years in the senior3 devas.
[9] A.—Does then the mind o f the devas who have
reached the plane o f space-infinity arise and cease moment
by moment ?
Th.—It does.
1
Cf. again Hume's unconscious plagiarism : ' Our eyes cannot turn
in their sockets without varying our perceptions. Our thought is still
more variable than our sight; . . . nor is there any single power of
the soul which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one
moment . . . several perceptions successively make their appearance ;
pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures
and situations' (p. 534, Green and Grose ed.).
2
The groups of devas are all enumerated in the text: of the heavens
of the Four Kings, of the Thirty-Three, of the Yama's, of Delight, etc.,
of the Brahmas, etc., as enumerated in the accurately preserved
tradition recorded in the Compendium, pp. 138, 142.
3
Literally, the non-younger devas. Cf. Compendium, pp. 140, 142.
A.—But do these devas themselves decease, and are they
reborn moment by moment ?
Th.—Nay, that .cannot truly be said.
A.—Surely this momentary living and dying is involved
in the momentary happening of consciousness ?
[10] Th.—But if you affirm that in the case of these
devas a unit of consciousness lasts as long as they live,
then you must also admit that they die with the same unit
of consciousness as that wherewith they are reborn ; but
you are not prepared to admit this. .. .
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