Monday, June 13, 2011

Kathavatthu - Of Insight into the Future, Of Knowledge of the Present, Of Knowing Others' Fruition

Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A

8. Of Insight into the Future.
Controverted Point.—That there is knowledge of the
future.
From the Commentary.—The future includes both what will happen
proximately and what is not just proximate. Concerning the former
there is absolutely no knowledge, any more than there is of what is in-
cluded in a single track or moment of cognition. But some, like the
Andhakas, incline to a belief that knowledge concerning any part of
the future is possible.
[1] Th.—If we can know about the future [in general],
it must be [as in other knowledge] through knowing its
root, condition, cause, source, origin, upspringing, support,
1
basis, correlation, genesis. But you deny that we know
the future thus. . . .
2
[2] And it must be [as in other knowledge] through
knowing how it will be correlated by condition, base, pre-
dominance, contiguity, and immediate contiguity.3 But
you deny here again. .. .
[8] Again, i f you are right, one in the stage o f adoption
has insight into the First Path, one in the First Path has
insight into the First Fruition, and so on. But you deny
here again. . . .
[4] A.—If I am wrong, is there not a Suttanta in which
the Exalted One said : ' To Patna, Ananda, three disasters
will happen: by fire or by water or by rupture of friend-
ship ' ?4 Surely then the future may be known.

1
Literally, 'food.'
2
Presumably, the belief was in an intuitive vision, and not in a
process of inference. The ten terms are the 'root ' and its nine
synonyms of the First Book in the Yamaka, I, p. 13.
3
These are the time-relations assigned in the doctrine of Relations
detailed in the Patthana, or last book of the Abhidhamma-Pitaha.
4
Dialogues, ii. 92. The orthodox position seems to have been, that
whereas events indefinitely future may be foretold through a super-
man's intuition, the exact nature of molecular, or psychical, vital
change at any given moment is unpredictable. Cf. M. Bergson on this
point; Creative Evolution, ch. i., p. 6 passim.


9. Of Knowledge of the Present
Controverted Point— That the present may be known.
From the Commentary.—Because of the Word: When all pheno-
mena are seen to be impermanent, the insight itself, as a phenomenon,
is also seen to be impermanent, some, as the Andhakas, have the
opinion that there is knowledge of the entire present, without distinc-
tion. Now if there be such knowledge, it [as present] must take place
at the present instant through itself. But because two knowledges
cannot be simultaneous in the one self-conscious subject, knowledge
of the present cannot be known by the same act of knowledge.
1
[1] Th.—If there be a knowledge of the present, does
one know that knowledge by the same act o f knowledge ?
If you deny, your proposition must fall. If you assent, I
ask: Does one know that he knows the present by that
same act of knowledge ? You deny, and your previous
assertion falls. If you assent, I ask : Is the conscious act
of knowing the object of the knowledge? You deny, and
your previous assertion falls. If you assent, then you
imply that one touches contact by the contact, feels feeling
by that feeling, wills volition by that volition. So for the
initial and the sustained application of thought. So for
zest, for mindfulness, for understanding. You imply that
one cuts a sword with that sword; an axe with that axe;
a knife with that knife; an adze with that adze; that one
sews a needle with that needle; handles the tip of a finger
with that finger; kisses the tip of the nose with that nose;
handles the head with that head; washes of f impurity with
that impurity.
[2] A.—I am wrong then? But when all things are
seen as impermanent, is not that knowledge also seen as
impermanent ? Surely then I am right.

1
In other words, self-consciousness is really an act of retrospection,
and its object is not present, but past.


10. Of Knowing Others' Fruition.
Controverted Point.—That a disciple can have knowledge
concerning fruition.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Andhakas, have held that,
since it was said that both the Bnddhas and their disciples teach beings
the doctrine of the attainment of Ariyan fruition, disciples can, like
the Buddhas, state that this or that being has won some Fruit. Now
if that were so, they could also, by their insight, give details concerning
that attainment. But they cannot.
[1] Th.—This implies that a disciple can make known
the property of each fruit;
1
that he possesses a knowledge
of the different degrees of development in fruitions, control-
ling powers, personalities; [2] that he possesses a concep-
tion of aggregates, sense-fields, elements, truths, controlling
powers, personality ; [8] that he is a Conqueror, a Teacher,
a Buddha Supreme, omniscient, all-seeing, Master of the
Norm, the Norm-Judge of appeal; [4] that he is one who
causes a "Way to spring up where no Way was, one who
engenders a Way not engendered; proclaims a Path not
proclaimed, knows the Path, is conversant with the Path, is
expert in the Path. All of which of course you deny. . . .
[5] A.—Yet you deny that the disciple lacks insight.
Surely then he may have insight into others' fruition.
1
Read phala-ssakatang . In line 5, for pannapetiti read
the atthiti of the controverted proposition.

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