Points of  Controversy 
OR 
Subjects of  Discourse 
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU 
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA 
BY 
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A 
AND 
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
8. Of  Insight  into the Future. 
Controverted  Point.—That  there is knowledge of  the 
future. 
From the Commentary.—The  future  includes both what will happen 
proximately and what is not just proximate. Concerning the former 
there is absolutely no knowledge, any more than there is of  what is in-
cluded in a single track or moment of  cognition. But some, like the 
Andhakas, incline to a belief  that knowledge concerning any part of 
the future  is possible. 
[1] Th.—If  we can know about the future  [in general], 
it must be [as in other knowledge] through knowing its 
root, condition, cause, source, origin, upspringing, support,
1 
basis, correlation, genesis. But you deny that we know 
the future  thus. . . .
2 
[2] And it must be [as in other knowledge] through 
knowing how it will be correlated by condition, base, pre-
dominance, contiguity, and immediate contiguity.3 But 
you deny here again. .. . 
[8] Again, i f  you are right, one in the stage o f  adoption 
has insight into the First Path, one in the First Path has 
insight into the First Fruition, and so on. But you deny 
here again. . . . 
[4] A.—If  I am wrong, is there not a Suttanta in which 
the Exalted One said : ' To  Patna, Ananda,  three disasters 
will  happen: by fire  or by water or by rupture of  friend-
ship ' ?4 Surely then the future  may be known. 
1
 Literally, 'food.' 
2
 Presumably, the belief  was in an intuitive vision, and not in a 
process of  inference.  The ten terms are the 'root ' and its nine 
synonyms of  the First Book in the Yamaka,  I, p. 13. 
3
 These are the time-relations assigned in the doctrine of  Relations 
detailed in the Patthana,  or last book of  the Abhidhamma-Pitaha. 
4
 Dialogues,  ii. 92. The orthodox position seems to have been, that 
whereas events indefinitely  future  may be foretold  through a super-
man's intuition, the exact nature of  molecular, or psychical, vital 
change at any given moment is unpredictable. Cf.  M. Bergson on this 
point; Creative  Evolution,  ch. i., p. 6 passim. 
9. Of  Knowledge  of  the Present 
Controverted  Point— That the present may be known. 
From the Commentary.—Because  of  the Word: When all pheno-
mena are seen to be impermanent, the insight itself,  as a phenomenon, 
is also seen to be impermanent, some, as the Andhakas, have the 
opinion that there is knowledge of  the entire present, without distinc-
tion. Now if  there be such knowledge, it [as present] must take place 
at the present instant through itself.  But because two knowledges 
cannot be simultaneous in the one self-conscious  subject, knowledge 
of  the present cannot be known by the same act of  knowledge.
1 
[1]  Th.—If  there be a knowledge of  the present, does 
one know that  knowledge by the same act o f  knowledge ? 
If  you deny, your proposition must fall.  If  you assent, I 
ask: Does one know that he knows the present by that 
same act of  knowledge ? You deny, and your previous 
assertion falls.  If  you assent, I ask : Is the conscious act 
of  knowing the object of  the knowledge? You deny, and 
your previous assertion falls.  If  you assent, then you 
imply that one touches contact by the contact, feels  feeling 
by that feeling,  wills volition by that volition. So for  the 
initial and the sustained application of  thought. So for 
zest, for  mindfulness,  for  understanding. You imply that 
one cuts a sword with that sword; an axe with that axe; 
a knife  with that knife;  an adze with that adze; that one 
sews a needle with that needle; handles the tip of  a finger 
with that finger;  kisses the tip of  the nose with that nose; 
handles the head with that head; washes of f  impurity with 
that impurity. 
[2] A.—I am wrong then? But when all things are 
seen as impermanent, is not that knowledge also seen as 
impermanent ? Surely then I am right. 
1
 In other words, self-consciousness  is really an act of  retrospection, 
and its object is not present, but past. 
10. Of  Knowing  Others'  Fruition. 
Controverted  Point.—That  a disciple can have knowledge 
concerning fruition. 
From the Commentary.—Some,  like the Andhakas, have held that, 
since it was said that both the Bnddhas and their disciples teach beings 
the doctrine of  the attainment of  Ariyan fruition,  disciples can, like 
the Buddhas, state that this or that being has won some Fruit. Now 
if  that were so, they could also, by their insight, give details concerning 
that attainment. But they cannot. 
[1]  Th.—This  implies that a disciple can make known 
the property of  each fruit;
1
 that he possesses a knowledge 
of  the different  degrees of  development in fruitions,  control-
ling powers, personalities; [2] that he possesses a concep-
tion of  aggregates, sense-fields,  elements, truths, controlling 
powers, personality ; [8] that he is a Conqueror, a Teacher, 
a Buddha Supreme, omniscient, all-seeing, Master of  the 
Norm, the Norm-Judge of  appeal; [4] that he is one who 
causes a "Way to spring up where no Way was, one who 
engenders a Way not engendered; proclaims a Path not 
proclaimed, knows the Path, is conversant with the Path, is 
expert in the Path. All of  which of  course you deny. . . . 
[5] A.—Yet you deny that the disciple lacks insight. 
Surely then he may have insight into others' fruition. 
1
 Read phala-ssakatang . In line 5, for  pannapetiti read 
the atthiti of  the controverted proposition.
 
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