Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
8. Of Lust for the Unpleasant.
Controverted Point.—That there is such a thing as lust-
ing for what is disagreeable.
From the Commentary. — In the Sutta-passage :—' Whatsoever
feeling he feels, pleasant, painful, or neutral, he delights in and
commends that feeling'—the reference is to erroneous enjoyment.1
But some, like the Uttarapathakas, emphasizing the ' delights in,'
hold that one can delight in painful feeling as enjoyment of passion-
lessness.
[1] Th.—Do you go so far as to maintain that of the
beings who delight in the painful, some wish for it, long
for it, seek, search, hunt for it, and persist in cleaving
to it? Is not rather the opposite your genuine belief-?
You assent. Then how do you maintain your proposi-
tion?
[2] Can anyone have at once a latent bias of lust for
painful feeling and a latent bias of aversion from pleasant
feeling?1 Will not these two forms of bias be [really]
directed inversely, the former craving pleasure, the latter
hating pain ?
[3] U.—But if I am wrong, was it not said by the
Exalted One: ' He, thus, expert in complacency and anti-
pathy, delights in and commends whatsoever feeling he feels,
pleasant, painful, or neutral, and persists in cleaving to
it'?2
Hence surely there is such a thing as lusting for the
unpleasant ?
9. Of the Unmorality of a Natural Desire for Objects
of the Mind.
Controverted Point.—That to crave for objects of the
mind is unmoral.
1
I.e. to being subjugated to feeling.
2
Majjhima-Nik., i, 266. ' Delight,' the Sutta goes on, ' is grasping
after the things of sense, which cause the feelings.'
From the Commentary.— Some, like the Pubbaseliyas, hold that
the sixth kind of objects of sense-experience,1 coming after any of the
five forms of sensations, is neither moral nor immoral.
[1] Th.—If that be so, this craving must belong to one
of the moral indeterminates—to wit, resultant or inopera-
tive indeterminates—matter, Nibbana, or the organs and
objects of the five senses. But you must deny this [as not
doctrinal].
Or what reason have you for dissociating this sixth
form of tanha [natural desire or craving] from the rest?
If you admit that a craving for objects of sight, sound,
and so on is immoral, you must admit as much concerning
the co-ordination of these.
[2] Did not the Exalted One call craving immoral ?
Does not this condemn your proposition ? Did he not call
appetite (or greed) immoral? and is not craving for objects
of the mind a kind of greed ?
[3] Tour contention is that a craving for objects of the
mind is an unmoral appetite, but you are not justified in
using lobha with this qualification, when in the other
five modes of sense it is called immoral.
[4] Again, was it not said by the Exalted One : ' This
natural desire is concerned with rebirth, is accompanied by
delight and hist, dallying here and there—to wit, desires of
sense, desire for rebirth, desire not to live again '?2 . . .
[5] P.—But if I am wrong, is not this [threefold]
craving a craving for certain ideas or mental objects?3
Hence surely such a craving is as such immoral.
1
The co-ordination of different successive sensations as a concrete
single percept and image—-e.g., of orange colour, smell, roundness, and
certain other touches into an orange—was conceived by Buddhists as
a sort of sixth sense.
2
Samyutta-Nik., iii. 26 ; Vin. Texts, i, 95, reading 'non-existence'
for 'prosperity.' (Vibhava may conceivably mean either ; but the
traditional reading is, as the Commentary to the Kathavatthu says,
the goal of the Annihilationists.)
3
'This is inconclusive, because the citation shows nothing as to
a non-ethical nature, but refers to the process of natural desire
concerning a mental object.'—Comy.
10. Of Desire for Ideas and the Cause of Ill.
Controverted Point.—That the natural desire for objects
of mind is not the Cause of Ill.
From the Commentary. — This, too, is an opinion of the Pubba-
seliyas and others. The argument follows the preceding.
[1] Th.—What reason have you for dissociating this
form of craving from the other five ? If you admit that
a craving for objects of sight, sound, and so on, is im-
moral, you must admit as much concerning the co-ordina-
tion of these as ideas (percepts or images).
[2-5] Continue to imitate the preceding argument, XIII. 9
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