Kathavatthu - Of Powers

Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A

BOOK III
1. Of Powers.
Controverted Point—That the powers of the Buddha
are common to disciples.
From the Commentary.—This is an opinion among the Andhakas,
derived from a thoughtless consideration of the ten Suttas in the Anurud-
dha Samyutta,1 beginning: 'I, brethren, from practice and development
of the Four Applications of Mindfulness, understand even as it really
is the causal occasion2
as such, and what is not the causal occasion
etc. Now of a Tathagata's ' ten powers,' some he holds wholly in
common with his disciples, some not, and some are partly common
to both. All can share insight into extinction of intoxicants (asava);
he alone discerns the degrees of development in the controlling powers
(indriyani) . The causal occasion of anything, as well as seven
other matters, a Tathagata knows without limit, the disciple knows
them only within a certain range.
3
The latter can state them; the
former can explain them. But the Andhakas say that the whole of
his power was held in common with his [leading] disciples.
[1] Th.—If your proposition is true, you must also affirm
that power of the Tathagata is power o f the disciple and
conversely, whether you take power in general, or this or
that power, or power of this or that sort. And you must
also affirm that the disciple's previous application, previous
line of conduct, instruction in the Doctrine, teaching of the
Doctrine,
4
are of the same sort as those of the Tathagata.
But all these [corollaries] you deny. . . .
1
Samyutta-Nikaya, v. 304 f.; Suttas 15-24.
2 Thanang thanato, paraphrased by Buddhaghosa (Comy, on A.,
iii. 417) as karanang karanato (reason).
3
Padesena , cf. Jat., v. 457 (trans., v. 246, n. 3).
4
The Comy, calls these two pairs of terms two pairs of synonyms.


[2] You affirm [of course] that the Tathagata is Con-
queror, Master, Buddha Supreme, All-knowing, All-seeing,
Lord of the Norm, the Fountain-head of the Norm.
1
But
you would refuse these titles to disciples. Nor will you
admit of the disciples, as you do of the, Tathagata, that he
brings into being a Way where no way was, produces a
Way that had not been called into being, proclaims a
Way untold, is knower and seer of the Way and adept
therein.
[3] If you affirm that [one of the Tathagata's powers :
that] of understanding as they really are the different
degrees of development in our controlling powers (i n -
driyani ) is held by disciples in common with him, you
must also allow that a disciple is all-knowing, all-seeing.
[4] A?—But you will admit that i f a disciple can distin-
guish a causal occasion from an occasion that is not causal,
it were right to say that genuine insight of this kind is
common to Tathagata and disciple. [But you refuse to say
this.3] .. .
[5] Again, you will admit that if a disciple knows, in
its causal occasion and conditions,
4
the result of actions
undertaken in the past, future, and present, it were right
to say that genuine insight of this kind is common to
Tathagata and disciple. [This, too, you refuse to say.5]
[6-11] A similar implication holds good with respect to
the power of knowing the tendency of any course of action,
of knowing the worlds of manifold and intrinsically different
1
Dhamma-patisaranang , the latter half is a neuter substantive
applied to the Buddha, when appealed to for guidance and explanatory
teaching. It means literally 'resorting to, having recourse to,' and thence
the objective of such movement. See Bud. Psychology, 1914, p. 69.
2
The Andhaka is querist to the end.
3
The Theravadin draws the line at a coincident range of power.
' These questions (§§ 4-11) are asked just to establish this : that the
powers named are common to disciples just in so far as they know
(jananamatta-samannena).'—Comy.
4
Thanas o hetuso , paraphrased, in Comy. on Anguttara.NiK,
iii. 417, by paccayato ceva hetuto ca.
5
Because the power is not equally supreme in both.


elements; of knowing the manifold things beings h'ave done
from free choice, of knowing the attainments in Jhana
or Deliverance or Concentration1
—their impurities, their
purity, and emergence from them; of knowing how to
remember former lives; of knowing whence beings are
deceasing and where they are being reborn. All these
corollaries, namely, that if a disciple knows, where a
Tathagata knows, the knowledge is common to both, you
deny. Finally, [12] are not the intoxicants as extinct for
a disciple as for a Tathagata ? Or is there any difference
between their extinction for a Tathagata and their extinc-
tion for a disciple, or between the [ensuing] emancipation
for a Tathagata and that for a disciple ? ' None' you
say ;
2
then surely my proposition holds.
[13] Again, you have admitted that a Tathagata shares
the power of insight into the extinction as it really is of
intoxicants, in common with the disciple. But you will
not admit—though you surely must—that this is the case
with his knowledge of real causal antecedents and such as
are not real . . .
3
and also of the decease and rebirth of
beings.
[14] You affirm then that the power of the Tathagata's
insight to discern as it really is a causal antecedent and
one that is not, is not held in common by disciples. Yet
you refuse to draw this line in the case of the extinction of
intoxicants. Similarly, in the case o f the remaining eight
powers—[which is absurd].
: [15] Again, you admit that the power of the Tathagata's
insight to know as they really are the degrees of develop-
ment in controlling powers is not held in common with the
disciples. Yet you will not admit as much with regard to the
insight into what are really causal antecedents and what
1
Buddhaghosa (on Anguttara-Nik., iii. 417) enumerates these as
'the four Jhanas, the eight Deliverances (Dialogues, ii. 119), and the
three samadhi' s (Digha-Nik, iii. 219), also the nine grades in
elimination (ibid., 266).
2
Here the Theravadin admits there is no distinction in insight.
—Comy.
3
Here supply the remaining powers, §§ 6-11.


are not, . . . nor of the insight into the extinction of intoxi-
cants. (Here, on the contrary, you find powers held in
common.)
1
[16] On the other hand, you admit a common power
1
in the discernment of what is really a causal occasion . . ,
and o f the extinction of intoxicants. But you will not
equally admit a common power in discernment of degrees
of development in controlling powers—how is this ?

1
To the whole or to a limited extent.—See Comy. above.