Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
6. Of the Transition from One Jhana to Another.
Controverted Point.—That we pass from one Jhana to
another [immediately].
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Mahingsasakas and certain
of the Andhakas, hold that the formula of the Four Jhanas [in the
Suttas] warrants us in concluding that progress from one Jhana-stage
to another is immediate without any accessory procedure.
[1 ] Th.—Does this imply that one can pass over from
First to Third, from Second to Fourth Jhana ? You deny
[setting an arbitrary limit]. .. .
[2] Or take only a passing over from First Jhana attain-
ment to that of Second—which you affirm to be possible—
you are implying that the mental process—adverting, re-
flecting, co-ordinating, attending, willing, wishing, aiming1
—called up for First Jhana is the same as that required for
Second Jhana. But you dissent. Do you mean that no
[preliminary] mental process of adverting, etc., is required
for Second Jhana ? On the contrary, you agree that Second
Jhana arises after a certain mental process—adverting, etc.
Therefore one does not pass over directly from First Jhana
to the next.
[3] [Again, take the objects and characteristics of First
Jhana.} The First Stage, you admit, may come to pass
while one is considering the harmfulness of sense-desires;2
moreover, it is accompanied by application and sustenta-
tion of thought. But neither that object nor these charac-
teristics, you must admit, belong to the Second Stage.
Yet your proposition really commits you to asserting identity
between First and Second Jhana.
[4] The same argument [2] applies to transition from
Second to Third Jhana. [5] [Again, take the specific objects
and characteristics of the Second Stage :] the Second Stage,
you admit, may come to pass while one is considering the
harmfulness of application and sustentation of thought ;
moreover, it is accompanied by zest. But neither that
object nor these characteristics, you must admit, belong to
the Third Stage. Yet your proposition really commits you
1
Cf . VII. 5, §2.
2
Kama ; the object being to supersede earthly consciousness (that
of the Kama-loka) by a heavenly or angelic consciousness (that of
the Rupa-loka).
to an assertion of identity between Second and Third
Jhana.
[6] The same argument [2, 4] applies to transition from
Third to Fourth Jhana. [7] [Again, take the specific
objects and characteristics of the Third Stage:] the Third
Stage, you admit, may come to pass while one is considering
the harmfulness of zest; moreover, it is accompanied by
happiness. But neither that object nor these character-
istics, you must admit, belong to the Fourth Stage. Yet
your proposition really commits you to an assertion of
identity between Third and Fourth Jhana.
[8] M. A.—But was it not said by the Exalted One :
' Here, bhikkhus, when a hhikkhu, aloof from sense-desires, etc.
. .attains to and abides in First . . . Fourth Jhana' ?1
According to that [formula] one does pass over
immediately from Jhana to Jhana.
7. Of Jhana and its Intervals.
Controverted Point.—That there is an intermediate stage
between the First and Second Stages.2
From the Commentary.—The Sammitiyas and certain other of the
Andhakas hold the view that, in the Fivefold Jhana series,3 the
Exalted One did not intend to classify, but only to indicate,- three
forms4 of concentration. But not knowing that form of concentration
to be possible which is accompanied by sustained thought (savicara),
and counting only initial application (vitakka) , they hold that the
former intervenes between First and Second Jhana, thus making up a
later fivefold series.
1
E.g., Dialogues, i. 84 f.; passim in Nikayas.
2
The words 'First,' etc., to 'Fourth,' in this discourse must be
understood solely with reference to the fourfold classification.
3
I.e., when First Jhana is divided into two, according as it is
accompanied or unaccompanied by initial application of thought. See
Bud. Psy. Eth., cf. p. 43 with p. 52. The Four Nikayas recognize
only four stages.
4
Namely, as specified above, IX. 8, §§ 3, 4. The first and second
divide First Jhana into two aspects, the third refers to the other
three Jhanas.
[1] Th.—But this is to imply intervening stages between
contact or feeling, or perception. . . .
Again, why deny intermediate stages between Second
and Third, or Third and Fourth Jhana ? If you deny them
here, you must deny them between First and Second Jhana.
[3] You cannot maintain the intermediate stages between
First and Second Jhana only, [4] denying the existence of
such stages between the others.
[5] You say that concentration of mind accompanied by
sustained thought only, without its initial application, con-
stitutes the intermediate stage. But why make an excep-
tion in this way ? Or why not include the other two forms,
accompanied by both or by neither ? [6] If you deny that
concentration with or without initial and sustained applica-
tion of thought is a Jhanic interval, why not deny it in the
case of concentration without initial application, but with
sustentation of thought ?
[7] You maintain that in the interval between the mani-
festation of two stages of Jhana there is concentration in
sustained thought only, without initial application of
thought. But while such concentration is proceeding, is
not the first Jhana at an end and the second Jhana mani-
fested ? You assent, but you contradict thus your proposi-
tion.
[8] S. A.—If we are wrong, does concentration in sus-
tained thought only, without initial application of thought,
constitute any one of the Four Jhanas ? You say, no.
Then it must constitute an interim state—which is what
we affirm.
[9] Th.—But did not the Exalted One declare three
forms of concentration, namely, in both applied and sus-
tained thought, in the latter only, and where there is
neither?1 If so, you cannot single out the second form of
concentration as a state intermediate between Jhanas.
1
Samyutta-Nik., iv. 363, etc. See above, IX. 8, § 4. For those
unacquainted with the classic procedure in Jhana, it may be explained
that whereas, in the first stage of attained ecstasy, consciousness
includes (a) initial and sustained application of thought, (b) zest,
8. Of Hearing in Jhana.
Controverted Point.—That one who has attained Jhana
hears sound.
From the Commentary.—The opinion is held by some—the Pubba-
seliyans, for instance—that because the Exalted One called sound a
thorn to First Jhana, and since sound, if not heard, cannot be a thorn
in the flesh of one who had attained that state, it was inferable that
such an one was able to hear.
[1] Th.—If so, it must be equally allowed that he can
also see, smell, taste and touch objects.1 This you deny
. . . You must also allow that he enters .Jhana enjoying
auditory consciousness. You deny, for you agree that con-
centration arises in one who is enjoying mental objects as
such ? [2] But if you admit that anyone who is actually
enjoying sounds hears sounds, and that concentration is
the property of one who is actually enjoying mental objects
as such, you should not affirm that one in the concentration
of Jhana hears sounds. If you insist that he does, you
have here two parallel mental procedures going on at the
same time. . . .
[3] P.—But was it not said by the Exalted One that
sound is a thorn for First Jhana ?2 Hence one in Jhana can
surely hear sound.
Th.—You say that one in Jhana can hear sound, and
quote the Word as to it being for First Jhana a ' thorn.'
Now it was further said that thought applied and sustained
is a thorn for Second Jhana—does one in Second Jhana
have applied and sustained thought? . . . Again, it was
further said that the mental factor last eliminated is a thorn
(c) pleasure, in the second stage (a) is eliminated, in the third (b), and
in the fourth (c) are eliminated. Now, in 'fivefold Jhana,' (a) was
resolved into two stages. (Theragatha, 916, gives a different pan -
cangiko samadhi. )
1 'But there is no five-door procedure (of sense) in Jhana.'—Comy.
2 Anguttara - Nik., v. 133-135. 'This was said because sound
induces distraction. When a loud noise strikes the ear, one is aroused
from First Jhana.'—Comy. See above, p. 123.
for the stage newly attained—zest for Third, respiration
for Fourth Jhana,1 perception of visible objects for con-
sciousness of space-infinity, this perception for that of con-
sciousness as infinite, this perception for that of nothingness,
perception and feeling for cessation of these in trance. Now
is ' the thorn ' actually present on the winning of the stage
whence it is pronounced to be a thorn ? If not, then how
can you say that the ' thorn ' of hearing sound is present
to one in First Jhana ?
9. Of the Eye and Seeing.
Controverted Point.—That we see visible objects with
the eye.
From the Commentary.—Here, judging by the Word-—'When he
sees an object with the eye'—some, like the Mahasanghikas, hold that
the sentient surface in the eye is that which ' sees.'
In the quoted passage the method of naming a necessary instrument
is followed,2 as when we say ' wounded by a bow,' when the wound
was inflicted by an arrow. So the words 'sees with the eye' are
spoken of a seeing by visual consciousness.
[1] Th.—Then you hold that we see matter by matter. . . .
You deny. But think ! And if you now assent,3 you imply
that matter is able to distinguish matter. You deny. But
think! And if you now assent, you imply that matter is
mind. . . .4
[2] Again, you are implying that the eye can 'advert'
or reflect, co-ordinate, will, etc.,5 albeit you agree that the
contrary is true.
1
So the Sutta. We should have expected sukha (pleasure or
happiness). See Jhana formula.
2
Sambhara-katha. Cf. Atthasalini, 399 f. in Bud. Psy. Eth.,
p. 351, n. 2.
3
'First he rejects, because of the [separate] category, "object of
vision"; then assents, with respect only to the eye.'—Comy.
4
Rupang manovinnanang.
5
As in VII. 5, § 2. If the 'eye' sees, it should be immediately
preceded by 'adverting' in the same way as the sense of sight
(cakkhu-vinnana).-— Comy.
[3, 4] .These arguments hold good for similar claims put
forward by you for the other four senses.
[5] M.—But was it not said by the Exalted One : 'Here,
bhikkhus, a bhikkhu sees objects with the eye, hears sounds,
and so on '?1 Hence surely we see visible objects with the
eye and'so on.
1
Dhammasangani, § 597, gives the passage verbatim as to the
process—cakkhuna . . . rupang . . . passati ; but though allu-
sions to the visual process abound in the Nikayas, we have not traced
the exact passage as in an exhortation to bhikkhus, except in the,
'Guarded Doors' formula, e.g., Samyutta-Nik., iv. 104, where the
formula has disva, 'having seen,' for passati, 'sees.'
0 comments:
Post a Comment