Dhamma-Sangani - THE GENESIS OF THOUGHTS - GOOD STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS III

A BUDDHIST MANUAL
Psychological Ethics,
FROM THE PALI
OF THE
DHAMMA-SANGANI

Translated by CAROLINE A. F. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A.

n.
[146] Which are the states that are good ?
When a good thought concerning the sensuous universe
has arisen by the prompting of a conscious motive,^ a
^ Sasankharena. Buddhaghosa's explanation of the
term is 'terse and explicit. Sa = co-, sankharo = com-
]30und, is here used in the sense of concomitant with spring,
motive, means, or cause (ussaho, payogo, upayo,
paccayo-gahanam). For instance, a bhikshu dwelling
in the neighbourhood of a vihara is inclined, when duty
calls him to sweep the terrace round the sthupa, wait on
the elders, or listen to the Dhamma, to find the way too far,
and shirk attendance. Second thoughts, as to the impro-
priety of not going, induce him to go. These are prompted
either by his own conscience (attano va payogena),
or by the exhortation of another who, showing the dis-
advantage in shirking, and the profit in attending, says,
* Come, do it !' And the *
good thought,' i.e., of course, the
resolve to go, is said 'to have arisen by way of a concomitant
motive, by way of the taking hold of a cause.' Asl. 156.
This explanation is not discrepant with that of sasank-
hariko, given to Childers by Vijesinha Mudliar. He


thought which is accompanied by pleasure, associated with
knowledge, and having, as its object, a sight, a sound, a
smell, a taste, a touch, a [mental] state, or what not, then
there is contact, feeling, etc.^ [here follows the list of '
states
'
dealt ivith in §§ 1-145 and constituting the First Thought]—
these, or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced
states there are on that occasion—these are states that are
good. . . .
[Here ends] the Second Thought.^
III.
[147] Which are the states that are good ?
"When a good thought concerning the sensuous universe
has arisen accompanied by pleasure, disconnected with
knowledge, and having as its object, a sight, a sound, a
was not, I take it, so bad a Buddhist as to mean that an
asankharikam cittam was a thought in and for
itself spontaneous, i.e., uncaused. He would mean only
that the subject of the thought experienced it without
being conscious of its mental antecedent as such, without
paccaya-gahanam. In a cittam sasankharena, on
the other hand, the thought presents itself in consciousness
together with its mental conditions. In the Abhidham-
mattha-Sangaha the terms used in a similar connexion are
asankharikam and sasankharikam. J. P. T. S., 1884,
p. 1 et seq. Cf. Warren, '
Buddhism in Translations,' 490.
^ In the text (§ 146), at the omitted repetitions indicated
by *. . . pe . .
.' reference is made to § 147. More cor-
rectly reference should be made to § 1. The second type-
thought is in all respects (including Summary and 'Empti-
ness '
Section) identical with the first (Asl. 156), with the
sole exception of the additional implication '
by the prompt-
ing of a conscious motive.' With the same exception the
fourth, sixth, and eighth type-thoughts are identical with
the third, fifth, and seventh respectively. Hence the
reference in § 159 of the text should have been to § 157.
^ K. reads Dutiyam Cittam, and so on for the
eight.


smell, a taste, a touch, a [mental] state, or what not, then
there is
contact, conception,
feeling, discursive thought,
perception, joy,
thinking, ease,
thought, self-collectedness
;
the faculty of ...
faith, concentration,
energy, ideation,
mindfulness, happiness,
vitality ;
right intention,^ right mindfulness,
right endeavour, right concentration
;
the power of
faith, concentration,
energy, conscientiousness,
mindfulness, the fear of blame ;
absence of lust,
absence of hate,
absence of covetousness,
absence of malice
;
conscientiousness,
fear of blame
;
serenity, wieldiness,
buoyancy, fitness,
plasticity, rectitude,
both of sense and thought
;
mindfulness, grasp,
quiet, balance.
^ Sammaditthi should have been here omitted in the
text, just as it is rightly omitted at the place of its second
mention between avyapado and hiri. Its absence from
the third type of thought is involved in the qualifying
phrase 'disconnected with knowledge,' just as 'wisdom,'
*
insight,' etc., are. Cf, K. In 147a the Path is said to be
fourfold only.


These, or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced
states there are on that occasion—tlaese are states that are
good.
[Summary, cf. § 58 et seq.'\
[147a] Now, on that occasion
the skandhas are four,
the spheres are two,
the elements are two,
the nutriments are three,
the faculties are seven,^
the Jhana is fivefold,
the Path is fourfold,
the powers are six,^
the causes are two,^ .
contact, etc.
[Continue as in § 58.]
^ -x- -x- * * -x-
[148] What on that occasion is the skandha of syntheses ?
The content of the sanskdra-skandha is the same as in the
First Type of Thought, § 62,* with the following omissions :
'
The faculty of wisdom,'
*
right views,'
'
the power of wisdom,'
'
the absence of dulness,'
'
intelligence,'
'
insight.'
^ That of * wisdom '
being omitted.
^ See preceding note.
^ *
Absence of dulness ' being omitted.
* In the text the reader is referred to § 62 without
reservation, and is thereby landed in inconsistencies.
K. enumerates the content of the skandha in full, omitting
all those factors which are incompatible with a thought
divorced from knowledge. I have thought it sufficient to
name only these excluded factors.


These are omitted as incompatible with the quality * discon-
nected with knowledge.'
^ ^ * * ¥r ^
These, or whatever other incorporeal, etc.
* * * * * *
[Here ends] the Third Type of Thought.^
lY.
[149] Which are the states that are good ?
When a good thought concerning the sensuous universe
has arisen by the prompting of a conscious motive, a
thought which is accompanied by happiness, disconnected
with knowledge, and having as its object a sight, a sound,
a smell, a taste, a touch, a [mental] state, or what not, then
there is contact, etc. [continue as in § 147]—these, or what-
ever other incorporeal, causally induced states there are on
that occasion—these are states that are good. . . .^
[Here ends] the Fourth Thought.
^ Placed erroneously in the text after § 147.
'^
So K. The text, by omitting not only the repetitions,
but also the essentially distinctive factor sasankh arena,
renders the insertion of the '
Fourth Thought ' quite un-
intelligible.
Buddhaghosa gives a different illustration of this type of
thought in harmony with its resemblance to and difference
from the former cittarn sasankharena, viz.: in its
involving a pleasurable state of mind, but not any great
understanding or discernment. Such is the thought of
little boys, who, when their parents duck their heads to
make them worship at a cetiya, willingly comply, though
doing so without intelligent conviction. Asl. 156.


V.
[150] Which are the states that are good?
When a good thought concerning the sensuous universe
has arisen, accompanied by disinterestedness,^ associated
with knowledge, and having as its object a sight, a sound,
a smell, a taste, a touch, a [mental] state, or what not,
then there is contact, etc. [continue as in § 1, but for *
joy
'
and *
happiness '
substitute *
equanimity '
(upekkha), and
for * the faculty of happiness '
substitute '
the faculty of
disinterestedness '].^
[151] What on that occasion is contact?
Answer as m § 2.
[152] What on that occasion is feeling?
The mental [condition] neither pleasant nor unpleasant,
which, on that occasion, is born of contact with the appro-
priate element of representative intellection ; the sensation,
born of contact with thought, which is neither easeful nor
painful ; the feeling, born of contact with thought, which is
neither easeful nor painful—this is the feeling that there
then is.
* -X- -x- -x- »• *
[Continue as in §§ 4-8.]
[153] What on that occasion is disinterestedness ?^
Answer^ as in preceding reply, omitting the phrase ' born
^ Upekkha. 'This is impartiality (lit., middleness) in
connexion with the object of thought, and implies a dis-
criminative knowledge' (Asl. 157). Cf. its significance in
the cultivation of Jhana, § 165. In the Jhana that may
arise in connexion with the first type of thought, which is
concomitant with '
joy ' and '
ease,' it is replaced by '
self-
collectedness.' See § 83.
^ Here, again, the excision, in the text, of practically the
whole answer, and the reference to § 156, where the sixth
thought is differentiated from this, the fifth thought, by
the quality sasankharena, quite obscures the classifica-
tion adopted in the original.
^ Substituted for 'joy' and 'ease,' §§ 9, 10.


of contact with the appropriate element of representative
intellection.'
[Continue as in §§ 11-17.]
[154] What on that occasion is the faculty of dis-
interestedness ?
Answer as in preceding reply. Continue as in §§ 19-57.
[Summary.]
[154a] Now, on that occasion
the skandhas are four,
the spheres are two,
the elements are two,
the nutriments are three,
the faculties are eight,
the Jhana is fourfold,^
the Path is fivefold,
the powers are seven,
the causes are three,
contact,
etc., etc. [c/. § 58],
the sphere of mental states is a single factor,
the element of mental states is a single factor.
These, or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced
states there are on that occasion—these are states that are
good. . . .
[Continue as in §§ 59-61.]
[155] What on that occasion is the skandha of syn-
theses ?
^ Consisting presumably in *
conception,' '
discursive
thought,' *
disinterestedness ' (superseding *joy' and 'ease'),
and '
self-collectedness.' Cf. § 83. The last-named atti-
tude of mind does not usually figure in the Pitakas as the
culminating (or other) stage of Jhana {cf, § 160 et seq.). In
the Abhidhammattha-Sangaha, however, it does occur as
such, and side by side also with '
disinterestedness.'
J. P. T. S., 1884, p. 3.


Answer as in § 62, omitting *
joy.'^
* ^ * * ^ ^
[Continue as in the Summay-y and *
Emptiness '
Section
of the First Type of Thought,
1
[Here ends] the Fifth Type of Thought.]
VI.
[156] Which are the states that are good ?
When a good thought concerning the sensuous universe
has arisen, accompanied by disinterestedness, associated
with knowledge, prompted by a conscious motive, and
having, as its object, a sight, a sound, a smell, a taste,
a touch, a [mental] state, or what not, then there is
contact, etc.
>;; jI' :Ij ;|; i|c i[<
[Continue as in the Fifth Type of Thought.^
[Here ends] the Sixth Type of Thought.
vn.
[157] Which are the states that are good ?
When a good thought concerning the sensuous universe
has arisen, accompanied by disinterestedness, disconnected
with knowledge, and having, as its object, a sight, a sound,
a smell, a taste, a touch, a [mental] state, or what not,
then there is contact, etc. . . .
•X- -X- -Jf -x- * -H-
[Continue as in the Third Type of Thought, substituting
'
disinterestedness '
for '
joy ' and *
ease,' the '
faculty of dis-
interestedness '
for that of *
happiness,' and * fourfold '
for
'fivefold Jhana. "2]
^ K. gives the skandha in full, omitting 'joy,' joy and
upekkha being mutually exclusive.
2 Nanindriyam in the text should be manindriyam.


[Summary.]
[157a] Now, on that occasion
the skandhas are four,
etc., etc.
[Continue as in the Third Type of Thought^ substituting
' fourfold '/o^' * fivefold Jhana.']
[158] What on that occasion is the skandha of syn-
theses ?
The content of this skandha is the same as in the Third
Type of Thought {see § 148), with the further omission of
'joy.'
[Continue as in the First Type of Thought.]
t'fi i\i .;: j;c ii ^:
[Here ends] the Seventh Type of Thought.
VIII.
[159] Which are the states that are good?
When a good thought concerning the sensuous universe
has arisen, accompanied by disinterestedness, disconnected
with knowledge, prompted by a conscious motive, and
having, as its object, a sight, a sound, a smell, a taste,
a touch, a [mental] state, or what not, then there is
contact, etc.
[Continue as in the Seventh Type of Thought.']
[Here ends] the Eighth Type of Thought.
[End of Chapter I. on] the Eight Main Types of Thought
concerning the Sensuous Universe.
(Here ends the Second Portion for Recitation.)

Dhamma-Sangani - THE GENESIS OF THOUGHTS - GOOD STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS II

A BUDDHIST MANUAL
Psychological Ethics,
FROM THE PALI
OF THE
DHAMMA-SANGANI

Translated by CAROLINE A. F. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A.

[15] What on that occasion is the faculty of concentra-
tion (samadhindriyam) ?^
Ansiver as for '
self-collectedness,' § 11.
[16] What on that occasion is the faculty of wisdom
(pannindriyam) ? 2
had I not preferred to bring out the negative form of the
original.
^ Buddhaghosa's etymology — *
arammane c it tarn
samma adhiyati, thapeti ti'—is no doubt incorrect,
sam-a-dha being the sounder analysis; nevertheless,
he brings out that voluntary and deliberate adjustment of
the attention with a view to sustained mental effort which
is connoted by samadhi (Asl. 122).
2 To fit the term pa fin a with its approximate European
equivalent is one of the cruces of Buddhist philosophy. I
have tried in turn reason, intellect, insight, science, under-
standing, and knowledge. All of these have been, and are,
used in the literature of philosophy with varying shades
of connotation, according as the sense to be conveyed is
popular and vague, psychological and precise, or transcen-
dental and
—
passez-moi le mot—having precise vague-
ness. And each of them might, with one implication or
another, represent paiifia. The main difficulty in choice
lay in determining whether, to the Buddhist, paiiiia stood
for mental function, or for the aggregate product of certain
mental functioning, or for both. When all the allusions to
paniia in the Sutta Pitaka have been collated, a final trans-
lation may become possible. Here it must suffice to quote
two. In M. i. 292, he who has pa fin a (paiinava) is
declared in virtue thereof to understand (pajanati) the
nature of the phenomenon of pain or ill (the Four Noble
Truths). In D. i. 124 Gotama asks : What is this pafiiiri ?
and himself sets out its content as consisting in certain
intellectual attainments, viz., the Jhanas, insight into the
nature of impermanence, the mental image of one's self, the
power of Iddhi, the cosmic Ear, insight into other minds, into
one's own past lives, the cosmic Eye, and the elimination of
all vitiating tendencies. Buddhaghosa also (Vis. M., ch. xiv.)
distinguishes paniia from saiiiia and vinnana. He
describes it as adequate to discern not only what these can,
viz., sense-objects and the Three Marks (impermanence,
jpain, and non-substantiality) respectively, but also the


The wisdom which there is on that occasion is under-
standing, search, research, searching the Truth,^ discern-
ment, discrimination, differentiation, erudition, proficiency,
subtlety, criticism, reflection, analysis, breadth,^ sagacity,^
leading,^ insight, intelligence, incitement f wisdom as
faculty, wisdom as power, wisdom as a sword/ wisdom as
a height,^ wisdom as light,^ wisdom as glory,^ wisdom as
splendour,^^ wisdom as a precious stone ; the absence of
dulness, searching the Truth,^^ right views—this is the
wisdom that there then is.
[17] What on that occasion is the faculty of ideation
(representative imagination, manindriyam)?
Answer as for 'thought ' (cittam), § 6.
Path. For him, then, it might be called intellect *
at a
higher power.' And in Gotama's reply, all those attain-
ments are described in terms of intellectual 'process.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the term did not stand for
hare mental process of a certain degree of complexityy
but that it also implied mental process as cultivated in
accordance with a certain system of concepts objectively
valid for all Buddhist adepts. Hence, I think it best to
reject such terms as reason, intellect, and understanding,
and to choose wisdom, or science, or knowledge, or philo-
sophy. Only they must be understood in this connexion
as implying the body of learning as assimilated and applied
by the intellect of a given individual. See further under
nan am (Introduction) and vijja (§ 1296).
^'l.e., the doctrines of the '
Four Truths ' (Asl. 147). Cf
Mil. 83.
2 Wisdom compared to the breadth and amplitude of the
earth (Asl. 147, 148).
^ Medha. The Cy. explains the specific wisdom of this
term to lie in '
slaying ' vice, or else in '
grasping and
bearing' (148).
^Parinayika. ^ Literally, a goad.
^ *
For the slaying of vices ' (Asl. 148 ; cf Jat. iv. 174).
^ *
In the sense of something lofty '
{ibid. ; cf Dhp. v.
28 = Mil. 387).
8 Ang. ii. 139. ^ Ibid, ^^ Ibid.
^^ Kepeated by way of antithesis to '
dulness ' (Asl. 148).


[18] What on that occasion is the faculty of pleasure
(somanassindriyam)?
Answer as for 'ease '
(sukham), § 10.
[19] What on that occasion is the faculty of vitality
(jTvitindriyam)?
The persistence of these incorporeal states, their sub-
sistence, going on, their being kept going on, their progress,
continuance, preservation, life, life as faculty^—this is the
faculty of vitality that there then is.^
[20] What on that occasion are right views (samma-
ditthi)?^
Answer as for the '
faculty of wisdom,' § 16.
[21] What on that occasion is right intention (samma-
sankappo) ?*
Answer as for '
conception,' § 7.
[22] What on that occasion is right endeavour (samma-
vayamo) ?
Ansiver as for the 'faculty of energy,' § 13.
[23] What on that occasion is right - mindfulness
(sammasati)?
Answer as for the '
faculty of mindfulness,' § 14.
[24] What on that occasion is right concentration
(sammasamadhi) ?
A7isiver as for ' self-collectedness,' § 11.
^ In the text, hoti before id am is probably an error.
^ This answer is exceptional in the omission of tasmim
samaye('on that occasion ') at the beginning of the sen-
tence. Cf. §§ 82, 295, 441. The reason of its omission is
probably that in the presence of life, by which the com-
plex of dhammas is sustained as lotuses by water, or as an
infant by its nurse (Asl. 124), there is nothing contingent
on the ethical quality (good, bad, or indeterminate) of the
given complex.
^ For a discussion of the term ditthi, see § 1003. On
these five factors of the Path see Introduction.
^ Sankappoisby the Cy. especially identified with the
expression cetaso abhiniropana, application of the
mind, the disposition or adjustment of attention, that on
which the heart is set, hence aspiration, intention, purpose,
design.


[25] What on that occasion is the power of faith
Ansicer as for the *
faculty of faith/ § 12.
[26] What on that occasion is the power of energy
(viriyabalam) ?
Answer as for the '
faculty of energy,' § 13.
[27] What on that occasion is the power of mindfulness
(satibalam) ?
Ansicer as for the *
faculty of mindfulness,' § 14.
[28] What on that occasion is the power of concentra-
tion (samadhibalam)?
Ansicer as for *
self-collectedness,' § 11.
[29] What on that occasion is the power of wisdom
(pannabalam) ?
Answer as for the *
faculty of wisdom,' § 16.
[30] What on that occasion is the power of conscientious-
ness (hiribalam) ?^
^ Hiri and ottappam, as analyzed by Buddhaghosa, pre-
sent points of considerable ethical interest. Taken together
they give us the emotional and conative aspect of the modern
notion of conscience, just as sati represents it on its in-
tellectual side. The former term '
is equivalent to shame
(lajja),' the latter to 'anguish (ubbego) over evil-doing.'
Hi r i has its source within ; ottappam springs from with-
out. Hiri is autonomous (attadhipati) ; ottappam,
heteronomous, influenced by society (lokadhipati). The
former is established on shame ; the latter on dread. The
former is marked by consistency ; the latter by discernment
of the danger and fearsomeness of error. The subjective
source of hiri is fourfold, viz., the idea of what is due to
one's birth, age, worth and education. Thus, one having
hiri will think, 'Only mean folk (fishers, etc.), children,
poor wretches, the blind and ignorant, would do such an
act,' and he refrains. The external source of ottappam
is the idea that '
the body of the faithful will blame you,'
and hence one refrains. If a man have hiri, he is, as
said the Buddha, his own best master. To one who is
sensitive by way of ottappam, the masters of the faith
are the best guides (Asl. 126).
In a supplementary paragraph (p. 127) the ' marks
'
(consistency, etc.) are thus explained : In hiri one reflects


The feeling of conscientious scruple^ which there is on
that occasion when scruples ought to be felt, conscientious
scruple at attaining to bad and evil states—this is the power
of conscientiousness that there then is.
[31] What on that occasion is the power of the fear of
blame (ottappabalam)?
The sense of guilt,^ which there is on that occasion,
where a sense of guilt ought to be felt, a sense of guilt at
attaining to bad and evil states—this is the fear of blame
that there then is.
[32] What on that occasion is the absence of lust
(alobho) ?
The absence of lust, of lusting, of lustfulness, which
there is on that occasion, the absence of infatuation, the
feeling and being infatuated, the absence of covetousness,
that absence of lust which is the root of good'^—-this is
the absence of lust that there then is.
[33] What on that occasion is the absence of hate
(adoso) ?
on the worth of one's birth, one's teacher, one's estate, and
one's fellow-students. In ottapparn. one feels dread at
self-reproach, the blame of others, chastisement, and re-
tribution in another life.
^ Hiriyat'i, paraphrased by jigucchati (Asl. 149 ;
D. i. 174; M. i. 78).
^ Ottappati, paraphrased by ubbego (Asl. 124).
^ I.e., the fundamental condition, the cause of goodness.
On * covetousness ' and 'infatuation,' see §§ 35, 1059.
Alobho and its two co-ordinate virtues, the threefold
'
root ' of goodness, lose all their force in English negatives,
but to a Buddhist convey doubtless as much impressive-
ness, as much of positive import, as the negative '
immor-
tality '
does to the Christian. Alobho, e.g., involves
active altruism ; a d o s o, active sympathy ; amoho, a life
of culture (see § 34, n.). I do not know any positive terms
meet to represent them.
The '
mark '
of the first is absence of greed, or of adhe-
sion, as a drop of water runs off a lotus leaf. Its essence
is independence, like that of the emancipated bhikshu
(Asl. 127).


The absence of hate, of hating,^ of hatred, which there
is on that occasion, the absence of malice, of spleen,^ the
absence of hate which is the root of good—this is the
absence of hate that there then is.
[34] What on that occasion is the absence of dulness
(amoho) ?
Answer as for the * faculty of wisdom,' § 16.^
[35] What on that occasion is the absence of covetous-
ness (anabhijjha) ?
Answer as for the '
absence of lust,' § 32.*
[36] What on that occasion is the absence of malice
(avyapado)?^
Answer as for the * absence of hate,' § 33.
[37] What on that occasion are right views (sam-
maditthi)?^
Answer as for the * faculty of wisdom,' § 16.
^ K. reads adusana, adusitattam. The 'mark' of
a do so is said to be absence of churlishness and crossness
(see § 1060) ; its essence the suppression of annoyance
and fever ; its immediate result is loveliness—like the full
moon (Asl. 127).
2 '
The opposite of the pain felt when one is angry
'
(Asl. 150).
2 Buddhaghosa expatiates at some length on the excel-
lencies of the fundamental trinity of Buddhist virtue. To
take a few only: a lob ho (1) involves health, a do so (2)
youth (hate ages quickly), am oho (3) long life (through
prudence). (1) tends to material good through generosity
(c/. 'he that soweth plenteously,' etc.) ; (2) to the acquisition
of friends, won and held by love ; (3) to self-development.
(1) leads to life in the devaloka, (2) to life in the Brahma-
loka, (3) to Arahatship. (1) gives insight into imperma-
nence, and, conversely, (2) and (3) into the other two marks
(* pain '
and *
non-substantiality,' respectively).
* Abhijjha and lobho are synonymous. See §§ 1059
and 1136, where abhijjha stands for lobho.
^ Described (Asl. 129) as the being void of any wish to
destroy welfare of others, bodily or mental, their advantages
in this or other worlds, or their good reputation.
^ C/". § 1 (xxxvi), footnote.


[38] What on that occasion is conscientiousness (h i r i) ?
Answer as for the *
power of conscientiousness,' § 30.
[39] What on that occasion is the fear of blame
(ottappam)?
Answer as for the *
power of the fear of blame,' § 31.
[40] What on that occasion is repose of sense (k a y a -
passaddhi)?^
The serenity,^ the composure which there is on that
occasion, the calming, the tranquillizing, the tranquillity of
the skandhas of feeling, perception and syntheses—this
is the serenity of sense that there then is.
[41] What on that occasion is serenity of thought
(cittapassaddhi)?
The serenity, the composure which there is on that
occasion, the calming, the tranquillizing, the tranquillity
of the skandha of intellect—this is the serenity of thought
that there then is.
[42] What on that occasion is buoyancy^ of sense
(kayalahuta)?
The buoyancy which there is on that occasion, the alert-
ness in varying,"* the absence of sluggishness^ and inertia,
in the skandhas of feeling, perception and syntheses—this
is the buoyancy of sense that there then is.
[43] What on that occasion is buoyancy of thought
(cittalahuta)?
^ On the meaning of kayo see Introduction.
^ Passaddhi is described as a state free from pain
—
where pain is allayed and suppressed ; where tremor or
unquiet is replaced by '
coolness '
—the opposite to the
states called kilesas, especially excitement (§ 1229).
Cf. D. i. 73 ; M. i. 37.
^ Literally, lightness, described as the opposite of heavi-
ness, sluggishness and the rigidity of stolidity and stupor
(§ 1185).
* '
The capacity of changing quickly ' (Asl. 150). Cf.
Childers' Dictionary, s.v. parivatti.
^ Eead adandhanata. K. reads adandhata, but
adandhanata in § 43 and § 639.


The buoyancy, etc. {as in § 42), in the skandha of in-
tellect—this is the buoyancy of thought that there then is.
[44] What on that occasion is plasticity of sense (kaya-
muduta) ?i
The plasticity which there is on that occasion, the
suavity, smoothness, absence of rigidity, in the skandhas
of feeling, perception and syntheses—this is the plasticity
of sense that there then is.
[45] What on that occasion is plasticity of thought
(cittamuduta)?
The plasticity which, etc. {as in § 44), in the skandha
of intellect—this is the plasticity of thought that there
then is.
[46] What on that occasion is wieldiness^ of sense
(kayakammannata) ?
The wieldiness which there is on that occasion, the
tractableness, the pliancy, of the skandhas of feeling, per-
ception and syntheses—this is the wieldiness of sense that
then is.
[47] What on that occasion is wieldiness of though*
(cittakammannata) ?
The wieldiness, etc. (as in § 46), of the skandha of
intellect—this is the wieldiness of thought that there
then is.
[48] What on that occasion is fitness ^ of sense (kaya-
pagunnata) ?
The fitness which there is on that occasion, the com-
petence, the efiicient state of the skandhas of feeling,
perception and syntheses—this is the fitness of sense that
there then is.
^ The suppression of stifi"ness and resistance, or oppug-
nancy ; the attitude antithetical to that belonging to the
kilesas of opinionativeness and conceit.
^ Kammannata, literally workableness, or serviceable-
ness—for good action (Asl. 151), by which one '
succeeds in
constructing objects of thought' {ibid. 130).
^ The antithesis to illness and diffidence {ibid, 131).


[49] What on that occasion is fitness of thought (citta-
pagunnata)?
The fitness, etc. (as in § 48), of the skandha of in-
tellect—this is the fitness of thought that there then is.
[50] What on that occasion is rectitude^ of sense
(kayujjukata) ?
The straightness which there is on that occasion, the
rectitude, without deflection, twist or crookedness, of the
skandhas of feeling, perception and syntheses—this is the
directness of sense that there then is.
[51] What on that occasion is rectitude of thought
(cittujjukata) ?
The straightness, etc. (as in § 50), of the skandha of
intellect—this is the rectitude of thought that there
then is.
[52] What on that occasion is mindfulness (sati) ?
Ansiver as for the '
faculty of mindfulness,' § 14.
[53] What on that occasion is intelligence (sam-
pajannam)?^
Answer as for '
wisdom,' § 16.
[54] What on that occasion is quiet (samatho) ?
Answer as for '
self-collectedness,' § 11.
[55] What on that occasion is insight (vipassana) ?
Ansiver as for '
wisdom,' § 16.
[56] What on that occasion is grasp (paggaho) ?
Ansiver as for the 'faculty of energy,' § 13.
[57] What on that occasion is balance (avikkhepo)?^
^ Defined as the antithesis of crookedness, deception
(may a) and craftiness (Asl. 131).
^ Or comprehension ; to know anything according to its
usefulness, its expediency, its scope, and to know it clearly.
Named as approximately equivalent to '
wisdom,' the Cy.
assigns to it as well the characteristics of mindfulness
{ibid.), Cf the frequent twin qualification of sati-sam-
pajano
—
e.g,, M. i. 274.
^ '
The opposite of excitement or fluster ' (Asl. ibid.).
Literally, '
the absence of wavering ' (or vacillation or
unsteadiness).


Answer as for *
self-coUectedness,' § 11.
These, or whatever other ^ incorporeal, causally induced
states there are on that occasion—these are states that
are good.
Here ends the delimitation of terms (Pada-bhajani-
yam).
End of the First Portion for Eecitation.
[Summary of the constituents of the First Type of
Thought (sangahavaram or kotthasa var am).]^
[58] Now, on that occasion
the skandhas are four,
the spheres (ayatanani) are two,
the elements ( dhatuyo) are two,
the nutriments (ahara) are three,
the faculties (indriyani) are eight,
the Jhana is fivefold,
the Path is fivefold,
the powers (balani) are seven,
the causes (hetu) are three
;
^ See above, p. 5.
^
The constituent dhammas of the first of the eight
schemata of *
good thoughts' (cittangani) are now
rehearsed with reference to class and number. The motive
probably was to aid the student either to a conspectus of
the psychosis in question, or mnemonically. Thus, if the
constituent factors of the thought be regarded under the
aspect of classified aggregates (rasatthena, or khandhat-
thena), they all fall under four heads. All that do not
belong to the skandhas of feeling, perception, or intellect,
come under the sanskara-skandha. Kegarded under the
aspect of collocation or conjuncture (ayatanam), they all
fall under two heads, corresponding to the fourth, and to
the first, second, and third, of those four skandhas re-
spectively. Regarded under the aspect of phenomena, of
non-noilmena (sabhavatthena, sunnatatthena, nis-
sattatthena), they all fall under two heads, corre-
sponding to the two preceding. We then come to partial
aspects.


contact,
feeling,
perception,
thinking,
thought,
the skandhas of
feeling,
perception,
syntheses,
intellect,
the sphere of ideation (man a-'
yatanam),
the faculty of ideation,
the element of representative in-
tellection (manovinnana-
dhatu),
the sphere of a (representative)
state,
the element of a (representative)
state,
These, or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced
states there are on that occasion—these are states that are
good.
are each single
[factors].
[59] What on that occasion are the four skandhas ?
The skandhas of feeling, perception, syntheses and in-
tellection.
[60] (i.) What on that occasion is the skandha of feeling?
The mental pleasure, the mental ease, which there is
on that occasion,^ the pleasurable, easeful sensation which
is born of contact with thought, the pleasant, easeful
^ The omission in both this and the next answer of the
phrase, used in § § 3 and 4—' born of contact with the
appropriate element of representative intellection '
—is not
noticed in the Cy. K. draws attention to it in a footnote,
not at this passage, but at §§ 108-110. The omission is
probably accidental.


feeling born of contact with thought—this is the skandha
of feeling that there then is (§§ 3, 10, 18).
[61] (ii.) What on that occasion is the skandha of per-
ception ?
The perception, the perceiving, the state of having per-
ceived, which there is on that occasion—this is the skandha
of perception that there then is (§ 4).
[62] (iii.) What on that occasion is the skandha of
syntheses?^
(i) Contact,
(ii) thinking,
(iii) conception,
(iv) discursive thought,
(v) joy,
(vi) self-collectedness,
(vii) the faculty of faith,
(viii) the faculty of energy,
(ix) the faculty of mindfulness,
(x) the faculty of concentration,
(xi) the faculty of wisdom,
(xii) the faculty of vitality,
(xiii) right views,
(xiv) right intention,
(xv) right endeavour,
(xvi) right mindfulness,
(xvii) right concentration,
(xviii) the power of faith,
(xix) the power of energy,
(xx) the power of mindfulness,
(xxi) the power of concentration,
(xxii) the power of wisdom,
(xxiii) the power of conscientiousness,
(xxiv) the power of the fear of blame,
(xxv) absence of lust,
(xxvi) absence of hate,
(xxvii) absence of dulness.


(xxviii) absence of covetousness,
(xxix) absence of malice,
(xxx) right views,
(xxxi) conscientiousness,
(xxxii) the fear of blame,
(xxxiii) serenity of sense,
(xxxiv) serenity of thought,
(xxxv) buoyancy of sense,
(xxxvi) buoyancy of thought,
(xxxvii) plasticity of sense,
(xxxviii) plasticity of thought,
(xxxix) wieldiness of sense,
(xl) wieldiness of thought,
(xli) fitness of sense,
(xlii) fitness of thought,
(xliii) rectitude of sense,
. (xliv) rectitude of thought,
(xlv) mindfulness,
(xlvi) intelligence,
(xlvii) quiet,
(xlviii) insight,
(xlix) grasp,
(1) balance.
These, or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced
states there are on that occasion, exclusive of the skandhas
of feeling, perception and intellection—these are the
skandha of syntheses.
[63] (iv.) What on that occasion is the skandha of in-
tellect ?
The thought which on that occasion is ideation, mind,
the heart, that which is clear, ideation as the sphere of
mind, as the faculty of mind, the skandha of intellect, the
appropriate element of representative intellection—this is
the skandha of intellect that there then is (§ 6).
These on that occasion are the four skandhas.
[64] What on that occasion are the two spheres ?
The sphere of ideation, the sphere of (mental) states.


[65] What on that occasion is the »sphere of ideation
(manayatanam)?
Answer as for '
thought,' § 6, and for the '
skandha of
intellection,' § 63.
[66] What on that occasion is the sphere of (mental)
states (dhammayatanam)?
The skandhas of feeling, perception, syntheses—this i&
on that occasion the sphere of (mental) states.
These are on that occasion the two spheres.
[67] What on that occasion are the two elements ?
The element of representative intellection, the element
of (mental) states.
[68] What on that occasion is the element of repre-
sentative intellection (manoviniianadhatu)?
Answer as for *
thought,' § 6 ; c/. §§ 63, ^d.
[69] What on that occasion is the element of ^
(mental)
states (dhammadhatu)?
The skandhas of feeling, of perception, of syntheses
—
these are on that occasion the element of (mental) states.
These are on that occasion the two elements.
[70] What on that occasion are the three nutriments?^
The nutriment of contact, the nutriment of representa-
tive cogitation, the nutriment of intellection.
[71] What on that occasion is the nutriment of contact
(phassaharo) ?
^ These three incorporeal nutriments or foods, together
with the fourth or corporeal food, are given in the Sutta
Pitaka: M. i. 261 ; S. ii. 11. In the A. they are not
classified under the Catukka Nipata ; but in the Dasaka
Nipata (A. v. 136) ten species of aharo are named, which
have no reference to the four. E.g., '
appropriate action is
the aharo of health.' Buddhaghosa, dwelling on the ety-
mology, calls them not so much conditions as supplementary
casual '
adducts' (a-har). Given, e.g., a living individual,
adduce contact, and you get feeling : adduce cogitation, and
you get the three *
becomings '
(in the universe of sense,
etc.) ; adduce intellect, and you get conception and name-
and-form (Asl. 153).


Answer as for '
contact,' ^ 2.
[72] What on that occasion is the nutriment of repre-
sentative cogitation (manosancetanaharo)?
The thinking, the cogitating, the reflection which there
is on that occasion^this is the representative cogitation
that there then is.
[73] What on that occasion is the nutriment of intellec-
tion (vifiiianaharo)?
Anstver as for the '
skandha of intellection,' § 63.
These on that occasion are the three nutriments.
[74] What on that occasion are the eight faculties ?
The faculties of faith, energy, mindfulness, concentra-
tion, wisdom, ideation, happiness, vitality.
[75-82] What on that occasion is the faculty of faith . . .
vitality ?
Ansivers as in ^^ 12-19 respectively. '
•
These on that occasion are the eight faculties.
[83] What on that occasion is the fivefold Jhana
(pancangikam jhanam) ?
Conception, discursive thought, joy, ease, self-collected-
ness.
[84-88] What on that occasion is conception . . . self-
collectedness ?
Ansivers as in §§ 7-11 respectively.
This on that occasion is the fivefold Jhana.
[89] What on that occasion is the fivefold Path (pan-
cangiko maggo)?
Eight views, right intention, right endeavour, right
mindfulness, right concentration.
[90-94] What on that occasion are right views ... is
. . . right concentration ?
Ansivers as in §§ 20-24 respectively.
This on that occasion is the fivefold Path.
[95] What on that occasion are the seven powers ?

The power of faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration,
wisdom, conscientiousness, the fear of blame.
[96-102] What on that occasion is the power of faith
. . . the fear of blame ?
Answers as in §§ 25-31 respectively.
These on that occasion are the seven powers.
[103] What on that occasion are the three causes (tayo
hetu)?
The absence of lust, of hate, and of dulness.
[104-106] What on that occasion is the absence of lust
. . . dulness ?
Answers as in §§ 32-34 respectively.
These are on that occasion the three causes.
[107] What on that occasion is contact . . .
[108] feeling . . .
[109] perception . . .
[110] thinking . . .
[Ill] thought . . .
[112] the skandha of feeling . . .
[113] the skandha of perception . . .
[114] the skandha of syntheses . . .
[115] the skandha of intellection ...
[116] the sphere of ideation . . .
[117] the faculty of ideation . . .
[118] the element of ideational intellection . . .
[119] the sphere of (mental) states . . .
[120] the element of (mental) states,
regarded as a single factor ?
Answers as in s^i< 2-6, 60-63, 65, 65, (S6, ^Q, 66, respec-
tively.
These, or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced
states there are on that occasion—these are states that
are good.
[Here ends] the Summary [of the constituents of the
First Main Type of Good Thoughts].


[The '
Emptiness '
Section (sunnatavaro)] .^
[121] Now, at that time there are
states (distinguishable constituents of the
*
thought'),
skandhas, powers,
spheres, causes,
elements, -
contact,
nutriments, feeling,
faculties, perception,.
Jhana, thinking,
the Path, thought,
the skandha of feeling,
the skandha of perception,
the skandha of syntheses,
the skandha of intellect,
the sphere of ideation,
the faculty of ideation,
the element of representative intellection,
the sphere of [mental] states,
the element of [mental] states.
These, or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced
states there are on that occasion—these are states that are
good.
^ On the significance of the term *
emptiness,' see
Introduction ; c/. § 344. The significance of this section
in the student's course of study seems to have consisted
simply in this : That the interest being withdrawn from the
nature and numbers of the particular constituents in each
of the species of mental activity to which the thought-
complex is reducible, emphasis is laid on the principle that
this same thought-complex is an aggregate or combination
of such phenomenal factors, and nothing more. '
There
are states of consciousness' (dhamma honti); that is
(Asl. 155), 'there is no permanent entity or self which
acquires the states.' '
The states are to be understood
phenomenally. There is no other being or existence or
person or individual whatever.'


[122] What on that occasion are states ?
The skandhas of feeling, of perception, of syntheses, of
intellection.
[123] What on that occasion are skandhas ?
Ansiver as in § 59.
[124-145] Similar questions are then put respecting
* spheres,' *
elements,' and so on through the list of con-
stituent species. The ansivers are identical with those given
to similar questions in the previous ' Summary,' viz., in
§§ 64, 67, 70, 74, 83, 89, 95, 103, and 107-120.
[Here ends] the *
Emptiness '
Section.
[Here ends] the First Main Type of Good Thoughts.

Dhamma-Sangani - THE GENESIS OF THOUGHTS - GOOD STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS I

A BUDDHIST MANUAL
Psychological Ethics,
FROM THE PALI
OF THE
DHAMMA-SANGANI

Translated by CAROLINE A. F. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A.

[BOOK I.
THE GENESIS OF THOUGHTS
(Cittuppada-kandam).
I
PART I.—GOOD STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS,
Chapter I.
The Eight Main Types of Thought relating to the
Sensuous Universe (Kamavacara-attha-mahacit-
tani).p
I.
[1] Which are the states that are good 9^
When a good thought concerning the sensuous uni-
verse^ has arisen, which is accompanied by happiness and
associated with knowledge/ and has as its object a
^ The brackets enclosing this and all other headings
indicate that the latter have been transposed from the
position they occupy in the text. There each heading
stands at the end of its section.
^
See Introduction. ^ Ibid.
* Nana-sampayuttani. According to the Cy., a good
thought deserves to be thus distinguished on three grounds
:
from the karma it produces, from the maturity of the
faculties it involves, and from the remoteness of mental
and moral infirmity which it implies (Asl. 76). Sam-
payuttam—lit., con -yoked—is, in the Kathavatthu,
quoted by the Cy. (p. 42), described as including the
following relations (between one '
state ' and another)
:
concomitant (sahagata), connate (sahajata), contiguous


sight, a sound, a smell, a taste, a touch,- a [mental] state,^
or what not,* then there is
(i) contact (§ 2),
(ii) feeling (§ 3),
(sarnsattha), having a common origin (ekuppada), a
common cessation (ekanirodha), a common basis or
embodiment (ekavatthuka),a common object of attention
(ekarammana). In the present work the term is sub-
sequently rendered by 'connected,' e.g., in § 1007, etc. The
preceding adjectival phrase, somanassa-sahagatam,
which I have rendered *
accompanied by happiness,' is
virtually declared by the Cy. to be here equivalent to
somanassa-sampayuttam, inasmuch as it is to be
interpreted in its fullest intension. Of its five distinguish-
able shades of meaning, the one here selected is that of
'conjoined' (samsattham). And of the four distinguish-
able connotations of 'conjoined,' the one here selected is
that of 'connate.' Hence 'accompanied by' means here
'connate.' And further, inasmuch as the concomitance is
not between two corporeal phenomena, or between a
corporeal and an incorporeal phenomenon, it is of that
persistent and thoroughgoing kind—persisting beyond the
common origin—which is described under the word
*
associated.'
Thus far the intricate Buddhaghosa. But I have yet to
discover any attempt to analyze the laws governing the
process of association between mental states, such as we
first find in Aristotle.
On '
happiness,' see §§ 10, 18.
^ Ruparammanam, saddarammanarn, etc., i.e,,
either as a present sensation or as a representative image
relating to the past or future ; in the language of Hume,
as an impression or as an idea ; in the more comprehensive
German term, as Vorstellung (Asl. 71). See Introduc-
tion.
^ Literally, an object that is tangible—the standard
Pali term.
^ Dhammarammanam—the 'object,' that is, of re-
presentative imagination or ideation (ma no, cittam,
Asl., 71), just as a thing seen is the object of sight.
Buddhaghosa rejects the opinion that a dhammaram-
manam is something outside the range of the senses, and
cites M. i. 295, where Sariputta declares that, whereas


(iii) perception (§4),
(iv) thinking (§ 5),
(V) thought (§ 6),
(vi) conception (§ 7),
(vii) discursive thought (§8),
(viii) joy (§ 9),
(ix) ease (§ 10),
(x) self-collectedness (§11),
(xi) the faculty of faith (§ 12),
(xii) the faculty of energy (§ 13),
(xiii) the faculty of mindfulness (§ 14),
(xiv) the faculty of concentration (§ 15),
(xv) the faculty of wisdom (^ 16),
each sense has its specific field, the mano has all these
five fields as its scope. At the moment when an object
enters '
the door of the eye ' or other sense, it enters also
the door of the ideating faculty causing the consciousness,
or one's being, to vibrate (bhavangacalanassa paccayo
hoti), just as the alighting bird, at the same moment,
strikes the bough and casts a shadow {ibid. 72).—As we
might say, presentative cognition is invariably accompanied
by representative cognition.—Then, in the course of the
mental undulations arising through this disturbance by
way of sense impact, one of these eight psychoses termed
Mahacittani may emerge. * But in pure representative
cognition (suddha-manodvare) there is no process of
sensory stimulation,' as when we recall past sense-experi-
ence.—The process of representation is illustrated in detail,
and completes an interesting essay in ancient psychology.
In the case of seeing, hearing, and smell, past pleasant
sensations are described as being simply revived during a
subsequent state of repose. In the case of taste and touch,
it is present disagreeable sensations which suggest certain
contrasted experience in the past. But the commentator
is not here interested in '
association by contrast ' as such.
* Lit., '
or whatever [object the thought] is about.' The
gist of the somewhat obscure comment is that, while no
new class of objects is here to be understood over and
above those of present or past sensations, there is no serial
or numerical order in which these " become material for
thought.


(xvi) the faculty of ideation (§ 17),
(xvii) the faculty of happiness (§ 18),
(xviii) the faculty of vitality (§ 19)
;
(xix) right views (§ 20),
(xx) right intention (§21),
(xxi) right endeavour (§ 22),
(xxii) right mindfulness (§ 23),
(xxiii) right concentration (§ 24)
;
(xxiv) the power of faith (§ 25),
(xxv) the power of energy (§ 26),
(xxvi) the power of mindfulness (§ 27),
(xxvii) the power of concentration (§ 28),
(xxviii) the power of wisdom (§ 29),
(xxix) the power of conscientiousness (§ 30),
(xxx) the power of the fear of blame (§ 31)
;
(xxxi) absence of lust (§ 32),
(xxxii) absence of hate (§ 33),
(xxxiii) absence of dulness (§ 34)
;
(xxxiv) absence of covetousness (§ 35),
(xxxv) absence of malice (§ 36),
(xxxvi) right views^ (§ 37)
;
(xxxvii) conscientiousness (§ 38),
(xxxviii) fear of blame (§ 39)
;
(xxxix, xl) serenity in sense and thought (§§ 40, 41),
(xli, xlii) lightness in sense and thought (§§ 42, 43),
(xliii, xliv) plasticity in sense and thought (§§ 44, 45),
(xlv, xlvi) facility in sense and thought (§§ 46, 47),
(xlvii, xlviii) fitness in sense and thought (§§ 48, 49),
(xlix, 1) directness in sense and thought (§§ 50, 51)
;
(li) mindfulness (§ 52),
(Hi) intelligence (§53)
(liii) quiet (§ 54)
1 According to Buddhaghosa the '
states ' numbered
xxxiv-vi are considered as equivalents of those numbered
xxxi-iii respectively, but as taken under another aspect.
In the prior enumeration the threefold '
root of good '
is
set out ; in the latter, reference to the * path of karma '
is
understood (Asl. 129).


(liv) insight (§ 55),
(Iv) grasp (§ 56),
(Ivi) balance (§ 57).
Now these—or whatever other incorporeal, causally in-
duced states^ there are on that occasion—these are states
that are good.
[2] What on that occasion is contact (p h a s s o) ?^
^ Nine other states, according to the Cy., are here im-
plied as factors in this psychosis, viz., desire (or conation,
or volition, chando), resolve (adhimokkho), attention
(manasikaro), equanimity (tatramaj jhattata), pity
(karuna), sympathy (mudita), abstinence from evil con-
duct in act, speech, and mode of livelihood. And the
opening words of this and similar supplementary clauses
in the text are coined into a technical term—ye-va-
panaka, 'the or-whatever ' [states],—to signify such
groups.
The Cy. then '
defines '
the nine : desire, qualified as
orthodox desire (dhammachando), to distinguish it from
ethically undesirable desire {cf. § 1097, etc.), is the wish to
act, the stretching forth the hand of the mind {cf. ope^is:)
to grasp the object in idea. Kesolve is steadfastness,
decision, the being unshaken as a pillar. Attention is
movement, direction of the mind, confronting the object.
Equanimity—lit., the mean (medium) state—is the being
borne along evenly, without defect or excess, without
partiality. Pity and sympathy are described in § 258 et
seq. The last three give those three factors of the Eight-
fold Path unrepresented in the analysis of the thought
(Asl. 132, 133).
It is not without interest to note that in this supple-
mentary category all the purely psychological states are
wholly, or at least mainly, volitional or emotional.
^ Touch or contact must be understood in a very general
sense, as the outcome of three conditions : an impingeing
sentient organ, an impingeing agency conceived as external
to the sentient organ, and impact or collision. The similes
in Mil. 60 of the rams and the cymbals are quoted in the
Cy. The eye and its object are the usual illustration, but
the representative imagination (mano or cittam) and its
object are included as proceeding by way of contact, only
without impact (sanghattanam). The real causal con-
nexion in every case—so I understand the, to me, obscurely


The contact which on that occasion is touching, the
being brought into contact, the state of having been
brought into touch with—this is the contact that there
then is.
[3J What on that occasion is feeling (vedana) ?^
The mental pleasure, the mental ease, which, on that
occasion, is born of contact with the appropriate element of
representative intellection f the pleasurable, easeful sensa-
worded comment to say (Asl. 109)—is mental, even though
we speak of an external agency, just as when lac melts
with heat we speak of hot coals as the cause, though the
heat is in the lac's own tissue.
*
Contact ' is given priority of place, as standing for the
inception of the thought, and as being the sine qua non of
all the allied states, conditioning them much as the roof-
tree of a storied house supports all the other combinations
of material {iUd, 107).
•^
Vedana is a term of very general import, meaning
sentience or reaction, bodily or mental, on contact or im-
pression. Sensation is scarcely so loyal a rendering as
feeling, for though vedana is often qualified as 'born of the
contact ' in sense-activity, it is always defined generally as
consisting of the three species—pleasure (happiness), pain
(ill), and neutral feeling—a hedonistic aspect to which the
term 'feeling' is alone adequate. Moreover, it covers
representative feeling.
This general psychical aspect of vedana, as distinct from
sensations localized bodily
—
e.g., toothache—is probably
emphasized by the term 'mental' (cetasikam) in the
answer. The Cy. points out that by this expression
( = cittanissitattam) 'bodily pleasure is eliminated'
(Asl. 139). It also illustrates the general scope of
vedana by the simile of a cook who, after preparing a
number of dishes for his lord, tastes each critically to test
them, the lord partaking of whichever he pleases. The
cook represents all the associated states in the thought-
complex, each functioning in one specific way. Vedana,
the master, '
enjoys the essence (taste) of the object ' as a
whole.
2 Tajja-manovifinanadhatu. Tajj a is paraphrased
by anucchavikfi, sarupa. Cf. A. i. 207; S. iv. 215;
M. i. 190, 191 ; Mil. 53. On the remainder of the com-


tion which is born of contact with thought ; ^ the pleasurable,
easeful feeling which is born of contact with thought—this
is the feeling that there then is.
[4] What on that occasion is perception (s a ii n a) ?2
The perception, the perceiving, the state of having per-
ceived which on that occasion is born of contact with the
pound term, see § 6. And on the hedonistic expressions in
the answer, see § 10.
^ Ceto-samphassajam . . . vedayitam. The latter
term (experience) is, more literally, that which is felt, das
Empfundene. Ceto, cittam are used interchangeably
in the Cy. on these terms (see § 6). The *
contact ' is that
between idea or object and thought, or the ideating agency,
conceived as analogous to the impact between sense-organ
and sense-object. In consequence of this contact or pre-
sentation, emotional affection arises in consciousness.
'^
The apparently capricious way in which the intension
of the term sanna is varied in the Pitakas makes it difficult
to assign any one adequate English rendering. In the
Mahavedalla Sutta (M. i. 293) and elsewhere (c/. Mil. 61)
it is explained as the relatively simple form of intellection
or cognition which consists in the discernment, recognition,
assimilation of sensations
—
e.g., of colours, as 'blue,' etc.
—
the process termed in modern English psychology sense-
perception, except that it is not quite clear that, in Buddhist
psychology, as in English, the perception is made only on
occasion of sense-stiimdation. The answer, indeed, in our
§ 4 alludes to representative activity only. In the Maha-
parinibbana Sutta, however {cf. A. v. 105), sanna stands
for the intellectual realization of a number of highly
complex concepts, such as impermanence, non-substan-
tiality, etc. In the Potthapada Sutta (D. i. 180-187), again,
the sanna discussed is clearly what we should call con-
sciousness, whether as opposed to the unconsciousness of
trance, or as the raw material of nanam, or as conceivably
distinct from the soul or Ego. Lastly, in a more popular
sense the term is used (notably in the Jatakas and in
commentators' similes) for sign, mark, or token.
Here, if we follow the Cy. (Asl. 110), sail ii a means simply
that sense-perception which discerns, recognises and gives
class-reference to (upatthita-visaya), the impressions
of sense. Its procedure is likened to the carpenter's recog-
nition of certain woods by the mark he had made on each;


appropriate element of representative intellection —this
is the perception that there then is.
[5] What on that occasion is thinking (cetana) ?^
The thinking, the cogitating, the reflection, which is born
of contact with the appropriate element of representative
intellection—this is the thinking that there then is.
[6] What on that occasion is thought (cittam) ?
to the treasurer's specifying certain articles of jewelry by
the ticket on each ; to the wild animal's discernment in the
scarecrow of the work of man. The essence of saiina is
said to be recognition by way of a mark. In this notion of
mark and marking lies such continuity of thought as may
be claimed for the various uses of the term. The bare fact
of consciousness means ability to discriminate—that is, to
mark. To mark is to perceive. And the ideas or concepts
of '
impermanence,' '
impurity,' and the like, were so many
acts of marking, though of a highly '
re-representative '
character. Sanna, no less than cittam (see Intro-
duction), and 'thought,' stands for both faculty and any
act or product of that faculty. And it is even objectified
so far as to signify further the result of any such act
—
that is, in its connotation of mark or sign.
It is, I believe, when connoting the more specific sense
of faculty, or of skandha, that it may safely be rendered by
'
perception '
or '
marking,' and may be taken to mean the
relatively '
superficial,' '
transient ' (Asl. 110, 111) play of
cognition when concerned with objects of sense. In ch. xiv.
of the Visuddhi Magga—in a passage the late Henry C.
Warren was good enough to transcribe for me—sanna is
in this way, and this way only, distinguished from viiina-
nam and panna. The latter terms stand for cognition at
(as we might say) a relatively higher and a still higher
power, in virtue of the greater depth and complexity of the
concepts they were exercised about (see §§6, 16).
1 There is no more difficult problem in interpreting the
Dhamma Sangani than to get at the grounds on which its
compilers, and subsequently its commentator, saw fit to set
out mutually independent descriptions of terms etymologi-
cally so identical as cetana and cittam. The only
parallel that suggests itself to me is the distinction drawn,
during a long period in British philosophy, between *
reason-
ing '
and '
reason '
—that is, between deductive inference and
the nous, or noetic function. Both pairs of terms are quite


The thought which on that occasion is ideation, mind,
heart, that which is clear, ideation as the sphere of mind,
the faculty of mind, intellection, the skandha of intellec-
tion, the appropriate element of representative intellection
—this is the thought that there then is.
popular in form. Compare, e.g., in the Nidana-katha
(Jat. i. 74), Buddha's reply to Mara :
'
I have here no con-
scious (or intelligent) witness. . . . Let this . . . earth, un-
conscious though it be, be witness. . . . Sacetano koci
sakkhi, etc. . . . ayam acetanapi . . . pathavi sak-
khlti.' Again, in A. i., p. 224, the import seems simple
and quite untechnical :
*
Their thoughts (cetana) and
hopes (lit., thinking and hoping) are fixed on lower things.'
Hence I have kept to terms popular in form. This does
not justify the use of terms so undifferentiated as 'thinking'
and '
thought ' ;
yet I have returned to them, after essaying
half a dozen substitutes, for various reasons. They show
the close connection between the Buddhist pair of terms,
instead of obscuring it ; they are equally popular and vague
in form and extension; the import of cetana has much in
common with a psychological account of thinking ; no term
misfits cittam less than * thought,' unless it be *
heart,'
on which see Introduction. It is unfortunate that Buddha-
ghosa does not give a comparative analysis of the two, as he
does in the case of vitakka-vicara and piti-sukham.
Under cetana he expatiates in forcible similes, describing it
as a process of activity and toil, and as a co-ordinating, order-
ing function. He likens it to an energetic farmer, bustling
about his fifty-five labourers (the fifty-five co-constituents
in the thought-complex) to get in the harvest ; to a senior
apprentice at the carpenter's, working himself and supervis-
ing the tasks of the others ; to the leader of a warrior band,
fighting and inciting. To these notions the definition of
Nagasena (Mil. 61) only adds that of preparing (abhisan-
kharanam), the other qualifying term being merely a
denominative form (as if we should say '
thinkifying ')
.
In so far, then, as '
thinking ' connotes representative,
co-ordinative intellection, it coincides with cetana. In its
narrower, technical sense of intellection by way of general
notions, it does not (see Introduction). Any way, to call it
*
thinking ' is sufficiently indefinite, and does not preclude
the rendering of it elsewhere by such terms as ' reflecting,'
*
cogitating,' '
considering,' etc. But the problem has still


[7] What on that occasion is conception (vitakko)?^
The ratiocination, the conception, which on that occasion
is the disposition,^ the fixation, the focussing,^ the applica-
to be solved of how it is related to such terms as sarin a,
c it tarn, and vinnanam. With regard to skandha, it is
classed, not with cittam, but under the sankhara-
skandha, § 62.
Cittam, together with the terms in which it is de-
scribed, is discussed in my Introduction.
^ Vitakko and vicaro is another pair of terms which it
is hard to fit with any one pair of English words. It is very
possible that academic teaching came to attach a more preg-
nant and specialized import to them than was conveyed in
popular and purely ethical usage. Cf, M. i., Suttas xix.
and XX., where vitakka would be adequately rendered by
ideas, notions, or thoughts. In Asl. 114, 115, on the other
hand [cf. Mil. 62, 63), the relation of the two to cittam
and to each other is set out with much metaphor, if with
too little psychological grasp. Vitakko is distinctively
mental procedure at the inception of a train of thought, the
deliberate movement of voluntary attention. As a king
ascends to his palace leaning on the arm of favourite or
relative, so thought ascends to its object depending upon the
conceptive act (vitakko; Asl. 114). Other metaphorical
attributes are its impingeing upon, circum-impingeing upon
(paryahanam), the object, and, again, bringing it near.
Hence in selecting '
conception '
in preference to 'reasoning,'
by which vitakko has often been translated, I wished to
bring out this grasping, constructive, reaching-out act of the
mind, this incipient fetch of the imagination, elaborated in
the Buddhist scholastic analysis of the term ; but I had no
wish to read our own logical or psychological import of con-
ception as intellection by way of general notions, or the like,
into the Eastern tradition. Yet just as conception may be
so used as to include 'reasoning' or 'ratiocination,' so
vitakko is, in the reply, described by takko, the term used
for ratiocinative procedure, argument, or logic {cf. D. i.
12, 21). 'What,' asks the Cy., 'does one reason about
(takkesi) ? About a pot, a cart, the distance of anything.
Well, vitakko is a stronger reasoning.'
2 On *
disposition,' '
right intention,' see § 21.
'^Appana vyappana, the latter an intensive form of
the former (Asl. 142, 143). In the '
Yogavacara's Manual
'
(p. xi and passim) appana denotes the dawn of the desired


tion of the mind,^ right intention—this is the conception
that there then is.
[8] What on that occasion is discursive thought
(vicaro) ?^
The process, the sustained procedure (vicaro), the
progress and access [of the mind] which on that occasion
is the [continuous] adjusting and focussing of thought^
—
this is the discursive thought that there then is.
[9] What on that occasion is joy (pit i) ?*
concept during the practice of regulated meditation. Bud-
dhaghosa defines it thus:—ekaggam cittam arammane
appenti.
^ Cetaso abhiniropana = arammane cittam . . .
patitthapeti (ibid.)
^Vicaro, as compared with vitakko, was used to express
the movement and maintenance of the voluntary thought-
continuum, as distinguished from the initiative grappling
with the subject of reflection. Examining in detail, as com-
pared with grasping the whole, is also read into it by com-
mentators (Asl. 114). It is a pounding up (anumajja-
nam), as well as a linking together. Metaphors are
multiplied, to show its relation to vitakko. It is as the
reverberation of the beaten drum or bell is to the beating;
as the planing movement of the bird's wings after the
initial upsoaring ; as the buzzing of the bee when it has
alighted on the lotus; as the scouring of the dirty bowl
when clutched; as the manipulating hand of the potter,
vitakko being represented by the hand which holds the
clay to the wheel, and so on. * Investigation ' would well
represent the sustained activity ;
'
analysis,' the cogitation in
details ;
'
discursive thought ' gives some of the import of
both, without introducing modern and Western implications.
^ Like the adjusting of bow and arrow. '
Focussing ' is
anupekkhamano.
^ Piti, as distinguished from sukham, is explicitly ex-
cluded from the skandha of feeling, considered as the
irreducible hedonic constituent, and referred to the
composite psychoses of the sankhara skandha. It con-
notes emotion, as distinct from bare feeling ; that is to say,
piti is a complex psychical phenomenon, implying a
'
central psycho-physical origin ' and a widely diffused
'
somatic resonance '
(ef. Sully, '
The Human Mind,' ii. 56).


The joy which on that occasion is gladness, rejoicing at,
rejoicing over, mirth and merriment, feHcity,^ exultation,
transport of mind^—this is the joy that there then is.
[10] What on that occasion is ease (s u k h a m) ?^
It arises out of a present idea, and suffuses the whole
being. By Buddhaghosa's day it was divided into five
species : the thrill of joy, just causing *
the flesh to creep '
;
the flash of joy, like lightning ; the flood of joy, like the
breakers on a sea-shore ; ecstasy or transport, in which
the subject could float in the air ; and overwhelming
suffusing joy (Asl. 115, 116). Instances are related of the
fourth species (ubbega-piti), the inspiring idea being
'Buddharammanam^ (see also Visuddhi Magga, ch. iv.
;
*Yogavacara's Manual,' vii.). The same word (ubbego) is
used to describe the anguish or trembling over guilt
discovered. See below, § 31 n.
^ Vitti, meaning literally, as the Cy. points out,
prosperity, wealth, and used here by analogy as a state
conditioned by a source of pleasure. '
Happiness arises to
him who is joyful through his joy, as it arises to the
wealthy through his rice-possessions.' (Asl. 143.)
^ Attamanata cittassa. Buddhaghosa, who did not
know the true etymology of this term, is ready as ever with
a guess : attano manata, or mentality of one's self, not
of another, subjective experience. If I am pained or
pleased, that is peculiarly my aft'air (ibid.). Psychologically
it is interesting to note that he is prepared to find this
intimate, subjective reference in a state of intense feeling.
*
Feeling is subjective experience jjar excellence . . . our
feelings . . . are all our own.' (Sully, '
The Human
Mind,' ii. 2 ; G. C. Eobertson, '
Elements of Psychology,'
185-188.)
^ To contrast piti with sukham, Buddhaghosa draws
a charming picture of the traveller who, fordone with
journeying through a desert, hears with joy of a pool in a
grove, and with joy comes upon it, and who, on drinking,
bathing, and resting in the shade is filled with ease.
Sukham, it is true, is not bare quiescence ; it is positive,
pleasurable feeling, and may have active concomitants; its
*
essence ' is expansion or increase ( u p a b r u h a n am ) . But
just as dukkham means, not so much pain as ill-being or
misery, so does sukham mean well-being or sane and
sound csenaesthesis. And as *
joy '
is the satisfaction of


The mental pleasure, the mental ease which on that
occasion is the pleasant, easeful experience born of contact
with thought, the pleasant, easeful feeling born of contact
with thought—this is the ease that there then is.
[11] What on that occasion is self-collectedness (cittass'
ekaggata)?!
The stability, solidity, absorbed steadfastness of thought^
which on that occasion is the absence of distraction,
gaining (potentially or actually) what we desire, so is 'ease'
the enjoyment of the flavour (French, savourer) of what
we have gained (Asl. 117). See further § 60. '
Mental
ease' (cetasikam sukham) is perhaps more correctly
somanassam, rendered (§ 1, etc.) by 'happiness,'
sukh am being sometimes distinguished as bodily (kayikam)
only. See S. v. 209.
1 'Citt' ekaggata, the one-peaked condition of mind,
is a name for concentration (samadhi),' says the Cy.
(p. 118). And accordingly, whereas under § 15 it gives
no further description of samadhi, it here applies to
citt' ekaggata the metaphors used in Mil. 38 to illustrate
samadhi, viz., the centre part of a tent-shaped hut, and a
chieftain leading his army. It then adds that '
this
samadhi, which is called self-collectedness, has, as its
characteristic mark, the absence of wandering, of distrac-
tion ; as its essence, the binding together of the states of
mind that arise with it, as water binds the lather of soap
;
and as its concomitants, calmness, or wisdom—for it is
said, " he who is at peace he understands, he sees things as
they really are "—and ease. The steadfastness of thought
is likened to the steadiness of a lamp-flame in a windless
place.' See '
Yogavacara's Manual,' p. xxvi.
^ These three cognate terms are in the text cittassa
thiti santhiti avatthiti. According to the Cy. (p. 143),
the standing unshaken in or on the object (arammane)
connoted by thiti is modified by the prefix sam to imply
kneading together (sampindetva) the associated states in
the object, and by the prefix ava to imply the being im-
mersed in the object. The last metaphor is in Buddhist
doctrine held applicable to four good and three bad states
—
faith, mindfulness, concentration ( = self-collectedness) and
wisdom ; craving, speculation and ignorance, but most of
all to self-collectedness.


balance,^ imperturbed mental procedure, quiet,^ the faculty
and the power of concentration, right concentration—this
is the self-collectedness that there then is.
[12] What on that occasion is the faculty of faith
(saddhindriyam)?^
The faith which on that occasion is a trusting in, the
professing confidence in,* the sense of assurance, faith,^
^ Avisaharo, avikkhepo [v. § 57). Distraction and
loss of equilibrium are attributed to the presence of '
excite-
ment and perplexity ' (§§ 425, 429 ; Asl. 144).
^ Samatho. Distinguished as of three species : mental
calm (so used here) ; legal pacification, or settlement
;
calm in all the sanskaras, by which, according to the Cy.
(144), is meant the peace of Nirvana.
^ On *
faculty,' see Introduction.
Faith is characterized and illustrated in the same terms
and approximately the same similes as are used in Mil.,
pp. 34-60. That is to say, it is shown to be a state of
mind where the absence of perplexity sets free aspiration
and energy. It is described as trust in the Buddha and
his system. There is, however, no dwelling just here on
any terminus ad quern, as St. Paul did in speaking of
'
the prize for the mark of the high calling,' etc., towards
which he pressed in ardent faith. There is, rather, an
insistence on that self-confidence born of conviction of the
soundness of one's methods and efforts which is, as it were,
an aspect of faith as a vis a tergo. In the simile of the
stream, the Cy. differs from Trenckner's version of the
Milinda to the extent of making the folk afraid to cross
because of alligators and other monsters, till the hero takes
his sword and plunges in. See the note on '
faith ' in the
translation of Mil. i. 56.
* I.e., in the Buddha, the Doctrine and the Order.
Buddhaghosa is only interested in making the etymology
bear on ethics, and compares the '
downward plunge ' of
confidence (o-kappana) in the attitude of faith to the
'
sinking '
in *
mindfulness,' the '
grounded stand ' in '
con-
centration,' and the '
sounding '
penetration of '
wisdom '
Asl. 144, 145).
^ The Cy. puts forward an alternative explanation of the
repetition in the description of this and following com-
pounds of the first term of the compound, viz., ' faith.'


faith as a faculty and as a power—this is the faith that
there then is.
[13] What on that occasion is the faculty of energy
(viriyindriyam) ?^
The mental inception^ of energy which there is on that
occasion, the striving and the onward effort, the exertion
According to the former, it is the method of Abhidamma
to set out in isolation the adjectival part of a compound on
which the substantival part depends: faith-faculty = faith
(faculty of). According to the latter, the identity between
the two abstractions, faith and faith-faculty, is brought
out. The case of woman and attribute of femininity, it
remarks, is different. (This may be a groping after the
distinction between concrete and abstract.)
^ Viriyam is by Buddhaghosa connected with (a) vira,
the dynamic effectiveness which is the essence of the genus
'
hero '
(viro), (b) iriya, vibrating movement. He charac-
terizes it by the two notions, '
supporting '
and '
grasping
at,' or * stretching forward' (pag^aho), and, again, by
'exerting' (ussahanam). Of. Mil. 36; Sum. Vil. 63.
And he cites the same similes as nppear in the Milinda.
He seems to have wished, as modern psychologists have
done, to account for the two modes of conscious effort
:
Resistance and Free Energy. But he also emphasizes the
fact that the energy in question is mental, not bodily
(pp. 120 et seq., 145).
2 Arambho (c/. ar am man am), overt action as distin-
guished from inaction, hence action at its inception, is dis-
tinguished by the Cy. as having six different implications,
according as there is reference to karma, to a fault com-
mitted, to slaying or injury, or to action as such (k iriya),
or energy as such.
I do not pretend that the four following pairs of words
fit those in the text exactly. They are mere approximations.
'Endeavour' is vayamo, the term representing 'energy'
in the Noble Eightfold Path. '
Unfaltering ' effort
(asithila-parakkamata) is the attitude of one who has
made the characteristic Buddhist vow : Verily may skin
and nerve and bone dry up and wither, or ever I stay my
energy, so long as I have not attained whatsoever by
human vigour, energy, and effort is attainable ! (M. i. 480).
The desire sustained—lit., not cast down—is that felt on
an occasion for making good karma.


and endeavour, the zeal and ardour, the vigour and forti-
tude, the state of unfaltering effort, the state of sustained
desire, the state of unflinching endurance, the solid grip of
the burden, energy, energy as faculty and as power, right
endeavour—this is the energy that there then is.
[14] What on that occasion is the faculty of mindfulness
(satindriyam) ?i
The mindfulness which on that occasion is recollecting,
calling back to mind ; the mindfulness^ which is remember-
ing, bearing in mind, the opposite of superficiality^ and
of obliviousness ; mindfulness as faculty, mindfulness as
power, right mindfulness—this is the faculty of mindfulness
that there then is.
1 Buddhaghosa's comment on sati, in which he closely
follows and enlarges on the account in Mil. 37, 38, shows
that the traditional conception of that aspect of conscious-
ness had much in common with the Western modern theory
of conscience or moral sense. Sati appears under the
metaphor of an inward mentor, discriminating between
good and bad and prompting choice. Hardy went so far
as to render it by '
conscience,' but this slurs over the in-
teresting divergencies between Eastern and Western
thought. The former is quite unmystical on the subject of
sati. It takes the psychological process of representative
functioning (without bringing out the distinction between
bare memory and judgment), and presents the same under
an ethical aspect. See also under hiri, §30; and the
notion as described in '
Questions of Milinda,' 38, n. 2.
2 The threciold mention of sati in the reply (c/. § 12)
agrees with K., but not with Puggala Panfiatti (p. 25). It
is not noticed by the Cy.
^Apilapanata. The Atthasalini solves the problem pre-
sented by this term (see Milinda (S.B.E.), vol. i., p. 58, n. 2)
by deriving it from pilavati, to float, and interprets:
—
* not floating on the surface like pumpkins and pots on the
water,' sati entering into and plunging down into the
object of thought. Cf. § 11, n. 2 ; § 12, n. 2, in which
connection the term is again used. The positive form occurs
m/m, §1349. P. P.has(a)vilapanata (21,25). (Asl. 147;
cf. 405.) I should have rendered the word by *
profundity,"