Kathavatthu - Of Attainment; Thusness (Suchness); Nibbana as Morally Good

Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A

4. Of Attainment (patti).
Controverted Point—That attainment is unconditioned.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Pubbaseliyas again, hold
that the winning of any acquisition is itself unconditioned.
[1] Is similar to § 1 in the foregoing.
[2-4] Th.—Again, do you imply that the winning
[through gifts] of raiment, almsfood, lodging, medicine,
is unconditioned ? But if so, the same difficulty arises as
in the case of attainment in general (§ 1). In fact, you
would have in these four and Nibbana five ' unconditioned's.'
[5, 6] A similar argument is used for the winning of any
of the Rupa Jhanas (4), or of the Arupa Jhanas (4), or of
the Four Paths and Four Fruits, concluding with :—
In fact, you would have in these eight and Nibbana nine
'unconditioned's,' etc.


[7] P.—But if I am wrong, can you identify winning
with any one of the five aggregates, bodily or mental ?
If not, then it is unconditioned.

5. Of ' Thusness.'
Controverted Point.—That the fundamental character-
istics of all things (sabba-dhamma) are unconditioned.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Uttarapathakas, hold that
there is an immutable something called thusness (or suchness)1 in the
very nature of all things, material or otherwise [taken as a whole].
And because this 'thusness' is not included in the [particular] con-
ditioned matter, etc., itself, therefore it is unconditioned.
[1] Th.—Do you then identify those fundamental charac-
teristics or ' thusness' with Nibbana, the Shelter . . . the
Goal, the Past-deceased, the Ambrosial ,? Or are there two
'unconditioned's'? You deny both alternatives [but you
must assent to one or the other]. If to the latter, I ask,
are there two kinds of Shelters and so on ? And is there
a boundary or . . . interstice between them?
[2] Again, assuming a materiality (rupata) of matter or
body, is not materiality unconditioned ? You assent. Then
I raise the same difficulties as before.
[3] I raise them, too, if you admit a 'hedonality' of feel-
ing,2 a 'perceivability' of perception,2 a sankharata or

1
Tathata . The Br. translation renders this by 'immutable
reality.' Cf . VI. 3, above. Br. reads here, differently from PTS
edition: sabbadhammanang rupadibhavasankhata tathata
nama atthi. On the metaphysical expansion of the notion, rendered
by those who have translated Asvaghosa from the Chinese as tathata
see T. Suzuki's Awakening of Faith, p. 53, etc. Tathata does not
occur again throughout the Pitakas. The Commentary attaches no
increased interest or importance to the term, and the argument in the
text is exactly like that in the foregoing discourse. But because of
the importance ascribed to ' thusness ' or ' suchness ' by certain of the
Mahayanists, and because of the unique abstract forms coined for the
argument, we do not condense this exposition.
2
Vedanata, sannata.


co-efficiency of mental co-efficients, a consciousness of
being conscious.1 If all these be unconditioned, are there
then six categories of 'unconditioned's'?
[4] U.—But if I am wrong, is the ' thusness ' of all things
the five aggregates [taken together] ?
Th.—Yes.
U.—Then that' thusness ' of all things is unconditioned.
6. Of Nibbana as Morally Good.
Controverted Point—That the element (or sphere)2 of
Nibbana is good.
From the Commentary.—All 'good' mental states are so called,
either because they can, as faultless, insure a desirable result-in-
sentience (vipaka) , or because they as faultless are free from
the corruptions. The idea of faultlessness is applied to all except
immoral states. The desirable result takes effect in a future rebirth,
either at conception or later. The first term in the triad :—good, bad,
indifferent—applies to the moral cause producing such a result. But
the Andhakas makes no such distinction, and call Nibbana 'good'
just because it is a faultless state.
[1] Th.—Do you imply that it has a mental object,
involving a mental process of adverting, reflecting, co-
ordinating, attending, willing, desiring, aiming ? Is not
rather the opposite true ?
[2] These things we can predicate of all morally good
mental states—of disinterestedness, love, intelligence, faith,
energy, mindfulness, concentration, understanding. But
if we cannot predicate them of Nibbana, then is the element
of Nibbana not rightly called morally good.
[3] A.—But is not the element of Nibbana faultless?
If so—and you do assent—then it, not being immoral, is
moral.

1
Vinnanassa vinnanata .
2
Nibbana-dhatu , Nibbana considered in itself, independently
coming to pass, ultimate, irreducible.