Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
7. Of Assurance which is not Final.
Controverted Point.—That the average man may possess
final assurance.1
From the Commentary.—Certain of the Uttarapathakas, judging by
the Sutta—'once immersed is so once for all,' etc.2—hold the view
above stated.
[1] Th.—Do you mean that he has that assurance even
if he commit the worst crimes—matricide, parricide,
Arahanticide, wounding a Buddha, breaking up the Order ?
'Nay,' you say.3
Again, could an average man holding that assurance feel
doubt about it? 'Yes,' you say. Then he cannot feel assured.
[2] Surely you agree that, if he feel assured, he cannot
feel doubt.4 Now has he put away doubt ? 'No,' you say.5
But think! You now assent.6 Then has he put away
doubt by the First Path ? or the Second, Third, or Fourth
Path? How, then?
U.—By a bad path.
Th.—[Do you tell me that] a bad path leads aright,
goes to the destruction [of lust, hate, etc.], goes to en-
lightenment, is immune from intoxicants, is undefiled ? Is
it not the opposite of all this ? . . .
[3] Could the Annihilationist view be adopted by a
person assured and convinced of the truth of the Eternalist
1
Accanta , i.e., ati-anta, very final. The Br. translator
renders this by 'true,' because all assurance for a finite period is not a
true assurance. Thus our conviction that the sun will rise to-morrow,
though it is exceedingly likely to be justified, is based only on a belief
that no cosmic dislocation will intervene, and is therefore no 'true'
assurance either.
2
See next page.
3 'The heretic, incorrigible as a tree-stump, is more or less assured
of cherishing his fixed opinions in other future existences. But the
matricide, etc., is assured of retribution in the next existence only.
Hence he must reject.'—Comy.
4 'He assents, because a man cannot doubt his own opinion if it be
repeatedly cherished.'—Comy,
5
'Because it has not been put away by the Ariyan Path.'— Comy.
6
Doubt not overriding the cherished opinion.— Comy
view?1 'Yes,' you say. Surely then the assurance of the
average man in his Annihilationist convictions is no 'in-
finite assurance.'
[4] If you now deny in reply to my question, I ask again,
has he put away [the Annihilationist view] ? If so, by which
of the Four Paths ? You reply, as before, ' By a bad path.'
That is to say, by a bad path he puts away a bad view. . . .
[5, 6] A similar argument may be put forward for an
Annhilationist who adopts the Eternalist view.
[7] U.—If I am wrong,2 was it not said by the Exalted
One: ' Take the case, bhikkhus, of a person whose mental
states are entirely black-hearted3 and immoral—he it is who,
once immersed, is so once for all'?4
Surely then any average man can attain infinite
assurance.
[8] Th.—Is that which you have quoted your reason for
maintaining your proposition ? You admit it is. Now the
Exalted One said further: ' Take the case, bhikkhus, of a
person who, having come to the surface, is immersedNow
is this [supposed to be] happening all the time ?5 Of course
not. .. . [9] But again he said: ' Take the case, bhikkhus,
of a person who, having emerged, so [remains]; of one who,
having emerged, discerns, glances around; of one who, having
emergedf swims across; of one who, having emerged, wins a
footing on the shore.'
Now is each of these persons doing so all the time?
And does any of these cases furnish you with a reason
for saying that any average person can have final assurance
[in his convictions]?
1
In the eternal duration of soul and universe. The former view
holds that the soul ends at death. Dialogues, i. 50, § 32.
2
In the Commentary, PTS edition, p. 181, line 14, read puccha
paravadissa. Suttassa . .. .
3
Ekanta-kalaka...dhamma ,
4
Anguttara-Nik., iv. 11, the 'water-parable' of seven classes of
persons. Discussed in Puggalar-Pannatti, 71.
5
The Theravadin asks this question in order to show the necessity
of a critical study, by research, of the spirit of Texts, without relying
too much on the letter.—Comy.
8. Of the Moral Controlling Powers.1
Controverted Point.—That the five moral controlling
powers—faith, effort, mindfulness, concentration, under-
standing—are not valid as 'controlling powers ' in worldly
matters.
From the Commentary.—This is an opinion held by some, like the
Hetuvadins and Mahingsasakas.
[1] Th.—Do you imply that there can be no faith, or
effort, or mindfulness, or concentration, or understanding
in worldly concerns ? You deny. [2] On the other hand,
you maintain that there is faith, etc., in such a connection,
but that none of them avail for moral control.
[3] You admit that both mind and mind as a controlling
power are valid in worldly matters. And you admit a similar
validity in both joy and joy as a controlling power, in both
psychic life and psychic life as a controlling power.
[4] Why then exempt those five ?
[5] Again, you admit that there is both a spiritual2
faith and a controlling power of that faith—why not both
a worldly faith and a worldly controlling power o f faith ?
And so for the rest. [6] Why accept in the one case, deny
in the other ?
[7] Moreover, was it not said by the Exalted One : ' And I,
bhikkhus, with the eyes of a Buddha surveying the world, satv
beings living whose vision loas dim with dust, in some but
slightly, greatly in others, beings whose faculties were here keen,
there blunt, of good disposition . . . apt to learn . . . some
among them discerning the danger and defect of [rebirth in]
other worlds'?3
Surely then the five moral controlling powers are valid in
worldly matters.
1
Or five faculties or factors of 'moral sense' (indriya) . See
above, pp. 16 ; 65 f.; 194, n. 1. These five are pre-eminent in doctrine
as ranking among the 'thirty-seven factors of Enlightenment.'
2
Or supra-mundane and mundane.
3
Dialogues, ii. 31 f . The two lacunae (of one word each) occur in
both Br. and PTS editions.
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