Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
IV.—CONSCIOUSNESS.
[193] Is there the notion of soul to each [moment of]
consciousness ?
Yes.
Does the soul undergo birth, decay, death, disease and
rebirth in each [moment of] consciousness ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
x
[194] When the second [moment of] consciousness in a
process of thought arises, is it wrong to say : ' It is the same,
or something different'?
2
Yes.
Then, when the second moment arises, is it not also
wrong to say : ' It is a boy' or ' it is a girl '?
3
It may be so said.
Now acknowledge the refutation : If at the second
moment of consciousness it could not be said, 'It is the
same or something different,' then indeed, good sir, neither
can it be said, at that moment, that ' It is a boy, or a girl.'
What you say, namely, that the former may not, the latter
may be affirmed, is false. If the former proposition may
not be affirmed, the second cannot be affirmed. Your
rejecting the one and accepting the other is wrong.
[195] According to you it is wrong to say, when the
second moment of consciousness arises, ' It is the same or
something different.' Can it not then, at such a moment,
be said :
4
It is male or female, layman or religious, man or
deva.'
Yes, it can be . . . {complete as in § 194).
V.—THE FIVE SENSES.
[196] P.—Is it wrong to say:
4
The soul or person is
known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact
1
?
Th.—Yes, it is wrong.
1
This the Puggalavadin, not approving of a momentary state for
the soul, rejects.—Comy.
2
I.e., same as the first moment or different from it.
3
Should one say 'a man,'
'a woman' instead. The Animist has
admitted constant becoming, change, in the previous reply. The child
at each moment is becoming more adult, but popular usage lets him
become/man ' or ' woman,' so to speak, by a sudden transition from
one static condition to the next. The Animist, who mixes such usage
with his philosophy, is constrained to justify the former and assents.
Cf . Mrs. Rh. D.'s Buddhism, p. 182.
P.—Is it not the case that when someone sees something
by means of something, a certain 'he' sees a certain 'it'
by a certain ' means '?
1
Th.—Yes.
P.—But if that is so, then surely it should be said that
the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate
fact?
Analogous questions are asked concerning the other four
senses. Again ;
Is it not the case that when someone knows something
by means of something, a certain 'he' knows a certain 'it'
by a certain 'means'? If so, then surely it may be,said
that the person is known in a real and ultimate sense.
[197] Th.—Is the person known in the sense of a real
and ultimate fact ?
P.—Yes.
Th.—Is it not the case that when someone does not see
something by means of something, a certain ' he ' does not
see a certain 'it' by a certain 'means' ?
P.—Yes.
Th.-—Then it is equally the case that the person is not
known in a real and ultimate sense.
Analogous questions are asked concerning the other four
senses and cognition generally.
[198] P.—Is it wrong to say the person is known in the
sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
Th.—Yes.
P.—Was it not said by the Exalted One :
£
0 bhikkhus,
I see beings deceasing and being reborn by the jmrified vision
of the eye celestial, surpassing that of men. I discern beings
in spheres sublime or base, fair or frightful, of happy or woeful
1
The Animist, or Entity-theorist, seeking to establish his view by
another method, now says :
4
Why are yon so concerned with all this
inquiry about derived concept ? Tell me this first: Why may we not
say, that a person is really and ultimately known, etc. . . Here
'someone' is the puggalo, ' something' is the visible object,
' means' is the eye. But the orthodox says it is only eye, depending
on visual consciousness, that sees, and so on. But in conventional
usage we say 'someone sees,' etc—Comy,
doom, faring according to their actions'?
1
Is the Suttanta
thus?
Th.—Yes.
P.—Surely then the person2
is known in the sense of a
real and ultimate fact ?
[199] Th.—Granting that the Exalted One said that
which is quoted, is that a reason for affirming that the
person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
P.—Yes.
Th.—Does the Exalted One, by the purified vision of the
eye celestial surpassing that of man, see visible objects, and
does he also see the person or soul ?
P.—He sees visible objects.
3
Th.—Are visible objects the person ? Do they end
one life and reappear ? Do they fare according to
Karma ?
P.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Th.—I repeat my former question.
P.—He does see the person or soul.
4
Th.—Is then the soul visible object ? Is it object
of sight, objective element of sight, blue, green, yellow,
red, white ? Is it cognizable by sight ? Does it impinge
on the eye ? Does it enter the avenue o f sight ?
5
P.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Th—I repeat my former question.
P.—He does see both.
Th— Are both then visible objects? Both objective
element of sight? Are both blue, green, yellow, red,
white? Are both cognizable by sight? Do both impinge
1
Gf . Majjhima-Nik., i. 482. The wording of this passage above
differs very slightly from about some twenty references in the Nikayas.
When adequate indexes to the first two Nikayas are finished, we may
be able to trace one exactly like this.
2
Satto, ' being,' is synonymous with ' puggalo.'—Comy.
3
The affirmative replies are not distinctly assignedin the P.T.S. text.
4
By the quotation : ' I see beings.' . . .—Comy.
5
Things that are perceptible are apprehended in a fourfold synthesis
of seeing, hearing, reflection, understanding. — Comy. Hence the
soul cannot be identified with external objects as seen.
on the eye ? Do both enter the avenue of sight ? Do both
disappear, reappear in rebirths, faring according to Karma ?
P.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
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