Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
III—DERIVATIVES.
Examination continued by Way of Derivative Concepts}
[171] Th.—Is the concept of soul derived from the
corporeal qualities ?
P.—Yes.
2
Are material qualities impermanent, conditioned, do they
happen through a cause ? Are they liable to perish, to
pass away, to become passionless, to cease, to change ?
Yes.
But has soul also any or all of these qualities ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[172] Or is the concept of soul derived from feeling, from
perception, from mental coefficients, from consciousness ?
Yes (to each £
aggregate' in succession).
Is any mental aggregate impermanent, conditioned?
does it happen through a cause ? is it liable to perish, to
pass away, to become passionless, to cease, to change ?
Yes.
But has soul also any or all of these qualities ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[173] You said that the concept of soul is derived from
material qualities. Is the concept o f blue-green3
soul
derived from blue-green material qualities ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Or is the concept of yellow, red, white, visible, invisible,
resisting, or unresisting soul derived from corresponding
material qualities, respectively ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. .. .
[174] Is the concept of soul derived from feeling?
1
This chapter is still largely eschatological, hence 'soul' is retained
for puggala, though individual, person, or ego would serve equally
well in the more psychological considerations.
2
He will have it that the concept or notion of soul, or personal
•entity, is derived from material and mental qualities, just as the
shadow (read PTS. ed., chayaya) is derived from the tree, and
.fire from fuel.—Comy.
3
Nila is both blue and also green, Indian writers applying it to
both sky and trees. In these replies the animist rejects a pluralistic
-state for the soul.—Comy.
T.S. V.
Yes.
Is the concept of good soul derived from good feeling ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat my question.
Yes.
1
Now, does feeling entail result or fruit, fruit that is
desirable, pleasing, gladdening, unspotted, a happy result,
and such as conveys happiness ?
No.
I repeat my question.
Yes.
But does ' good soul' entail result or fruit of like nature
with the above ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said.
2
.. .
[175] If the concept of soul is derived from feeling, is the
concept of bad soul derived from bad feeling ?
Yes.
Now does bad feeling entail result or fruit, fruit that is
undesirable, unpleasing, spotted, an unhappy result, and
such as conveys unhappiness ?
Yes.
3
But does bad soul entail result or fruit of like nature to
the above ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. .. .
[176] If the concept of soul is derived from feeling, is
the concept of indeterminate soul—one to be termed neither
good nor bad—derived from indeterminate feeling ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Is the concept [I repeat] of an ethically indeterminate
soul derived from an ethically indeterminate feeling ?
Yes.
4
1
He now assents, taking 'good' in the sense of expertness, pro-
ficiency.—Comy.
2
He rejects because it is not customary to speak thus of 'soul.'
—Comy.
3
Taking 'bad' analogously to ' good' above.—Comy.
4
He now assents, because of the indeterminateness [of soul] with
respect to the Eternalist or Nihilist heresies. The changed replies are
to evade the imputation of Eternalism, etc.—Comy.
Is indeterminate feeling impermanent, conditioned ?
Does it happen through a cause ? Is it liable to
perish, to pass away, to become passionless, to cease, to
change?
Yes.
Has an ethically indeterminate soul any or all of these
qualities ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[177] Is the concept of soul derived from any o f the
other three aggregates:—perception, mental co-efficients,
consciousness ?
1
Yes.
[Taking the last] :—is the concept of good soul derived
from good consciousness ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Now does good consciousness entail result or fruit—fruit
that is desirable, pleasing, gladdening, unspotted, a happy
result, such as conveys happiness ?
Yes.
And does a good soul also entail the like ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[178] You say that the concept of soul is derived from
consciousness—is the concept of bad soul derived from bad
consciousness ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[I repeat] is the concept of bad soul derived from bad
consciousness ?
Yes.
Now does bad consciousness entail result or fruit, fruit
that is undesirable, etc. (the reverse of what is entailed by
good consciousness) ?
Yes.
And does a bad soul also entail the like?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[179] Again, since you admit that the concept of soul is
derived from any or all of the aggregates, e.g., conscious-
1
Elaborate, as with the two preceding aggregates (khandha) .
ness, is the concept of an ethically indeterminate soul
derived from indeterminate consciousness ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat my question.
Yes.
But is the ethically indeterminate soul impermanent,
conditioned, arisen through a cause, liable to perish . . .
to change ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[180] Ought it to be said that a soul who sees
1
is de-
rived from sight (or eye) ?
2
Yes.
Ought it to be said that, when sight (or eye) ceases, the
seeing soul ceases ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. .. .
(The pair of queries is applied, with like replies, to the
other four senses, and also to the sensus communis, mano.)
[181] Ought it to be said that a soul o f wrong views is
derived from wrong views ?
Yes.
Ought it to be said that when the wrong views cease to
exist, the soul having wrong views ceases to exist ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Ought it, again, to be said that when any other parts of
the "Wrong Eightfold Path3
cease to exist, the soul, said
by you to be derived from that part, ceases to exist ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. .. .
[182] Similarly, ought it to be said that a soul of right
views, or right aspiration, right speech, right action, right
livelihood, right endeavour, right mindfulness, right con-
centration, is derived from the corresponding part [of the
Eightfold Path]?
1
The Comy, notes the ambiguity, in the argument, of moral and
physical vision in this word cakkhuma .
2
Cakkhu is both 'eye' and 'sight.'
3
The opposites to the qualities prescribed in the Ariyan Eightfold
Path are so termed—e.g., in MajjMma-Nik., i. 118.
Yes.
Ought it, again, to be said that when the given part
ceases, the soul so derived ceases ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[183] Is the concept of soul derived from material
qualities and feeling ?
Yes.
Then could the concept of a double soul be derived from
the pair of aggregates ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Or could the concept of a double soul be derived from
material quality coupled with any of the other three aggre-
gates . . . or the concept of five souls be derived from all
five aggregates?
1
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[184] Is the concept of soul derived from the organs of
sight (eye) and hearing (ear) ?
Yes.
Then could the concept 'two souls' be derived from
the two organs ? . . . (and so on as in § 183, to include
all the twelve ayatanas—i.e., organs and objects of sense
and the organ and object of sense co-ordination, ma no,
dhamma. )
[185] Is the concept of soul derived from the elements
of sight (or eye) and hearing (or ear) ?
Yes.
Could the concept of a double soul be derived from these
two ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Is the concept of soul derived from the element of sight
and any other of the eighteen elements ?
2
Yes. •
1
The idea is that, there being a plurality of aggregates in the
individual organism, and soul a derivative of anyone, there might
conceivably be five , souls cohering in one individual's life-continuum
(ekasantanena)—which the Animist denies.—Comy.
0
See p. 15.
Could the concept of eighteen souls be derived from the
eighteen elements ?
Nay, that cannot be truly said. . . .
[186] Is the concept of soul derived from the control-
ling powers
1
—eye and ear ?
Yes.
Could the concept of a double soul be derived from these
two ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. .. .
Could the concept of soul be derived from the control-
ling power, eye, and from any other o f the twenty-two con-
trolling powers ?
Yes.
Could the concept of twenty-two souls be derived from
these ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[187] Is the concept of one soul derived from the be-
coming of one aggregate ?
2
Yes.
Could the concept of four souls be derived from the
becoming of the four (mental) aggregates ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Or again, by your assenting to the former question, could
-the concept of five souls be derived from the becoming of
the five aggregates (mental and bodily)?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. .. .
[188] Is there only one soul in the becoming o f one
aggregate ?
Yes.
Then are five souls in the becoming of all five aggre-
gates?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. .. .
[189] Is the concept of soul derived from material
1
Indriya (see p. 16). Of . Ledi Sadaw, JPTS., 1914, p. 162.
2
Here the term vokar a replaces khandha , as it often does
in the Yamaka. Becoming (bhava) in our idiom would be life-
time.'
qualities just as the idea of shadow is derived1
from a
tree? And just as the idea o f its shadow is derived from
the tree, and both tree and shadow are impermanent, is it
even so that the concept of soul is derived from material
qualities, both soul and material qualities being imper-
manent ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. • . .
Are material qualities one thing and the concept of soul
derived therefrom another, in the same way as the tree is
one thing, and the idea of shadow derived from it another ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[190] Is the concept of soul derived from material
qualities just as the notion ' villager' is derived from
village ? And if that is so, is material quality one thing,
soul another, just as village is one thing, villager another ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[191] Or—just as a kingdom is one thing, a king
another?
2
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[192] A jail
3
is not a jailer, but a jailer is he who has
the jail. Is it just so with material qualities and one who
has them? And accordingly, just as the jail is one thing,
the jailer another, are not material qualities one thing, and
one who has them another ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
1
Upadaya is only now defined in the Comy. as 'having come
(or happened) because of , not without such and such.' And as from
the impermanent only the impermanent can come, this idea of
puggala as 'derived from' impermanent aggregates, bodily and
mental, is obviously unfavourable for its upholder.
2
Worded analogously to § 190.
3
More literally a fetter or chain, and a 'fetterer' or 'chainer,'
nigalo, negaliko .
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