Abhidhammattha Sangaha ( A Manual of Abhidhamma )
Translated by Narada Maha Thera
Published By the Buddhist Missionary Society
Chapter III
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Pakinnaka—Sangaha—Vibhago
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1.Sampayutta yathayogam — te pannasa
sabhavato
Cittacetasika dhamma — tesam’dani
yatharaham.
Vedana hetuto kiccadvaralambanavatthuto
Cittuppadavasen’eva — sangaho nama niyate.
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(Miscellaneous Section)
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§1.The conjoined consciousness and mental states that
arise accordingly are fifty-three. (1)
Now their classification, taking the mind (2) as a
whole, is dealt with in a fitting manner, according to feel-
ing, roots, function, doors, objects, and bases.
Notes:
1. All the 89 classes of consciousness are collec-
tively treated as one in that they possess the characteristic
of awareness of an object. The 52 mental states are treated
separately as they possess different characteristics.
(1 + 52 = 53)
2.Cittuppada, literally, means a genesis of Citta.
Here the term means consciousness itself (cittam’eva cit-
tuppado). In other instances it implies the collection of
mental states together with the consciousness (annattha
pana dhammasamåho).
(Vedana—Sangaho)
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§2.Tattha vedanasangahe tava vedana:—sukham
dukkham, adukkbamasukham’ ti. Sukham,
dukkham, somanassam, domanassam,
upekkha’ti ca bhedena pana pancadha hoti.
§3.Tattha sukhasahagatam kusalavipakam
kayavinnanam ekam’eva.
§4.Tatha dukkhasahagatam akusalavipakam
kayavinnanam.
§5.Somanassa-sahagatha-cittani pana lobha-
målani cattari, dvadasa kamavacarasobha-
nani, sukhasantirana—hasanani ca dve’ ti
attharasa kamavacara cittani c’eva, pathama-
dutiyatatiya-catutthajjhanai sankhatani catu-
cattaëisa Mahaggata-Lokuttaracittani c’ati
dvasatthividhani bhavanti.
§6.Domanassa-sahagata cittani pana dve
patighacittan’eva.
§7.Sesani sabbani’pi pancapannasa upekkha-
sahagata-cittan’ eva’ti.
§8.Sukham dukkham-upekkha’ti tividha tattha
vedana
Somanassam domanassam iti bhedena
pancadha.
Sukham’ek’attha dukkhan ca domanassam
dvaye thitam
Dvasatthisusomanassampancapannasa-
ketara.
(i.Summary of Feeling)
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§2.In the summary of feeling (3) there are at first
three kinds:— pleasurable (4), painful, and that which is
neither pleasurable nor painful. Or, again, it is fivefold—
namely, happiness, pain, pleasure, displeasure, and indif-
ference or equanimity.
§3.Of them, moral resultant body-consciousness is
the only one accompanied by happiness.
§4.Similarly immoral resultant body-consciousness
is the only one accompanied by pain.
§ 5.There are sixty-two kinds of consciousness
accompanied by pleasure (5)—namely:
(a)the eighteen types of Sense-Sphere con-
sciousness, such as four rooted in attach-
ment, twelve types of Sense-Sphere Beau-
tiful consciousness, the two types of
investigating and smiling consciousness,
(b)forty-four types (6) of Sublime and Supra-
mundane consciousness pertaining to the first,
second, third, and fourth Jhanas. (12+ 32)
§6.Only the two types of consciousness connected
with aversion are accompanied by displeasure (7).
§7.All the remaining fifty-five types of conscious-
ness are accompanied by indifference or equanimity (8).
§8.Feeling, therein, is threefold—namely, happi-
ness, pain, and indifference. Together with pleasure and
displeasure it is fivefold.
Happiness and pain are found in one, displeasure in
two, pleasure in sixty-two, and the remaining (indiffer-
ence or equanimity) in fifty-five.
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Notes:
3.Vedana is a significant mental state which is
common to all types of consciousness. Feeling is its char-
acteristic (vedayita-lakkhana), and is born of contact.
Sensation, therefore, is not an appropriate rendering for
Vedana.
Feeling is defined as “a conscious, subjective impres-
sion which does not involve cognition or representation of
an object,.”85 Sensation is explained as “the content of
sensuous intuition, or the way in which a conscious subject
is modified by the presence of an object,.”86
Vedana modifies the stream of consciousness and
serves both as a life-promoting and life-destroying force.
Pleasure, for example, promotes life; pain impairs it. As
such feeling plays a very important part in the life of man.
Experiencing the taste of an object is the function of
Vedana (anubhavana rasa). Particular likes and dislikes
depend on the desirability and the undesirability of the
external object. Generally they are mechanistic.
Sometimes the freewill of a person determines the
mode of feeling independent of the nature of the object.
The sight of an enemy, for example, would normally be a
85. Dictionary of Philosophy—p. 108.
86. Ibid., p. 289.
source of displeasure, but a right-understanding person
would, on the contrary, extend his loving-kindness to-
wards him and experience some kind of pleasure. Socrates,
for instance, drank that cup of poison with joy and faced a
happy death. Once a certain brahman poured a torrent of
abuse on the Buddha, but He kept smiling and returned
love unto him. The ascetic Khantivadi, who was brutally
tortured by a drunkard king, wished him long life instead
of cursing him.
A bigoted non-Buddhist, on the other hand, may
even, at the sight of a Buddha, harbour a thought of
hatred. His feeling will be one of displeasure. Likewise a
similar feeling may arise in the heart of a bigoted Buddhist
at the sight of a religious teacher of an alien faith. What is
meat and drink to one, maybe poison to another.
Material pleasures, for instance, would be highly
prized by an average person. An understanding recluse
would find happiness in renouncing them and leading a
life of voluntary poverty in perfect solitude. Such a solitary
life, a sensualist may view as hell. Yes, what is heaven to
one may be hell to another; what is hell to one may be
heaven to another. We ourselves create them, and they are
more or less mind-made.
“There are, O Bhikkhus, two kinds of feeling—pain
and happiness”, says the Buddha. Well, then, how can
there be a third which is neither pain nor happiness? The
commentary states that blameless neutral feeling is
included in happiness and the blameworthy in pain.
Again, the Buddha has stated that whatever is felt in
this world, all that is pain. It is because of the changeable
nature of all conditioned things.
From another standpoint considering all forms of
feeling as purely mental, there are only three kinds—
namely, happiness (sukha), pain (dukkha), and neutral
(adukkhamasukha).
Atthasalini explains them as follows:—
The term sukha means ‘pleasurable feeling’
(sukkhavedana), ‘root of happiness’ (sukha-måla), ‘pleas-
urable object’ (sukharammana), ‘cause of happiness’
(sukhahetu), ‘conditioning state of pleasure’ (sukhapacca-
yatthana), ‘free from troubles’ (abyapajjha), ‘Nibbana’, etc.
In the expression: “By eliminating sukha” — sukha
means pleasurable feeling.
In the expression: “Sukha is non-attachment in this
world”. Here sukha means root of pleasure.
In the expression: “Since, O Mahali, form is sukha,
falls and descends on sukha”. Here sukha means object of
pleasure.
“Merit, O Bhikkhus, is a synonym for sukha.” Here
sukha means cause of pleasure.
“Not easy. is it, O Bhikkhus, to attain to heavenly
sukha by description”. “They know not sukha who do not
see Nandana”. Here sukha means conditioning state of
pleasure.
“These states constitute a sukha life in this very
world”. Here sukha means freedom from troubles.
“Nibbana is supreme sukha”. Here sukha means
Nibbana.
From these quotations the reader can understand in
what different senses the term sukha is used in the texts.
In this particular connection the term sukha is used in the
sense of pleasurable feeling.
Nibbana is stated to be supreme bliss (sukha). This
does not mean that there is a pleasurable feeling in Nib-
bana although the term sukha is used. Nibbana is a bliss of
relief. The release from suffering is itself Nibbanic bliss.
The term dukkha means ‘painful feeling’, ‘basis of
pain’, ‘object of pain,’ ‘cause of pain,’ ‘conditioning state of
pain,’ etc.
“By eliminating dukkha”—here dukkha means pain-
ful feeling.
“Birth too is dukkha”—here dukkha means basis of
pain.
“Since, O Mahali, form is dukkha, falls and descends
on pain”—here dukkha means object of dukkha.
“Accumulation of evil is dukkha” — here dukkha
means cause of pain.
“It is not easy, O Bhikkhus, to realise the pain of woe-
ful states by description”—here dukkha means “condition-
ing states of pain.”
In this particular connection the term dukkha is used
in the sense of painful feeling.
In the Dhammacakka Sutta the Buddha enumerates
eight divisions of dukkha—namely,
1. Birth is suffering, 2. decay is suffering, 3. disease is
suffering, 4. death is suffering, 5. association with the
unpleasant is suffering, 6. separation from the beloved is suf-
fering, 7. when one does not obtain what one desires there
is suffering, 8. in brief the Five Aggregates are suffering.
All these are the causes of dukkha.
When the Buddha addresses Devas and men He
speaks of eight kinds of dukkha. When He addresses only
men He speaks of twelve. Instead of vyadhi (disease) He
says soka (grief), parideva (lamentation), dukkha (pain),
domanassa (displeasure) upayasa (despair) are suffering.
All these five are included in vyadhi which embraces both
physical and mental disharmony.
Soka, domanassa, and upayasa are mental, while
dukkha and parideva are physical.
Practically there is no marked difference between the
two formulas.
Adukkha—m—asukha is that which is neither pain
nor happiness. It is a neutral feeling. This corresponds to
both stolid indifference and Stoic indifference. The Pali
term upekkha, which has a wider connotation, is more fre-
quently used to denote this kind of neutral feeling.
In an immoral type of consciousness upekkha assumes
the role of stolid indifference because it is prompted by
ignorance. In an ahetuka resultant consciousness, such as a
sense-impression, upekkha means simple neutral feeling
which has no ethical value. Adukkha-m-asukha strictly
applies in this connection. Upekkha latent in a kama vacara
Sobhana Citta (Beautiful types of consciousness pertaining
to the Sense-Sphere) may be any of the following states—
simple indifference (not stolid because there is no ignor-
ance), simple neutral feeling, disinterestedness, unbiassed
feeling, Stoic indifference, and perfect equanimity.
Upekkha in the jhana consciousness is perfect equa-
nimity born of concentration. It is both ethical and intel-
lectual.
According to a still wider, classification vedana is
fivefold—namely,
(i)Sukha (physical happiness),
(ii)Somanassa (mental pleasure),
(iii)Dukkha (physical pain),
(iv)Domanassa (mental displeasure),
(v)Upekkha (indifference, equanimity, feeling).
All feelings, from an ultimate standpoint, are mental be-
cause vedana is a cetasika. But a differentiation has been
made with regard to sukha and dukkha.
Of all the 89 types of consciousness only two are
associated with either sukha or dukkha. One is the body-
consciousness associated with happiness, and the other is
body-consciousness associated with pain.
Both these are the resultant types of consciousness,
effects of good and evil Kamma.
A soft touch, for instance, yields happiness. A pin prick,
on the contrary, yields pain. In these cases one experiences
the aforesaid two types of consciousness respectively.
Now a question arises—Why only the body-
consciousness is associated with happiness and pain? Why
not the other sense-impressions?
Mr. Aung provides an answer in his introductory
essay to the Compendium:—
“The sense of touch alone is accompanied by the positive
hedonic elements of pain and pleasure; the other four
senses are accompanied by hedonic indifference. This
exceptional distinction is assigned to the sense of touch,
because the impact between the sentient surface (pasada
råpa) and the respective objects of other senses, both sets of
which are secondary qualities of body, is not strong enough
to produce physical pain or pleasure. But in the case of
touch there is contact with one or other, or all the three pri-
mary qualities (locality—pathavi, temperature—tejo, pres-
sure—vayo) and this is strong enough to affect those pri-
mary qualities in the percipient’s own body. Just as cotton
wool on the anvil does not affect the latter, but a hammer
striking cotton wool imparts its check to the anvil also.”
(Compendium of Philosophy p. 14).
In the case of touch the impact is strong. The “essentials”,
pathavi, tejo, and vayo (extension, heat, and motion)—
apo, cohesion, is excluded being intangible—forcibly and
directly strike against the essentials of the body. Conse-
quently there is either pain or happiness.
In the case of seeing, hearing, smelling, and tasting,
there is a bare impact. The consequent feeling is neither
pain nor happiness.
Although these sense-impressions may be sukha,
dukkha, or upekkha the javana thought-processes condi-
tioned thereby may not necessarily be associated with a
similar feeling.
For instance, the Buddha experienced a body-
consciousness associated with pain when a rock splinter struck
His foot, but His javana thought-process conditioned thereby
would not necessarily be associated with displeasure. Un-
affected by the pain, He would have experienced perfect equa-
nimity. The immanent feeling in the stream of consciousness
would have been upekkha. Similarly at the sight of the Buddha
a right-understanding person would automatically experience
an eye-consciousness associated with indifference (upekkha-
sahagata cakkhu-vinnana), but his javana thought would be
moral. The innate feeling would be pleasure (somanassa).
This intricate point should be clearly understood.
Somanassa (good-mindedness) and domanassa
(bad-mindedness) are purely mental.
These five kinds of feeling could be reduced to three,
the three to two, and the two to one as follows:
i.sukha+somanassa ; upekkha; dukkha + domanassa
ii. sukha; upekkha; dukkha
iii. sukha dukkha
iv. dukkha
(Upekkha is merged in sukha, and sukha is ultimately merged
in dukkha).
4.Sukha—physical happiness should be differ-
entiated from somanassa—mental pleasure. So should
dukkha—physical pain—be differentiated from doma-
nassa—mental displeasure. There is only one conscious-
ness accompanied by sukha. Similarly there is only one
accompanied by dukkha. Both of them are the effects of
good and bad actions respectively.
When the Buddha, for instance, was injured by
Devadatta Thera He experienced a body-consciousness
accompanied by pain. This was the result of a past evil
action of His. When we sit on a comfortable seat we expe-
rience a body-consciousness accompanied by happiness.
This is the result of a past good action. All forms of physi-
cal pain and happiness are the inevitable results of our
own Kamma.
5. Readers will note that pleasurable types of con-
sciousness exceed all others. As such during a lifetime a per-
son experiences more happy moments than painful ones.
This does not contradict the statement that life is sorrow
(dukkha). Here dukkha is not used in the sense of painful
feeling but in the sense of oppression or impeding (piëana).
A careful reading of the description of dukkha, given in the
Dhammacakka Sutta will make the matter clear.
6. They are the four Kusala Jhanas, four Vipaka
Jhanas, Four Kriya Jhanas, and thirty-two Lokuttara Jha-
nas. (4 + 4 + 4 + 32 = 44)
7. There is displeasure only in the two types of
consciousness connected with patigha or aversion. We
experience displeasure when we get angry.
Is there aversion where there is displeasure? Yes, in
a gross or subtle form. See Ch. 1. p. 32, n. 10.
8. Viz., 6 Akusalas, 14, Ahetukas, 12 Sobhanas,
3Råpa Jhanas, 12 Aråpa Jhanas, 8 Lokuttaras = 55.
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