OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
APPENDIX
1 . PARAMATTHA, SACCIKA : THE REAL.
(I. 1., p. 9.)
IN the phrase paramatthena , saccikatthena ,
rendered ' in the sense of a real and ultimate fact,' these
two terms are used synonymously. Saccik a is also
stated to be something existent (atthi); and this ' existent,
as being not a past, or future, but a present existent, is
explained to be vijjamana, sangvijjamana :—some-
thing verifiably or actually existing (p. 22). Vijjamana,
a very important synonym of paramattha, means
literally ' something which is being known,' present
participle of the passive stem vid-ya,
c
to be known.' It
is rendered into Burmese by the phrase
£
evidently exist-
ing.' Upalabbhati (p. 8, n. 3),
6
to be known as
closely as possible,' is the subjective counterpart of the
existing real. Pa r am a- is, by the Corny., defined as
4
ultimate,' u ttama , a word traditionally defined, in the
AbhidhanappacUpika-suci, as that which has reached [its]
highest—ubbhuto atayattham uttamo .
According to Dhammapala, in the KathciTatthu-aniitTka,
p a r a m a means patthana , ' pre-eminent,' ' principal/
because of irreversibility (a-viparitabhavato ) or/in-
capacity of being transformed. And he further thought
that the reality of that which is parama depends upon its
being a sense-datum of infallible knowledge (avipari -
tassa nanassa visayabhavatthena sacci -
kattho.
In his Abhidhammattha-vibhavani,
1
Summangalasami
follows the K.V. Comy., but annexes Dhammapala's
'irreversibility.'
1
Comy, on the Compendium of Philosophy; see ibid., p. ix.
Ariyavangsa
1
judged that uttama, applied to parama,
excludes the other meaning of pamana-atireka, ' sur-
passing in measure.' And he, too, agrees with Dham-
mapala, that a thing is ' ultimate ' because it is incapable
o f further transformations, or of analysis, and because it
is the sense-datum of infallible knowledge.
Attha , in the term paramattha , Europeans usually
render by (
meaning.' It refers rather to all that is
meant (meaning in extension, not intension) by any given
word. In its present connection it has nothing to do with
the verbal meaning, import, sense or significance of a word.
According to Ariyavagsa, it means either a thing per se
(sabhdra), or a sense-datum (visaya). In the former sense,
paramatth a becomes an appositional compound of two
terms, both applying to one and the same thing. In the
latter sense, the compound is resolvable into paramassa
attho . If, with Sumangalasami, we read uttamai )
nanam into parama, we get, for paramattha in this
latter sense, sense-field of highest knowledge.
Now7
, there are Buddhists in Burma who hold that i f the
' real' can only be fitly described in terms of highest know-
ledge, only a Buddha can know it, and average folk can
therefore only know the shadow of it (paramattha -
chay a). We, i.e., know the phenomenon but not the
noumenon. This transcendentalism, however, is not ortho-
dox doctrine.
Turning finally to the term saccika , or the more
familiar sacca,
2
this may mean abstract truth ( lak-
khana - saccang), as of a judgment, or concrete fact
(vatthu-saccang) , as of a reality.
3
' Truth' by no
means always fits sacca. See, e.g., our translation of
the Four Ariyan ' Truths,' p. 215 of the Compendium. The
Second Sacca is reckoned to be a thing to be got rid of like
1
In the Manisara-manjusa, Tika on that Comy,; fifteenth cen-
tury, A.D.
1
Saccam eva saccikaij , Manisara-manjusa. For English
readers it may be stated that the doubled c (pron. cch) results from
sat-ya .
* P. 188, n. 4.
poison. But we do not wish to discard a Truth. Hence
we have substituted ' fact/ following Sumangalasami, who
comments on the term ' Ariyan Truths' in the passage
referred to as meaning 4
realities' or ' facts' which
' Ariyanize those who penetrate them/ making them
members of one stage or another of the Ariyan Path. Or,
again, ' realities so-called because Ariyans penetrate them
as their own property, or because they were taught by the
greatest of Ariyans.'
1
Ariyavaijsa, sub-commenting, holds that sacc a imports
actual existence, not liable to reversion ; for instance, the
reality of the characteristics of fire or other natural forces.
2
Finally, in this connection, Ledi Sadaw's disquisition on
conventional or nominal truth and real, ultimate, or philo-
sophical truth in < Some Points of Buddhist Doctrine
5
(.JPTS, 1913-14 p. 129) and in his 'Expositions'
(.Buddhist Review, October, 1915), expanding the section in
the K.V. Corny., (p. 63, n. 2), of this volume should be
considered. In his own Corny, on the Compendium of
Philosophy—Paramattlia-dlpanl—he examines more closely
the terms we are discussing.
4
At t ha / he says, ' may
mean: (a) things per * e (sabhava-siddha) ; or (b) things
merely conceived (parikappa-siddha) . The former
(a) include mind, etc., verifiable existents, severally, by their
own intrinsic characteristics, and, simply, without reference
to any other thing. The latter (/; ) are not such verifiable
existents. They exist by the mind .. .
4
being,' 'person,'
etc., are ' things ' created by mental synthesis.
3
Of these two classes, only things per se are termed
paramattha , real. Atth a may therefore be defined
as that thing which is intelligible to mind and represent-
e e by signs, terms or concepts. Paramatth a is that
reality which, by its truly verifiable existence, transcends
1
See III., p. 81, of Saya Pye's Tikagyaw and Manisaramanjusa.
2
Op. et loc. cit. . . . aggalakkhanang viya lokapakati
viya .
3
Or ' logical construction,' as Mr. Bertrand Russell would say
(Lowell Lectures, 1914, p. 59).
concepts. . . . Ultimate facts never fail those who seek for
genuine insight. Hence they are real. Concepts, on the
other hand, not verifiably existing, fail them ' (pp. 14-16).
2. THITI : THE STATIC.
(I. 1., p. 55.)
IN the passage here quoted from the Suttas:—'of con-
ditioned things the genesis is apparent, the passing away
is apparent, the duration (as a third distinct state amidst
change) is apparent'—the three stages of 'becoming' in
all phenomena, always logically distinguishable, i f not
always patent to sense, are enunciated. That the midway
stage is a constant like the others: that between genesis
and decay there was also a static stage (perhaps only a
zero point of change), designated as thit i (from
titthati[sTHl] , to stand), was disputed by some—e.g.,
Ananda, the author of the Ttka on the three Abidhamma
Commentaries by Buddhaghosa. But the Compendium
itself states the traditional and orthodox tenet in the case
of units of mental phenomena: ' one thought-moment con-
sists of three time-phases, to wit, nascent, static, and
arresting phases' (
thiti , but thitanaij , gen. plur. of thitaij , or static
[thing]. Commentarial philosophy tended to use the
abstract form. It also distinguished (or commented upon
as already distinguished) two kinds of duration (or enduring
things): khanika-thiti,
4
momentary duration,' and
pabandha-thiti , or combined duration. The latter
constitutes the more popularly conceived notion of j ar a:
decay, old age, degeneration in any phenomenon. The
Puggalavadin was thinking of this notion when he answered
the first question.
Now if, in the Sutta, duration was to be understood as a
static stage between genesis and decay, it would almost
certainly have been named in such an order. But it was
named last. And it may well be that the more cultured Intel-
lect of the propounder of the Sutta did not accept the popular
notion of any real stationariness (thiti ) in a cosmos of
incessant change, but only took it into account as a com-
monly accepted view, expressing it, not as one positive phase
in three positive phases of becoming, but negatively, as this
' otherness ' of duration (i.e., a state of duration other than
genesis and passing away) appears to ordinary intelligence.
3. SABBAM ATTHI: ' EVERYTHING EXISTS. '
(L 6, p. 84 f. )
At first sight it would appear that the emphasis is on the
first word : 'everything,' 'all.' This would be the case if
the thesis were here opposed to e k a e c a m atthi : ' some
things exist, some do not,' which is discussed in the next
discourse but one. But the context shows clearly that, in
both these theses, the emphasis is really on the word
'atthi' : 'is,' in the sense of 'exists.'
Now the Burmese translator supplies after sab bag, a
term which, in Pali, is dhamma- j at aij. This, dis-
connected, is dhammass a jataij : the arising or
happening of dhamma ; anything, that is, which exists
as a fact, as opposed to a chimaera, or in the Pali idiom,
a hare's horn. (We use the term ' thing' not in the sense of
substance, or having a substrate, but as anything which is
exhausted, as to its being, by some or all of the known twenty-
eight qualities of body or matter, and by the facts of mind.
Should sabbang be understood collectively—' all,' or
distributively—' everything' ? Taken by itself, one of the
questions in § 1, p. 85 : " Does
4
all' exist in all [things] ?"
would incline us at first sight to the former alternative, at
least in the case of the locative term. Yet even here we do
not read the question as: Is there in the whole a whole ?
but as: Does the whole exist in everything, or every part ?
taking the nominative, sabbang , collectively, the locative,
sabbesu, distributively. And the context in general leads
us to the latter alternative. The Sabbatthivadin believes
in the continued existence of any particular [thing] past,
present, and future. The Commentator accounted for this
belief by that school's interpretation of this postulate:
No past, present, or future dhamma' s (facts-as-cognized)
abandon the kh andha-nature (sabbe pi a ti t ad i-
bheda dhamma khandha-sabha vaij na vijahanti) .
Once a dhamma, always a dhamma. The five aggre-
gates (khandha's), in other words matter-mind, however
they may vary at different times, bear the same general
characteristics all the time.
Perhaps the following quotation from John Locke's critics,
taken from Green and Grose's Hume, vol. i., p. 87, may
help to show the Commentator's meaning with reference to
the rupakkhandha , or material aggregate : ' But of
this (that is, of another thing which has taken the place of
a previous thing, making an impact on the sensitive tablet
at one moment, but perishing with it the next moment),
the real essence is just the same as the previous thing,
namely, that it may be touched, or is solid, or a body, or a
parcel of matter; nor can this essence be really lost. . . .
It follows that real change is impossible. A parcel of
matter at one time is a parcel of matter at all times.'
Thus, the Sabbatthivadin might say, because a parcel of
matter to which we assign the name 'gold'' was yellow,
fusible, etc., in the past, is so now, and will be so in future,
therefore gold c
exists.' Again, because fire burned yester-
day, bums to-day, and will burn to-morrow, therefore fire
exists.
In some such way this school had come to believe in the
immutable existence, the real essence of all or everything,
taken in the distributive sense of everything without excep-
tion ; but not always excluding the collective sense.
Rupa—e.g. , in § 3 :
'Do past material qualities exist ?'—
refers to the rupakkhandha , i.e., in a collective sense.
That, however, does not preclude any one of the twenty-eight
qualities of body (Compendium, pp. 157-160) from being
taken distributively, or prevent any material object com-
posed of eight or more of these qualities from being discussed
separately.
In the heckling dialectic of the paragraph numbered 22
(p. 89, f.), we have found it necessary to supply certain
terms chosen according to the context, and from the Com-
mentary. The Pali reader should consult the Burmese
edition of the latter, since there are errors of printing and
punctuation in that compiled byMinayeff (PTSedition p.45).
It may prove helpful i f we give in English the Burmese
translation of the Commentary from p. 45, 1. 18, PTS
edition : ' Athanam Sakavad I : yad i te.' . . .
Theravadin : ' Let that thing of yours, which, on becom-
ing present after having been future, be taken into account
as " having been, is." And let it equally be spoken of as
" again having been, is." Then a chimera which, not having
been future cannot become present, should be spoken of as
"not having been, is not." But does your chimera repeat
the negative process of not having been, is not? If so,
it should be spoken of as "again not having been, is not." '
The Opponent thinks:
4
An imaginary thing cannot,
having been future, become present, because of its very non-
existence. Let it then be spoken of as " not having been, is
not" (" na hutv a n a ho t i nam a tav a hotu." )
But how can such a thing repeat the negative process
(literally £
state ' : bhavo) ? If not, it cannot be spoken of
as " again not having been, is not."
The Sabbatthivadin is here and throughout represented
as dealing with mere abstract ideas of time—i.e., with
abstract names for divisions of time—and not with things
or facts. The object of the Theravadin, in introducing
imaginary things, is to refute arguments so based. His
opponent is not prepared to push his abstractions further
by allowing a repetition of a process which actually never
once takes place.
4 . PATISAMBHIDA ; ANALYSIS.
(Seep. 179, V. 5.)
In this, the earliest Buddhist doctrine of logical analysis,
the four branches (or ' Four Patisambhida's), frequently
referred to are (1) Attha-patisambhida : analysis
of meanings ' in extension.' (2) Dhamma-patisam -
bhida : analysis of reasons, conditions, or causal relations.
(3) Nirutti-patisambhida : analysis of [meanings 'in
intension' as given in] definitions. (4)Patibhana-pati -
sambhida : analysis of intellect to which things lmowable
by the foregoing processes are presented.
1. ' Attha ' does not refer to verbal meanings. Ledi
Sadaw and U. Pandi agree with us that it means the
' thing' signified by the term. Hence it is equivalent to
the European notion of denotation, or meaning in extension.
2. The latter authority holds that dhamma refers to
terms. [He has, by the way, a scheme of correspondence
between the branches of the literary concept kavi, and the
above-named branches:—
Attha-kavi ... ... Attha-patisambhida
Suta-kavi ... ... Dhamma- "
Cinta-kavi ... ... Nirutti- "
Patibhana-kavi ... Patibhana "
suggested by the mutually coinciding features.] But in
the Abhidhanappadipika-suci, art. dhamma , this term, in
the present connection, is taken to mean hetu, or paccaya
(condition, or causal relation): hetumhi nanam
dhamma - patisambhidati adisu hetumhi
paccaye .
3. Nirutti (ni [r] : 'de' utti :'expression') means,
popularly, 'grammar '; technically it is ' word-definition '
(viggaha , vacanattha) . E.g., Bujjhatiti Buddho
—'Buddha is one who knows'—is a definition of the word
'Buddha.' Such a definition is nirutti , the meaning
being now expressed or uttered. Hence nirutti may
stand for the European connotation, or meaning in intension.
4. Patibhan a (pati : 're'; bha : 'to beconae ap-
parent ') is defined in the Abhidhanappadipika-suci:
patimukh a bhavanti , upatthahanti neyya
etenati patibhanaij : 'Patibhana ' means that
by which things knowable (1, 2, 3) become represented,
are present. The representative or ideating processes are
not themselves patisambhida , but are themselves (as
knowables) analyzed in ' analytic insight' (patisam-
bhida-nanam).
1
Thus the scope of this classic doctrine is entirely logical.
And while it is regarded as superior to popular knowledge,
it is distinct from intuition. Men of the world may develop
it, but not intuition. Ariyans, who attain to intuition,
might not have developed it to any great extent.
Patisambhid a in the Vihhaitf/a.
(PTS edition, chap, xv., p. 293 f. )
The definition quoted above, § 2, cites this work:
hetumh i nanai j dhamm a patisambhida , p. 298.
In the list of exegetical definitions of the four branches,
entitled ' Suttanta-bhajaniyag,' we find (1) Attha-pati -
sambhid a defined as analysis of phenomena, dhamma,
or things that ' have happened, become, . . . that are mani-
fest'; (2) dhamma-patisambhida, defined as knowledge
of conditions (hetu), of cause and effect (hetuphala), 'of
phenomena by which phenomena have happened, become,'
etc. Thus (1) may be knowledge of decay and death ;
(2) is then knowledge of the causes (samitdaya) of decay and
death. Similarly for the third and fourth Truths (Cessation
and the Path). But (2) may also refer to the Doctrine, or
Dhamma :—' knowledge of the Suttas, the Verses,' and the
rest.
1
Patibhana is here defined as a technical term of Buddhist
philosophy. Its popular meaning of fluency in literary expression is
well illustrated in the Vangisa Sangyutta (i. 187 of the Nikaya).
Vangisa, the irrepressibly fluent ex-occultist, is smitten with remorse
for having, because of his rhetorical gifts (patibhana) , despised
friendly brethren, and breaks forth once more to express his re-
pentance, admonishing himself—as Gotama, i.e., as the Buddha's
disciple (Comy.)—to put away conceit. "When the afflatus was upon
him in the Buddha's presence, he would ask leave to improvise with
the words : 'It is manifest [is revealed] to me, Exalted One !' The
response is: 'Let it be manifest to thee, Vangisa!' And he would
forthwith improvise verses. Cf. Pss. of the Brethren, p. 395, especially
pp, 399, 404.
Of the third and fourth branches, nirutti-patis ° is
always, in this chapter, defined as abhilapa, or verbal
expression, or statement. And patibhana-patis° is always
defined as ' knowledge in the knowledges,' as i f it referred
to psychological analysis.
In the following section or Abhidhammabhajaniyaij, we
find an inverted order in branches 1, 2. The dhamma' s
considered are all states of consciousness. If they are
moral or immoral—i.e., i f they have karmic efficacy (as
causes)—knowledge of them is called dhamma-analysis.
Knowledge of their result, and of all mi moral or inoperative
states, which as such are results, is called attha-analysis.
As to 3, 4: knowledge o f the connotation and expression of
dhamma' s as pannatti' s (term-concepts) is nirutti -
analysis. And ' the knowledge by which one knows those
knowledges ' (1-3) is patibhana-analysis.
We are greatly indebted to the kindness of Ledi Sadaw
Mahathera for a further analysis of Patisambhida :
' In this word, pat i means visum visum (separately,
one after another); sam means 'well,' ' thoroughly'
bhid a means to 'break up.' Thus we get: Patisam-
bhid a is that by which Ariyan folk well separate, analyze
[things] into parts.
This, as stated above, is fourfold:
1. Attha-patisambhida includes—(a)Bhasit'attha,
meaning in extension, things signified bywords; (b) Pac-
cayup pann' a ttha , things to which certain other things
stand in causal relation; (c) Vipak'attha , resultant
mental groups and matter born of karma; (d) Kiriy' -
attha ; inoperative mental properties—e.g., 'advertings'
of the mind, etc.; (e) Nibbana , the unconditioned.
2. Dhamma-patisambhida includes—(a) Bhasita-
dhamma, or words spoken by the Buddha; (b) Paccaya-
dhamma , things relating themselves to other objects by
way of a cause; (c) Kusala-dhamma ; (d) Akusala -
dhamma , thoughts moral and immoral; (e) Ariya -
magga-dhamma, the Ariyan Path.
3. Nirutti-patisambhida is grammatical analysis
of sentences.
4. Patibhana-patisambhid a is analytic insight
into the three preceding (1-3).
Further details may be found in the Commentaries
on the Patisambhidamagga1
and the Vibhanga.
1
This work itself describes the four branches with some fulness.
See PTS edition, ii. 147 f .
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