Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
BOOK XVI
1. Of Control
Controverted Point.—That one can control the mind of
another.1
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Mahasanghikas, hold that
the attainment of power and authority in the world is only genuine if
it include power to control the consciousness of others.
[1] Th.—Do you mean that one can bid the consciousness
of another not to lust, not to hate, not to be bewildered, not
to be corrupted ? Of course you deny. But how then can
you maintain your view ? Or do you mean that one can
bid any mental phase uprisen in another's consciousness—
reaction, feeling, perception, volition . . . understanding—
to cease ? Equally you deny. .. . [2] Or do you mean
that anyone puts away lust, hate, or any evil mental
coefficient2 on account of another? Or practises the
[Ariyan] Path, or applications in mindfulness, or any other
set of the factors of enlightenment3 because of another?
Or masters the Four Truths—understanding Ill , putting
away its Cause, realizing its Cessation, practising the Path
thereto—because of another? Or finally, do you mean
that anyone makes another the doer of his actions, that
anyone's happiness and ill are wrought by another, that
one acts while another experiences? If you deny, you
must deny your own view.
1
To know (or, as we say, 'read') the thoughts of another was one
of the supernormal knowledges (see above, V. 7; Compendium, p. 209),
but control or influence over another so as to prevent corruption was
not assumed for it.
2
See above, p. 229, n. 2.
3
See Compendium, p. 179.
[3] And was it not said by the Exalted One:—
''Tis thou alone dost work thine evil deeds ;
'Tis thou alone dost make thyself corrupt;
'Tis thou alone dost leave the wrong undone;
'Tis thou alone dost purify thyself
Self-torought is cleanness and impurity.
None may his brother's heart1 make undefiled'?2
Hence it is surely wrong to say that one can control the
mind o f another.
[4] M.—But have not some admittedly won power and
authority? Surely this includes control over others'
minds.
2. Of Assisting Another s Mind.
Controverted Point.—That one can help the mind of
another.
The Commentary merely ranges this under the preceding discourse.
[1] Th.—Do you mean that one can so help another as
to bid his consciousness not to lust or to hate, or to be
bewildered, or to be corrupted ? . . . Or that one may
bring forth in the heart of another any of the moral condi-
tions, to wit, disinterestedness, love, understanding, or any
of the five 'controlling powers [of enlightenment], to wit,
faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, understanding,
etc. . . . {the remainder agrees verbatim with XVI. 1).
3. Of making Another Happy according to his Deserts.
Controverted Point.—That one can bestow happiness on
others.3
1
Literally, 'another.'
2
Dhammapada, verse 164.
3
One can bestow the conditions of happiness to some extent, but
not the actual state of mind.
From the Commentary.—This view is derived by its adherents,
notably the Hetuvadins, from the Sutta quoted below. But the words
of the Exalted One were spoken to show how the arising of happiness
in others is conditioned. Producing happiness in others is not like
bestowing food upon them; hence the citation is inconclusive.
[1] Th.—Your proposition implies that one can also
cause misery in others. But you deny this, while you
maintain the opposite with respect to happiness.
[2] You imply further that you can hand over your own
happiness to another; or others' happiness, or his own
happiness, to another. You deny. To whom then ?
You imply, finally, that anyone causes another to act
for him, that one's own welfare and ill are wrought by
another, that one acts while another experiences.
[3] H.—But did not the venerable Udayin say: 'Verily
of many unhappinesses doth the Exalted One rid us, many
happinesses doth he bestoiy upon us, of many bad things doth
he rid 'its, many good things doth he bestow upon us ' ?1
Hence one may hand on happiness to another.
4. Of Attending to All at Once.
Controverted Point. —That one can attend to everything
simultaneously.
From the 'Commentary.—Attention has two aspects, according as
we consider the method Or the object of attention. To infer from the
observed transience of one or more phenomena that 'all things are im-
permanent' is attention as [inductive] method. But in attending to
past things, we cannot attend to future things. "We attend to a
certain thing in one of the time-relations. This is attention by way of
object of consciousness. Moreover, when we attend to present things,
we are not able at the present moment to attend to the conscious-
ness by which they arise. Nevertheless some, like the Pubbaseliyas
and Aparaseliyas, because of the Word, 'All things are impermanent,'
hold that in generalizing we can attend to all things at once.2 And
because they hold that in so doing we must also attend to the con-
sciousness by which we attend, the argument takes the line as stated.
1
Majjhima-Nik., i. 447.
2
Sabbe sankhare ekato manasikaroti—Comy.
[1] Th.—Do you imply that we know the consciousness
by which we so attend ? You deny.1 But I ask you again
—now you assent.2 Then do we know as consciousness the
consciousness by which we so attend ? You deny. But I
ask you again—now you assent. Then is the subject of
consciousness its own object ? You deny. But I ask you
again—now you assent. Then do we experience mental
reaction by the same mental reaction ? Do we feel a feel-
ing by that feeling? And so on for perception, volition,
cognition, applied thought, sustained thought, zest, mindful-
ness, understanding ? If you deny, you undo your previous
affirmations. . . .
[2] When we attend to the past as past, do we then attend.,
to the future as future ? You deny. But I ask you again
—now you assent. But this commits you to a collocation of
two parallel mental processes. . . . And this holds i f I sub-
stitute 'present' for 'future.' . . . And i f you claim that
we can, while attending to the past as past, attend also to
the future as such, and to the present as such, we get a
collocation of three parallel mental processes. . . . And—
[3-4] [we may ring the changes with] the same argument
on other permutations of the time relations. . . .
[5] P.A.-But was it not said by the Exalted One :
'When he by wisdom doth discern and see :
"Impermanent is everything in life !"
Then lie at all this suffering feels disgust.
Lo! herein lies the way to purity.
When he by wisdom doth discern and see,
That " Everything in life is bound to Ill! . . "
That "Everything in life is Void of Soul!"
Then he at all this suffering feels disgust
Lo ! herein lies the way to purity' ?3
Hence we can attend to all at once.
1
Because it cannot be subject and object at once.—Comy.
2
Because we are already aware of the nature of our thought in
general, or because of the thesis advanced.—Comy.
3
Pss. of the Brethren, verses 676-678; ascribed to Anna-Kondanna,
the first amoug the first five disciples to grasp the new gospel.
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