Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
BOOK VIII
1. Of Divers Destinies.1
Controverted Point.—That there are six spheres of destiny.
From the Commentary.—There is an opinion among some schools
—the Andhakas and Uttarapathakas—that the Asuras form a sixth
plane of rebirth. The Theravadin contradicts this in virtue of the
hair-raising illustration of the five divisions of destiny in the Sutta:
' There are these five destinies, Sariputta.'2 .. . It is true that a
troop of Asuras—that of Vepacitti3—was freed from the fourfold plane
of misery, but not to form a separate plane. They were taken up
among the devas. The Kalakanjakas were taken up among the Petas.
[1] Th.—Did not the Exalted One name five destinies—
purgatory, the animal kingdom, the Peta-realm, mankind,
the devas? [2] And did not the Kalakanjaka Asuras, who
resembled the Petas in [ugly or frightful] shape, sex-life,
diet, and length of life, intermarry with them? [3] And
did not Vepacitti's troop, who in the same respects re-
sembled the devas, intermarry with devas? [4] And had
not Vepacitti's troop been formerly devas ?
[5] A. U.—But since there is an Asura-group, it is
surely right to speak of it as a [possible] destiny?4
1
Gati , literally, a going, or bourne, a career. On these, concisely
stated, see Compendium, p. 137.
2
Majjhima-Nik., i. 73.
3
Samyutta-Nik., i. 221 f. Cf. Dialogues, ii. 289 ; Pss. of the
Brethren, verse 749.
4
The Commentary includes between 'in shape' and 'sex-life,' the
[bracketed] term bibhaccha—Bibhaccha ti virupa dud-
dasika . It also paraphrases samanabhoga . (rendered as 're-
sembling . . . in sex-life') by sadisa-methuna-samacara ;
and samanahara ('resembling .. . in diet') by sadisa-khela-
singhanika-pubba-lohitadi-ahara.
2. Of an Intermediate State.
Controverted Point.—That there is an intermediate state
of existence.
From the Commentary.—Some (as, for instance, the Pubbaseliyas
and Sammitiyas), by a careless acceptation of the Sutta-phrase—
'completed existence within the interval'
1
—held that there is an
interim stage where a being awaits reconception for a week or longer.
The counter-argument is based on the Exalted One's dictum that there
are three states of becoming only—the Kama-, the Rupa-, and the
Arupa-worlds.
2
And it is because of that dictum that the opponent
[in so far as he is orthodox] has to deny so many of the questions.
[1] Th.—If there be such a state, you must identify it
with either the Kama-life, or Rupa-life, or Arupa-life,
which you refuse to do. . . .
[2] You deny that there is an intermediate state between
the first and second, or the second and third, of these . . .
[3] you affirm, indeed, that is no such thing; how then
can you maintain your proposition ?
[4] Is it a fifth matrix, a sixth destiny, an eighth station
for reborn consciousness,
3
a tenth realm of beings ? Is it a
mode of living, a destiny, a realm of beings, a renewal of
life, a matrix, a station of consciousness, an acquiring of
individuality? Is there karma leading to it? Are there
beings who approach thither ? Do beings get born in it,
grow old, die in it, decease from it, and get reborn from it?
Do the five aggregates exist in it? Is it a five-mode
existence ? All this you deny. How then can you main-
tain your proposition?
[5-7] You admit that every one of these [categories or
notions] applies to each of the three planes of life named
above, the only difference being that the first two—Kama-
life and Rupa-life—are five-mode existences; the last—
1
I.e., died within the first half of the normal life-span in those
heavens. See I. 4, § 9.
2
Samyutta-Nik., ii. 3, etc. Cf. Compendium, 81, n. 2, 138 f.
3
The seven 'stations' (vinnanatthitiyo), or opportunities for
the resultant rebirth-consciousness (the effect of a dying person's
consciousness) to happen—are described in Dialogues, ii. 66 f.
Arupa-life—is a four-mode existence (that is, without
material qualities). If then there is an intermediate
stage of life, you must be able to predicate some or all of
these [notions or categories] of it. But you say you
cannot. . . .
[8] But you deny also that there is an intermediate life for
all beings. Hence your proposition is not universally valid.
[9-11] For whom then do you deny the intermediate
state? For the person whose retribution is immediate?1
If you assent, to that extent your proposition is for you not
true. Or is it for the person whose retribution is not im-
mediate that you affirm this state ? Yes, you say. Then
you must deny it for his opposite.
You deny it also for one who is to be reborn in purgatory,,
in the sphere of unconscious beings, in the immaterial
heavens. Therefore to that extent your proposition is not
universally valid. Nevertheless, you maintain that there-
is an intermediate stage of life for one whose retribution is
not immediate, for one who is not to be reborn in purga-
tory, nor among the ' unconscious beings,' nor in the im-
material heavens. [Concerning these you have yet to state
in what respect, as a plane of life, it resembles, or differs
from, the three named by the Exalted One.]
[12] P.S.2—But are there not beings who ' complete
existence within the first half of the term ?' If so, are we
not right ?
[13] Th.—Granted that there are such beings, is there
a separate interval-state [between any two recognized exist-
ences] ? Yes, you say. But granted that there are beings
who 'complete existence within the second half of the term,'
is there a separate state of life corresponding thereto ? If
you deny, you must also deny your proposition [since you
rest it on this basis].
The same argument applies to such cognate terms as
' beings who complete existence without,' and again, 'with
difficulty and striving' (see above, I., 4, § 9, n. 1).
1 On this term, see Bud. Psy. Eth., § 1028.
2 Pubbaseliya, Sammitiya.
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