Kathavatthu - Of Existence in Immutable Modes

Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A

10. Of Existence in Immutable Modes.
Controverted Point.— That things exist so and not
otherwise.
From the Commentary. — This is an opinion now held by the
Andhakas and others, such as the Pubbaseliyas, etc., named above.
They declare that all things exist, in time, by way of material and other
qualities, as past, present, or future, but that there is no past that is at
once future and present, nor any future and present that are also past,
and therefore all exists only as thus (a), and not as thus (b). Then,
says the Theravadin, the past both is and is not.
[1] Th.— Does the past exist ?
A.—It exists on this wise, it does not exist on that
wise.
Th—Does the past, as you describe it, both exist and not
exist ? You deny,3 then affirm4—for you must affirm. And

3
Because it cannot, in its character as past, be both existent and
non-existent.
4
Because it can exist in its own character only.


if this same past both exists and does not exist, then is also
existence non-existence and conversely, then is the state of
being a state of non-being and conversely, then are ' is'
and ' is not' convertible terms, identical, one in meaning,
the same, same in content and in origin. And this of course
you do not admit.
[2] Similarly, you say the future exists only on this wise,
not on that wise. This is to say it both exists and does not
exist; and that involves the same antinomy.
[3] Similarly, you say the present exists only on this
wise, not on that wise—and you are landed as before.
[4] If the past exists only as you say it does, how is it
existent, how non-existent ?
A.—The past exists only as past; it does not exist as
future, it does not exist as present.
Th.—But this still commits you to saying that the same
both is and is not, and thus to the same antinomy.
[5, 6] Similarly as regards the 'how' of such future
and present as you hold to exist.
[7] A.—Then is it wrong to say 'the past or the
future or the present exists only on this wise, not on that
wise' ?
Th.—Yes.
A.—Do you mean then that the past exists also as
future and as present, the future also as past and as
present, the present also as past and as future—for to this
you are committed ? Hence I am surely right.
[8] Th.—Do material qualities exist ?
A.—They exist on this wise, they do not exist on that
wise.
Th.—Here again you are committed to saying ' the
same both exists and does not exist,' and to the same anti-
nomy as before. [9] Similarly in the case of the other
four aggregates—feeling, etc. [10-11] Again, with refer-
ence to how they exist on this wise, and how they do
not, when you reply, 'the one aggregate, e.g., the bodily,
exists as such, but not as any of the four mental aggre-


gates,' you are equally committed to the antinomy stated
above.
[12] A.—Then is it wrong to say 'any aggregate exists
only on this wise, not on that wise' ?
Th.—Yes.
A.—But this commits you to saying that each aggregate
exists equally as any of the other four. Surely then I am
right in saying that each aggregate exists in a specific
fashion, and not otherwise.
1
1
The peculiar phraseology of this dialogue:—the 'S'ev'atthi
s'eva n'atthiti' of the Theravadin, and the h'ev'atthi h'ev a
natthiti of the Andhaka,—calls up, as Mr. Belli M. Barua has
pointed out to us, the Sapta-bhangi-naya of the Jains, by which they
sought to meet the uncompromising scepticism of Sanjaya Belatthi-
putta and his school. However that may be, the object here is rather
to shake rigid dogma, than to meet a series of negations. See H.
Jacobi, Jaina-Sutras, SBE, XLV., pp. xxvi-viii; Dialogues of the
Buddha, i. 75.