Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
9. Of Applications in Mindfulness.
Controverted Point.—That all mental states are appli-
cations in mindfulness.
From the Commentary.—The groups holding special views who arose
later, to wit, the Andhakas, comprising the sub-groups of the Pubbaseliyas,
Aparaseliyas, Rajagirikas, and Siddhatthikas, held the opinion that the
objects of mindfulness, namely, the body and the rest, were themselves
[the conscious subject;] mindfulness. This they deduced from the
passage in the 'Satipatthana-Samyutta': ' I will show you, bhikkhus,
the induction and the cessation of applications in mindfulness.'1 To
break down this opinion, the Theravadin puts the question.
1
Samyutta-Nikaya, v. 184. The controversy turns upon the double
sense, subjective and objective, of the term sati-patthana, or
mindfulness-applications. The Opponent confuses the objects of this
important fourfold religious exercise with the mental exercise itself,
[1] Th.—Do all cognizable things constitute applications
in mindfulness ?1
Andhaka.—Yes.
Th.—Then must you also admit that all cognizable
things constitute mindfulness, the controlling faculty and
force of mindfulness, mindfulness that is perfect, that is a
factor of enlightenment, the ' sole conveying' path ' leading
to extinction,' to 'enlightenment,' to 'disintegration,' are
'not [bound up with] the intoxicants,' not akin to the
fetters, ties, floods, bonds, hindrances, contagions, graspings,
corruptions'; you must admit that all cognizable things
constitute the ' ten recollections,' namely of the Buddha,
the Norm, the Order, morals, pious liberality, the devas,
'mindfulness in respiration,' 'reflection on death,' 'mind-
fulness concerning the body,' 'reflection on peace.'2 But
this you deny.
thus merging object in subject, 'subject' in Buddhism being 'con-
sciousness of object.' We have much the same ambiguity observed in
the popular use of object and subject of thought. Etymologically oh-
and sub- scarcely support the distinction prescribed by philosophy.
A 'subject for meditation' is an 'object of thought.' A 'hypnotic
subject' is for the hypnotizer an object.
The Sutta on which the opinion is based is ambiguously worded in
the context that follows. This gives not the induction and cessation
of the meditating 'mindfulness,' but the cause or genesis (samudayo
can mean these or induction) of the four prescribed objects of the
meditation—the body, feelings, consciousness, and cognizable objects—
the causes being nourishment, contact, mind-and-body, attention,
respectively. Hence for the immature thought o f the sectarian mind
there is thus much of justification.
1
On this term, which includes 'memory,' the etymological meaning
of sati , see Compendium, 40, 179 ; Buddh. Psy., 1914. . . . The
quaint comment runs thus : 'Inasmuch as patthan a mean "those
things to which one applies";—applies what? mindfulness . . . thus
such mindfulness has patthana' s as its field; but patthanas
apply—what? mindfulnesses. Thus patthana' s mean (a) objects
of mindful application, (5) subjects applying mindfulness.'
3
All of these terms are technical in Buddhist religious culture, and
most are associated with applications of mindfulness, in the Suttas
concerning it. Dialogues, ii. 327 f.; Majjhima-Nik., i. 55 f.; Samyutta-
Nik., v. 141 f.; 294; also Vibhanga, 193 f.; 206.
[2] Again, you must equally admit, given your firso
affirmation, that the eye-organ constitutes an application in
mindfulness. And if you are driven to admit that it does,
then you must admit everything for it, which, as I claim,
you must admit for all cognizable things. [3] The same
argument holds for the four other sense-organs, for the five
objects of sense, for lust, hate, dulness, conceit, error,
doubt, sloth, distraction, impudence, indiscretion.
[4] Is mindfulness itself an application of mindfulness,
and conversely ? If you admit this, then must you also
admit that each of the foregoing cognizable things is an
application of mindfulness, and that application of mindful-
ness is each of those things.
You deny; then do you hold that each of those cognizable
things is an application of mindfulness, but not conversely ?
You assent; then you must equally admit that mindfulness
itself is an application in mindfulness, but that application
in mindfulness is not mindfulness.
[5] A.—Then is it wrong to say ' all things are applica-
tions in mindfulness' ?
Th.—Yes.
A.—But is not mindfulness established1
concerning all
cognizable things ?
Th.—Yes.
A.—How then, good sir, can you deny what I affirm :
' All cognizable things are applications of mindfulness'?
Th.—We have said that mindfulness is established
concerning all cognizable things: now, are air cognizable
things applications of mindfulness ?
A.—Yes.
Th.—Contact2 is established with respect to all cognizable
things: are then all such things applications in contact?
For this is that to which you have committed yourself.
Again, feeling, perception, volition, consciousness, each of
1
Santitthati, literally translated, but 'actualized' may possibly
be a truer rendering.
2
Contact (phassa) may be physical or mental. If mental, it
takes place without impact (sanghattana). Bud.Psy.Eth., 5, n. 2.
these is established with respect to all cognizable things:
are then all such things applications in feeling, in percep-
tion, etc. ? For this must equally be admitted.
[6] Again, if your proposition is to stand, then you
equally admit for all beings1 that they have mindfulness at
hand, are endowed and set up with2 mindfulness, having it
ever in readiness.3
Moreover, was it not said by the Exalted One: 'They,
bhikkhus, who do not enjoy mindfulness regarding the body, do
not enjoy the Ambrosial; they, bhikkhus, tvho enjoy mindfulness
regarding the body, enjoy the Ambrosial'?4
Is the Suttanta thus? You admit it is; but do ' all
beings' enjoy, obtain, practise, develop, and multiply mind-
fulness regarding the body ? You know they do not.
[7] Again, was it not said by the Exalted One: ' There is
a 'way, bhikkhus, that leads only to the purification of beings, to
the passing beyond sorrow and grief, to the extinction of ill
and sadness, to the attainment of right method,5 to the realiza-
tion of Nibbana, and that ivay is the four applications of
mindfulness6
Is the Suttanta thus ? You admit it is; but have ' all
beings ' this one and only way so leading ? You are bound
to admit that they have not.
[8] Again, was it not said by the Exalted One: ' When
a Wheel-turning Monarch appears, bhikkhus, then doth there
appear seven treasures. What are the seven ? The treasure
of the Wheel doth appear, and the treasures of the Elephant,
the Horse, the Jewel, the Woman, the Householder, the Heir-
apparent; yea, bhikkhus, on the appearance of a Wheel-
turning Monarch do these seven treasures appear. When
1
Who are all 'cognizable things' (dhamma).
2
Samohita.
3
This term, in the original, is an intensive form of the attribute
first named in this sentence : upatthita, paccupatthita .
4
Anguttara-Nik., i. 45. ' The Ambrosial' in its literal meaning,
the Not-dead, is a name for Nibbana.
5
Cf . Samyutta-Nik, v. 388.
6
Samyutta-Nik., v. 141; cf. Dialogues, ii. 327 : Majjhima-Nik., i. 55.
a Tathagata appears, bhikkhus, Arahant Buddha Supreme,
then doth there appear these seven treasures of enlightenment.
What are the seven? The treasures of those factors of
enlightenment: Mindfulness, Search for Truth, Energy, Zest,
Serenity, Concentration, Equanimity; yea, bhikkhus, on the
appearance of a Tathagata Arahant, Buddha Supreme, do
these seven treasures appear' ?1
Is the Suttanta thus ? You admit it is. But do ' all
things' become that treasure o f Mindfulness which is a
factor of enlightenment, when a Tathagata appears ? You
know they do not, yet you are bound to admit they do.
[9] Lastly, if all things are applications of mindfulness,
they must be equally other of the (thirty-seven) things
pertaining to enlightenment,2 such as the supreme efforts,
the steps to magic potency, the controlling faculties and
forces, the factors of enlightenment. To this admission
are you committed.
1 Samyutta-Nik., v. 99. 2 See p. 65, n. 5
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