Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
4. Of Giving and the Gift
Controverted Point.—That dana is [not the gift but] the
mental state.
From the Commentary.—Dana is of three kinds:4 the will to
surrender [something], abstinence, the gift. In the line—
Faith, modesty, and meritorious giving,
we have the will to surrender something when opportunity occurs. In
the phrase 'he gives security,' abstinence, when opportunity occurs, is
meant. In the phrase ' he gives food and drink in charity,' a thing to
be given on a given occasion is meant. The first is dan a [in an
active sense], as that which surrenders, or [in the instrumental sense]
as that by which something is given. Abstinence is giving in the
sense of severing from, cutting off . When it is practised, one severs,
cuts of f the immoral will which we consider to be a fearful and
dangerous state. And this is a 'giving.' Finally, dan a implies that
an offering is given. This triple distinction is in reality reduced to
two : mental and material. But the view held, for instance, by the
Bajagirikas and Siddhattikas, recognizes the former only. And the
object of the discourse is to clear up the confusion (lege sankara-
bhavang)
5
between the meanings of this dual distinction.
[1] Th.—If dana be a mental state, is it possible to
give a mental state away to others? If you deny, your
4
Dana means grammatically both giving and gift and liberality.
Hence the necessity of retaining the Pali word.
5
So Br. The readings in the PTS edition are impossible.
proposition falls through. If you assent,1 you then imply
that it is possible to give any mental property to others:
contact, feeling, perception, volition, faith, energy, mind-
fulness, concentration, understanding.
[2] R. S.—If we are wrong, we ask you, is giving
attended by undesirable, disagreeable, unpleasant, barren
consequences?2 Does it induce, and result in, sorrow? Is
not rather the opposite true? Surely then dana is a
mental state.
[3] Th.—Granting that giving was pronounced by the
Exalted One to produce desirable results, is giving a robe,
or alms-food, or lodging, or materia medica and requisites
for illness dana ? You admit they are, but you cannot
assert that these directly bring about desirable, agreeable,
pleasant, felicific mental results.
[4] R. S.—If we are wrong, let us quote the words
of the Exalted One :
' Faith, modesty, and meritorious giving :
These are the things that men of zvorth pursue ;
This, say they, is the path celestial,
Hereby we pass into the deva-world.'3
[5] Again: ' Bhikkhus, these five giving s, the Great Dana's,4
are supreme, secular, hereditary; ancient [customs'], unmixed
now or in the past; they are not mixed one with the other, nor
shall be, and they am not despised by recluses or brahmins, or
by the wise. What are the five? First, there is the Ariyan
disciple who, having put away taking life, is opposed to it
Such an one gives to all beings without limit security, amity,
1
On the ground that anything mental cannot be given as if it were
food, etc., the opponent denies ; when the question is insisted upon, he
recollects the Sutta on ' giving security, etc.,' and assents.—Comy.
2
If dan a means the material gift, and this be, say, a nauseous
medicine, the giver must reap corresponding undesirable fruit.—
Comy.
3
Anguttara-Nik., iv. 286.
4
In his Commentary on Anguttara-Nik. Buddhaghosa calls these
'the gifts of the will' (cetana), deliberate, intentional giving.
benevolence. And having thus given without limit, he himself
becomes partaker in that security, amity, benevolence. Secondly,
the Ariyan disciple, having put away taking what is not given,
wrong conduct in sense-desires, lying, and occasions for indulg-
ing in strong drinks, is opposed to these. Thus renouncing,
bhikkhus, he gives to all beings ivithout limit security, amity,
goodwill. And so giving, he himself becomes partaker in that
unlimited security, amity, goodwill. These, bhikkhus, are the
five Great Dana's. . . .'1
If the Suttanta says thus, then giving is a mental state.
[6] Th.—According to you, then, dan a is not some-
thing to be given. But was it not said by the Exalted One :
'Take the case of one who gives food, drink, raiment, a carriage,
a wreath, a perfume, ointment, a couch, a dwelling, means of
lighting'?2 Surely then dan a is a thing to be given.
[7] B. S.—You say then that giving is a thing to be
given. Now you do not admit that the thing to be given
has as its direct result something desirable, agreeable,
pleasant, felicifie, a happy capacity and consequence. On
the other hand, the Exalted One said that dana had such a
result. Now you say that a robe, alms-food, and the other
requisites are dana. Hence it follows that a robe and so
on has such a result, which cannot be. Therefore it is
wrong to say that dana is a thing to be given.
5. Of Utility.
Controverted Point.—That merit increases with utility.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Rajagirikas, Siddhattikas,
and Sammitiyas, from thoughtlessly interpreting such Suttas as
'merit day and night is always growing,' and 'the robe, bhikkhus,
which a bhikkhu enjoying the use of . . .,'3 hold that there is such
a thing as merit achieved by utility.
1
Anguttara-Nik., iv. 246.
2
Op. cit., iv. 239. This is a 'stock' catalogue ; cf. op. cit., i. 107 ;
ii. 85, 203 ; Digha-Nik., iii. 259.
3
See below.
[1] Th.—By your thesis you imply [that other mental
experiences are increasing quantities :—] that contact, feel-
ing, perception, volition, cognition, faith, energy, mindful-
ness, concentration, understanding, can each keep growing1
—which you deny. . . . And that merit keeps growing
just as a creeper, a liana, a tree, grass, or brushwood
grows—which you deny. .. .
[2] Again, in affirming it, do you also admit that a giver
acquires merit when, having given his gift, he does not
consider it further ?
2
You do. But this is to imply, in
other words, that merit accrues to one who does not
consciously advert to, reflect upon, consider, attend to,
deliberate, anticipate, aim. Is not the opposite the ease ?
You assent. Then it is wrong to say that merit goes on
growing with utility.
[3] Again, in affirming your thesis, do you also admit
that a giver may acquire merit who, on giving a gift,
entertains sensual, malevolent, or cruel thoughts? ' Yes/
you reply. Then have we here a combination of two con-
tacts, feelings, perceptions, volitions, cognitions ? No ?
Think ! ' Yes,' you now reply.
3
Then you are maintaining
that good and bad, guilty and innocent, base and noble,
sinister and clear mental states, can co-exist side by side
[at the same moment]. You deny. Think again! ' Yes,'
you now reply.
4
But was it not said by the Exalted
One : 'There are four things, bhikkhus, very far away one
1
Merit (punna) is an abstract notion or human estimate of the
balance of anyone's chances of a surplus over unhappy experience in
the future in consequence of deeds done now. Thus, for both estimator
and the subject of the estimate, it is nothing else than a series of
mental phenomena, and should be considered as such, and not as some
external and mystic entity or continuum.
2
Nasamannaharati, i.e., the 'adverting,' having arrested the
subconscious life-flux, does not 'smoothly conduct' the will-to-give
(dana-cetana) along its own path.— Comy.
3
He now assents, because he includes the consciousnesses of both
donor and donee. — Comy.
4
He now assents, because by his opinion that which is derived from
sustained enjoyment is not a conscious phenomenon,-— Comy.
from the other. What are the four ? The sky and the earth,
the hither and the yonder shore of the ocean, whence the sun
rises and where he sinks, the Norm of the good and that of
the wicked.
' Far is the sky and far from it the earth lies;
Far too the further shore of ocean, say they;
And whence the radiant sun at day-dawn rises,
And where he goes, lightmaker, to his ending.
Yet further than all these asunder, say they,
The Norm of good men's lives and that of bad men.
Co-operation of the good can never perish,
True to its nature while it yet endureth.
But swift dissolves the intercourse of bad men.
Hence far is Norm of good from that of evil'?1
Therefore it is wrong to say that good and bad, etc.,
mental states, co-exist side by side in anyone.
[4] It S. S.—But, if your Rejection is right, was it not
said by the Exalted One :
'Planters of groves and shady woods,
And they who- build causeway and bridge,
And wells construct and watering sheds,
And to the homeless dwellings give :—
Of such as these by day and night
For ever doth the merit grow.
In righteousness and virtue's might
Such folk from earth to heaven go '?2
Therefore merit goes on growing with utility.
[5] Again, was it not said by the Exalted One:
' Bhikkhus, there are these four streams of merit and of
good, sources of happiness and blissful fate, resulting in
happiness, conducive to heavenly life, conducive to that which
is desirable, agreeable, and sweet, to welfare and happiness.
What are the four ? When a bhikkhu, enjoying the use of
robes, or of alms-food, or of shelter, or of medical requisites
1
Anguttara-Nik., ii. 50.
2
Samyutta-Nik., i. 33.
given him, is able to attain to and dwell in infinite concentra-
tion of mind, to the giver each of these four gifts is an infinite
stream of merit and of good . . .'?1
Therefore merit goes on growing with utility.
[6] Th.—You still affirm your proposition. Now, does a
giver who has given a gift acquire merit when the acceptor,
having accepted the gift, throws it away, abandons it?
'Yes,' you reply. But you cannot possibly say of that
giver's merit that it goes on growing.
[7] Or if, when the gift is accepted, kings, or thieves,
take it away again, or fire burns it, or water bears it away,
or hostile heirs take it back? The same holds good.
Hence merit is not dependent upon utility.
1
Anguttara-Nik., ii. 54
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