Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
BOOK VII
1. Of the Classification [of things].1
Controverted Point.—That things cannot be grouped
together by means of abstract ideas.
From the Commentary.—-It is a belief held, for instance, by the
Rajagirikas and the Siddhatthikas, that the orthodox classification of
particular, material qualities under one generic concept of 'matter,'
etc., is worthless, for this reason, that you cannot group things together
by means of ideas, as you can rope together bullocks, and so on.
The argument seeks to point out a different meaning in the notion of
grouping.2
[1] Th.—But you do not also deny that any things may
combine or be included with other things under a concept
of totality or universality. Hence, how can you deny that
they may be grouped together ? [2] The organs of sense
[3] and their objects are, you admit, computed under the
material aggregate [of a living individual]. [4] Pleasant,
painful, or neutral feelings are computed under the aggre-
gate of feeling. [5] Percepts on occasion of sense and idea-
tion come under the aggregate of perception. [6] Volitions
on occasion of sense and ideation come under the aggregate
of conscious concomitants. [7] Consciousness on occasion
of sense and ideation comes under the aggregate of con-
sciousness. Hence, by admitting these inclusions, you must
admit that things may be grouped by an idea.
1
The title should, in the Pali, be Sangaha-, not Sangahita-
katha.
2
Physical grouping is, of course, the bringing together a number of
individuals. But things may be grouped mentally, i.e., included under
a concept of totality involved in counting, or a general concept by
generalizing.
[8] R. S.—Then you understand 'things being grouped
, together by ideas' in the same way as two bullocks may
be grouped together by a rope or a yoke, an alms-bowl
may be held together by a suspender, a dog may be held
in by a leash ?
Th.—[Yes;1 and] hence it is not less right to say that some
things may be grouped together by other things (ideas).
2. Of Mental States as mutually connected.
Controverted Point—That mental states are not con-
nected with other mental states.
From the Commentary.—This again is a view of some, for instance,
the Rajagirikas and Siddhatthikas, namely, that the orthodox phrase
'associated with knowledge
2
is meaningless, because feeling or other
mental states do not pervade each other (anupavittha ) as oil
pervades sesamum-seeds. The argument is to show ' connected' under
another aspect.3
[1] Th.—But you do not also deny that some things are
concomitant, co-existent, compounded with other things,
arise and cease together with them, have the same physical
basis and the same object? Why then except the relation
' connected with'?
[2] One aggregate, for instance/may be co-existent with
another: feeling with perception, mental coefficients, con-
sciousness, and so on. Surely then it may be 'connected
with' that other.
R. S.—Then do,you understand that one such state
accompanies, pervades another state, just as oil pervades
sesamum, or sugar pervades cane?
Th.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .4
1 Br [rightly] omits this. The Theravadin, concludes the Com-
mentator, neither approves nor disapproves of the [material] simile,
but by his rejoinder implies that 'even as you can't deny the physical
grouping, so must you admit the mental grouping by general concepts.
2
E.g., Dhamma-sangani, § 1, etc.
3
Br reads, as in the preceding katha, annen' ev' atthena for
anne va sabb e va (PTS). The latter seems meaningless.
4
'This, namely, is not a proper parallel. "We cannot assign an
3. Of Mental Properties.
Controverted Point.—That they do not exist.
From the Commentary.—Once more, some, like the Rajagirikas and
Siddhatthikas, hold that we can no more get ' mentals' (cetasika )
from mind (citta) , than we can get 'contactals' from contact,
so that there is no such thing as a property, or concomitant, of
mind. The Theravadin contends that there would be nothing wrong
if custom permitted us to say ' contactal' for what depends on contact,
just as it is customary usage to call 'mental' that which depends on
mind (citta-nissitako).
[1] Th.—You surely do not also deny that some mental
phenomena are concomitant, co-existent, conjoined with
consciousness, have their genesis and cessation, physical
basis and object in common with it ? Why then exclude
the 'mental?' [2] Contact, for instance, is co-existent with
consciousness; hence it is a 'mental,' i.e., a property or
concomitant of mind. So are feeling, perception, volition,
faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, understanding,
lust, hate, dulness, . . . indiscretion—all the ' mentals.'
[3] R. S.—You allow then that what is co-existent with
consciousness is a 'mental.' Do you equally admit that
what is co-existent with contact is a 'contactal,' or that
what is co-existent with each of those mental phenomena
is to be analogously regarded ; for instance, that what is
co-existent with indiscretion is an ' indiscretional'?
Th.—Certainly. [4] And if you assert that there are
no mental phenomena corresponding to our term ' mentals/
was it not said by the Exalted One :
' Yea ! verily this mind and mental states
Are void of soul for one loho understands.
Whoso discerns the loiv and high in both,
The seer, he knows that neither can endure' ?1
essential difference between sesamum and its oil as we can between
feeling and perception. " Sesamum" is the customary name for
something that is kernel, husk, and oil. When the former appearance
is changed, we call it oil.'—Comy. The MSS. and Br are discrepant
in detail here, but we believe we have given the intended meaning.
1
We cannot trace these verses.
[5] Or again, was it not said by the Exalted One:
'Suppose in this case, Kevatta,
1
that a bhikkhu can make
manifest the mind, and the mental [property], and the direction
unci application of thought in other beings, other individuals,
saying : Such is your mind. This is your mind. Thus and
thus are you, conscious '?2
Hence there is such a thing as a ' mental' [that is,
a property, or concomitant, of conciousness or mind] .3
1
Or Kevaddha. The KV. MSS. read as above.
2
Digha-Nikaya, i. 213.
3
On cetasika see Compendium, 237 f.; Buddh. Psychology, 175 f.
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