Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
8. Of Matter in Arupa-Sphere.
Controverted, Point.—That there is matter among the
Immaterial.
From the Commentary.—Some (as, for instance, the Andhakas),
judging by the Word—' Because of consciousness there comes mind
and body'1—imagined that, even in the Arupa-sphere of exist-
ence, there was a subtle, refined matter segregated from grosser
matter.
[1] Th.—Is then 'matter' (rupa) a sphere of life, a
destiny, a realm of beings, renewed life, a matrix, an
acquiring of individuality ? This you deny; but all this
you can predicate truly o f Arupa. Hence you cannot
maintain your proposition.
[2] You cannot predicate them truly of a five-mode
existence, one mode of which is material qualities. But
you can do so respecting a four-mode existence, that is,
with the material qualities omitted, as is the case with
Arupa. . . .
[3] You can predicate them truly of the Rupa-sphere,
where there yet is matter. But this sphere is not iden-
tical with the Arupa-sphere. [4] And i f you predicate
matter of the Arupa-sphere, you must show that matter
agrees with the description you can truly give of the Arupa-
sphere as a state of existence, a destiny, etc.
[5] Again, did not the Exalted One say that the Arupa
was a way of escape from visible or material things ? If
that is true, do you still maintain your proposition ? Yes ?
Well, then, the Exalted One said that renunciation was a
way of escape from sense-desires.
2
Now, according to your
reasoning (if there is matter in the Immaterial), there are
sense-desires in renunciation, and there are intoxicants in
1
Dialogues, ii. 52 f.; Samyutta-Nik., ii. 1, passim; Compendium,.
p. 188; Buddhism (Mrs. Rhys Davids), p. 91.
2
Nekkhamma . . . kama , a (very poor) word-play of exegetical
derivation. The former term = going out or down from. Cf. Digha-
Nik., iii. 239 f., 275; Anguttara-Nik., iii. 245.
those who are freed from them, there are things ' included'
(in intoxicant-infested states of the three spheres) among
the 'unincluded'1 which is absurd.
9. Of Matter as ethically Good or Bad.
Controverted Point.—That physical actions [involved in
bodily and vocal intimations] proceeding from good or bad
thoughts amount to a moral act of karma.
From the Commentary.—Some (as, for instance, the Mahirjsasakas
and the Sammitiyas) hold that acts of body and voice being, as they
are, just material qualities, reckoned as bodily and vocal intimation 2
are morally good if proceeding from what is good, and morally bad
if proceeding from what is bad. But if, runs the counter-argument,
they are to be considered as positively moral, and not amoral—as
we are taught
3
—then all the characteristics of the morally good or
bad must apply to them, as well as material characteristics.
[1] Th.—If that be so—if rttpa involved in bodily action
be of morally good import—then it must have a mental
object, and the mental attributes of' adverting,' ideating,4
co-ordinated application, attending, willing, anticipating,
1
I.e., the Ariyan Way or Order (niyama) , with its Paths and
Fruits (Bud. Psy. Eth., pp. 254, 335).
2
See Compendium, p. 264; Bud. Psy. Eth., 192 f.; and below,
X. 10, 11.
3
Bud. Psy. Eth., p 169, especially n. 5.
4
Abhogo , from bhuj , to bend, turn (cf. our 'bow,' 'bough,'
from the common Aryan root bhugh) , is synonymous with avaj -
jana (or avattana) , the preceding term. Popularly equivalent to
manakkara (mind-doing, mentation), it is technically defined, with
the former term, as the adverting of consciousness, when attention is
arrested or roused. It is tantamount to 'what is in the mind' ; hence
the rendering 'ideating.' Cf. Milinda (translation), i. 147 : Would a
wind that had died away acquiesce in being produced again ? No, i t
can have no idea (abhogang) , or will (cetanang) to be reproduced
. . . it is an unconscious thing.'
aiming,1 which you deny. But otherwise it is not
good.
[2] All these things you can predicate about the good
contact proceeding from good consciousness, as well as
about the good feeling, perception, volition, faith, energy,
mindfulness, concentration, understanding, that proceed
from good consciousness, and have an object o f thought,
but you cannot do so about rupa involved in bodily action.
[3] Or again, you would admit that, if rupa of the kind
you name has no mental object, it will have no mental
adverting, ideating, and so on ; but you would deny that
contact, feeling, perception, and the rest, similarly pro-
ceeding from good thought—good, but without mental
object—lacked mental adverting, ideating, and so on.
[4] Now take the matter involved in the bodily action,
resulting from good thought: Is all of it morally good?
You deny. But then you cannot maintain your pro-
position as generally true. For instance, would you call
visible object which was the consequence of good thought,
' good' matter ? Are audible, odorous, sapid, or tangible
object, or the four elements: extended, cohesive, hot, and
mobile, [if they 'happened' as] the result of good thought,
'good' matter ? You deny. [5] Then would you call any
of them, under the circumstances, indeterminate matter
(neither good nor bad) ? ' Yes' you say; yet you deny that
the matter or material quality appearing, under the circum-
stances, as bodily action is indeterminate. That, you say,
would be 'good.' . . .
[6] Let us then take your 'good' bodily action which,
as matter, has no mental object: must you not equally
allow that visible or other sense-object, or those four
elements which, as matter, have no mental object, are
also, under the circumstances, ' good' ? But you deny.
.. . [7] Similarly you refuse to see that, if you allow
1
The last two are equivalents of cetana , volition. The former
is volition under the aspect of preparation, or exertion; the latter is
the same,regarded as persistent.—Comy. The former—patthana—
in its popular meaning, is 'praying,' and is used as equivalent to
asingsa, hope.
any sense-object, or any element brought about by good
thought, and having no mental object, to be indeterminate,
you must equally allow the 'matter ' of bodily intimation
resulting from good thought and with no mental object, to
be indeterminate. . . .
[8] You call this bodily intimation, which is consequent
on good thought, ' good' matter [even though it is so un-
mental as] not to be conjoined with any [mental reaction
or] ' contact.' Yet you would deny the possibility o f this
if, for ' bodily intimation,' you substitute any sense-object,
or one of the elements.
[9] Taken conversely, you allow that any object of sense
or an element consequent on good thought, but not con-
joined with any mental reaction, is indeterminate (neither
good nor bad). Yet you would deny the indeterminateness
if, for sense-object or element, you substitute matter
of bodily action born of good thought.
[10, 11] And if to ' not conjoined with mental reaction
or contact' I add ' not having a mental object,' your
attitude is the same, in both alternatives [8, 9].
[12-15] The whole argument to be repeated for 'vocal'
instead of 'bodily intimation.'
[16] Next with respect to bodily intimation proceeding
from bad thought. You affirm similarly that this is ' morally
bad ' matter. Then it too must have a mental object, and
those mental attributes named above,
1
which you deny.
But otherwise it is not morally bad. [17] All these things
you can predicate about the bad reaction, or 'contact,' pro-
ceeding from bad consciousness, as well as about the bad
feeling, perception, volition, lust, hate and dulness, pride,
erroneous opinion, doubt, sloth, distraction, immodesty,
and indiscretion, that proceed from bad consciousness,
having a mental object, but you cannot do so about that
bodily intimation, which is rupa, or of material quality
[18]2 Or again, you will admit that, if bad rupa of the
kind you name has no mental object, it will have no mental
adverting and other mental attributes named above ; but
1 See § [1].
2 Cf. §§ 3, 4.
you will deny that contact, feeling, perception, volition,
lust, hate, and so on, proceeding from bad thought, bad
and having no mental object, lack mental adverting and
those other attributes. . . .
[19] Now this that you call ' morally bad ' matter pro-
ceeding from bad consciousness :—is all of it bad ? Yes ?
Whether it be ' bodily intimation,' or other material quality ?
This you deny, so your proposition amounts to this: that
some material qualities resulting from bad consciousness
are bad, some not.
[20-23] And all that we have argued as to ' bodily
intimation ' as ' bad ' matter applies to 'vocal intimation.'
[24]1 For instance, would you call visible object which
was the consequence o f bad consciousness ' bad ' matter ?
Or audible, odorous, sapid, or tangible matter ? Or any of
the four elements ? Or impure matter, tears, blood, sweat
(i f any of them happened as the result of bad consciousness)
—would you call them ' bad ' matter ? You deny. [251
Then would you call any o f them, under the circumstances,
indeterminate matter ? ' Yes,' yon say. Yet you deny that
the matter or material quality appearing, under the cir-
cumstances, as bodily or vocal action, is indeterminate.
That, you say, would be ' bad.' . . .
[26]2 Let us then take your ' bad' vocal action, which,
as material, has no mental object : must you not
equally allow that any sense-object, or any o f the four
elements, or impure matter, tears, blood, sweat, which
have no mental object, are also, under the circumstances,
'bad'? But you deny. . . . [27] Similarly you refuse to
see that, if you allow any of these things, when brought
about by thought, and having no mental object, to be
indeterminate, you must equally allow the ' matter,' bodily
or vocal, of action resulting from bad thought, and with no
mental object, to be indeterminate.
[28-31] are simply repetitions of [8-11], substituting 'bad'
for 'good,' 'vocal' for 'bodily,' and adding ' impure matter,
tears, blood, sweat' to the sense-objects and four elements.
1 Cf. [4], [5].
2 Cf. [6], [7].
[32] M. S.—But if we may not say that matter is good
or bad, is not deed or word as an act good or bad? [This
being quite orthodox,] our proposition must be right.
[33] Th.—But if you maintain that matter is good or
bad, you must not hesitate to say that all five organs and
objects of sense, the four elements and impure matter, etc.,
are (intrinsically) good or bad—which you deny. [34] If
body and bodily action be material, would you affirm that
mind and mental action are so ? If these, on the contrary,
are both immaterial, would you affirm that both body and
bodily action are immaterial ? Or if body is material and
bodily action immaterial, would you speak similarly of
mind and mental action ?1
[35] To say that bodily action
as well as body is material, involves such statements as
' sense-consciousness is material because the sense-organs
are material.'
[36] You must not say that rupa, or matter, is action
{or karma). For was it not said by the Exalted One :
'I say, bhikkhus, that volition is karma; when tve have willed,
then toe make action (or karma) by deed, word, and thought ?5 2
[37] And again: 'When, Ananda, there is action, subjec-
tive pleasure or pain arises because it is well determined by
the deed. So also when there is speech or thought, subjective
pleasure or pain arises because it is well determined by the
action of speech or of thought.'3
[38] And again: 'There are, bhikkhus, three modes of
volitional acts of body, four modes of volitional acts of speech,
and three modes of volitional acts of mind, all of which amount
to immoral deeds, bringing forth4 ill and entailing it as result.
And there are a like number of modes of volitional acts of body,
1
The PTS adds a repetition of the first question in this section.
Br. omits both the repetition and also the third question. They are
all only so many parallel instances to show the unreasonableness of
implicating the whole of matter in statements about bodily and
vocal action.
2
Anguttara-Nik., iii. 415.
3
Ib., ii. 157 f.; Samyutta-Nik., ii. 39 f .
4
Read dukkhudrayang. So the Br. translation.
t.s . v .
speech, and mind amounting to moral [karma], bringing forth
and entailing happiness as result.'1
[39] Once more:.'If, Ananda, this foolish man, SamiddJdr
when ashed by the Wanderer Pdtaliputta, were to answer:
"Brother Pataliputta, it is when anyone has acted intentionally
in deed, word, and thought that he comes to feel pleasant, or
painful, or neutral feeling, felt as pleasure, as pain, or as
neitherso ansivering he would make right answer' ?2
Is the Suttanta thus ? Then it is not right to say:.
Matter, or material quality, is karma (action).
1
We cannot trace this passage (cf. Compendium, pp. 145, 146).
The Burmese translator adds a note : 'The Theravadin takes kaya,
vaci , mano, when compounded with kamma , to denote merely
a means (nimitta) , and kamma by itself to denote volition
(cetana) . But the opponent takes feach compound to mean a moral
act (of deed, word, or thought).' Hereby we see how certain purely
immoral actions involved in gestures and speech, proceeding from
moral thoughts, came to be regarded as also moral.
2
Majjhima-Nik., iii. 209. All four passages are quoted in Buddha-
ghosa's Atthasalini (PTS), p. 88.
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