Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
10. Of Vital Power.
Controverted Point.—That there is no such thing as a.
material vital power.
From the Commentary.—Some, as, for instance, the Pubbaseliyas.
and Sammitiyas, hold that, because vital power is an immaterial fact,
distinct from consciousness, therefore there is nothing material in it.
[1] Th.—If there is not, you imply also that, in material
(organic) phenomena, there is no such thing as ' a term
of life, or a subsisting, no going on, being kept going on, no
progress, procedure or preservation of them'3—but you
3
This is the canonical formula for jivitindriya , or vital power
(see Bud. Psy. Eth., § 9). The Burmese translator also reads thiti
as a separate synonym of ayu and the rest, and understanding each
in the instrumental sense, he renders the passage thus: 'Is there
no such thing as a means of living, subsisting, maintaining, moving,
or preserving?'
deny that; in fact, you maintain the opposite. Hence
your proposition falls through.
[2] With regard to the immaterial, you affirm both the
existence of immaterial vital power and also its continuity,
going on, etc. Why do you affirm the latter only, and
deny the former ?
[3] You admit that the life-term of immaterial organic
phenomena is immaterial vital power: why not admit the
corresponding counterpart in the case of material organic
power ? Why is it wrong to deny the latter when you
admit the former ?
[4] You say that, for you, the life-term of material
organic phenomena is an immaterial vital power ? Would
you then maintain the contrary? No? Why not? [5]
Both vital powers, you say, are immaterial. It seems to
me you could with equal plausibility say that both were
material.
[6, 7] You will admit that vital power is still present in
one who has fallen into a cataleptic trance.
1
Yet you could
not call his vital power (he being unconscious) immaterial.
In which aggregates is the vital power included ? In that
of mental coefficients,
2
you say? But is that aggregate
existent in one who has attained trance? 'No,' you say ?
I repeat my question. 'Yes,' you now say. But if anyone
in trance has mental coefficients, he will also have the
other mental aggregates—feeling, perception, cognitive
consciousness. 'No,' you say? I repeat my question.
' Yes,' you now say.
3
Then that person cannot be in a
cataleptic trance.
1
Nirodha , literally cessation (viz., of consciousness) : the utmost
result of Jhana abstraction. Everything mental (immaterial) is
suspended for a time.
2
Sankhara. These, in the Suttas, are defined as activity in
deed, word, and thought; in Abhidhamma as fifty phases, more or
less of them present in states of consciousness. ' The opponent thinks
of the fifty, and denies; then of the three activities, and assents.'—
Comy. Cf. XIX. 2.
3
He denies with respect to mid-trance, but assents with respect to
entrance into and emergence from trance.—Comy.
[8, 9] If there be no material vital power, no vital power
can exist for the inmates of the unconscious sphere,1 for
how can they have an immaterial (or mental) vital power ?
The argument above as to mental coefficients, which you
say they have, applies to them also. They cannot be as
they are and yet possess all five aggregates, as in a five-
mode existence.
[10] [If vital power be wholly psychical, it must be
affected by mental conditions; for instance,] you will admit
that vital power, springing from a consciousness that seeks
rebirth, must, when that consciousness breaks off , be itself
broken of f in part. Now, would you say the same of a
purely mental phase such as ' contact' (or mental reaction
to stimulus) ? Why not ? You mean that contact would
be broken off , not in part, but entirely ? Now, would you
say the same of vital power [it being, as you say, not
material] ? You deny. .. .
[11] P. S.—Are there then two vital powers (material
and immaterial) ?
Th.—Yes.
P. S.—Then you are committed to this—that we live
with two lives, die with two deaths?
2
Th.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
11. Of a Result of Karma,
Controverted, Point.—That because of karma an Arahant
may fall away from Arahant ship.
1
See above, I. 3 ; III. 11.
2
'At the moment of decease the two break off together.'—Comy.
The Compendium, when treating of mind, takes note only of the
psychic vital power. Cf. Introduction, p. 17: 'The activities of will
and the other concomitant properties [or coefficients] are due to the
psychic life (jivitindriya), which infuses mental life into one and
all, constituting the whole a psychosis or psychical state.' But when
treating of matter, the author notices physical vital power (Com-
pendium, p. 156). The doctrine as to the two is clearly stated in
Vibhanga, 123: 'Vital power is twofold: material and immaterial.'
From the Commentary.—Such is an opinion held, for instance, by
the Pubbaseliyas and Sammitiyas, the Arahant so falling being one
who, in a former birth, calumniated one who was then Arahant. For
any other comment, see the argument on the falling away from
Arahantship (I. 2, p. 64 f.).
[1, 2] Th.—How can you affirm this without also affirm-
ing—which you will not—that those in the three lower
stages of fruition may fall away from their fruit ?
[3] And your claim is that he may fall away, not because
o f such karma, or prior action, as murder, theft, fornica-
tion, evil speech, matricide, parricide, Arahanticide, wound-
ing a Buddha, or schism-making, but because of having
calumniated Arahants. You affirm he may fall away be-
cause of having calumniated Arahants, but you deny that
everyone who calumniates Arahants realizes Arahantship.1
Therefore your proposition that falling is due to calumnia-
tion is absurd.
1 'The opponent, not discerning the constancy (niyama) in the
attaining (leg. sampapunane) of Arahantship with such a karma,
denies.'—Comy. The denial amounts to the admission that some who
calumniated Arahants realize Arahantship. The converse of this is-
that all Arahants are not those who so calumniated. If those who
did not so calumniate fall at all, their fall cannot possibly be due
to calumniation, because they had not calumniated. Therefore the
opponent's proposition is not universally valid on his own showing.
The orthodox view, however, is that there can never be a true falling,
because, among other reasons, all the previous karmas had been
exhausted. It is not necessary here to work out this obvious argu-
ment, all that is necessary being to disprove the opponent's statement
by refuting him on his own grounds.
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