Kathavatthu - Of Path-Culture and the Senses, Of Sensations as Moral, Immoral and Ideation

Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A

3. Of Path-Culture and the Senses.
Controverted Point.—That one may develop the Path
while enjoying the fivefold cognitions of sense.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Mahasanghikas, with
reference to the Sutta : ' When he sees an object with the eye, he does
not grasp at it in idea'
3
hold to the view stated above. The Thera-
vadin's argument is that, if this be so, either the Path developed is of
a worldly nature, or the developer's sense-experience must be of the
nature of the Path. But neither is possible, because seose-cognition
is worldly, and has not Nibbana as its object.2
[1] Th.—But you will admit—(i.) that the five kinds of
sense-consciousness have a seat and an object that have
already sprung up; (ii.) that their seat and object are
antecedent; (iii.) that their seat is o f the subject whi|e
their object is external, that seat and object are not yet"
broken up while operative; (iv.) that seat and object are
of different varieties ; (v.) that they do not enjoy mutually
their respective ranges and fields; (vi.) that they come to
pass not without co-ordinated application or attention3;
(vii.) that they are not unmixed; (viii.) are not without
order in time; (ix.) are without order of contiguity; and
(x.) without any ideation?
4
Now if all this be true, your
proposition cannot be true.

2
The Path is a concern of mano, not of the five senses ; again, i.—x.
are not predictable of the Path.—Comy.
3
By the mind adverting to external object.—Comy.
4
Quoted from Vibhanga, 307. 'Leaving aside the automatic fall
(incidence in a presented object), there is not even the semblance of
minding about it [in sense].'—Comy.


[2] Consider visual consciousness and one of the Path-
subjects— Emptiness1— does the former come to pass
concerning the latter ? If you deny,2 you are opposing
your thesis. If you assent, I ask whether it is right doc-
trine to say not only :
'Because of the eye and the visible object visual con-
sciousness arises
but also:
Because of the eye and Emptiness visual consciousness
arises ?
Is the Suttanta thus? [Of course not.]
[3] Again, if your proposition be true, you must also
affirm that visual consciousness arises concerning the past
and the future. Also that it arises [not solely because of
visible object, but also] concerning mental contact, feeling,
perception, volition, thought, the organs of sight, hearing,
smell, taste, touch, and the objects of hearing, smell,
taste, touch—impossible affirmations.
Now you can admit that representative (ideational)
consciousness does arise concerning Emptiness, concerning
the past and the future, concerning phases of mind, factors
of experience, as stated just now.
And one may develop a Path while enjoying representa-
tive cognition concerning any one of those matters, but not
during the enjoyment of sense-consciousness, which as
such is not concerned with them.
[4] M.—Well, but was it not said by the Exalted One :
' Here, bhikkhus, when a bhikkhu sees an object with the eye,
he does not grasp at the general characters nor at the details
of it, . . . or hears a sound, . . . or smells, . . . tastes, . . .
touches a tangible . . . '?3
Surely here there is Path-practice by one who is enjoying
the five sorts of sense-consciousness ? . . .

1
Compendium, 67, 216, and above, iii. 2.
2
Because of the orthodox formula below. See Majjhima-Nik.,
i. 259; Samyutta-Nik., iv. 87.
3
Anguttara-Nik., i. 113; cf. Dialogues i. 80, n. on the terms
rendered by 'characters,' 'details,' and their being generally taken to
refer to sex-attraction. See also Appendix : Nimitta.


4. Of Sensations as Moral and Immoral.
Controverted Point— That the five kinds of sense-con-
sciousness are good and bad (have positive moral quality).
The Commentary contributes no discussion.
[1-3]1 Th.—{Verbatim similar to X, 3, §§ 1-3.) The
argument being here, too, that the senses are limited to sense-
objects, ethical and intellectual matters being the concerns of
intellect, will, etc.
[4] M.—Well, but was it not taid by the Exalted One:
'Here, bhikkhus, when a bhikkhu sees an object with the eye,
he grasps, .. . or again, does not grasp, at the general
characters, or the details of it,...or hears a sound, etc. . . '?
Surely then the five sorts of sense-consciousness are good
and bad.

5. Of Sensations and Ideation.
Controverted Point.—That the five kinds of sense-con-
sciousness as such are co-ideational.2
From the Commentary. — Here again the Mahasanghikas, for
instance, carelessly interpret the Teacher's words, quoted in the fore-
going. They hold them to mean that the five kinds of Sensations as
such are accompanied by ideation, because sexual ideas ai^ generated
by immoral thoughts.
(The argument is verbatim similar to the preceding, the
authority appealed to being that in X. 2.)

1 The Commentary refers also to the preceding discourse.
2 Sabhoga. See VIII. 9, § 1, note.