Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
6. Of Two Codes of Morals.
Controverted Point.—That one who is engaged in the
Path is practising a double morality.
From, the Commentary,—From such passages in the "Word as
'When a man is established in virtue he is gifted with wisdom,'1 some,
like the Mahasanghikas, hold that, inasmuch as the virtuous person is
developing the Path which is not of the world, with a morality that is
of the world, he must, at the moment of realization, be possessed
simultaneously of both a worldly an$ an unworldly morality. The
argument begins by showing; that each morality would involve two
separate sets of mental processes.
[1] Th.—You must then be prepared to affirm that he
is possessed of his dual morality with a dual mental con-
tact, dual feeling, dual perception, dual volition, dual
thought, dual faith, dual energy, dual mindfulness, dual
concentration, dual understanding. .. . [2] If his moral
code be worldly, these processes will be worldly. [3] If
his moral code be both, they will be double. The mental
contact, the fueling, etc., that he experiences, will be both
worldly as well as unworldly [or supramundane]—which you
of course deny. .. .
And if you say that one actually engaged on the Path is
possessed of a worldly code of morals, you are calling such
an one in effect an average person or worldling—which you
of course Refuse, to do. .
[4-6] Your position, you say, is this: (1) one actually -
engaged on the Path practises a worldly morality in the
three factors relating to conduct—right speech, right action,
right livelihood—but not in the five factors relating to
mental life.2
(2) In those three factors his morals are
both worldly and supramundane, but they are only the latter
In the other five factors. My position is that you must
affirm one and the same higher morality for all the eight.3
1
Samyutta-Nik., i. 13,165; quoted in Milindapanha, 34.
2
See X. 2.
3
Implied, not stated in so many words.
[7] M.—:Well, but does the Path come to be1 when
worldly morality has ceased ?
Th.—Yes.
M.—What! can anyone without morals—his virtue
defective, imperfect, cut off—develop the Path ?
Th.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. .. .
7. Of Virtue or Morality as Automatic.2
Controverted Point.—That virtuous conduct is automatic
(and not a property of consciousness).
From the Commentary.is held by some, like the Mahasangh-
ikas, that when there has been moral conduct, even though it has
ceased, there is an accretion of virtue, and hence the doer becomes
virtuous. The argument is analogous to that on giving as not mental
(VII. 4).
[1] Th.—But is virtue either material qualities, or
Nibbana, or an organ or object of sense [since these are
the opposites of properties of mind] ? .. . [2] You would
not call mental contact, feeling, perception, volition, faith,
energy, mindfulness, concentration, understanding, un-
mental. But if virtue cannot be identified with anything
that is not mental, it must be a property of mind. .. .
[3-5] If virtue be no property of consciousness, you must
affirm that it has not a result consciously sought after.
Is not the opposite true? But if it has a .result to be
desired, it is also something mental. . . . The mental
properties just enumerated—they have boih consciously
desired results and are mental. In admitting this, you
must also admit that virtue is of the same dual c^racter.
But you contend that virtue, on the contrary, is so
anomalous as to have a consciously desired result, yet to
be not mental. .. .
[6-8] Again, if virtue be not a thing of the mind, you
must admit that it has not a result, not an effect [in
1
Literally, 'arise.'
2
A-cetasikang .
future consciousness]1; yet is it not precisely something
having such a result and effect? You would surely not
say that it is non-mental and not productive of effect , as
you would admit in the case of an organ or object of
sense ? Again, you would not consider that these non-
mentals have such a result; yet this is what you say of
virtue:—that it is both non-mental and yet fruitful of
results in consciousness.
[9-10] With reference to the Path-factors, you would
call the three factors relating to virtuous conduct non-
mental, while calling the other five mental [which you are
not justified in doing].
[11] M.—But if I am wrong, you must then admit that
when virtuous acts have ceased, the doer becomes immoral.
You deny this? Then I am right to say that virtue is
[i.e., goes on] without mind, mechanically.
8. Of Virtue as conforming to Thought.
Controverted Point.—That virtue does not proceed in
adaptation to2 thought.
From the Commentary.—This is merely a pendant to the previous
discourse.
[1-5] The argument is exactly similar to X. 7, 'does not
proceed in adaptation to thought' being substituted for 'is
automatic (or a property of consciousness),' and the middle
sections [3-8] on ' result' and ' effect' being omitted.
1
See pp. 205, n. 3, 207, n. 2.
2
Literally, roll along after, in accordance with (anu-parivat -
tati) . Cf. Bud. Psy. Eth., §§ 671, 772.
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