Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
BOOK XII
1. Of Self Restraint.1
Controverted Point.— That self-restraint is [positive]
action (karma).
From the Commentary.—This is a view held, for instance, by the
Mahasanghikas, and based on the Sutta: ' When he sees an object,
hears a sound, etc., he grasps, etc., at the general characters thereof,'2
etc. They hold that both self-restraint and want of self-restraint amount
to overt action, or karma. In our doctrine it is volition that con-
stitutes karma. And it is argued that just as volition, proceeding by way
of deed, word, and thought, gets the name of action of body, speech, and
mind, so, if self-restraint be action, that self-restraint, proceeding by
way of sense-control, would get the name of visual karmas, auditory
karmas, etc. This, as not warranted by the Suttanta, the opponent
rejects till the fifth sense is mentioned. Here he stumbles at the
ambiguity of kaya : 'sentient skin-surface' and 'intimating body.'
The Sutta quoted is concerned with the presence and absence of
self-restraint, not of karma, hence it is inconclusive.
[1] Th.—If this be so, you imply that ocular self-
restraint is moral action of the eye; so for the other
senses — you cannot admit this. . . . But as to self-
restraint, involved in sense-control of body and in control
of mind, you at first deny it3
to be moral action, and then
1 Cf . above, III. 10.
2
Anguttara-Nik., ii. 16; also Dialogues, i. 80, and elsewhere. The
'general characters' (nimit t a), according to the Commentators, are
usually taken, in this connection, as referring to sex-features and sex-
attraction. Self-restraint is the carrying out of the volition (cetana),
which alone ranks as morally effective action—i.e., karma.
3
He rejects for k ay a as organ of touch; accepts for it as the
vehicle of intimation. As to 'mind,' he rejects it as organ of sense,
accepts it as an avenue of karma.
assent to the proposition that it is moral action. Why
then do you not concede this for the remaining four senses ?
That which you admit as true for mind, the co-ordinator
of sense, you must admit as true no less for the five senses.
[2] Want of self - restraint you admit of course is
[immoral] action (karma): is it eye-karma when self-
restraint is not practised by the controlling power of
sight ? . . . (proceed as in § 1).
[3] M.—But i f I am wrong, was it not said by the
Exalted One: ' Here, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu, when he sees an
object with the eye, grasps at the general characters thereof,'
. . . [again] ' does not grasp at the external appearance, . . .
when he hears a sound, . . . cognizes a thing with the mind,
, . . does not grasp, etc'?1
Surely both self-restraint and want of it are herein
shown to be morally effective action ?
2. Of Action.
Controverted Point.—That all action (karma) entails
moral result (vipaka).
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Mahasanghikas again, hold
this view, basing their opinion on the Sutta quoted below. Now
whereas the Master, without any qualification, spoke of volition as
moral action (karma), the argument here shows that only good or
bad volition as entailing moral result was meant, and that volition
which is morally indeterminate is without moral result. The Sutta
quoted is inconclusive, since it refers to the experience of results in
actual life or lives, given the necessary conditions.
[1] Th.—Do you imply that all volition entails result
[volition being moral action]? If you deny, then your
proposition is not universally valid. If you do imply that
volition entails result, then you are committed to this—
that volition which is indeterminate as to moral result
entails moral result; that volition which is inoperative and
1
See preceding note.2
therefore indeterminate as to moral result entails such
result, whether such volition be exercised in any one of the
three spheres of life, or in that which is not included in
them.1 .. . All of this you must deny. .. . [2] For do
you not hold that resultant or inoperative volition, which
is indeterminate as to moral result, cannot be said to entail
result ? Where then is your universal proposition ?
[3] M.—But i f I am wrong, was it not said by the
Exalted One : ' I declare, bhikkhus, that there can be no
annulment of voluntary deeds done and' accumulated, without
experience of the results thereof, be it in this life or in the
after-life'?2
Wherefore all action surely entails result.
3. Of Sound as Result [of Karma].
Controverted Point.—That sound is a result of karma.
From the Commentary.—Here again some, like the Mahasanghikas,
from carelessly interpreting such passages as, ' He by the doing, the
accumulating, the augmenting, the abundance of that karma, is
gifted with the voice of a Brahma god^ have adopted this view. The
argument shows that ' result of karma ' is a term applying to mental
states only, which have been transmitted by karma, but does not apply
to material things. The retinue, for instance, attending a Superman is
not a vipaka, or specific result of karma.3
[1] Th.—[Now what can rightly be predicated of a
'result of karma' ?] Such a result is a matter of feeling,
pleasant, painful, or neutral; it is conjoined with feeling
1
Dhammasangani, § 583.
2
Anguttara-Nik., v.292 ff.
3
But the pleasure derived from well-being of this kind is vipaka.
Vipaka is essentially a subjective phenomenon, subjective experience,
emotional and intellectual. Sound, as object, is something 'other,' or
external. The importance of speech-sounds for thought doubtless
provoked the exceptional position claimed by the heterodox for sound.
Sadd a means both sound and word; hence, without a qualifying
context, sadd a means as much vocal sound as sound in general.
of these three kinds; it is conjoined with mental contact,
feeling, perception, volition, thought; it goes with a mental
object; with it go adverting, ideating, co-ordinated applica-
tion, attention, volition, anticipation, aiming. Is sound
anything of this kind?1 Is it not rather the opposite?
[2] Now mental contact is result of karma, and of
mental contact it is right to predicate any of the fore-
going characteristics, and wrong not to. But the opposite
holds with regard to sound.
[3] M.—But if I am wrong, was it not said by the
Exalted One : 'He through having tvrought, having accumu-
lated, having piled up, having increased such karma, becomes
reborn with the voice of a Brahma god, like that of the
karavika bird '?2 Hence surely sound3 is a specific result
of karma.
1 In the PTS edition the reply should here be, Na h'evang
vattabbe .
2
Digha Nikaya, iii. 178.
3
Though,the sense-organs are well produced through karma, they
are not designated as vipaka's.—Comy.
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