Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
6. Of Concentration.
Controverted Point.—That the continuity of conscious-
ness2 is concentration o f mind (samadhi).3
From the Commentary,—Some, like the Sabbatthivadins and
Uttarapathakas, hold that, because of the Word—'to spend seven
days and nights motionless, speechless, in the experience of absolute
bliss'—the flow of consciousness itself may constitute concentration.
They do not take the latter term as meaning collectedness of thought,
even when the coefficient of individualizing intentness (ekaggata )
has arisen in a momentary unit of consciousness.
[1] Th.—Your statement must include of course past
and future states of consciousness in the series. You
forgot that, and you must agree that the pust having
ceased and the future being unborn, it is not right to say
that they form a [present] concentrated state of mind.4
2
Citta-santati. See Compendium, 6,153, n. 1; 157, n. 4; 252 f .
3
Samadhi means the placing, establishing of consciousness ex-
clusively and voluntarily on any single object. Ekaggata is the
essential factor in consciousness, the cultivation of which may bring
about the state called Samadhi .
4
There is no use in speaking of a ' state' without a 'function' of
mind. And only the present state can be functioning (paccup-
pannam eva cittang kiccakarang hoti).—Comy.
[2] S. U.—Then is concentration confined to a momen-
tary conscious unit ?
Th.—Yes.
S. U.—But if you could affirm that concentration is
involved in each momentary unit of consciousness, you
should say no less that one had won the ecstasy1 of Jhana
on the actual occasion of any sense-cognition, or at the
very moment of thinking immoral thoughts, accompanied
by lust, hate, dulness, or any of the ten corruptions.2 . . .
[3] Th.—If your proposition is true, it must also be
true [a fortiori] that a series of bad conscious units is
concentration, whether it is accompanied by lust, hate, or
any of the ten corruptions. This you deny. . . .
[4] S. U.—But if we are wrong, did not the Exalted
One say: 'I, friend Jainas,3 am able, without moving the
body or using the voice, to spend seven nights and days in the
experience of absolute bliss '?4
Surely then the flow of consciousness constitutes con-
centration of mind.
7. Of the Causality of Things.5
Controverted Point.—That a cause of things is predeter-
mined.6
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Andhakas, hold that,
because of the Word— 'There is a cause, and that is elemental '7—
1
Here appana-samadhi is meant (Compendium, p. 56).
2
See above, pp. 65, 66, nn. 4; Compendium, p. 173.
3
Nigantha Jains.
4
Majjhima-Nik., i. 94.
5
Dhammatthitata —i.e., the state of being a cause by which
resulting things are established. See above, VI. 2, and Appendix.
6
Parinipphanna . On nipphanna (here intensified by the
prefix) see Compendium, pp. 156 (c), 157, n. 6.
7
Samyutta-Nik., ii. 25 ; Anguttara-Nik., i. 286. In these passages
it is stated that, whether Tathagatas arise to point it out or not,
always the natural order holds good that (1) causation in the physical
and psychical world goes on; (2) all things are impermanent, pregnant
with ill, soulless.
each term in the chain of Causal Origination is, as a cause, elemental,
and is therefore predetermined. The Theravadin shows that, if it were
predetermined by another cause, this cause would in turn be pre-
determined by yet another, and so on ad infinitum.
[1] Th.—Is then the cause of causes predetermined [by
something else] ? You deny. For if you assent,1 you
commit yourself to this: that, because of the continued
eventuating due to endless causation, there can never be an
end made to 111 , nor any cutting of f the round of rebirth,
nor any Nibbana free from the residual stuff of rebirth.
[2] Again, is the cause of any one of the five aggregates
(body, mind) predetermined ? If you assent, you commit
yourself to the admission that the cause itself is predeter-
mined by something else. And if you deny—and I insist,
and take no denial—you, assenting, commit yourself to
this—that there is, for this endless causation,2 no making
an end of Ill , no cutting of f of the round of rebirth, no
Nibbana without stuff of rebirth. . . .
8. Of Impermanence.
Controverted Point.—That impermanence is predeter-
mined.
From the CommentarySome, like the Andhakas, hold that im-
permanence itself is no less predetermined than impermanent things,
such as the body, etc. By this they are involved either in a plural
order of impermanence, or in an interminable series of temporal
features, each predetermined in its own way, with no prospect of
coming to the end of predetermination.3
[1-3] Th.—Then is impermanence predetermined by im-
permanence already predetermined. And if you admit this,
1
He judges that the correlation may hold by way of contiguity and
reciprocity (two of the twenty-four Paccayas or conditioning relation),
—Comy.
2
Literally, predetermination of one by the other.
3
The idea is that things possess impermanence as a characteristic
feature. If this characteristic were predetermined, it should possess
another feature of impermanence equally predetermined.
you imply that there is no making an end of ill, no cutting
off the round of rebirth, no Nibbana without residual stuff
of rebirth. This holds good for both decay and death, the
two manifestations of impermanence.
[4-5] [Take now these manifestations of impermanence
in the five aggregates, body-mind:] body is undoubtedly
predetermined and characterized by impermanence in the
form of decay, dissolution, disappearance. But you cannot
equally affirm all this of impermanence, decay, or death
itself. So far the mental aggregates....
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