Kathavatthu - Of Speech & Action Conforming to Thought, Of Past, Future and Present

Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A

10. Of Speech conforming to Thought.
Controverted Point.—That speech does not accord with
thought.
From the Commentary.—Inasmuch as anyone can decide [to think
about one thing and] talk about another, therefore there is no accord,
no sequence, no conformity between thought and speech. Speech can
proceed even without thought. Such is the view of some—for instance,
the Pubbaseliyas.
[1J Th.—If this be so, then a fortiori neither does
speech accord with mental contact, feeing, perception,
volition, nor with any property of consciousness. But
surely, as you agree, the opposite is the case.3

3
I.e., speech occurs to, or proceeds from, one who has ' mental
contact,' etc.


[2] You must, again, deny that speech accords with
adverting, ideating, co-ordinated application, willing, in-
tending, aiming—which you will not, the opposite being
true.
[3] You admit that speech which is provoked by thought
is co-existent, and one in its origin, with the thought. Yet
this is in contradiction to your proposition.
[4] Again, you commit yourself to this, that one speaks
of what one does not wish to speak, discourses, addresses
[others], converses about what one does not wish. Surely
the opposite is the case.
[5] P.—You say I am wrong, but you must admit that
people can speak, discourse, address [others], converse
.about something different [from that which is occupying
their minds].
1
Hence my proposition is tenable.

11. Of Action conforming to Thought.
Controverted Point.—That action does not accord with
thought.
From the Commentary.—Inasmuch as anyone, when proposing to
go in one direction, can go elsewhere, some—for instance, the Pubbase-
liyas—hold that action is not in accord or conformity with, or consequent
upon, thought.
[1-3] Th.—(The argument is exactly similar to that in
IX. 10, §§ 1-3.)
[4] Again, you commit yourself to this, that one moves
forward and backward, or looks ahead and back, or bends or
extends, when not wishing to perform these respective acts.
Surely the opposite is the case.
[5] P.—You say, I am wrong, but does it not happen
that some one, thinking 'I shall go in one direction,' goes
in another, or . . . thinking ' I shall hold forth something,'
holds forth another ? Hence my proposition is tenable.

1
The illustration given in the Comy, is that of one intending to
say civarang (robe) and saying cirang (fibre), as if we were to say
'coming' for 'comforting.' Speech not conforming to mental action,
'no blame attaches to the speaker.'
T.S. V.


12. Of Past, Future, and Present.
Controverted Point.—That a past or future experience is
actually possessed.
From the Commentary.—In this connection we must distinguish
between actual and potential possession.
1
The former is of the present
moment. But for a man who has acquired the Eight Attainments in
Jhana, the possession of them is potentially persistent, though not of
all at once. But some, not discerning this distinction—for instance,
the Andhakas—speak of past and future Jhanas as something actually
and presently possessed.
- [1] Th.—But is not the past extinct, departed, changed,
come to an end, finished? [2] And is not the future-
unborn, not yet become, not come into being, not produced,,
not brought to pass, not manifested ? How then can you
call either something that is actually possessed ?
[3] Is one who possesses a present material or bodily
aggregate also in possession of a past and a future bodily
aggregate ? Then must you admit three bodily aggregates.
Similarly, if he is actually in possession of five past and.
five future, as well as five present [bodily and mental]
aggregates, you must admit fifteen aggregates. . . .
[4-6] A similar argument applies to the organs and
objects of sense, to the eighteen elements, to the twenty-
two controlling powers.
[7] A.—But are there not those who, meditating on the
eight stages of emancipation, can induce the four Jhanas
at their pleasure, can acquire the four serial grades ?2
Surely then it is right to say that one can have actual
present possession of past and future things ?

1
More literally, 'the notion of being in possession of (saman-
nagata), and that of having acquired (patilabha) Comy,
2
Anguttara-Nik., iv. 410, 448. Buddhist Suttas (SBE XI.), 212,.
§§ 9,10; Pss. of the Brethren, ver. 916, 917, 1172.