Points of Controversy
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A
6. Of Past Ideas.
Controverted Point.—That consciousness of a past object
is without object.
From the Commentary.—Some—for instance, the Uttarapathakas—
hold that, since past and future mental objects are not actually
existing, therefore mind recalling a past object is mind without object.
[1] Th.—But you admit that there is such a thing as a
mental object that is past ? Then how can you make such
a self-contradictory statement? [2] Again, is there not
adverting of mind, ideation, co-ordinated application, atten-
tion, volition, anticipation, aim, concerning that which is
past? . . .
7. Of Future Ideas.
Controverted Point.—That a consciousness, having an idea
that is future, is without object.
The Commentary makes no separate comment.
[1, 2] are verbatim as in 6, 'future' substituted for ' past.
[3] Th. continues. — You admit of course concerning
what is present, that there can be adverting of mind,
ideation, and so on (6, § 2), so that consciousness of a
present idea has its mental object. And you admit that
there can be adverting of mind and the rest about the past
and also about the future. Yet in both these cases mind,
you say, is without mental object. [4] Why not also say
then that, while there can be adverting of mind, etc., about
the present, mind occupied about a present object is mind
without object ?
[5] A.—But you admit that a ' past object' does not
exist [at the present moment] ? Surely then a mind occu-
pied with past object is occupied with no (that is, with a
non-existent) object. . . .
8. Of Initial Application of Mind and its Field of
Operation}
Controverted Point. — That initial mental application
'falls' on all consciousness.
From the Commentary.—This may happen in two ways : by way
of falling on consciousness as object, and by way of association,2 as a
concomitant of the consciousness in which it operates. In the absence
of any rule3 by which we can say, that such and such a consciousness
1
Vitakka is the distinguishable sense, or nuance, in a given state
of mental activity, of a ' directing-on-to an object.' In Buddhist
psychology it is an occasional or particular, not a constant, factor of
consciousness. See Compendium, 94 f., 238 f., 282. On the rather
unusual term anupatita , cf. Dhammapada, verse 302. Burmese
translators adopt two alternative renderings of vitakkanupatita :
(a) Those things which constantly accompany the initial application
or direction of the mind; (b) those things on which this vitakk a
constantly falls. The first alternative suggests the question : Does
vitakk a operate in all consciousness? The second suggests: Does
it operate on all consciousness ? While it may operate on all con-
sciousness as its object, it does not operate in all consciousness, since
it is absent in some, as in avitakka-citta.
2
Sampayogato.
3
Niyama .
cannot become an object of initial application, we might say that the
thesis is true. But since some consciousness is brought to pass inde-
pendently of any initial application, this does not fall on (i.e., operate
in) all consciousness. [Hence the contradictory of the thesis is true.]
Those who maintain the thesis—for instance, the Uttarapathakas—
fail to draw this distinction.
[1] Th.—If that is true, you must also be prepared to
admit in detail that [other mental properties1] sustained
application, zest, pleasure, pain, gladness, melancholy,
indifference, faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration,
understanding, lust, hate . . . indiscretion fall on (or
operate in) all consciousness. - But you are not so pre-
pared. . . .
[2-4] Contrariwise, is there not concentration with sus-
tained application only, not initial application; also con-
centration wherein there is neither kind of application ?
Were not, in fact, three kinds of concentrative exercise
distinguished by the Exalted One: (1) With both modes o f
.application; (2) with the sustained mode only; (3) with
neither?2
Hence your proposition is wrong.
9. Of Sound as purely Mental,
Controverted Point.—That sound is nothing more than a
diffusion of initial and sustained mental application.
3
From the Commentary.—Because it was said, ' Applied and dis-
cursive thinking is productive of speech,'4
therefore some — for
instance, the Pubbaseliyas—hold that sounds may occur even when
cognition is proceeding without work of sense, because they consist
merely in 'thrillings' [or irradiation] of initial and sustained applica-
1
Cetasika . Cf . vii. 3.
2
Digha-Nik., iii. 219; Majjhima-Nik., iii. 162; Samyutta-Nik.,
iv. 363; Anguttara-Nik., iv. 300.
3
In other words, that sounds are psychical 'thrillings' (vipphara,
or reverberations, or vibrations).
4
Majjhima-Nik., i. 301, where it is said that speech is an activity
or co-efficient of mind, because there is first thought, then speech.
tion of mind.
1
The Theravadin submits that if sound can be so
specialized, each mental property would send forth its own peculiar
sounds. If,not, then we cannot speak of auditory cognition of a sound
that is merely a matter of intellect, and not an object of sense. But
the Word : 'Hearing a sound, an irradiation of initial application
of mind, he reveals'
2
. . . shows there is auditory consciousness also.
[1] Th.—If this be true, you must affirm no less that
sounds from mental contact are solely an irradiation of
mental contact; that such as are from feeling are solely
an irradiation of feeling. So also for such as are from
perception, volition, thought in general, mindfulness, un-
derstanding. This you will not do.
[2] Must you not also affirm of a sound that is an irra-
diation of mental application, that it is [none the less] to
be cognized by hearing, impinges on the ear, comes into
the auditory avenue? This you deny; you affirm that
such a sound is not cognizable by hearing, etc. How then
can you speak of it as sound ?
1
A phrase from Digha-Nik., iii. 104, and Anguttara-Nik., i. 170.
Digha-Nik., i. 213, in the same context, omits -vippharasaddang
sutva and uses slightly different inflexions.
2
See preceding references.
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